The starting point of and period of extinctive prescription for claims for indemnity under the former Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act

Article 15 (1) of the former Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act (amended by Act No. 4826 of Dec. 22, 1994) provides that "the Minister of Labor shall subrogate the person who received benefits to the third party within the limit of the amount of benefits, in cases where insurance benefits have been provided due to a disaster caused by a third party's act." This is merely the purport of acquiring the right to claim damages to the third party within the limit of the amount of benefits paid under the premise that the person who received benefits has the right to claim damages to the third party. Thus, the right to claim damages acquired by the Minister of Labor through the provision of the Act maintains the identity of the right to claim damages, and therefore the starting point and period

Article 15(1) of the former Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act (amended by Act No. 4826 of Dec. 22, 1994) (see current Article 54(1) of the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act), Article 766 of the Civil Act

Supreme Court Decision 79Da1668 delivered on December 26, 1979 (Gong1980, 12492) Supreme Court Decision 92Da10968 delivered on June 26, 1992 (Gong1992, 2274, modified)

Korea Workers' Compensation & Welfare Corporation

Defendant 1 and three others

Seoul District Court Decision 94Na46250 delivered on June 29, 1995

The appeal is dismissed. The costs of appeal are assessed against the plaintiff.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

Article 15 (1) of the former Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act (amended by Act No. 4826 of Dec. 22, 1994) provides that "the Minister of Labor shall subrogate the person who received benefits to the third party within the limit of the amount of benefits, in cases where insurance benefits have been provided due to a disaster caused by a third party's act (the main sentence of Article 54 (1) of the current Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act is the same purport)" (Article 54 (1) of the current Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act). This merely purports to acquire the right to claim damages within the limit of the amount of benefits paid under the premise that the person who received benefits has the right to claim damages against the third party (see Supreme Court Decision 79Da1668 of Dec. 26, 1979). The right to claim damages acquired by the Minister of Labor through the provision of the above Act maintains the identity of the right to claim damages, and as such, the starting

The Supreme Court Decision 92Da10968 Decided June 26, 1992, which has taken a different view, has decided to revise it.

According to the facts established by the court below in this case, the Minister of Labor recognized the injury suffered by the defendants while driving a taxi for business use on April 8, 1991 as occupational accident and provided the insurance benefits of this case to the above non-party. Thus, it is clear that the above non-party's damage claim against the defendants was caused by tort, barring any special circumstance, and under such premise, the court below rejected the plaintiff's claim of this case by accepting the defendants' defense that the plaintiff's damage claim against the defendants of this case claimed by the non-party for subrogation of the plaintiff in this case brought a lawsuit on May 2, 1994 at the time when the non-party suffered the injury and the perpetrator was known, unless there were special circumstances.

The Supreme Court Decision 93Da32958 delivered on January 11, 1994 regarding the extinctive prescription of the right to indemnity, which is pointed out in the ground of appeal, is related to the case where the insurer of the joint tortfeasor who has paid damages to the victim subrogated the right to indemnity against the other joint tortfeasor, and thus, it is not possible to invoke the case of this case where the damage employee subrogated the right to indemnity against the

The court below did not err in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the starting point of the statute of limitations or erroneous deliberation, as alleged in the ground of appeal. The ground of appeal cannot be accepted.

Ultimately, the appeal is dismissed, and all costs of appeal are assessed against the plaintiff who has lost. It is so decided as per Disposition by all participating Justices on the bench.

1. The grounds of appeal are with merit. The grounds of appeal are with merit. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench and all participating Justices on the bench.