The case holding that it is unlawful for a lessor to terminate a lease contract on the grounds of a lessee’s violation of the Agreement on the Prohibition of and the Timing for Occupancy in the department store, on the grounds that the lease contract is unreasonable.

The case holding that the lessor’s termination of the lease contract on the leased stores in the department store due to the lessee’s breach of the contract on the prohibition of the lessee’s temporary closure and the timing of occupancy is unlawful as it violates the definition and equity.

Articles 2, 543, and 623 of the Civil Act

Attorney Park Jae-soo, Counsel for the applicant

Grand Industrial Development Co., Ltd., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant

Seoul High Court Decision 91Na17070 delivered on December 10, 1991

The part of the judgment of the court below against the applicant shall be reversed.

The case is remanded to the Seoul High Court on this part.

The grounds of appeal by the applicant (the grounds of appeal stated in the supplementary appellate brief submitted after the lapse of the deadline for submitting the appellate brief shall be limited to the supplement of the grounds of appeal).

1. On June 12, 1984, the court below determined that the applicant leased the store of this case (46.314m2) on the Respondent's 1st floor of the Grand Island 84,060,000, and leased the store for 10 years to the non-applicant 1, and let the Respondent move the store to 4th floor on April 20, 198, and the Respondent started business directly with the Respondent 1's order from the above Respondent 1's non-applicant 1's non-applicant 1's order ordering the Respondent to move the above Respondent's location to 4th floor. The Respondent's right to request the Respondent to move to the above Respondent 1's office was rejected on the ground that the Respondent 1's order to move to the above Respondent and the Respondent 1's order to terminate the lease contract without the Respondent's consent to move to the Respondent 1's order on September 13, 1990.

2. However, as recognized by the court below, the applicant sublets the store of this case to another person, and it is clear that the applicant again received the order of this case as a result of winning the lawsuit against the respondent who was ordered the store of this case by the sub-lessee by filing a request for surrendering the order of this case. It is next to 6 years and 3 months after the conclusion of the initial lease contract. In the absence of the applicant's business operation at the store of this case, even if the applicant again was ordered to order the store of this case, it is clear that the applicant needs a considerable period of preparation to commence the business of this case in light of the actual transaction and our rule of experience.

Furthermore, when comprehensively considering the statements in Nos. 1 (Lease Contract) and No. 25 (Examination Protocol No. 25) employed by the court below as evidence, testimony of No. 3 other than the applicant for the first instance court witness, and the testimony of No. 5-3 through No. 6 (each photograph) of the lawsuit that does not reject by the court below, the leased type of business and item in the store lease contract concluded between the applicant and the respondent are precious metals. Since the respondent used the instant store as a store until the applicant again issues a new order, it can be seen that the applicant should first use the instant store as a precious metal store under the lease contract, such as new installation of display place and lighting, before the respondent displays notice of termination of the above lease contract, it is difficult for the applicant to unilaterally prepare for the commencement of the business of this case until the date of commencement of the business of this case and the date of commencement of the business of this case can be seen that the applicant did not start the business of this case until the date of commencement of the business of this case.

If so, the court below should have examined how time takes place in order to install facilities necessary for installing precious metal stores in the department stores such as the instant store. After examining how much time takes place, whether the applicant usually takes place in preparing for the commencement of the business handling precious metal, and whether the applicant has sufficiently taken into account the date designated by the respondent as the time when the applicant should commence his/her business as the time when the applicant should commence his/her business, and whether the applicant has failed to commence his/her business even after the lapse of the above period of preparation.

3. In addition, according to the evidence evidence No. 25 of the above wall No. 25 employed by the court below, the applicant requested the approval of the respondent to remove the display site which was brought to the store of this case on or around September 20, 1990, for the purpose of replacing the new display site for the reason that the display site was wrong for not meeting the precious metal store, and the applicant's approval was not made. The respondent's general chief director of the respondent company and the non-applicant 2 "it is not good for the applicant to promptly change the place of business even if it is insufficient," and the approval was not made. Further, the applicant and the respondent's 4, the non-applicant company chief of the above display site and the non-applicant company's miscellaneous director of the above display site and the summary judgment was received with the applicant's report, and the respondent's request for the removal of the goods in the department store No. 3 of this case to the applicant's department store No. 2 of this case to obtain the approval of the respondent's discretionary authority.

4. Nevertheless, the court below determined that the applicant did not review and see the preparation period necessary for the commencement of the business handling precious metals at the store of this case, and that there was no evidence to acknowledge that the respondent interfered with the applicant's preparation for the commencement of the business without rejecting evidence No. 25 of the above Category A, and accepted the respondent's assertion that the lease contract of this case was lawfully terminated by the respondent's notification of termination of the lease contract. Thus, the court below did not err by misapprehending the legal principles on the termination of the lease contract, which led to the failure to conduct a proper deliberation, or by misapprehending the rules of evidence, or by misunderstanding the facts contrary to the rules of evidence, and it is clear that such illegality has affected the judgment. Thus, there

5. Therefore, the part of the judgment of the court below against the applicant shall be reversed, and the case shall be remanded to the court below for a new trial and determination. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Yoon Jae-ho (Presiding Justice)