[1] Interpretation of an agreement between the perpetrator and the victim to pay a certain amount and give up the remainder of the claim regarding tort damages

[2] The case holding that the claim for damages equivalent to lost profit and consolation money caused by the subsequent disability is unlawful on the ground that the victim could have predicted the occurrence of the subsequent disability at the time of agreement on the compensation for damages caused by the traffic accident

[1] When the perpetrator and the victim agree to receive a certain amount of amount and waive the remainder of the claim, the damage can not be claimed again after the occurrence of the damage. However, it is difficult to accurately confirm the scope of the damage because the agreement has not yet passed after the accident, which is the cause of the damage, and it is not possible to predict the extent of the damage in light of the circumstances at the time of the agreement, and it is reasonable to view that the damage would not have been settled under the generally accepted social norms if the parties anticipated the damage due to the occurrence of the damage. As such, if the damage is significant, the intent of the parties would not be deemed to have waived the right to claim the damage, and thus, it shall be deemed that the parties can

[2] The case holding that the claim for damages equivalent to lost profit and consolation money caused by the subsequent disability is unlawful on the ground that the victim could have predicted the occurrence of the subsequent disability at the time of agreement on the compensation for damages caused by the traffic accident

[1] Articles 109, 733, and 750 of the Civil Act / [2] Articles 109, 733, and 750 of the Civil Act

[1] Supreme Court Decision 97Da423 delivered on April 11, 1997 (Gong1997Sang, 1440), Supreme Court Decision 96Da46903 delivered on August 29, 1997 (Gong1997Ha, 2851), Supreme Court Decision 99Da7046 delivered on June 22, 199 (Gong199Ha, 1475)

Plaintiff 1 and four others

Dongbu Fire Marine Insurance Co., Ltd. (Attorneys Lee Ho-ho et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Seoul District Court Decision 98Na38325 delivered on June 4, 1999

The part of the lower judgment against the Defendant against Plaintiff 1 is reversed, and that part of the case is remanded to the Seoul District Court Panel Division. All appeals against Plaintiffs 2, 3, 4, and 5 are dismissed. The costs of appeal against the dismissed appeal are assessed against the Defendant.

1. The grounds of appeal against the plaintiff 1 are examined.

A. According to the reasoning of the lower judgment and the reasoning of the first instance judgment cited by the lower court, the lower court acknowledged the following facts: (a) comprehensively based on the evidence adopted by the Defendant who acquired the insurance of the instant vehicle involved in the instant traffic accident on June 15, 1994, the Plaintiff 1 received KRW 1,650,000 from the Defendant who acquired the insurance of the instant vehicle involved in the instant accident, and agreed to not file a civil or criminal lawsuit or objection in the future while giving up the claim for damages arising from the instant traffic accident; and (b) on the grounds that the said agreement concerns Plaintiff 1’s medical expenses and consolation money, it is reasonable to deem that the said agreement concerns Plaintiff 1’s medical expenses and consolation money, and that it cannot be deemed that Plaintiff 1 gave up the right to claim damages, the lower court rejected the Defendant’s defense

B. As to damages caused by tort, when the perpetrator and the victim agreed to receive a certain amount of amount and to waive the remainder of the claim, the damages cannot be claimed again after the occurrence of the above amount of damages. However, as long as the agreement was caused after the accident, which is the cause of the damages, it is difficult to accurately confirm the scope of the damages. As such, it is reasonable to deem that the damage was unexpected in light of the circumstances at the time of the agreement, and it is reasonable to view that if the parties anticipated the damage after delay, the parties would not have reached a settlement in terms of social norms if it was gross, it cannot be deemed that the parties would have waived their right to claim the damages, and thus, the parties can claim the damages again.

However, it is difficult to readily conclude that the agreement of this case was related to Plaintiff 1’s medical expenses and consolation money. Rather, considering the evidence admitted by the court below on April 3, 1994, Plaintiff 1 was diagnosed as having suffered injury to the left-hand spons, the left-hand spons and the left-hand spons, and the brain spons, which require two weeks’ treatment immediately after the traffic accident of this case. On April 17 of this year, Plaintiff 1 was diagnosed as having suffered injury to the brain spons and the left-hand spons and the left-hand spons, and was diagnosed as having suffered injury to the plaintiff 1’s physical disability at the time of this case’s accident, and the agreement was not reached on June 15 of this year after the date of this case’s accident, and it could not be seen that the agreement was not reached after the plaintiff 1’s injury to the plaintiff 1’s physical disability at the time of the accident. According to the results of the judgment of the first instance, the plaintiff 1’s spick workers.

Thus, the agreement of this case also has its effect on the damage caused by the plaintiff 1's aftermath disability. Thus, the plaintiff 1's lawsuit of this case seeking damages equivalent to the lost profit and consolation money on the ground that the damage was caused more than the damages caused by the agreement of this case due to the aftermath disability is brought against the above part of the lawsuit, and it is unlawful as there is no benefit of protection of rights.

Nevertheless, the court below rejected the defendant's main defense and further decided on the merits on the grounds as stated in its reasoning shall not be deemed to have erred by misapprehending the facts against the rules of evidence or by misapprehending the legal principles on the validity of the agreement on compensation for damages, which affected the conclusion of the judgment. The part pointing this out in the grounds of appeal is with merit.

2. Although the Defendant filed an appeal against Plaintiffs 2, 3, 4, and 5, it did not state any of the grounds of appeal against the above Plaintiffs in the appellate brief, and did not submit a separate appellate brief. The appellate brief does not state any of the grounds of appeal in the appellate brief.

3. Therefore, without further proceeding to decide on the remaining grounds of appeal, the judgment of the court below is reversed, and this part of the case is remanded to the court below for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. The remaining appeals against the plaintiffs are all dismissed, and the costs of appeal as to the dismissal of appeal are assessed against the appellant. It is so decided as per Disposition with the assent of all participating Justices who reviewed the appeal.

Justices Lee Yong-woo (Presiding Justice)