2013 Doz. 54447 Damage, Claim

Attached 1. It is as listed in the Plaintiff List.

Korea

oly 10, 2015

November 13, 2015

1. The plaintiff A, B, and C shall be dismissed respectively.

2. Each of the plaintiffs' claims except the plaintiffs A, B, and C is dismissed.

3. Of the costs of lawsuit, the portion arising between the plaintiff B, C and the defendant shall be borne by Law Firm D, and the remainder shall be borne by the plaintiffs other than the plaintiff B and C.

The defendant shall pay to the plaintiffs the amount of money stated in the "claim" column in attached Form 2. The defendant shall pay 5% interest per annum from March 14, 1979 to the delivery date of a copy of the complaint of this case, and 20% interest per annum from the next day to the day of complete payment.

1. Basic facts

A. Investigation and judgment on the plaintiffs related to emergency measures

1) Plaintiffs E, A, F, G and network H (hereinafter referred to as “the Plaintiffs related to emergency measures”) were arrested on charges of violating the Presidential Emergency Measures (hereinafter referred to as “Emergency Measures No. 9”) for the national security issued pursuant to Article 53 of the former Constitution of the Republic of Korea (wholly amended by Act No. 9 of October 27, 1980; hereinafter referred to as “former Constitution”) and the protection of public order.

2) The plaintiffs E, A, G, and net H (hereinafter referred to as "the plaintiffs of the crime of oil") were indicted for detention and sentenced to a conviction, and the above judgment became final and conclusive. The plaintiff F was convicted at the first instance court after the defendant was prosecuted, but the judgment was final and conclusive at the appellate court upon receiving a judgment of acquittal due to the cancellation of Emergency Measure No. 9.

3) The facts charged against the plaintiffs related to emergency measures are as listed in attached Form 3. The investigation, trial, and detention are as listed in attached Form 4.

(b) Re-adjudication and criminal compensation;

1) The Plaintiffs (Plaintiff 1, an son in the case of the network H) filed a request for a retrial on the final judgment of conviction, and the court rendered a final judgment of conviction on the grounds that the Emergency Measure No.9 was unconstitutional or invalid from the beginning to the beginning, and thus the Defendant’s case constitutes a crime, and thus, the judgment became final and conclusive around that time.

2) The Plaintiffs guilty (in the case of the network H, Plaintiff J, K, L, M, N, I,O, P, and Plaintiff F, the inheritor of the deceased, were determined to pay criminal compensation by claiming criminal compensation.

3) Details of the new judgment and the decision on criminal compensation are as shown in attached Form 4. The Plaintiffs’ relationship.

The rest of the plaintiffs except the plaintiffs related to emergency measures shall be the family members of the plaintiffs related to emergency measures.

As a family relationship, the family relationship is listed in attached Form 2.

[Ground of recognition] Facts without dispute, Gap 1 through 12, and 15 items of evidence (including tentative numbers; hereinafter the same shall apply) and the purport of the whole pleadings

2. The plaintiffs' assertion

A. Emergency Decree No. 9 was issued in order to publicly announce the long-term power and to suppress the opposite power of the Constitution, and is unconstitutional measures that seriously violate the fundamental rights of the people, such as warrant requirement under the Constitution, freedom of expression, etc. Therefore, the enactment and issuance of the presidential emergency measures constitutes illegal duties.

B. Based on the Emergency Measure No. 9, an investigative agency to which the Defendant belongs has arrested and detained the Plaintiffs related to the emergency measures without a warrant, and subsequently prosecuted them. In addition, the court rendered a judgment of conviction against the Plaintiffs related to the emergency measures by applying Emergency Measure No. 9. Since Emergency Measure No. 9 is unconstitutional and invalid, the investigation by an investigative agency and the trial by a judge constitutes an unlawful act.

C. In the process of arresting a person suspected of violating Emergency Decree No. 9, the Plaintiffs were not informed of the right to reply and the right to appoint a defense counsel, and were not notified of his/her family members. In addition, the Plaintiffs were detained for more than the period of detention under the Criminal Procedure Act.

D. The Plaintiffs related to emergency measures were continuously subject to inspection and surveillance by the investigator affiliated with the Defendant even after they were released.

E. The plaintiffs suffered emotional distress due to the tort committed by public officials belonging to the above defendant, and the plaintiffs related to emergency measures suffered property damage that could not obtain income during the period of detention. Accordingly, the defendant shall compensate for the plaintiffs' own damages or inherited damages as stated in attached Form 2.

3. Determination on this safety defense

A. Defenses relating to the power of attorney

1) The defendant's assertion

The plaintiffs' attorney did not have the power of attorney due to the plaintiffs' lawful delegation of litigation from the plaintiffs.

2) Determination

The plaintiffs' attorney's name is written in the same text, and a seal is affixed to the so-called "abdominance book". However, the plaintiffs' attorney submitted a certificate of the plaintiffs' personal seal impression or a copy of the passport except the plaintiffs B, C, and the plaintiffs E, F, and G attended the court and responded to the party's personal examination. According to this, the plaintiffs' attorney's attorney is recognized to have been duly granted the right of attorney from the other plaintiffs except the plaintiffs B and C.

However, the plaintiffs' legal representative fails to submit materials to confirm that he/she was delegated with the lawsuit by the plaintiffs B and C until now (the plaintiffs' legal representative withdraws the lawsuit by the plaintiffs B and C, but the defendant did not consent thereto). Thus, it is insufficient to recognize the fact that the plaintiff B and C granted the plaintiffs' legal representative authority to the plaintiffs' legal representative.

Therefore, the lawsuit filed by the Plaintiffs’ legal representative without representation in the Plaintiff B and C’s name is unlawful.

(b) Defenses related to the Democratization Compensation Act;

1) The defendant's assertion

The plaintiff A received compensation under the Act on the Restoration of Honor of and Compensation to Persons Related to Democratization Movement (hereinafter referred to as the "Act on the Compensation for Democratization Movement") and the judicial compromise has been established in respect of all the damage incurred in relation to democratization movements by the plaintiff A's consent in the decision to pay compensation, etc. pursuant to Article 18 (2) of the same Act. Thus, the plaintiff A's lawsuit is unlawful.

2) Determination

A) When comprehensively taking into account the legislative purport of the Democratization Compensation Act, the legislative purpose of Article 2 subparags. 1 and 2(d), Articles 10(1), 14(1), and 18(2) of the same Act, Article 20 subparag. 3 of the Enforcement Decree of the Democratization Compensation Act (attached Form 10), together with the consent prepared and submitted by the applicant, and the details of the written claim, where an applicant consents to a decision on the payment of compensation, medical allowances, living allowances (hereinafter referred to as "compensation, etc.") in addition to the contents of the written claim, the legislative purpose of Article 18(2) of the Democratization Compensation Act is to promptly terminate and implement it through the procedure of the decision on the payment of compensation, such as compensation, etc., of the person related to the democratization movement and the Compensation Deliberation Committee (hereinafter referred to as "Compensation Deliberation Committee"), and when an applicant consents to the decision on the payment of compensation, etc., the same effect as the settlement under the Civil Procedure Act becomes effective as 2015.

B) According to the results of fact-finding and the overall purport of the arguments on the Compensation Review Committee of this Court, it is recognized that Plaintiff A was determined to recognize persons related to democratization movements and was determined to pay living allowances by the Compensation Review Committee in relation to the above final judgment of conviction, and that Plaintiff A consented to the above decision on November 12, 2008 and received living allowances of KRW 11,053,780.

Therefore, since the damage incurred by the plaintiff A in relation to the violation of Emergency Measure No. 9 has the same effect as a judicial compromise, the plaintiff A's lawsuit is unlawful because there is no benefit in protecting the rights.

4. Determination as to the plaintiffs except the plaintiffs A, B, and C (hereinafter referred to as "the plaintiffs").

A. In regard to the assertion of a tort caused by the enactment and issuance of an emergency measure, Article 9 of the Emergency Measures Act does not only lack the requirements per se stipulated in Article 53 of the Postal Constitution, which serves as the basis for the issuance, but also infringes on the fundamental rights of the people by seriously restricting the freedom of expression, warrant requirement and physical freedom, residence, right to petition, and academic freedom as stipulated in the current Constitution (see, e.g., Supreme Court en banc Order 2011Hu689, Apr. 18, 2013).

However, even if Emergency Measure No. 9 was subsequently declared unconstitutional or null and void by a court, the exercise of the presidential emergency measures based on the new constitution is a highly political act with high level of political nature, and the President, in principle, assumes political responsibility in relation to the exercise of the national emergency measures, and does not have a legal obligation in response to the individual rights of the people. Thus, it cannot be deemed that the exercise of such power by the President constitutes a civil tort in relation to each citizen (see Supreme Court Decision 2015Da48824, Mar. 26, 201).

Therefore, since the act of enacting and issuing the Presidential Emergency Decree No. 9 itself does not constitute a tort by a public official's intentional or negligent act under Article 2 (1) of the State Compensation Act, the prior plaintiffs' assertion cannot be accepted on a different premise.

B. As to the assertion of tort due to investigation and trial by emergency measures

1) Relevant legal principles

Where a penal law has retroactively lost its effect due to a decision of unconstitutionality by the Constitutional Court, or a court has declared unconstitutional or null and void, a public prosecution has been initiated and a conviction has been pronounced on the basis of the relevant law, even if such circumstance alone does not constitute a tort by a public official’s intentional or negligent act.

Even if Emergency Measure No. 9 was unconstitutional and invalid, the act of judicial duties of a judge who was convicted of having conducted an investigation by arresting and detaining a suspect without a warrant pursuant to Emergency Measure No. 9, which was in force at the time, and applying Emergency Measure No. 9, is stipulated that “the act of judicial duties of an investigative agency instituting a prosecution or by applying Emergency Measure No. 9” is not subject to judicial review, and that Emergency Measure No. 9 was not declared unconstitutional and invalid, it is difficult to view that it constitutes a tort by a public official’s intentional or negligent act, unless it was declared that Emergency Measure No. 9 is unconstitutional and invalid.

However, if the judgment of innocence becomes final and conclusive on the conviction of a violation of Emergency Measure No. 9 in the retrial procedure, the defendant or his/her heir can claim criminal compensation under the Criminal Compensation and Restoration of Honor Act under certain conditions and receive due compensation for the damage.

On the other hand, in a case where a public prosecution was filed based on evidence collected by a State agency in the course of investigation and a final judgment of conviction was made, but the case under the latter part of Article 325 of the Criminal Procedure Act is "when there is no proof of criminal facts" and thus the judgment of innocence was finalized, the State's liability for damages caused by the reinstatement, etc. can be

However, in a case where a judgment of innocence was finalized by the former part of Article 325 of the Criminal Procedure Act on the grounds that the Emergency Measure No. 9, which was applied to the defendant in the retrial proceedings against the conviction of a violation of Emergency Measure No. 9, was unconstitutional or invalid, it cannot be deemed that the State agency’s unlawful act committed during the investigation process, barring any other special circumstances. Therefore, solely on the grounds that the judgment of innocence was finalized, the reinstatement, etc. caused by the judgment of innocence cannot be deemed immediately deemed as a tort of the State, and it cannot be deemed as a damage caused by the State’s unlawful act committed by the State

In this case, it is necessary to separately examine whether there is a causal relationship between the illegal act committed in the course of investigation and the conviction, and accordingly determine whether to recognize the State's liability for damages against the reed crime by the conviction judgment.

Therefore, in full view of the contents of the facts constituting an offense charged, the existence of evidence to acknowledge a guilty, the grounds for the commencement of a retrial, the reasons for the decision, the circumstances leading up to the person involved in the case, including the parties, to having received a judgment of innocence, and the reasons therefor, if there was no reason for innocence under the former part of Article 325 of the Criminal Procedure Act, such as the unconstitutionality and invalidation of Emergency Measure No. 9, and there was a high probability of having been a reason for innocence under the latter part of Article 325 of the Criminal Procedure Act, a causal link between the offense committed in the course of investigation and the conviction, and accordingly, the State’s liability for damages can be recognized for a return of conviction by conviction (see Supreme Court Decision 2013Da2

2) Determination on the instant case

A) In light of the above legal principles, the act of judicial duties of a judge who was convicted by the application of the Emergency Measure No. 9, which was in force at the time, arrested and detained the plaintiffs related to the Emergency Measure No. 9, and conducted an investigation without a warrant and prosecuted the defendant, or by applying the Emergency Measure No. 9, which was in force at the time, cannot be deemed to constitute a tort by a public official’s intentional or negligent act, committed pursuant to Article 325 of the Criminal Procedure Act on the ground that the Emergency Measure No. 9, which was applicable to the plaintiffs related to the Emergency Measure No. 9, was unconstitutional or invalid during the review procedure for the judgment subject to a retrial, cannot be deemed to be a case where a judgment of innocence was rendered by a State agency’s illegal act during the investigation process, barring any special circumstance. Thus, the return of the judgment upon conviction cannot be deemed to constitute a tort of the State immediately, and it cannot be deemed that the damage caused by such failure, etc. was caused by an illegal act of a State

B) Furthermore, we examine whether there was high probability proof as to the existence of a cause of innocence under the latter part of Article 325 of the Criminal Procedure Act if there was no cause of innocence under the former part of Article 325 of the Criminal Procedure Act, such as the unconstitutionality and invalidation of Emergency Measure

(1) In the case of Plaintiff E

In light of the following circumstances, it is difficult to view that there was a high probability proof as to the existence of the grounds for innocence under the latter part of Article 325 of the Criminal Procedure Act, in light of the following circumstances: (a) the statement of evidence Nos. 6, 16, and 17; (b) the result of the personal examination of Plaintiffs E; and (c) the result of the commission to send

(A) Grounds for a decision on commencing a new trial and a judgment on new judgment

The reason for the decision to commence a new trial on the conviction judgment rendered by Plaintiff E is that Emergency Measure No. 9 is unconstitutional and invalid, and it is not because public officials involved in the investigation conducted harsh acts, such as adviser and violence, or committed a crime relating to their duties during the investigation process. In the new trial procedure, the judgment of innocence was rendered pursuant to the former part of Article 325 of the Criminal Procedure Act on the ground that Emergency Measure No. 9 was unconstitutional and invalid. The existence of factual relations as stated in the facts charged or

① Evidence of conviction against Plaintiff E is as follows:

A. The facts charged: (a) the student’s demonstration in Q within the passenger car, claiming the removal of the new constitution, and thus, the abolition of the Constitution and the student’s demonstration act is publicly disseminated): Plaintiff E’s legal statement and the statement of the suspect interrogation protocol prepared by the prosecutor;

○ The latter part of paragraph (a) of the facts charged (referring to Q in the car, thereby vaining vain that students’ demonstration will arise): The plaintiff E’s legal statement and the statement of the suspect interrogation protocol prepared by the prosecutor.

B. Paragraph B. (B.) of the charge: (a) the statement of the Plaintiff E’s legal statement and the protocol of interrogation of the public prosecutor’s protocol; (b) the part of the Co-Defendant R’s legal statement and the protocol of interrogation of the public prosecutor’s protocol are written; (c) the content of the above report was confirmed in the Japanese newspaper; and (d) the content of the above report was confirmed in the S media Seoul branch; and (d)

② Plaintiff E, who appointed a private defense counsel and received a judgment, acknowledged the facts charged at the court of first instance: Provided, That Plaintiff E, not a passenger car bill on the day, but a student’s demonstration was reported to the Japanese newspaper. The facts charged in the above facts charged are confirmed together with R, but there was no fact that R made it known to R, but there was no fact that R was recommended to do so (24,25 pages as a result of the request to send documents to Seoul Northern District Public Prosecutor’s Office). In addition, Plaintiff E’s attorney did not deny the facts charged without denying the fact relevance, and the facts charged in the above facts charged were not a crime as an exercise of the right to know under the Constitution. Plaintiff E appealed appealed the judgment of the court of first instance and did not dispute with the facts charged (60 pages as a result of the commission to send documents). However, Plaintiff E did not dispute the facts charged at the court of first instance, but did not dispute the facts charged at the court of first instance.

③ Plaintiff E argued to the effect that the facts suspected of having known R of the scheduled fact of the student demonstration at the time of the second investigation by the police could not constitute a will or dissemination (the commission of the delivery of the above document). Moreover, Plaintiff E denied the above facts charged at the time, and if it denies the possibility of leakage to Q Q from the police, the fact of suspicion was denied (285 pages as a result of the commission of the delivery of the above document) and the prosecutor’s office accepted the above facts charged (342 pages as a result of the commission of the delivery of the document). In addition, Plaintiff E denied the suspected facts of having known R of the scheduled fact of the student demonstration at the time of the investigation (342 pages). On the other hand, it is difficult to view that Plaintiff E was a voluntary confession from the prosecutor’s office in light of the following circumstances: (i) the above facts of conviction, and all of the facts of suspicion of temporary confession (342,3444 pages as a result of the delivery of the documents) at the time of investigation.

(3) In light of the above circumstances, Plaintiff E’s act as described in the facts charged can be deemed as having been committed.

C) Whether it can be assessed against a violation of Emergency Decree No. 9

(1) The same statement as written in the facts charged contains the content that can be interpreted as contrary to the Emergency Decree No. 9, which was in force at the time.

② As to the facts charged as to ① the point of view, Plaintiff E was able to hear the horses of Plaintiff E and the horses were disseminated, since Plaintiff E was able to hear the same contents as the facts charged (39 pages as a result of commission for delivery of documents) from Q on the back-side edge of a passenger car driven by U.S.

③ In relation to the facts charged as above, Plaintiff E stated that the student’s demonstration was published in the Japanese newspaper to the R, who is employed as the Director General of the National Human Rights Office of Vparty, and confirmed it together. As such, Plaintiff E could have disseminated the demonstration, and in fact, R disseminated it to the Director General of the International Bureau of the Political Party on the same day.

④ Therefore, Plaintiff E’s act in the facts charged can be evaluated as publicly spreading the students’ act of demonstration and spreading a will, by publicly alleging the abolition of the Constitution and the student’s act of demonstration, which was enforced at the time of the emergency measure.

(2) In the case of Plaintiff A, F, G and net H

In light of the following circumstances acknowledged by the respective descriptions of Gap 7 through 10, the results of each personal examination of plaintiffs F and G, and the purport of all pleadings, it is difficult to deem that there was a high probability proof as to the existence of a ground for innocence under the latter part of Article 325 of the Criminal Procedure Act. The grounds for determining a new trial decision and a new trial decision

The grounds for the decision to commence a retrial on the final judgment of conviction against Plaintiff A, G, and the deceased H are merely unconstitutional and invalid, but it is not because public officials involved in the investigation conducted harsh acts such as adviser and assault during the investigation process or committed a crime related to their duties. The judgment of innocence was rendered in accordance with the former part of Article 325 of the Criminal Procedure Act on the grounds that the Emergency Measure No. 9 was unconstitutional and void.

① The evidence of conviction against the Plaintiff A is “Plaintiff A’s legal statement, entry of the protocol of interrogation of a police officer prepared by the military prosecutor and police officer prepared by the military law, and the presence of five seized posters.” The Plaintiff A acknowledged facts, such as the act of posting a poster as indicated in the facts charged, from the investigative agency to the court. The poster recorded in the facts charged was seized, and there is no circumstance to deem the seizure procedure unlawful.

② The evidence of conviction against the Plaintiff F is “Plaintiff F’s partial statement, witness W, and X’s statutory testimony.” The written evidence evidence No. 19 alone is insufficient to deny the admissibility and probative value of the testimony made by WW and X from Plaintiff F as the facts charged.

The evidence of conviction against the plaintiff G is the "statement of the plaintiff G's court statement, the statement of the interrogation protocol prepared by the prosecutor, and the statement of the statement prepared by the judicial police officer against the other party to the statement." The plaintiff G appoints a private defense counsel and received the judgment, and recognized the facts charged in the court of first instance.

The evidence of guilt against the network H is “the statement of the deceased H’s partial statement, the statement of the suspect interrogation protocol prepared by the prosecutor, the part of the co-defendant, who is the other party to the distribution of representations, the statement of the suspect interrogation protocol prepared by the prosecutor, the statement of the suspect interrogation protocol prepared by the prosecutor, and the present presence of the seized evidence No. 1 (Y). The network H was disputing some of the facts charged in the court of first instance, and the reasons for appeal were not accepted, but all of them were not accepted. The network H and co-defendant recognized some of the facts charged, the representations recorded in the facts charged were seized, and there was no circumstance to deem the seizure procedure unlawful.

⑤ In light of the aforementioned circumstances, it is recognized that Plaintiff A, F, and G were engaged in the same conduct as described in the facts charged. Whether it is possible to assess the violation of Article 9 of the Emergency Measures against the State.

The statements and representations, such as the statements in the facts charged against Plaintiff A, F, G, and deceased H, can be interpreted as going against the Emergency Decree No. 9, which was in force at the time. It contains contents that can be interpreted as going against the Emergency Decree No. 9. The process of arrest, detention, investigation, and trial, and individual tort claims that occurred during the process of trial, even if there were individual tort as alleged by the Plaintiffs in the above 2.C., the Plaintiffs’ damages claim against the State for monetary payment is a right against the State for monetary payment, and if it is not exercised for five years from the date of the unlawful act pursuant to the former Budget and Accounts Act (repealed by Article 2 of the Addenda to the National Finance Act, Act No. 8050, Oct. 4, 2006). However, the instant lawsuit was filed on September 17, 2013 when 33 or more years have elapsed since the release of the Plaintiffs related to the Emergency Decree No. 1977 or around September 17, 2013.

2) The plaintiffs asserted that the defendant's defense of extinctive prescription is not allowed as abuse of rights.

On the other hand, the exercise of the right of defense based on the extinctive prescription is subject to the control of the principle of good faith and the prohibition of abuse of rights, which are the major principles of our Civil Act. As such, where there are special circumstances, such as the obligor’s exercise of rights or the interruption of prescription prior to the completion of prescription, the obligor’s act of making it impossible or considerably difficult for the obligee to exercise his rights or the interruption of prescription, the obligee’s act of making such measures unnecessary, or there exist grounds for objectively obstructing the obligee from exercising his rights, or the obligor’s act of not using the statute of limitations after the completion of prescription, or where there exist such special circumstances as making the obligee trust, the need to protect the obligee, and where other creditors of the same conditions receive the repayment of the obligation, etc., the obligor’s refusal of the performance may not be allowed as an abuse of rights against the principle of good faith (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2012Da37565, Mar.

However, solely on the grounds that the state is obligated to protect the people, the State’s assertion of the completion of extinctive prescription itself does not constitute abuse of rights against the principle of good faith (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2004Da33469, May 29, 2008).

However, in light of the following circumstances, it is insufficient to recognize that the defendant made it impossible or considerably difficult to exercise the plaintiffs' right to claim damages or made such a speech or behavior to believe that such measures are unnecessary, or that there was a considerable reason to believe that the plaintiffs cannot exercise their right to claim damages, or that there was a considerable reason to believe that the plaintiffs cannot exercise their right to claim damages, or that the defendant had expressed the same attitude as not giving up the benefit of prescription or not giving rise to the statute of limitations. Therefore, the defendant's assertion on the completion of the statute of limitations cannot be viewed as an abuse of rights against the principle of good faith. The

① Prohibition of suspicion by an investigative agency or interview by defense counsel and their family members is unlawful regardless of the unconstitutionality of Emergency Measure No. 9. Thus, the Plaintiffs were entitled to seek damages due to a harsh act by an investigative agency, etc. without waiting the Supreme Court or the Constitutional Court’s decision as to the unconstitutionality of Emergency Measure No. 9. Therefore, it is difficult to deem that the tort in this part constitutes a case where damages can be paid only through a retrial procedure.

② The Plaintiffs filed the instant lawsuit after the lapse of 33 years after the detention status was terminated, even though they had been aware of the aforementioned tort from around that time.

3) Ultimately, the Plaintiffs’ assertion seeking damages for tort damages cannot be accepted.

D. As to the assertion of tort caused by inspection and surveillance after release, even if inspection and surveillance were conducted against the Plaintiffs or their families related to emergency measures, as seen in the foregoing Section C, the claim for damages arising from inspection and surveillance also expired by prescription. Ultimately, the Plaintiffs’ assertion on this part cannot be accepted.

5. Conclusion

If so, the lawsuits of plaintiffs A, B, and C are unlawful and dismissed, and the remaining plaintiffs' claims are without merit, and they are dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition.

The presiding judge, junior judge, and senior judge

Judges Park Jae-young

Judges, Senior Superintendent-General

1) Each provision of subparagraph 9 of the Emergency Measures applied to the Plaintiffs related to the Emergency Measures is as follows:

(1) No person shall engage in the following activities:

(a) Making or spreading a will or spreading a fact distorted;

(b) The Republic of Korea by means of public radio waves, such as assemblies, demonstrations, newspapers, broadcasting, communications, documents, drawings, sound records, etc.;

An act of denying, opposing, diving, or slandering the Constitution, or of asserting, filing, instigating, or publicizing the amendment or abolition thereof.

(c) classes, studies or the prior permission of the principal conducted under the guidance and supervision of the school authorities, or other courtesy non-politicals;

assembly, demonstration, or political intervention of a student, except for the activities of the

(d) openly slandering this measure;

The public dissemination of any content in violation of paragraph 1 by means of broadcasting, news, or other means, or the production, distribution, and display of any content thereof.

An act of selling, possessing, or displaying shall be prohibited.

(7) Any person who violates this measure or the measures of the competent Minister pursuant thereto shall be punished by imprisonment for a limited term of not less than one year.

The same shall also apply to a person who has committed, prepared or conspired to suspend qualifications for not more than a year. The same shall also apply to such person.

A person who violates this measure or the measures of the competent Minister under this Act shall be arrested, detained, seized or searched without a judge's warrant.

the corporation.