[1] The meaning and the method of proving the "suspect" as stipulated in the automobile insurance clause

[2] The case holding that in case where a person who prevented the departure of a vehicle from the departure is forced to drive a vehicle 40 meters away on the Bosn unit and thereby was injured on the road by harming the person, it constitutes an exemption from liability under the terms and conditions of the insurance contract, on the ground that there was an willful negligence on the driver as to the occurrence of the result of the injury, and thus, there was an intention on the part of the driver

[1] Article 659 (1) of the Commercial Act / [2] Article 659 (1) of the Commercial Act

[1] [2] Supreme Court Decision 2000Da67020 decided Mar. 9, 2001 (Gong2001Sang, 847) / [1] Supreme Court Decision 2003Da26075 decided Aug. 20, 2004 (Gong2004Ha, 1574)

Plaintiff (Law Firm Ha, Attorneys Lee Dong-chul, Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Hyundai Marine Fire Insurance Co., Ltd. (Law Firm Dongdong, Attorneys Kim Woo-hee et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Busan High Court Decision 2009Na7731 Decided September 8, 2009

The appeal is dismissed. The costs of appeal are assessed against the plaintiff.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

The intention stipulated in the terms and conditions of automobile insurance refers to the psychological condition of the automobile insurance with the knowledge that the occurrence of a certain result is caused by the act of the automobile insurance, and this refers to not only the conclusive intention but also the willful negligence. In addition, in a case where there is no direct evidence to acknowledge it, the intent of the automobile insurance, such as the intentional intent, is bound to be proved by the method of proving indirect facts having considerable relevance with the intention given the nature of the object, and what constitutes indirect facts having considerable relevance, should be reasonably determined in accordance with logical and empirical rules (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2000Da67020, Mar. 9, 2001).

According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below acknowledged the following facts based on the adopted evidence: (a) the drunk Plaintiff obstructed the car driving on the top of the passenger car set, and (b) the Co-Defendant 2 of the first instance trial 44 meters away on the passenger car set side, and (c) caused the Plaintiff to suffer serious injury of 44% of permanent disability, 26% of brain damage permanently, 58% of the multiple disability rate due to brain damage, etc. due to brain damage, etc.

Furthermore, the court below rejected the decision of the court below on the following grounds: (a) it appears that the Co-Defendant 2 of the first instance court at the time of the accident indicated the intention of refusal in the manner that it would have been very highly highly rapidly satised in the Plaintiff’s behavior, which would prevent the departure of the Plaintiff from getting off the car satn, even though he had expressed his intention of refusal; (b) it could not be concluded that the Co-Defendant 2 of the first instance court could not be concluded that some of the Plaintiff would have actively expressed his intention to inflict injury by cutting off the Plaintiff on the car satn; and (c) it could not be determined that the Plaintiff could have suffered injury due to the Plaintiff’s intentional injury or injury caused by the Plaintiff’s act as a result of this case’s insurance contract by allowing the Plaintiff’s exemption at least from the insurance contract, on the ground that the Plaintiff could have suffered injury due to the Plaintiff’s intentional injury as a result of this case’s act.

In light of the above legal principles and records, the above fact-finding and judgment of the court below are just and acceptable, and there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the intention of the terms of exemption.

The Supreme Court Decision 2006Da39898 Decided October 26, 2007, which is invoked in the ground of appeal by the plaintiff, is not a general road but a plant near the death of a construction site where the victim was faced with the steel H beam of the construction site, and is not a plant near the death. Thus, the judgment of the court below cannot be deemed to have judged in conflict with the Supreme Court precedents.

Therefore, the appeal is dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Min Il-young (Presiding Justice)