[1] In the event of environmental pollution or environmental damage, whether the causing person shall compensate for the damage even if there is no cause attributable to him/her pursuant to Article 44(1) of the Framework Act on Environmental Policy (affirmative), and whether the burden of proof as to the causal relation is allocated in a lawsuit claiming compensation

[2] The probative value of the appraiser's appraisal result and the determination of fact-finding or ratio on the grounds for mitigation of liability in a claim for damages caused by tort is whether the fact-finding court's discretionary power (affirmative in principle

[3] In a case where a legal representative is separately authorized to file an appeal, whether the legal representative may revise the defects not attached to the written appeal (affirmative in principle), and whether the presiding judge of the court below may order the legal representative to correct the stamps (affirmative in principle)

[4] The case holding that in a case where Gap et al., who operates flower farmers in the vicinity of the horse park, claimed that the salt spreaded to prevent the ice ice of sand flows into a farm source through underground water and that Gap et al. al. al. had deadly damaged, and claimed damages against the Korean Racing Association, the liability for damages is recognized in accordance with Article 44(1) of the Framework Act on Environmental Policy

[1] Article 44(1) of the Framework Act on Environmental Policy provides that “In cases where any environmental pollution or environmental damage has occurred, the person who has caused such environmental pollution or environmental damage shall compensate for such damage.” This is a special provision for tort under the Civil Act, which provides that the victim of the environmental pollution or environmental damage may claim damages to the person who has caused such environmental pollution or environmental damage. Therefore, when any environmental pollution or environmental damage has occurred, the person who caused such environmental pollution or environmental damage shall compensate for such damage even if there is no cause attributable to such damage pursuant to Article 44(1) of

In general, in a claim for damages due to a tort, the perpetrator bears the burden of proving the causal relationship between the perpetrator’s harmful act, the victim’s loss, the harmful act, and the victim’s loss. However, in a claim for damages due to air pollution or water pollution, requiring the victim to prove a scientificly strict causal relationship with respect to the existence of the factual causal relationship may result in the refusal of judicial relief due to high seas. On the other hand, since there are many technical and economic cases where the perpetrator is much more easy to investigate the cause of the damage than the victim, and there is a concern that the perpetrator may conceal the cause of the damage. Thus, the causal relationship between the harmful act and the victim may be acknowledged unless the perpetrator proves that the perpetrator discharged any harmful material and caused the damage by reaching the damaged article. However, in this case, at least, the perpetrator discharges any harmful material, that the degree of harm exceeds the permissible limit under the social norms, that it reached the damaged article, and that the victim still bears the burden of proving the fact that the damage was incurred.

[2] The appraiser's appraisal result shall be respected unless there exist significant errors, such as the appraisal method, etc. is contrary to the rule of experience or unreasonable.

Even in cases where damage occurs or has been expanded by competition between harmful acts and the victim's causes, if compensating the perpetrator for the whole damage is contrary to the principle of fairness, the court shall set the amount of compensation and apply the principle of comparative negligence to the victim's factors that contributed to the occurrence or expansion of the damage by analogical application of the principle of comparative negligence. Determination of fact-finding or ratio on the grounds for mitigation of liability in a claim for damages by tort falls under the exclusive authority of the fact-finding court unless it is deemed significantly unreasonable in light of the principle of equity.

[3] The scope of the power of attorney is, in principle, limited to the pertinent instance, but if an attorney has been separately authorized to file an appeal, he/she is obligated to submit a written appeal, barring any special circumstances. Therefore, if there is any defect that does not attach a stamp in the written appeal, the attorney may correct it, and the presiding judge of the lower court may also order the attorney to correct the stamp.

[4] The case holding that in case where Gap et al., running the horse park near the horse park, claimed that the salt distributed to prevent the ice of sand flow into the farm through underground water, and sought damages against the Korean Racing Association, claiming that Gap et al. had deadly damaged pots and flowers cultivated by Gap et al., the case held that the Korean Racing Association is liable to compensate for damages in accordance with Article 4(1) of the Framework Act on Environmental Policy, in light of the fact that since the concentration of salt emitted by Gap et al, et al., flowing into the ground and flow into underground water in order to prevent sand ice from iceing into the racing, and that the concentration of salt emitted by Gap et al. flow into the surrounding river after the passage of a large quantity of salt flow into the river near the horse park is above the water quality standard for agricultural water water quality or its close value, it would have affected the increase in the concentration of salt ion concentration used by Gap et al., according to the Environmental Management Corporation's investigation, etc., it is presumed that the Korean Racing Association moved into the surrounding area.

[1] Article 3 subparag. 1, subparag. 4, 5, Articles 7, 44(1) of the Framework Act on Environmental Policy, Articles 750 and 751 of the Civil Act, Article 288 of the Civil Procedure Act / [2] Articles 202, 339(1) and 432 of the Civil Act, Articles 393, 396, 750, and 763 of the Civil Procedure Act / [3] Articles 90(2)3, 39, and 425 of the Civil Procedure Act / [4] Articles 3 subparag. 1, 4, 5, 7, and 44(1) of the Framework Act on Environmental Policy, Article 750 of the Civil Act

[1] Supreme Court Decision 2006Da50338 Decided September 11, 2008, Supreme Court Decision 2012Da11661 Decided October 11, 2013, Supreme Court Decision 2015Da23321 Decided February 15, 2017 (Gong2017Sang, 548), Supreme Court Decision 2016Da35802 Decided September 13, 2018 (Gong2018Ha, 1962), Supreme Court Decision 2016Da233538, 23545 Decided November 28, 201, Supreme Court Decision 2017Da201368 Decided October 15, 2014 / [2] Supreme Court Decision 2016Da2381638, Jun. 28, 2012; Supreme Court Decision 2013Hah 20638, Nov. 26, 20197

Korean Racing Association (Law Firm LLC, Attorneys Kim Yoon-kn et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Defendant (Counterclaim Plaintiff) 1

Defendant (Counterclaim Plaintiff) 2 and 3 others (Attorneys Seo Sung-sung et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Seoul High Court Decision 2018Na206824, 2068231, 2068248 decided September 27, 2019

All of the appeals by the Plaintiff (Counterclaim Defendant) are dismissed. The appeal by the Defendant (Counterclaim Plaintiff) is dismissed. The costs of appeal by the Plaintiff (Counterclaim Defendant) are assessed against the Plaintiff (Counterclaim Defendant) and the Defendant (Counterclaim Plaintiff) 1, respectively.

The grounds of appeal are examined (to the extent of supplement in case of supplemental appellate briefs not timely filed).

1. Judgment on the ground of appeal by the Plaintiff (Counterclaim Defendant)

A. Basic facts

According to the reasoning of the first instance judgment cited by the lower court and the record, the following facts are revealed.

(1) The Plaintiff (Counterclaim Defendant; hereinafter “Plaintiff”) is operating the “Pletz Seoul” (hereinafter “instant horse park”). The area around the horse park of this case there is a flower complex that cultivates flowers and pots, etc. In addition, the Defendant (Counterclaim Plaintiff; hereinafter “Defendant”), Defendant 2, Defendant 3, Defendant 4, and Defendant 5 operated by the Defendant 5 (hereinafter “Defendant”) are far away from the North side of the horse park of this case from the 20 to 300 meters away from the North side of the horse park of this case. The Subdivision, operated by Defendant 1, is located far from the North side of the horse park of this case to the North side of the horse park of this case. The Subdivision, operated by the Defendant 1, is located far from the North side of the horse park of this case.

(2) On December 2015, the Defendants filed an application against the Plaintiff for the adjudication of environmental disputes with the Central Environmental Dispute Resolution Committee (hereinafter “Central Environmental Dispute Resolution Committee”). The reasons are that the Plaintiff contaminated groundwater with ppuri salt to prevent ice in the instant horse park, and died of pots and flowerss using polluted groundwater. The Plaintiff filed a lawsuit seeking confirmation of the existence of the obligation of the instant case without responding to the application for the adjudication of environmental disputes, and the Defendants filed the instant counterclaim seeking compensation for damages.

B. Whether liability for damages is established (Ground of appeal No. 1)

(1) Article 44(1) of the Framework Act on Environmental Policy provides that “In cases where any environmental pollution or environmental damage has occurred, the person who caused the environmental pollution or environmental damage shall compensate for such damage.” This is a special provision for the provisions of tort under the Civil Act (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2006Da50338, Sept. 11, 2008). Therefore, when any environmental pollution or environmental damage has occurred, the person who caused the environmental pollution or environmental damage shall compensate for such damage even if there is no cause attributable to such person (see Supreme Court Decisions 2015Da2321, Feb. 15, 2017; 2016Da35802, Sept. 13, 2018).

In general, in a claim for damages due to a tort, the perpetrator bears the burden of proving the causal relationship between the perpetrator’s harmful act, the victim’s damage, the harmful act, and the victim’s damage. However, in a lawsuit claiming damages due to air pollution or water pollution, requiring the victim to objectively prove the existence of the causal relationship may result in the refusal of judicial relief due to high seas. On the other hand, there are much cases where the perpetrator is much more easy to investigate the cause of the damage than the victim in technical and economic aspect, and the perpetrator is likely to conceal the cause of the damage. As such, the causal relationship between the harmful act and the victim’s damage may be acknowledged unless the perpetrator proves that the damage was caused by the harmful act, unless the perpetrator discharges any harmful material and the damage was caused by the arrival of the damaged material. However, in this case, at least the perpetrator discharges any harmful material, the degree of harm reaches the damaged material, the fact that it reached the damaged material, and the burden of proving the damage to the victim after the occurrence of the damage still bears the burden of proof on the victim (see Supreme Court Decision 23136Da13615, 162, 14, 15, 1362, 14.

(2) The lower court determined that the Plaintiff’s liability for damages is recognized pursuant to Article 44(1) of the Framework Act on Environmental Policy on the following grounds.

(A) In order to prevent the ice of sand from ice by the racing, the Plaintiff spreaded a large quantity of salt to the racing of the horse park in this case. It appears that the spawn salt flowed into ground and underground water by spawnizing it. The spawn concentration of underground water used by the Defendants is more than 250 g/L, which is the water quality standard for agricultural water, or is in close vicinity to it. Since underground water near the spawn-dong in Sincheon-si is flowed in the direction of spawn, only after the Defendant’s agricultural source is located in the north of the horse park in this case, it is reasonable to view that a large quantity of salt flow affected the increase of the spawn concentration of underground water used by the Defendants.

(B) From July 23, 2008 to November 23, 2008, the Environmental Management Corporation investigated the soil and groundwater environment around the relevant Gyeong Park, and estimated that the Plaintiff could have flown of pollutants from salt used on the racing into groundwater and flown into the surrounding area.

(C) Around 2008, a person who operated a farmer in the vicinity of the Gyeongnam Park, on the ground that he was the Defendants of this case, filed an application for adjudication on environmental disputes against the Plaintiff on the same ground. At the time, the opinions presented by the National Institute of Specialization of the Arts and Arts and the Agricultural Research Institute around March, 2013 and by the National Agricultural Research Institute around April, 2013 are presumed to have caused damage to agricultural crops. The Central Environmental Tribunal rendered a ruling recognizing the Plaintiff’s liability for damages on April 12, 2013 and June 20, 2013 that recognized the Plaintiff’s liability for damages against the applicant for adjudication. The first instance court recognized the Plaintiff’s liability for damages (Seoul District Court Decision 2015Na27581, Nov. 27, 2015; 2015; 2015Da25785, Jul. 25, 2015). 205, the first instance court acknowledged the Plaintiff’s liability for damages against the Plaintiff.

(D) On March 30, 2016, Sindo Co., Ltd. entered into a service contract with the Plaintiff on the impact assessment of the water in teletts Seoul Underground Water, and prepared a report on November 30, 2016. The content points out the Plaintiff’s salt spraying due to the main cause of the pollution of groundwater near the Gyeongma Park in the instant case.

(3) Examining the reasoning of the lower judgment in light of the evidence duly admitted, the lower judgment is justifiable in light of the foregoing legal doctrine. In so determining, the lower court did not err by exceeding the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence against logical and empirical rules, or by misapprehending the legal doctrine

C. Scope of and limitation on liability for damages (ground of appeal Nos. 2 and 3)

(1) As long as the appraiser’s appraisal method is contrary to the empirical rule or unreasonable, the appraiser’s appraisal result should be respected unless there exist significant errors (see Supreme Court Decision 2012Da18762, Oct. 15, 2014).

Even in cases where damage occurs or has been expanded due to competition between harmful acts and the causes of the victim, if compensating the perpetrator for the whole damage is contrary to the principle of fairness, the court shall set the amount of compensation, and may apply the principle of comparative negligence to take into account the factors of the victim who contributed to the occurrence or expansion of the damage by analogical application of the principle of comparative negligence. The fact-finding or the determination of the ratio of liability mitigation in cases of tort claims falls under the exclusive authority of the fact-finding court unless it is clearly unreasonable in light of the principle of equity (see the above Supreme Court Decision 2016Da35802, supra).

(2) The lower court accepted the appraisal result of the first instance appraiser and limited the Plaintiff’s liability as follows.

(A) The appraiser in the first instance trial calculated the amount of damages as follows. ① Defendant 2, Defendant 3, and Defendant 5 cultivated seedlings, etc., and Defendant 4 cultivated and sold flowers species. The amount of damages calculated by multiplying the amount of damages by the amount of damages calculated based on the actual status of flowers cultivation in Gyeonggi-do, which is the basis of living of the said Defendants, the current status of flowers cultivation in Gyeonggi-do, objective transaction data submitted by Defendant 3, and the sales office president of Defendant 4, etc., determined the amount of damages in the absence of salt in the absence of salt distribution, taking into account the methods of operation of the farm, and calculated the amount of damages calculated by multiplying the said amount of damages by the damage rate. In addition, in order to prevent salt damage, the amount of damages was included in the amount of damages paid for the treatment of land rent, etc. incurred in cultivating iron in other places, etc., and with respect to Defendant 1, who operates the pot.

(b) However, in cultivating and cultivating powder and flowers, the Plaintiff’s responsibility shall be limited to 40 per cent in consideration of the fact that various factors, such as soil, temperature, fertilizer, blight and harmful insects, as well as the quality of groundwater, such as soil, temperature, fertilizer, and blight and harmful insects, have an impact on growth and death.

(3) Examining the reasoning of the lower judgment in light of the evidence duly admitted, the lower court did not err by exceeding the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence in violation of logical and empirical rules, or by misapprehending the legal doctrine on the scope of and limitation on liability for damages, without failing to exhaust all necessary deliberations, contrary to what is alleged in the grounds of appeal.

2. Determination on Defendant 1’s appeal

We examine ex officio Defendant 1’s appeal relating to the legitimacy of appeal.

The scope of the power of attorney in a lawsuit is, in principle, limited to the relevant level, but if an attorney has been separately authorized to file an appeal, barring any special circumstance, the authority and duty to submit a written appeal. Thus, if there is any defect in the attachment of a stamp in the written appeal, the attorney may correct it, and the presiding judge of the lower court may also order the attorney to correct the stamp (see Supreme Court Order 2013Ma670, Jul. 31, 2013).

According to the records, Defendant 1’s attorney served the judgment of the court below on October 5, 2019, and filed an appeal against the judgment below on October 17, 2019. The court below issued an order to dismiss Defendant 1’s petition of appeal on the ground that Defendant 1’s attorney, who received the special right to receive the appeal, failed to comply with the order to notify the court of final appeal and to revise service charges, and the presiding judge issued an order to dismiss the petition of appeal on November 5, 2019 on the ground that he did not correct stamp within the correction period. The above order was served on Defendant 1’s attorney on November 6, 2019. Defendant 1 submitted the petition of appeal of this case on December 19, 2019.

Examining these facts in light of the legal principles as seen earlier, since Defendant 1 delegated the lower court’s lawsuit to the attorney, Defendant 1’s attorney was ordered to be aware of and correct, and the measures taken by the presiding judge of the lower court that dismissed the petition of appeal on the ground of Defendant 1’s refusal to comply with the order to verify and correct the facts. Accordingly, Defendant 1’s appeal is unlawful as it was subsequent to the lapse of the peremptory period, which is the final

3. Conclusion

The Plaintiff’s final appeal is dismissed in its entirety as it is without merit, and it is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench. The costs of final appeal by the Plaintiff (Counterclaim Defendant) are assessed against the Plaintiff (Counterclaim Defendant) and the costs of final appeal by Defendant 1 are assessed against each other.

Justices Lee Dong-won (Presiding Justice)