[1] In a case where a non-corporate company entered into a sales contract for collective ownership according to a resolution of the general meeting, whether the representative of a non-corporate company shall obtain approval of the interruption of extinctive prescription for the debt incurred pursuant to the sales contract, or undergo a resolution of the general meeting separately when the debt is discharged (negative in principle)

[2] Whether the act of management and disposal of collective property is an act of suspending the extinctive prescription, which merely indicates that the existence of an obligation under a sales contract is recognized (negative)

[3] The case holding that the act of the representative of a non-corporate association visiting a certified judicial scrivener office with the purchaser to allow the registration of ownership transfer to the purchaser of collective ownership constitutes an approval with the validity of suspending the statute of limitations of the right to

[1] If a general meeting of non-corporate association approves the conclusion of a sales contract for collective ownership, it is reasonable to deem that such a resolution includes a resolution that approves the burden of obligations and performance of obligations arising from the conclusion of the sales contract. Thus, if the representative of a non-corporate association approves the validity of interrupting extinctive prescription for the obligations, or if he/she performs the obligations, it is not necessary to go through a resolution of the general meeting, barring special circumstances.

[2] The act of a non-corporate association to enter into a sales contract for the property owned in collective ownership constitutes an act of disposal of property owned in collective ownership as an act of bearing obligations arising from the disposal of the property owned in collective ownership, but the approval of the interruption of the statute of limitations, which merely indicates the recognition of the existence of an obligation borne by the sales contract, shall not be deemed an act of management and disposal of property owned in collective ownership, since it does not follow

[3] The case holding that the non-corporate association's visiting a certified judicial scrivener's office together with the purchaser to allow the registration of ownership transfer to the purchaser of collective ownership constitutes an approval with the validity of suspending the statute of limitations of the right to claim

[1] Articles 275 and 276(1) of the Civil Act / [2] Articles 275 and 276(1) of the Civil Act / [3] Articles 168 subparag. 3 and 177 of the Civil Act

[2] Supreme Court en banc Decision 2004Da60072, 60089 Decided April 19, 2007 (Gong2007Sang, 693)

Plaintiff (Attorney Cho Jae-do, Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Defendant

Daegu District Court Decision 2009Na1212 Decided July 16, 2009

The judgment below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Daegu District Court Panel Division.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

On April 12, 1997, the court below acknowledged that the plaintiff attended the general meeting of the defendant's residents, composed of the residents of ○○-ri, and entered into a sales contract with the defendant to purchase the land of this case owned by 15 million won (hereinafter "the sales contract of this case") around that time, the above purchase price was paid in full, but the land of this case was not received and remains at present. On the other hand, the defendant's representative visited the certified judicial scrivener office at the plaintiff's request in order to implement the procedure for the registration of transfer of ownership of the land of this case, but he was unable to transfer ownership of the land of this case without the minutes of the general meeting of the residents. The court below rejected the plaintiff's claim for the registration of transfer transfer of ownership of this case on the ground that the approval of the debt of this case which is the cause of interruption of the extinctive prescription should be made in due process by the authorized person, and the representative of the general meeting was to dismiss the plaintiff's claim for transfer registration of ownership of this case on the ground of this case.

However, it is difficult to accept the judgment of the court below for the following reasons.

First of all, according to the facts found by the court below, the defendant can be deemed to have concluded the sales contract of this case through a resolution of the residents' general meeting. As such, if the general meeting of non-corporate groups approves the conclusion of the sales contract on the property jointly owned, it is reasonable to view that such a resolution would have included a resolution that approves the burden of the obligations arising from the conclusion of the sales contract and the performance of the obligations arising from the conclusion of the sales contract. Thus, it is not necessary to separate the resolution of the general meeting of members where the representative of the non-corporate group approves the validity of the interruption of the extinctive prescription for the obligations, or

In addition, the management and disposition of collective ownership under Articles 275 and 276(1) of the Civil Act refers to the act of using or improving collective ownership property itself or the act of disposal of legal and private performance (see Supreme Court en banc Decision 2004Da60072, 60089, Apr. 19, 2007). Thus, the act of a non-corporate group to enter into a sales contract for collective ownership constitutes an act of disposal of collective ownership as an act of bearing obligations arising from its disposal, but the act of a non-corporate group to enter into a sales contract for collective ownership constitutes an act of disposal of collective ownership as an act of bearing obligations arising from its disposal, although it merely indicates that the existence of obligations arising from the sales contract is recognized, it cannot be deemed an act of management and disposal of collective ownership, as it does not follow the management and disposition of collective ownership. Accordingly, even if the representative of the defendant's representative approves the interruption of the statute of limitations on the obligation to transfer ownership under the sales contract of this case, such approval cannot be deemed null and void.

On the other hand, approval as a ground for interrupting extinctive prescription is established when an obligor who is a party to the benefit of prescription expresses that he/she would lose his/her right due to the completion of extinctive prescription or his/her agent is aware of the existence of such right. The method of indication does not require any form nor explicitly explicitly explicit. An implied approval indication is sufficient if it is performed in a way that allows the other party to the other party to the other party to the other party to the other party to the other party to the other party to the display recognition of the existence and amount of the obligation, on the premise that the obligor is aware of the existence and amount of the obligation, to restore the obligation through such indication (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 92Da947, Apr. 14, 1992; 2004Da5959, Feb. 17, 2005). In light of such legal principles, it is sufficient to deem that the Defendant’s representative visited the Plaintiff to register the ownership of the land of this case at the request of the Plaintiff on February 2001.

In addition, according to the reasoning of the lower judgment and the record, the Defendant appears to have rejected the transfer of ownership of the instant land against the Plaintiff on the ground that the Plaintiff did not pay KRW 5 million for delay damages of the agreement on the land adjacent to the instant land (number omitted) as indicated in the lower judgment. Even if the payment of KRW 5 million was made at the time of the instant sales contract, the existence or validity of the debt approval cannot be denied under such performance terms, even if there was a fact that the payment of KRW 5 million was made in conjunction with the transfer of ownership of the instant land

Therefore, the plaintiff's right to claim the transfer registration of ownership based on the contract of this case shall be deemed to have been suspended by the defendant's representative visiting a certified judicial scrivener office as above with the plaintiff around 2001. However, the court below's judgment which judged otherwise contains an error of law by misunderstanding the relevant legal principles, which affected the conclusion of the judgment

Therefore, the judgment of the court below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the court below for a new trial and determination. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Kim Nung-hwan (Presiding Justice)