Within the litigation procedure, the representative of a juristic person or an association which is not a juristic person has not been granted the authority necessary for waiver, recognition, or compromise of a claim, which is in violation of the interests of the juristic person, etc., by abusing his/her authority for the purpose of seeking the benefit of himself/herself or a third party, and where the other party knew or could have known of the fact of the representative, the meaning of "the date when the juristic person, etc., becomes aware of the cause of quasi-examination" (=the time when other executives, etc. who have the authority to properly preserve the benefit of

Where a juristic person or an association which is not a juristic person (hereinafter referred to as “juristic person, etc.”) gives up, recognizes, or compromise of a claim as a party and enters it in the pleading record or the protocol for preparatory pleadings, and where there exist any defects in granting authority necessary for the waiver, recognition, or compromise of a claim, the juristic person, etc. may file a lawsuit for quasi-adjudication with respect to the pleadings or the protocol for preparatory pleadings, and the lawsuit for quasi-adjudication shall be filed within 30 days from the date on which the juristic person, etc. has given up, acknowledged, or compromise of a claim and has become aware of the grounds for quasi-adjudication (Articles 461, 220, 451(1)3, 456, 64, and 52 of the Civil Procedure Act).

In principle, “the date when the representative of a corporation, etc. becomes aware of the grounds for quasi-examination” is the date when the representative of the corporation, etc. becomes aware of the grounds for quasi-examination, and the period of quasi-examination is in progress from that time. However, the period of quasi-examination is not sufficient in light of the fact that the representative of the corporation, etc. was unable to obtain the necessary authority for waiver, recognition, or compromise of the claim, which is the grounds for quasi-examination, and where the representative of the corporation, etc. has abused his/her authority for the purpose of promoting his/her own or a third party’s interest, and the other party knew or could have known the intention of the representative of the corporation, etc., in general, it is difficult to expect that the representative of the corporation, etc. will exercise his/her authority to file quasi-examination as the grounds for quasi-examination, and at least when another executive, etc. who has the authority to properly preserve the interest of the corporation, etc. has become aware of the grounds for quasi-examination.

Articles 52, 64, 220, 451(1)3, 456, and 461 of the Civil Procedure Act

[Plaintiff-Appellant] Plaintiff 1 and 1 other (Law Firm Domin, Attorneys Park Jong-soo and 2 others, Counsel for plaintiff-appellant)

Plaintiff (Quasi-Appellant) 1 and 7 others (Attorney Seo-tae et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant-appellee)

Jinju C&P Co., Ltd. (Law Firm Gyeongyang, Attorneys Cho Young-chul et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Seoul High Court Decision 2013Na27932 decided January 16, 2014

The judgment below is reversed and the case is remanded to Seoul High Court.

The grounds of appeal are examined (to the extent of supplement in case of supplemental appellate briefs not timely filed).

1. Where a juristic person or an association which is not a juristic person (hereinafter “juristic person, etc.”) gives up, recognizes, or compromise of a claim as a party and entered in the pleading protocol or the preparatory date for pleading protocol, if there is any defect in the granting of the authority required for the waiver, recognition, or compromise of such claim, the juristic person, etc. may file a lawsuit for quasi-deliberation with respect to the said protocol of pleading or the preparatory date for pleading, and such lawsuit for quasi-adjudication shall be brought within 30 days from the date on which the juristic person, etc. has become aware of the cause for quasi-adjudication after giving up, acknowledged, or compromise of the claim (Articles 461, 220, 451(1)3, 456, 64, and 52 of the Civil Procedure Act).

In principle, “the date when a corporation, etc. becomes aware of the grounds for quasi-examination” is the date when the representative of the corporation, etc. becomes aware of the grounds for quasi-examination, and the above period of quasi-examination is proceeding from that time. However, the representative of the corporation, etc. has not been granted the necessary authority for waiver, recognition, or compromise of the claim, which is the grounds for quasi-examination, and has abused his/her authority for the purpose of promoting one’s own or a third party’s interests and has been aware or could have been aware of such a fact by the other party, it is reasonable to interpret that the above period of quasi-examination is initiated only when the representative of the corporation, etc. has become aware of the grounds for non-examination, but also when the representative of the corporation, etc., who has the authority to properly preserve the interests of the corporation, etc., has become aware of the grounds for quasi-examination.

2. Review of the reasoning of the lower judgment and the record, including the duly admitted evidence, reveals the following facts.

A. In the case subject to quasi-examination of this case where the Plaintiff (Quasi-Appellant; hereinafter “Plaintiff”) filed a claim against the Defendant (hereinafter “Defendant”) for the implementation of the registration procedure for cancellation of ownership transfer registration of each of the instant real estate, the duplicate of the complaint was served on Nonparty 1, who was the Defendant’s representative, and Nonparty 1, along with the reply demanding dismissal of the Plaintiff’s claim, submitted a written response accompanied by the judgment to the effect that some of the instant real estate owned by the Defendant was owned by the Defendant.

However, after that, the plaintiffs and their legal representatives were not present at the date of the first pleading, and the non-party 1 did not appear at the meeting, and (2) the plaintiffs' legal representatives and the non-party 1 appeared at the second pleading, but for agreement, the date of pleading was postponed for agreement. (3) The plaintiffs' legal representatives and the non-party 1 appeared at the third pleading, and the non-party 1 voluntarily accepted the plaintiffs' claims without obtaining the right to vote from the defendant's general assembly, and furthermore, on April 17, 2012, the plaintiff did not notify other clan members of this fact.

B. Meanwhile, around June 12, 2012, in the course of confirming that some of the Defendant’s clan members were doubtful about Nonparty 1’s representative’s execution of duties, Nonparty 1 became aware of the fact that Nonparty 1 accepted the Plaintiffs’ claim without a resolution of a clan general assembly, and the Defendant’s clan members filed a complaint with the Gyeonggi Branch Police Station on June 15, 2012 for the suspicion of Nonparty 1’s breach of trust, etc.

C. After that, on June 18, 2012, Nonparty 1: (a) prepared a written confirmation to acknowledge that “the case subject to a quasi-adjudication that is subject to a single quasi-adjudication, in which the Plaintiff would receive remuneration from the Plaintiff; and (b) the Plaintiffs’ claim was accepted at will; and (c) did not notify at all to the clan members,” and issued it to the Defendant.

D. On June 24, 2012, at the Defendant’s clan meeting held on June 24, 2012, Nonparty 1 expressed his intention of resignation and elected Nonparty 2 as a new representative (chairperson). At the subsequent meeting held under Nonparty 2’s supervision, Nonparty 1 decided to file a lawsuit for quasi-deliberation as a result of discussions on the measures regarding each of the instant real estate in which Nonparty 1 accepted the Plaintiffs’ claims, and accordingly, the Defendant filed a lawsuit for quasi-deliberation on July 11, 2012.

E. Nonparty 1 stated at the police investigation stage that “If the ownership of real estate is recognized to Nonparty 4, who is the deceased Nonparty 3’s largest child, the deceased Nonparty 1 believed to have the right to this real estate,” and that “a general meeting or by any means, there was no fact regarding this judgment with a clan member.”

3. Examining these facts in light of the legal principles as seen earlier, there is sufficient room to view that Nonparty 1’s recognition of the plaintiffs’ claims as the defendant’s representative in the above litigation procedure constitutes abuse of authority for the purpose of promoting one’s own interest or the plaintiffs’ interest. Therefore, the lower court should have determined that Nonparty 1’s claim constitutes abuse of authority to recognize the plaintiffs’ claims as the representative or for the purpose of pursuing one’s own interest. Accordingly, the lower court should have determined that Nonparty 1 knew of, or had the authority to review other than that of Nonparty 1’s own interest, the circumstances leading up to Nonparty 1’s receipt of the plaintiffs’ claim in the case subject to quasi-deliberation, Nonparty 1’s delivery of a written confirmation dated June 18, 2012, and whether the facts indicated therein were true, the change of rights or substantial attribution of, and the possibility of, the transfer of rights to each of the instant real estate, and the relationship between, Nonparty 1 and other clan 1’s family members and the defendant’s position or division of duties.

4. Nevertheless, without examining the above circumstances properly, the lower court determined otherwise, on the ground that the instant quasi-deliberation suit was unlawful, on the ground that Nonparty 1, who was the representative of the Defendant, knew that there was a defect in granting the necessary authority for the falling of the claimant, around the time when Nonparty 1, who was the representative of the Defendant, knew of the defect in the granting of authority in the case subject to quasi-deliberation, and that the instant quasi-deliberation suit was

Therefore, the judgment of the court below is erroneous in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the initial date of the filing period for quasi-examination where the representative of a corporation, etc. has any defect in the granting of authority necessary for the recognition and acceptance of a claim, which affected the conclusion of the judgment. The ground of appeal

5. Therefore, without examining the remaining grounds of appeal, we reverse the judgment below, and remand the case to the court below for a new trial and determination. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Kim So-young (Presiding Justice)