Whether the use is prohibited or restricted under the provisions of Acts and subordinate statutes" under Article 21 subparagraph 1 of the Enforcement Decree of the Land Excess Profit Tax Act, even if the administrative agency does not grant permission for construction.

Even if the use of land is not directly prohibited or restricted by the provisions of laws and regulations, it shall be included in the case where the use of land is prohibited or restricted by the provisions of laws and regulations, even if the use of land is prohibited or restricted by the administrative agency as part of administrative action by the authority prescribed by laws and regulations, and Article 8(3) of the Land Excess Profits Tax Act and Article 23(1) of the former Enforcement Decree of the Land Excess Profits Tax Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 13655 of May 30, 192).

Article 8(3) of the Land Excess Profit Tax Act; Article 23 subparag. 1 of the former Enforcement Decree of the Land Excess Profit Tax Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 13655 of May 30, 192)

Supreme Court Decision 93Nu1893 delivered on January 11, 1994

Plaintiff 1 et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant

Head of Seocho Tax Office

Seoul High Court Decision 92Gu21977 delivered on December 24, 1992

The appeal is dismissed.

The costs of appeal are assessed against the defendant.

The defendant's grounds of appeal are examined.

According to the facts duly confirmed by the court below, the Mayor of Seoul Special Metropolitan City decided on March 20, 197 as urban planning facilities (city bus terminal site) with respect to the land including each of the instant land owned by the plaintiffs on March 20, 198, but on February 4, 1987, when the designation of the existing urban planning facilities was cancelled on June 29, 1989, and the service was provided to establish an urban design for individual construction, and thereafter made a public announcement on August 30, 191. The Mayor of Seoul Special Metropolitan City established and announced the urban design on August 30, 191. Since the buildings constructed within the urban design zone should be constructed in conformity with the urban design, the construction permission cannot be granted within the zone until the urban design is established and finalized, based on the view that the construction permission cannot be granted until the plaintiffs used each of the instant land in a lump sum.

Article 8 (3) of the Land Excess Profit Tax Act provides that the use of the idle land, etc. shall not be deemed idle land, etc. during the period prescribed by the Presidential Decree, notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (1) of this Article, which provides that the idle land, etc. among the land owned by an individual shall not be deemed idle land, etc., and Article 23 subparagraph 1 of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act (amended by the Presidential Decree No. 13198 of Dec. 31, 190 and enforced from that date) provides that the use of the land shall not be deemed idle land, etc. for three years from the date of prohibition or restriction of the use of the land after acquisition of the land, even though the use of the land is not directly prohibited or restricted by the provisions of the Act and subordinate statutes, since the administrative agency's permission to construct the land as part of administrative action under the authority prescribed by the Act and subordinate statutes, it shall be deemed that the use of the land is prohibited or restricted by the provisions of Article 8 (3) of the same Act and Article 23 subparagraph 1 of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act, respectively.

Therefore, the lower court’s conclusion that each of the lands of this case cannot be deemed a idle land subject to the Land Excess Profit Tax is just and acceptable, and it cannot be deemed that there was no reason or an error of law that erroneously interpreted the statutes without properly deliberating as to the theory of the lower judgment. Therefore, there is no reason to discuss.

Therefore, the defendant's appeal is dismissed and all costs of appeal are assessed against the losing defendant. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Ahn Yong-sik (Presiding Justice)