(a) Purport of Article 108-3 of the Civil Act and Article 8-2 (2) 2 of the Inheritance Tax Act;

(b) Where the heir and the presiding official of a memorial cemetery are different after the owner of a fish, forest, etc. dies, whether the fish, forest, etc. return to the ordinary inherited property;

A. The provisions of Article 1008-3 of the Civil Act and Article 8-2(2)2 of the Inheritance Tax Act purport to exclude the property from the taxable value of inherited property in a case where the heir succeeds to the property deemed as a special property separate from the inherited property in a case where the heir succeeds to the property used for the purpose of making the deceased deceased deceased, the right to succeed to the donated forest such as a gold-sea forest and arable land shall be deemed to belong to the heir in a case where there are several heirs after the decedent died of the decedent who owned a tombal land, a tombal land, a tombal land, and a dual land, etc.

(b) Where the heir and a person presideing over a grave of a dives forest as a dives forest after the death of the owner of a dives forest, the dives forest, etc. shall be deemed to return to the heir’s inherited property, and the right to succeed to the dives forest, etc. shall not be deemed to belong to a person who is not the heir;

Article 108-3 of the Civil Act and Article 8-2(2)2 of the Inheritance Tax Act

Plaintiff 1 and three others, Plaintiffs Kim Jong-tae, Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant-appellee

Head of Seocho Tax Office

Seoul High Court Decision 93Gu19858 delivered on February 15, 1994

All appeals are dismissed. The costs of appeal are assessed against the plaintiffs.

We examine the grounds of appeal.

On the first ground for appeal

Article 108-3 of the Civil Act provides that the presiding official succeeds to the ownership of a spawal forest within the scope of one information pertaining to a grave, farmland within 600 square meters, spawal land and spawal land, and spawal land and spawal land. Article 8-2(2)2 of the Inheritance Tax Act provides that “property not included in the taxable amount of inheritance taxes and stipulated in Article 1008-3 of the Civil Act” is “property not included in the taxable amount of inheritance taxes.” The above provision aims to exclude the inheritance tax from the taxable amount of inheritance taxes in cases where the heir succeeds to the property for the purpose of continuing the spawalian association, which is distinct from the ordinary inherited property. If there are several heirs after the death of the decedent who owned the spawal forest, the right to succeed to the spawal forest, etc., shall be deemed to belong to the heir of the spawal forest, not to the heir of the spawal forest.

Therefore, the reasoning of the judgment below is not somewhat insufficient, but there is no evidence to acknowledge that the plaintiffs, who are heirs, preside over the removal of graves existing in the forest of this case, and thus, the conclusion that the forest of this case is subject to inheritance tax as general inherited property is just and the judgment below did not err by misapprehending the legal principles of the Civil Act and the Inheritance Tax Act, which affected the conclusion of the judgment.

On the second ground for appeal

The court below rejected the plaintiffs' claim on the ground that there is no evidence to prove that the plaintiff 2 was the person in charge of the production of the company, but did not request that the plaintiffs and the defendant request the resumption of the company. The court did not accept the plaintiffs' claim despite the plaintiffs' request for reconsideration. The court is obligated to urge the plaintiff 2 to prove the plaintiff's assertion that the deceased non-party 1, who was the deceased non-party 2, was the deceased non-party 2, and the plaintiff 2, was the deceased non-party 1's heir, and the defendant 2 had the presence of the company as the head of the company in the above case (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 90Nu5047, Apr. 23, 1991). The court's request for resumption of the company's existence belongs to the court's discretion, so it cannot be accepted that the plaintiff 2's request for resumption of the company's pleading is not sufficient to prove the plaintiff 1's objection (see, e.g., the court's request for resumption of the plaintiff 182).

Therefore, all appeals are dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Lee Yong-hun (Presiding Justice)