The expiration of the statute of limitations for perjury and the period for raising a national review;

The prosecutor's awareness that he/she has no right to prosecute for perjury is not the time when the prosecutor made a decision that he/she has no right to prosecute, but the statute of limitations has expired during the investigation by the prosecutor. In such cases, since the prosecutor becomes aware of the completion of the statute of limitations, the initiation of the peremptory period of Article 426 (1) of the Civil Procedure Act in the above case should be deemed to run from the time when the statute of limitations has expired.

Article 426 of the Civil Procedure Act

A representative of the law of the Republic of Korea and a re-transfer of a litigation performer;

Attorney Lee Jong-ok, Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant-appellee

Daegu High Court Decision 76Na6 delivered on March 24, 1978

The original judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Daegu High Court.

The grounds of appeal No. 1 (to the extent of supplement in case of the appeal filed by another agent) are examined as follows.

According to the recognition judgment of the original judgment, the lawsuit for retrial caused by the country's "76.6.28" was brought into evidence by the non-party witness "69.2.21 and "70.10.22" of the non-party witness who had been admitted as evidence for a final judgment, and the prosecutor decided not to institute a prosecution on the ground that the testimony was suspected of perjury" through the number of admission applicants "73.4.16.26. The plaintiff was aware of the grounds for retrial, and therefore, the purport of this case is that the plaintiff should be deemed a legitimate re-appeal.

According to the record and the purport of the pleading, the final and conclusive judgment subject to review was completed in the country against the country, and the prosecutor was involved in the litigation as the litigation performer of the country. The issue of the judgment was whether the number of farmland was legitimate, and the prosecutor had already entered the investigation into the crime of forging false public document because the prosecutor was suspected of the non-party, who is the employee in charge of distribution affairs, and entered the investigation as a crime of forging false public document. On the same day after the judgment became final and conclusive, the above testimony as to the distribution of farmland to the same person was made on the same day as the fact that there was no right of prosecution, and the result was deleted as above.

In a case where a judge conducts a formal trial on a wrong charge for the reason that the right to prosecute has been extinguished, it is a legal principle that a judgment of acquittal has to be rendered without any substantial deliberation (see Supreme Court Decision 64Do64, Mar. 31, 64). As such, the prosecutor also has a legal principle that if the statute of limitations for a crime has expired, the necessity to conduct an actual investigation has no right to prosecute if there is no right to prosecute. Therefore, it is not the case where the prosecutor has made a decision that there is no right to prosecute for perjury in this case, but it is the day when the statute of limitations has expired. This is because the completion of the statute of limitations has been more advanced than the prosecutor's decision. In addition, as in this case, it is reasonable to understand that the structure of a lawsuit that the country is a party, and the relationship between the prosecutor and the minister, which the prosecutor should have become subordinate to the prosecutor's decision, and that the prosecutor should not become the day when the statute of limitations has expired.

Therefore, in this case, it is clear that the starting of the peremptory period of Article 426 (1) of the Civil Procedure Act to be observed by the country is to run from the expiration date of the statute of limitations for perjury, and it is judged in the same manner with the above explanation by the court below, since the interpretation and application of the law on the retrial remains illegal because it is reasonable to see that the interpretation and application of the law on the retrial remains illegal, it is difficult for the court below to reverse this case and re-examine this case without examining other arguments.

Therefore, we decide as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Lee Il-young (Presiding Justice)