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(영문) 대법원 2007. 10. 26. 선고 2006다39898 판결
[채무부존재확인][집55(2)민,204;공2007하,1840]
Main Issues

[1] In a case where the policyholder or the insured cannot be deemed to have known and used the victim's awareness and awareness of the victim's injury in light of the situation before and after the automobile accident, etc., whether the loss caused by the death, etc. constitutes "damage caused by the policyholder or the insured's intentional act" as stipulated in the automobile insurance exemption clause (negative)

[2] The case holding that automobile insurance exemption clause does not apply to the case where a police officer, who was under drinking control, did not take over a motor vehicle damaged by the escape of control and led to the situation of plant life due to brain damage, when he was faced with the sloping beam of the steel beam of the subway construction site, and the damage caused by the above accident cannot be intentionally caused by the policyholder or the insured

Summary of Judgment

[1] In light of the situation, before and after the occurrence of an accident caused by the operation of a motor vehicle, it may be deemed that the policyholder, etc. was aware and used as to the fact that the victim was injured, but in case where it cannot be deemed that the victim was aware and used as a result of the serious consequences of the death, etc., the damage caused by the death, etc. does not constitute the intentional damage of the policyholder, etc., and therefore, it is reasonable to deem that the automobile insurance exemption clause under which the insurer does not compensate for the damage caused by the death, etc.

[2] The case holding that the automobile insurance exemption clause does not apply in the case where the police officer, who was under drinking control, did not carry the vehicle in which the police officer attempted to escape from the crackdown and caused brain damage by the steel sn beam of the subway construction site, and the driver was aware and used that the above police officer fell from the vehicle different from the other police officer, and was aware that the driver was aware of and used to have a certain degree of injury, but it cannot be deemed that the driver predicted, awareness, and accepted that the above accident was faced with the sn beam of the steel h beam, and therefore, it cannot be deemed that the damage caused by the accident was intentionally caused by the policyholder, etc.

[Reference Provisions]

[1] Article 659(1) of the Commercial Act, Article 105 of the Civil Act / [2] Article 659(1) of the Commercial Act, Article 105 of the Civil Act

Plaintiff-Appellee

Samsung Fire and Marine Insurance Co., Ltd. (Law Firm Gyeong & Yang, Attorneys Kim Yong-mun, Counsel for defendant-appellant

Defendant

Defendant 1 and one other

Defendant Intervenor, Appellant

Intervenor (Attorney Han-soo et al., Counsel for defendant-appellant)

Judgment of the lower court

Gwangju District Court Decision 2005Na4730 Decided May 23, 2006

Text

The judgment of the court below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Gwangju District Court Panel Division.

Reasons

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. Article 14 of the automobile insurance clause of this case provides that "damage caused by the policyholder or the insured (hereinafter "subscriber, etc.")'s intentional act" shall not be compensated by the insurer. Such exemption clause shall be strictly interpreted. In light of the fact that there is a qualitative difference between injury and death or serious injury equivalent to death (hereinafter "Death, etc.") and the scope of liability for damages, it is reasonable to deem that the exemption clause is not applied to the case where the policyholder, etc. deal with an insured accident which the policyholder, etc. directly caused in excess of the ordinarily foreseeable scope and the serious result such as death, etc. occurs. Unless the policyholder, etc. actively expresses or expresses the result of the death, etc., it is reasonable to deem that the damage does not constitute a serious danger of causing an artificial accident even if it is not applied to the exemption clause, and rather conforms to the social security function of the insurance. Therefore, it is reasonable to deem that the victim's death, etc. goes beyond the recognition and recognition of the result of the accident caused by the operation of a motor vehicle and it does not constitute a serious injury.

2. According to the records, Defendant 2, as the Intervenor’s assistant participant (hereinafter “the Intervenor”) controlled a drunk driving, proceeded with the vehicle as it is under the influence of the driver’s seat with one hand, and the other hand. Defendant 2, as the Intervenor was towing the vehicle in the direction of the driver’s seat in order not to fall from the vehicle, and went into contact with the ground of the driver’s seat. Nevertheless, the above Defendant 2 started driving at a speed of 30-40 km per hour at the first time and went from the vehicle without any further understanding of the Intervenor, and its branch was under the influence of this case’s humline, and the point was under the influence of the Intervenor’s humline, and the point was under the influence of this case’s humline, and the point was under the influence of this case’s humke, which could not be seen as being under the influence of the Intervenor’s humline, and thus, the Defendant could not be seen as being under the condition of the Intervenor’s injury.

Nevertheless, the court below held that the damage caused by the above accident is the damage caused by the above defendant's intentional act and the automobile insurance of this case is exempted by the plaintiff. The judgment below is erroneous in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the above automobile insurance, or by misunderstanding facts against the rules of evidence, which affected the conclusion of the judgment. The argument in the grounds of appeal on this point is with merit.

3. Therefore, without examining the remaining grounds of appeal, the judgment of the court below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the court below for a new trial and determination. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Park Si-hwan (Presiding Justice)

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-광주지방법원 2005.4.6.선고 2004가단58654
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