(a) Standing to sue in administrative litigation;

(b) The legitimacy of a lawsuit seeking the invalidity and cancellation of the approval of taking office by the supervisory authority based on the reason of defects in the act of selecting an officer of the school juristic person;

A. An administrative litigation requires that a certain right or interest in an administrative disposition is infringed due to an illegal administrative disposition as a requisite for filing a lawsuit, and that the infringed right or interest in the administrative disposition may be recovered, or that the interest in the protection of rights, i.e., the interest in seeking confirmation of invalidity. An administrative litigation may be filed as the plaintiff, barring special circumstances, in cases where there is a specific interest in the revocation or modification of the disposition, or where there is a benefit in seeking confirmation of invalidity, as well as a third party.

B. The approval of taking office by the supervisory authority under Article 20 (2) of the Private School Act is a supplementary act that serves as a supplement to the act of selecting an officer and that serves as a legal effect, and where the act of selecting an officer is not established or null and void, the act of selecting an officer, which is a basic act, shall not be effective even if the approval was granted, and even if the basic act is valid and there is a defect in the approval that is a supplementary act that serves as a legal effect, the invalidation or revocation of the approval can be asserted. However, if there is no defect in the approval disposition itself, unless there is a defect in the basic act, it cannot be asserted immediately that there is a defect in the approval disposition itself unless there is a special reason. Accordingly, the cancellation or invalidation of the approval disposition, which is a basic act, cannot be claimed as a cancellation or invalidation of the approval disposition, which is a administrative disposition, that contests the defects or effects under private law

Article 20 of the Private School Act, Articles 12 and 19 of the Administrative Litigation Act

Plaintiff (Attorney Lee Im-soo, Counsel for plaintiff-appellant)

Seoul High Court Decision 200Na14480 decided May 1, 200

December 26, 1985

All of the plaintiff's claims are dismissed.

Litigation costs shall be borne by the plaintiff.

The primary claim: on February 2, 1985, the defendant confirmed that the defendant's disposition that approved the appointment of a director of the Korea Exemplary Institute of Education as the chief director, the non-party 3 as the non-party 4, the disease day, the Kim Jin, the profit-making class, and the dual class as the chief director is null and void. The costs of the lawsuit

Preliminary claim: The above disposition shall be revoked. The costs of lawsuit shall be borne by the defendant.

1) Determination on the Defendant’s main defense

The defendant asserts that the disposition of this case's chief director and the approval of the appointment of director is an administrative disposition against the non-party educational foundation of the Korea Institute of Corruption, and that the plaintiff is not a party to the claim of this case as the plaintiff, because it is merely a third party to the disposition of this case, and it is not a party to the claim of this case.

However, the Administrative Litigation Act requires that certain rights or legal interests of the plaintiff be infringed upon due to an administrative disposition. The infringed rights or interests may be recovered, i.e., the benefits to seek nullification of such administrative disposition. It is not only the direct counter-party of the disposition, but also the third party may bring an action as the plaintiff, unless there are special circumstances. Thus, the above 1, 2-1, 3-2, 4, 10-3 (Articles of Incorporation), 10-4, 10-4 (Request for Approval), 10-4, 10-4, 5-10, 10-1, 19-2, and 19-2, which are the directors of the board of directors. The above 2-1, 3-1, 3-2, and 9-1, who are parties to the above administrative disposition, may again be appointed by the board of directors. The plaintiff's appointment of the above 1-2, 3-2, and 9-1, who are parties to the above disposition.

In accordance with the above facts of recognition, the plaintiff is not a director of the above school juristic person, and a third party, who is not the other party to the disposition of this case, is the same as the defendant's assertion. However, if the resolution of the board of directors made on December 28, 1984 and the defendant's approval of appointment of this case made on February 2, 1985 based on the plaintiff's assertion becomes invalid or cancelled, the above resolution of the board of directors made on October 22 of the same year, who appointed the plaintiff as the director and the chief director, shall be valid, and the above resolution of the board of directors made on October 22 of the same year shall be in the position of the chief director of the above school juristic person as well as the director of the board of directors of the above school juristic person after obtaining the approval of letter delivery in accordance

2) Determination on the principal

The plaintiff asserts that the approval of taking office of this case is void as a matter of course, or is just to revoke if it is non-explosible. The case is determined by dividing it into the following cases.

A) First of all, the Plaintiff’s approval of the appointment of an officer of a school foundation by a supervisory authority under Article 20(2) of the Private School Act has the nature as an authorization to supplement and complete the validity of a resolution to appoint an officer in force at the board of directors of the school foundation. Such authorization should be premised on the validity of the basic act subject to it. However, in the first case, the board of directors held on December 28, 1984, which was convened on October 22 of the same year, Nonparty 2 and Nonparty 6 had already lost the qualification as a director by expressing his intention to resign at the board of directors convened on October 22 of the same year, and by accepting it, only four other directors, including Nonparty 3, etc., were present at the meeting, and eventually, it cannot be deemed that the above board of directors cannot be deemed to have been duly constituted by the majority of the fixed number of directors, which is a quorum for holding the board of directors under Articles 22 and 32, and the above board of directors cannot be deemed to have been held at least 274 of the above resolution.

In light of the above facts, the approval of the board of directors under Article 20 (2) of the Private School Act is a supplementary act to complete its legal effect by supplementing the appointment of executive officers, and it cannot be deemed that the appointment of executive officers, which is the basic act, is valid even if the approval was granted, and if there is a defect in the approval of the supplementary act to complete its validity even if the basic act is valid, it can be asserted that the approval of the board of directors is invalid or cancelled. However, if there is no defect in the approval of the basic act, the approval of the board of directors cannot be asserted immediately if there is a defect in the basic act, unless there are special circumstances, and it cannot be asserted that there is a defect in the approval of the board of directors' appointment of executive officers under Article 20 (2) of the Private School Act, and it is not possible to request cancellation or invalidation of the above approval of the appointment of executive officers, which is an administrative disposition, because it does not conflict with the above approval of the appointment of executive officers under Article 10 (2) of the Private School Act.

B) Following the Plaintiff’s articles of incorporation, pursuant to Article 33 subparag. 2 of the corporation’s articles of incorporation, the officer’s number of money and property accompanied by the receipt and payment of money and the matters directly related to the corporation were prevented from participating in the resolution of the board of directors. However, on December 28, 199, the board of directors on the agenda, such as the receipt and payment of money, which is directly related to the corporation, decided by Nonparty 3, who attended the meeting, and on the other hand, Nonparty 3 asserted that the above provisions of the articles of incorporation are null and void. Thus, it can be acknowledged by the evidence No. 3 (Articles of incorporation) without dispute over the establishment of the articles of incorporation. However, even if the above board of directors passed a resolution of the board of directors to attend the matters involving the receipt and payment of money and property directly related to the corporation, such as the Plaintiff’s head, the board of directors does not have any reason to decide on the appointment of the chief director of this case and the appointment approval of the Defendant based thereon.

C) The Plaintiff also committed an error in approving the appointment of a person who is not entitled to take office as an officer. In other words, on September 24, 1983, Nonparty 3 took office as a director of the above school foundation and took part in the corporate affairs and took part in the corporate affairs, and without obtaining the supervisory authority’s approval, took a debt amounting to approximately KRW 33,300,000. The Plaintiff, upon dealing with the above corporate affairs with the above corporate affairs, took a claim against the above corporate affairs, thereby significantly impeding the purpose of the appointment by facing the bankruptcy crisis due to the error in the management of the above corporate affairs, and the newly appointed director, Nonparty 4, etc. was involved in the above illegal acts committed without obtaining the supervisory authority’s approval and approved the taking office of the above corporate entity as a person who traded the above corporate affairs with the above corporate affairs and is also in the position of creditor. It asserts that it is unlawful in violation of the purport of Article 28(1) and Article 20-2(1)2 of the Private School Act.

However, Article 28 (1) of the Private School Act provides that a supervisory authority shall obtain approval for the obligations of the school juristic person. Article 20-2 (1) 2 of the Private School Act provides that where it is impossible to achieve the purpose of the establishment of the school juristic person due to disputes between executives, accounting fraud, and significant unjust practices, the supervisory authority may cancel approval for the appointment of an officer. In addition, it does not meet the requirements for approval for the appointment of an officer, and the purport of the evidence No. 6-1 and No. 7 of the No. 2 of the No. 1 of the No. 7 of the No. 1 of the No. 1 of the No. 1 of the Private School Act is all the purport of the oral argument. The above debt of the plaintiff's assertion is that the plaintiff is the chief director of the school juristic person, and the general manager of the (title omitted) of the above school juristic person's affairs with the approval of the supervisory authority for the transfer of the teacher of the new school, and there is no accumulated evidence related to the above corporate normalization.

D) As to the application for taking office by the resolution of the board of directors dated July 5, 1984 of the above school juristic person, the plaintiff participated in the appointment resolution, and the plaintiff rejected the application on the ground that the plaintiff did not attach the plaintiff's foreigner registration certificate, but the non-party 3 participated in the board of directors' meeting with respect to the application for taking office of this case, but it is obvious that the non-party 3 was present at the board of directors' meeting with respect to the appointment approval resolution of this case, but the application was rejected without return

However, if Nonparty 3, as a director, attended the meeting of the board of directors held on December 28, 1984 as the whole purport of the pleading in the records of the above evidence No. 3 (Minutes), the non-party 3 was recommended as the chief director, and the non-party 3, as the representative director, cannot participate in the resolution of the board of directors under Article 33 (1) of the articles of incorporation. Thus, the plaintiff's above assertion is without merit.

3) Therefore, all of the Plaintiff’s claims in this case are dismissed as it does not appear to be a part of the mother, and it is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

January 16, 1986

Judges Kim Jong-chul (Presiding Judge)