A. The purpose of Article 17(4) of the Private School Act, Article 8 of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act, and the nature of approval by supervisory authorities

(b) Validity of approval for convening the board of directors by the supervisory authority designating the place of convocation;

(c) Whether additional clauses may be attached to the indecent act or the act of discretionary discretion;

A. In full view of the provisions of Article 17(4) of the Private School Act and Article 8 of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act, when there are circumstances such as where the chief director becomes vacant or it is difficult to promote the normal operation of the school juristic person by evading the call-up of the board of directors, etc., it appears that the purpose is to promote the smooth operation of the school juristic person by allowing directors to convene the board of directors with the approval of the supervisory authority at the same time of a majority of the directors, and to prevent illegal isolation of the board of directors which obstructs the normal operation of the school juristic person by allowing the supervisory authority to convene the board of directors with the approval of the supervisory authority. Thus, the supervisory authority is obliged to approve the call-up of the board of directors meeting meeting meeting meeting meeting meeting the above requirements, and the approval of the call-up shall grant the applicant the authority to convene the board of directors.

B. When the supervisory authority approves the convocation of the board of directors, it is only possible to approve the convocation itself of the board of directors which set the purpose of the meeting, and it cannot designate the time and place to convene the board of directors. Even if the family supervisory authority approves the convocation and designates the date and place, the designation of the date and place is merely an infinite without any binding force. Thus, the convocation approval is only effective as a convocation approval without the designation of such date and place.

(c) Generally, speed action or speed action is not subject to additional clauses, and even if a family secretary attached to it, it is invalid.

(a)Article 17(4) of the Private School Act; Article 8(c) of the Enforcement Decree of the Private School Act; Article 2 of the Administrative Litigation Act

(b) Supreme Court Decision 87Nu1107 delivered on April 27, 198 (dong)

School Foundation and 3 others, et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant who is the highest luminous rate, spawn, spawn, and Hunting-Ga.

Attorney Lee Jong-soo, et al. at the Office of Education of Daegu Metropolitan City

Daegu High Court Decision 86Gu262 delivered on October 28, 1987

The appeal is dismissed.

The costs of appeal are assessed against the defendant.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. On the first ground for appeal:

(1) In granting approval to convene a board of directors under the provisions of Article 17(4) of the Private School Act, even if the school juristic person’s supervisory authority designates the date, time, and place to convene a board of directors, this does not have any effect, and thus, it shall be deemed to be an approval to convene a board of directors conducted without the designation of the place from the beginning. Thus, even if the approval to convene a meeting is revoked, the date, time, and place specified in the above approval to convene a meeting has already been already passed since it is premised on the validity of the designation of the date, time, and place attached to the above approval to convene a meeting. Therefore, we cannot accept the argument that the instant

(2) According to the records, the directors of the plaintiff corporation opened a board of directors on August 21, 1986 and appointed plaintiffs 2, etc. as chief director, and the defendant rejected the application from August 25 of the same year while the defendant applied for the approval of the appointment of chief director under the name of the plaintiff corporation, and thereafter, the plaintiff corporation opened a board of directors on August 29 of the same year and made the same resolution as the above resolution of August 21, 1986 by the director of the plaintiff corporation, and the defendant rejected the application as of December 8 of the same year, although the plaintiff corporation applied for the approval of the appointment of chief director under the name of the plaintiff corporation as of September 1 of the same year, each of the above rejection dispositions is a separate disposition different from each other, and since the subsequent rejection disposition was made as a result of the previous rejection disposition, it cannot be deemed that there was no interest in the lawsuit of this case seeking the cancellation of the rejection disposition as of August 25, 1986.

2. With respect to points 2, 3 and 5:

Article 17 (4) of the Private School Act provides that in preparation for a vacancy of the board of directors who is a person with the authority to convene the board of directors or a case where it is impossible to convene the board of directors due to evasion of the convocation of the board of directors, where it is required to convene the board of directors, or where it is impossible to convene the board of directors for at least seven days due to a vacancy of the person with the authority to convene the board of directors or a challenge, it may be convened with the approval of the supervisory authority at the same time as the majority of the registered directors. Article 8 of the above Enforcement Decree provides that an application for convening the board of directors shall be accompanied by the documents proving the impossibility of convening the board of directors and the documents proving the above reasons, the documents proving that the majority of the registered directors of the board of directors, and the documents proving the anticipated damage caused by the failure to convene the board of directors. In full view of these provisions, it shall be deemed that an application for convening the board of directors may be rejected by allowing the directors to convene the board of directors with the consent of a majority of the board of directors, and it shall not be justified.

Therefore, when the supervisory authority approves the convocation of the board of directors, it is only possible to approve the convocation of the board of directors, and it cannot designate the date, time, and place for convening the board of directors. Even if the domestic supervisory authority designates the date, time, and place while granting the convocation approval, the time, time, and designation of the place are nothing more than that without any binding force. Thus, the approval of convening shall be deemed to be effective only as the convocation approval without the designation of the place.

As the decision of the court below or the final appeal, even if the date and time for the approval of the convocation of the board of directors, and the designation of the place, are considered as the subsidiary of the approval of the convocation of the board of directors, the subsidiary cannot be attached to the act of binding or binding discretion, and it is clear that the above act of the approval of the convocation of the board of directors constitutes the act of binding or binding discretion as mentioned above. Thus, the subsidiary of the articles should not be attached. Even if the articles were attached, it is invalid, and it should be deemed that there was an act of the approval of convocation that was not attached to the subsidiary from the beginning.

In this regard, the judgment of the court below is just, and there are no errors in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the nature, invalidation, and cancellation of administrative acts such as the theory of lawsuit, negligence in the incomplete hearing, and omission of judgment. There are no grounds for appeal.

3. On the fourth ground for appeal:

Even if the supervisory authority of a school juristic person designates the time, place, etc. of the school juristic person's act of approving the convocation of the board of directors, it was judged before the school juristic person did not have any binding force. In this case, as in this case, the defendant, after designating the time, place, requested the supervisory authority to change the place of the board of directors, after requesting the supervisory authority to change the place of the board of directors, and notified the applicant of the cancellation of the convocation approval when refusing to do so, the request for change of the place is not of doubt, and the applicant does not have any duty to comply. Thus, the request for change of the place cannot be cancelled because the applicant rejected the request for change of the place.

Furthermore, if the supervisory authority approves the convening of the board of directors, the applicant for the convening of the board of directors can convene the board of directors on the basis of the authority granted by the supervisory authority, and according to the records of this case, the applicant convened the board of directors and appointed the plaintiff 2 as the chief director on August 21, 1986 after the approval of the defendant's convening of the board of directors, and there is no data to view that there is a defect in the convocation procedure or resolution process of the board of directors.

Therefore, the court below held that the disposition revoking the approval of convening a meeting is unlawful without any legal basis, such as the defendant's failure to comply with the request for the change of place after the convocation approval, and that the disposition rejecting the request for the approval of convening a meeting based on the resolution is unlawful on the premise that the above disposition is invalid by the board of directors of August 21, 1986 without the convocation approval. In light of the records, the above judgment of the court below is just and it is not erroneous in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the principle of balancing interests in the cancellation or withdrawal of the administrative act, such as the theory of lawsuit, and the omission of the determination.

4. Therefore, the appeal is dismissed, and the costs of the appeal are assessed against the losing defendant. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating judges.

Justices Lee Jae-hee (Presiding Justice)