Seoul Administrative Court 2013Guhap9137 (Law No. 13, 2013)

Whether to recognize extra expenses related to the receipt of processing tax invoices

Since the Plaintiff’s proof on the fact that the instant tax invoice was false, and that the cost was actually paid is insufficient, the instant disposition that was made by denying the construction cost of the instant tax invoice as deductible expenses is lawful.

2013Nu48431 Revocation of Disposition of Corporate Tax Imposition

AA General Construction Corporation

Head of Yeongdeungpo Tax Office

Seoul Administrative Court Decision 2013Guhap9137 decided September 13, 2013

July 10, 2014

July 24, 2014

1. The plaintiff's appeal is dismissed.

2. The costs of appeal shall be borne by the Plaintiff.

The judgment of the first instance shall be revoked. The disposition taken by the Defendant against the Plaintiff on March 2, 2012 by the OOOO of the corporate tax for the business year 2008 shall be revoked.

1. Quotation of judgment of the first instance;

The reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance is partially dismissed as follows, and the reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance is identical to that of the judgment of the court of first instance, except for the addition of the judgment of the plaintiff as to the argument at the appellate court as follows. Thus, it is accepted in accordance with Article 8(2) of the Administrative Litigation Act and Article

O The 5th and the 4th below the 3rd part are each AA Construction.

O) Of the table in paragraph 4(3), the sum paid to 0B in the Schedule shall be removed from OOO(5) per week, with 5 OOO(5).

O's 8th head of the 5th head of the O OO is moving into OOO.

2. Judgment on the plaintiff's assertion

A. The plaintiff's assertion

JungCC, the representative director of the AA Construction, paid the construction cost on behalf of the Plaintiff to 0B, KimE, MaF, and MaG, and thereafter, the Plaintiff settled the construction cost that was paid to MaCC. The instant tax invoice was paid to 0B, KimE, OF, and MaG as above. Although it was true tax invoices or other tax invoices, the Plaintiff actually paid the construction cost corresponding to the instant tax invoice in the way that MaCC first pays the construction cost and then settled the construction cost to MaCC, it should be included in the calculation of losses. Accordingly, the instant disposition made on a different premise is unlawful.

B. Determination

In light of the following circumstances, it is difficult to recognize the Plaintiff’s assertion, and the Plaintiff’s assertion is without merit. The Plaintiff’s assertion is without merit. In light of the following circumstances, it is difficult to acknowledge the facts of the Plaintiff’s assertion.

1) The contract document entered into between the Plaintiff and AA Construction (Evidence 7-1 of the evidence A), the construction period, was set from January 2, 2008 to September 20, 2008, and the representative director of AA Construction, written as AACC. However, it seems to be very exceptional that the Plaintiff, who was a representative director of the AA Construction, takes office on May 19, 2008, to prepare a contract for construction retroactively after he was appointed as the representative director of the AA Construction. Accordingly, the Plaintiff’s assertion that the Plaintiff was entering into a subcontract to PaB, etc. under a contract for the instant construction from AA Construction, is difficult to believe that it is reasonable.

2) From January 3, 2008 to December 30, 2008, PCC and PD paid the construction cost to 0B, etc. However, AA Construction had taken over the Plaintiff at around August 2008, and PCC and ED had taken office as the representative director and director of the Plaintiff on September 16, 2008. However, it is difficult in light of the empirical rule to accept the fact that AA Construction had taken over the Plaintiff and the PCC and ED had paid the construction cost on behalf of the Plaintiff to 0B, etc. before the Plaintiff was appointed as the representative director and director. Rather, PD had been the representative director of AA Construction, OF and ED had been the director at the site of AA Construction, since it was highly probable that DCC and ED had paid the construction cost as income tax on the income tax on AA Construction on September 16, 2008 and 208.

"3) The plaintiff, as the last day of July 1, 2014 submitted by the appellate court, was entitled to receive KRW 100 from 200 on December 1, 2008 from 1, 208, but at that time, AAB's account was seized, and the plaintiff paid 200 won to the plaintiff, and during that period, remitted the remaining amount after deducting the pre-paid amount from 11 and 12 from 2000 on 2000, 2000 O's account deposit from 2000 O's account. However, according to the plaintiff's second bank passbook (Evidence No. 11 and 12, 2008, 2000 O's deposit from 200 O's 2000 won to 200 O's deposit from 200 O28 O's account deposit from 200 O's 208 O's account deposit.

Considering not only the above specific details of admission and withdrawal, but also the fact that regularCC was the representative director of the Plaintiff, it is difficult to recognize that the amount of money entered and withdrawn between the Plaintiff and JeongCC was necessarily settled the Plaintiff’s construction cost paid in lieu of regularCC.

4) The Plaintiff’s assertion as to the relationship between AA Construction and the Plaintiff and 0B, KimE, E, OF, and ChoG, the details of the payment of the construction cost between them, as well as the details of the payment thereof, is inconsistent with the specific evidence as seen earlier, as well as the modification without consistency, from the first instance trial to the closing of argument in the appellate trial, and there is no evidence to prove that the amount claimed by the Plaintiff constitutes the amount indicated in the instant tax invoice or that it was excluded from deductible expenses at the time of the instant disposition.

3. Conclusion

Since the judgment of the first instance is justifiable, the plaintiff's appeal is dismissed as it is groundless.