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(영문) (변경)대법원 1979. 5. 8. 선고 79므3 판결
[남녀관계해소에따른위자료등][집27(2)행,18;공1979.8.1.(613),11993]
Main Issues

(a) Whether or not the natural mother of a child born out of wedlock may make a claim against the natural father for a change in matters concerning the designation or rearing of the child;

(b) Obligation to support the biological mother and limitation on claims for child support;

(c) Requirements for establishing a de facto marriage;

Summary of Judgment

1. Under the current law, in case of an application by a divorce party, unless there is an application by that party at the time of a judgment on nullity or revocation of marriage, there is no legal basis to apply for the designation or bringing-up of the person, and thus, the birth of a person born in a de facto marriage or temporary or regular settlement relationship cannot make such a claim against his/her biological father or mother.

2. Since the biological mother is a person who is originally responsible for the child born out of wedlock, the biological mother has voluntarily supported the child, and is trying to support the child, the biological father may not claim the child support for the past or in the future.

3. In order to be in a de facto marital relationship, there must be, subjectively, the parties have the intention to marry and there should be an substance of marital life to recognize marital life in terms of social norms or family order.

[Reference Provisions]

Articles 837 and 974 of the Civil Act, Article 30 of the Personnel Litigation Act, Article 2(1)3 of the Family Trial Act

claimant-Appellant

[Defendant-Appellant] Defendant 1

Appellant-Appellee

appellees

original decision

Seoul High Court Decision 77Reu155 delivered on January 16, 1971

Text

The appeal is dismissed.

The costs of appeal shall be borne by the appellant.

Reasons

The grounds of appeal by the appellant are examined.

With respect to No. 1:

In light of Article 909 of the Civil Act, Article 2 (1) 3 (f) of the Family Trial Act, Article 30 of the Personnel Litigation Act, Articles 837 and 843 of the Civil Act, and Article 32-5 of the Court Organization Act (the original judgment shall be deemed to be a clerical error in writing), etc., the court below rejected a request for a judgment on the designation of a person bringing up a child against the court in case where the parents fail to reach an agreement on bringing up the child or are unable to reach an agreement on bringing up the child, or where the parties request the court to determine the necessary matters concerning bringing up the child, or where the parties request the court to determine the matters concerning bringing up the child, or to determine the matters concerning bringing up the child. In other cases, the court below did not find any other provisions of the law which can request the designation of the person bringing up the child. As a result, with respect to the person bringing up the child born between the claimant and the respondent, the claimant and the respondent cannot designate the person bringing up the child as his child.

In a case where a divorce party (consultations, divorces, and judicial divorces) applies in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Act, the Family Trial Act, and the Personnel Litigation Act, or where a judgment of nullity or revocation of marriage is rendered, it is permitted to determine matters concerning the designation or fostering of a person who takes care of the child at the request of the party concerned. In other cases, it is clear that there is no legal basis to apply for the designation or fostering of the child. Thus, the above determination measures in the original judgment are just and it is not erroneous in the interpretation and application of the law, and there is no error of law regarding the basic ideology of the law, and the extension of the above provision should be interpreted as to a person born due to de facto marriage or temporary relations.

With respect to the second ground:

The court below recognized the fact that the claimant voluntarily raises the person other than the above claimant and the claimant voluntarily raises the person other than the above claimant until today, and that the defendant would bring the defendant up his own care by failing to comply with the defendant's request for delivery of infant. In recognizing the above facts, the court below did not err in the misapprehension of law as to the abandonment of the defendant's bad faith to the person other than the defendant.

In addition, since both parents have the duty to support their own consciousness, it is reasonable to view that the claimant as the mother of the above person outside the claim has the duty to support the person other than the claim, and therefore, if they have been voluntarily supported and intend to support themselves, they cannot claim the child support in the past or future child support.

We affirm the lower court’s judgment based on this view.

The issue is groundless.

With respect to the third point:

The court below determined that the claimant and the respondent did not have a de facto marital relationship solely on the ground that there is no evidence to recognize that the claimant and the respondent living together, even though they were aware of the fact that a de facto marital relationship had an intention to marry between the parties, and that there was an objective marital relationship between the claimant and the respondent, and that there was no objective fact that the claimant and the respondent had an intention to marry, and that there was an objective marital relationship between the claimant and the respondent at the time of having a marital relationship between the claimant and the respondent, and that the claimant and the respondent had a de facto marital relationship on December 10, 1971.

In examining the record, the above decision of the court below is just, and there is no error in finding facts against the rules of evidence or in interpreting the legal principles on de facto marriage. Therefore, the argument is also groundless.

Therefore, the appeal is dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the appellant. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Ahn Byung-soo (Presiding Justice)

Justices Ahn Byung-man's business trip is unable to sign and seal.

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심급 사건
-서울고등법원 1971.1.16.선고 77르155
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