2015Do14405 Violation of the Local Education Autonomy Act

1. A;

2. B

Defendants

Law Firm BP (For the Defendants)

Attorney Q, Q, BR, and BS

Seoul High Court (Chuncheon) Decision 2015No118 Decided August 26, 2015

December 10, 2015

All appeals are dismissed.

The grounds of appeal are examined (to the extent of supplement in case of supplemental appellate briefs not timely filed).

1. As to the grounds of appeal denying relevance to election campaign, Articles 230(1)4 and 135(3) of the Public Official Election Act, which apply mutatis mutandis under Article 49(1) of the Local Education Autonomy Act, are subject to punishment for offering or promising to offer money, goods, and other benefits in connection with election campaign, and for punishing the act of receiving such benefits. In addition, in relation to election campaign, "in relation to election campaign" under Article 135(3) of the Public Official Election Act, "in relation to election campaign", "in accordance with election campaign," it is more broad, and there was no purpose of influencing the purpose of election campaign or election, and there was no need to regulate acts that are highly likely to infringe on the freedom and fairness of election. Thus, the provision of money and goods does not necessarily require consideration for election campaign-related election campaign, and the provision of information related to election campaign is also subject to punishment for election campaign-related election campaign-related expenses, such as election campaign-related expenses related to election campaign.

For the reasons indicated in its holding, the lower court determined that Defendant A’s act of preparing for future election campaign or providing simple labor services is not merely an act of preparing for future election campaign, but also an act of directly related to election campaign, in full view of various activities performed by the J, L, M, N, andO at an election campaign office established after the registration of the E, F, G, H, and preliminary candidate, which was worked in the BD established by Defendant A two months prior to the official declaration of the going out of the Office of Education of this case and about three months prior to the registration of the preliminary candidate.

Examining the reasoning of the lower judgment in light of the aforementioned legal principles and records, the lower court’s aforementioned determination is justifiable. In so doing, it did not err by misapprehending the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence against logical and empirical rules, or by misapprehending the legal doctrine as to Articles 230(1)4 and 135(3) of the Public Official Election Act.

2. As to the grounds of appeal that denies Defendant A’s solicitation or that denies the relevance of election expenses paid by Defendant A by 1, etc., this part of the grounds of appeal is not legitimate grounds of appeal, as it contests the selection of evidence and fact-finding belonging to the lower court’s exclusive jurisdiction.

Furthermore, examining the evidence duly adopted and examined by the court below and the first instance court, it is just to determine that the court below, based on its stated reasoning, in collusion with Defendant A through Defendant B or C, provided or promised to provide money and goods in connection with the election campaign to persons engaged in the election campaign, and disbursed election expenses through a deposit account in which no report is made to the competent election commission, and that the expenses used as stated in the separate sheet (3) of the judgment of the court of first instance constituted election expenses related to the election campaign, and contrary to what is alleged in the grounds of appeal, there is no error of law by misapprehending the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence in violation of logical

3. The assertion that the appeal procedure by the election commission is unlawful or that the decision of excluding a participatory trial or the decision of revocation on bail is unlawful is not a legitimate ground for appeal since the Defendants asserted that they were not subject to a trial by the court below, or that they were not subject to a trial by its authority. Furthermore, even upon examining the remaining grounds for appeal, the judgment of the first instance and the judgment of the court below

In addition, under Article 383 subparagraph 4 of the Criminal Procedure Act, only in cases where death penalty, life imprisonment, or imprisonment or imprisonment without prison labor for not less than ten years has been imposed, an appeal on the grounds of unfair sentencing is allowed. Thus, in this case where a more minor sentence has been imposed on the Defendants, the argument that the sentencing of the sentence is unreasonable

4. Conclusion

Therefore, all appeals are dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Kim Chang-suk

Justices Lee Sang-hoon

Justices Cho Jong-hee

Justices Park Sang-ok