[1] Whether the issue of whether an accident insurance for a non-life-free motor vehicle falls under the category of "non-life-free motor vehicle" of the accident insurance for a policyholder's insurance premium being legally terminated (affirmative), and whether the victim's insurance company's payment of an accident insurance for a non-life-free motor vehicle constitutes a case where a non-debtor paid another's debt by mistake to the insurer, or a case where the insurance company for a non-life-free motor vehicle manages its business on behalf of the insurance company for a non-life-free motor vehicle (negative)

[2] Standard for determining whether a debtor's assertion that the statute of limitations expired constitutes an abuse of rights against the good faith principle

[1] The term "non-life insurance" used in the category of automobile insurance coverage, which means an injury by non-life insurance (hereinafter "non-life insurance for non-life insurance") among the types of insurance coverage, includes a melting vehicle where the issue arises as to whether a policyholder's delayed payment of insurance premium was legally terminated due to the delayed payment of insurance premium by an insurance company that entered into a contract for non-life insurance as an insured vehicle II (hereinafter "life insurance company"). Therefore, in such a case, if the victim claims for the payment of insurance proceeds from non-life insurance for his/her insurance company (hereinafter "victim insurance company"), the insurance company cannot refuse the victim's claim unless it is clearly and objectively stated in law, and the insurance company should first pay the victim the insurance proceeds under non-life insurance for the non-life insurance for the damage suffered by the victim.

In this case, it is merely a performance of the obligation under the victim's non-life insurance contract to pay the insurance money under the victim's non-life insurance to the insured who is a victim. Thus, it does not constitute a business management for the insurance company for the victim, since it is merely a performance of the obligation under the victim's own insurance contract. In addition, even if it is objectively and objectively revealed that the victim's insurance company should bear the liability for compensation under the automobile insurance substitute compensation II after the victim paid the insurance money to the insured, it cannot be said that the victim's insurance company exempted the insured from the liability for compensation due to an accident, as stipulated in the terms and conditions, if the insured acquires the right to a third party within the insurance money paid by the victim's insurance company to the insured, it cannot be deemed that the victim's insurance company obtained the benefit without any legal ground from the payment of the insurance money to the victim's insurance company, and it cannot be deemed that the victim's insurance company acquired a separate claim for indemnity against the insurance company for the

[2] The exercise of the obligor’s right of defense based on the statute of limitations is subject to the control of the principle of good faith and the prohibition of abuse of rights, which are the major principles of our civil law. Thus, in special cases where the obligor has made it impossible or considerably difficult for the obligee to exercise the obligee’s right or the interruption of prescription prior to the completion of the statute of limitations, has acted to make such an obligee believe it unnecessary, has objectively obstructed the obligee from exercising its right, or the obligor has shown the same attitude that the obligor would not invoke the statute of limitations after the completion of the statute of limitations, or the obligor has made the obligee trusted it, there is a great need to protect the obligee, and there is a great need to protect the obligee, and there are other creditors under the same conditions remarkably unfair or unfair to refuse the performance of the obligation, the obligor’s assertion

However, if the obligor’s claim for the completion of extinctive prescription is contrary to the good faith principle and constitutes an abuse of rights, special circumstances should be recognized as seen earlier, and it is also difficult to apply the above general principles to exclude the operation of specific systems, which are governed by the law, as there is a risk of undermining the legal stability, which is another general principle in the interpretation of the law.

[1] Articles 650(2), 682(1), 726-2, and 737 of the Commercial Act; Articles 734, 741, and 745 of the Civil Act / [2] Articles 2 and 162 of the Civil Act

[1] Supreme Court Decision 2002Da61958 delivered on December 26, 2003 (Gong2004Sang, 211) / [2] Supreme Court Decision 2002Da32332 delivered on October 25, 2002 (Gong2002Ha, 2849) Supreme Court Decision 2004Da71881 Delivered on May 13, 2005 (Gong2005Sang, 950)

Samsung Fire and Marine Insurance Co., Ltd. (Bae & Yang LLC, Attorneys White-chul et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

ELa District Damage Insurance Co., Ltd. (Law Firm Duo, Attorneys Kim Jung-gi et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Daegu District Court Decision 2011Na11823 Decided October 21, 2011

The appeal is dismissed. The costs of appeal are assessed against the defendant.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. As to the grounds of appeal Nos. 1 through 4

Of the types of automobile insurance, the term “non-insurance vehicle” used in the term “non-life insurance policy” refers to an insured automobile which caused a traffic accident as an insured automobile, includes a sea-free vehicle in the case where an insurance company that entered into an automobile insurance contract II for automobile insurance (hereinafter “life insurance company”) under the terms and conditions of exemption has a problem as to whether the insurance company for the pertinent traffic accident has exempted the victim from liability on the ground of the relationship of refusing the payment of insurance money, and the existence of liability for compensation by the insurance company for the sea-free vehicle has not been clearly identified objectively (see Supreme Court Decision 2002Da61958, Dec. 26, 2003). In light of these legal principles, the term “non-insurance vehicle” used in the accident insurance policy refers to an insurance company for non-life insurance, which refers to 202Da61958, which is an insurance company for non-life insurance, and ultimately includes a victim’s liability to pay insurance money to the victim under the law, 2000.

In this case, it is merely a performance of the obligation under the victim's non-life insurance contract to pay the insurance money under the victim's non-life insurance to the insured who is the victim. Therefore, it does not constitute a business management for the purpose of the Insurance Companies Act, since it is merely a performance of the obligation under the victim's own insurance contract. In addition, even if it is objectively and objectively revealed that the victim's insurance company should bear the liability to compensate for automobile insurance after the victim paid the above insurance money to the insured, it cannot be said that the victim's insurance company exempted the insured from the liability to compensate for damage caused by an accident, as stipulated in the terms and conditions, if the insured acquires the right of the third party within the scope of the insurance money paid by the victim's insurance company to the insured, it cannot be deemed that the victim's insurance company obtained the benefit without any legal ground from the payment of the above insurance money to the victim's insurance company, and it cannot be deemed that the victim's insurance company has acquired a separate claim for indemnity against the insurance company in addition

According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below acknowledged the facts as stated in its holding, and rejected the payment of insurance money to the deceased non-party 1's bereaved family members and non-party 2 (hereinafter the deceased non-party 1's "the deceased", his bereaved family members, and non-party 2's "the deceased, etc.") due to the termination of the comprehensive automobile insurance contract except for the large-person damage I, and rejected the claim for reimbursement against the plaintiff under Article 745 (2) of the Civil Code or the defendant's claim for reimbursement of the above insurance money to the plaintiff, on the ground that the accident insurance was caused by the non-life insurance which the deceased, etc. entered into with the defendant, and therefore, the accident insurance money paid to the deceased, etc. under the non-life insurance contract constitutes a non-life insurance accident insurance for which the deceased, etc. acquired the claim for reimbursement against the plaintiff under Article 745 (2) of the Civil Code or returned the above insurance money to the plaintiff or the above non-party 2's claim for reimbursement of unjust enrichment."

In light of the above legal principles and records, the above judgment of the court below is just, and there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the establishment of the right to indemnity and the period of extinctive prescription under Article 745 of the Civil Act, the establishment of unjust enrichment return claim or right to indemnity, and the period and

In addition, according to the records, the court below did not explicitly decide on the defendant's argument that the office manager acquired the right to claim reimbursement of expenses. However, in light of the overall purport of the judgment of the court of first instance cited by the court below, it can be deemed that the above judgment contains the purport of not establishing the right to claim reimbursement of expenses by the office manager, and even if the judgment was omitted, the above assertion should be rejected for the reasons as seen earlier, and therefore, the omission of judgment by the court below did not affect the conclusion of the judgment.

In conclusion, the judgment of the court below is not erroneous in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the establishment of the office manager's right to claim reimbursement of expenses, the period of extinctive prescription, omission of judgment, and so on. The ground of appeal on this part is without merit

2. As to the fifth ground for appeal

The exercise of a debtor's right of defense based on the statute of limitations is governed by the principle of good faith and prohibition of abuse of rights, which are the major principles of our Civil Act. Thus, in special circumstances where the debtor has made it impossible or considerably difficult for the creditor to exercise his right or the interruption of prescription before the expiration of the statute of limitations, or acted to make it unnecessary to take such measures, or the creditor has objectively obstructed the creditor from exercising his right, or the debtor has shown the same attitude that the debtor would not invoke the statute of limitations after the expiration of the statute of limitations, or where other creditors of the same condition receive the repayment of the debt, etc. make it considerably unreasonable or unfair to allow the debtor to assert the completion of the statute of limitations as an abuse of rights against the principle of good faith (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2002Da3232, Oct. 25, 2002). However, if the debtor's claim for the completion of the statute of limitations is contrary to the principle of good faith and constitutes an abuse of rights, it should be acknowledged as above.

In light of the overall circumstances of the lawsuit in this case, the court below's determination that the defendant's assertion of extinctive prescription goes against the principle of trust and good faith or it is difficult to regard it as abuse of rights is just and there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the violation of the principle of trust and good faith or abuse of rights. The ground of appeal

3. Conclusion

Therefore, the appeal is dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Jo Hee-de (Presiding Justice)