After a judgment dismissing the absence of ownership and the claim for prohibition of entry against the same defendant with respect to the same farmland, there is a judgment accepting the claim for confirmation of farmland right, and Article 422 (1) 10 of the Civil Procedure Act.

After the judgment that Gap rejected the claim for confirmation of existence and non-entry of ownership against Eul and the claim for prohibition of entry against the same land became final and conclusive, the claim for confirmation of farming right against the above Eul was accepted, it does not constitute a ground for retrial under paragraph (1) 10 of this Article.

Article 422(1)10 of the Civil Procedure Act and Articles 202 and 204 of the Civil Procedure Act

Park Jong-il

Freeboard

Seoul High Court Decision 63Na316 delivered on February 20, 1964, Seoul High Court Decision 63Na316 delivered on February 20, 196

The judgment below is reversed;

The case shall be remanded to the Panel Division of the Seoul Civil District Court.

As the Seoul District Court Decision No. 961 of 4294 rendered a new trial, the order of the judgment on the farmland right confirmation case between the above Defendant No. 1 and the above Defendant No. 461 of this Act was confirmed to be owned by the Plaintiff, and the farmland right No. 76 of Yeongdeungpo-gu, Seoul District Court Decision No. 1465 of 4290 of the Seoul District Court Decision No. 1490 of the Seoul District Court Decision No. 965 of Apr. 15, 4290 of the farmland committee's claim for cancellation of the decision on the farmland committee between Defendant No. 1 of this case and Defendant No. 4 of this case, which was the plaintiff No. 961 of this case's short-term Seoul District Court Decision No. 961 of 4294, the Seoul District Court's decision that the farmland committee distributed the above farmland to the Plaintiff, which was the plaintiff No. 94 of this case's claim for new trial or its cancellation on the land ownership No. 941 to the above defendant No. 92 of this case's claim for new judgment.

However, the court below held that the above two lawsuits are a farming household under the Farmland Reform Act, which is distributed to one of them, and they are the cause of the claim that there is ownership and the right of cultivation premised on the above two lawsuits, and the judgment is in conflict with each other. The judgment of the court below is erroneous, and there is a wrong error in interpreting Article 422 (1) 10 of the Civil Procedure Act, and there is a ground of appeal.

Therefore, it is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating judges, except the Dob-dong and B-Sap.

The dissenting opinion of the judge of the Supreme Court is as follows. The final judgment of the Seoul District Court No. 961 of 4294 (No. 1-1) in the case claiming the confirmation of the farmland right between the defendant Lee Jong-dong, the defendant Lee Jong-gu, the Seoul District Court's short-term 4294 (No. 1-1-1), which is the subject of the request for the retrial, is comparison with the final judgment (No. 3-1-1-1-2) on the claim for non-entry prohibition of entry among the final judgment on the claim for confirmation of the non-existence of the land ownership and the non-entry prohibition of entry between the defendant Lee Jong-dong, the defendant Lee Jong-dong, the decision of the Supreme Court in 4290 (No. 1465-2-2-2) which is the subject of the request for retrial, and even if the form of the claim differs, the cause of each claim is the same as the subject matter of the above farmland, which is the subject matter of the lawsuit.

In light of the fact that the above two rulings dealt with the existence or absence of ownership or right to cultivate farmland subject to the same Act after the enforcement of the Farmland Reform Act, and that the important provisions of the same Act, such as purchase or distribution of farmland under the Farmland Reform Act, are at least matters to be ex officio at a fact-finding court, and that the legislative intent of Article 422 (1) 10 of the Civil Procedure Act is to adjust the division of right relationship due to conflict with the final and conclusive judgment before and after the enforcement of the same Act, in the case after the final and conclusive judgment which had been rendered first to observe the purpose and cause of each claim, the new judgment against the plaintiff was sought for the cancellation of the new judgment against the plaintiff's claim against the plaintiff for the cancellation of the new trial on farmland distribution under the premise that the defendant continued to cultivate the farmland, which was non-party 1, 1951, after the enforcement of the Farmland Reform Act.

Since the former, which is a final and conclusive judgment after this, seeks confirmation of the right to cultivate farmland on the premise that the farmland is cultivated since the acquisition of farmland prior to the enforcement of the Farmland Reform Act, 1948 (the time for acquisition by transfer was retroactive, and the above judgment accepted the right to cultivate, but the time was changed to 1951, on the record, and the right to cultivate which the final and conclusive judgment first rendered after the final and conclusive judgment was rendered in an unlawful manner is favorable to the right to cultivate farmland and cannot be recognized as the Farmland Reform Act, and it cannot be seen as a right of a nature which cannot be acknowledged as the Farmland Reform Act) is obvious that the core part of each cause of the request is the same, and therefore, it should be viewed that the new defendant asserted that the above farmland was legitimate as at the time of the judgment, and therefore, it would not be viewed that there was a violation of the right to cultivate farmland under the Farmland Reform Act and that there was no such a claim for the same purport of the final and conclusive judgment as the above decision did not have any different purport of the purport of the right to cultivate.

Therefore, although the reasoning of the judgment does not seem to be sufficient, it was justified that the above purport of the judgment was judged to be in conflict with the part of dismissing the claim for prohibition of entry into and departure from the final judgment in the case No. 1465 of the Seoul District Court Decision 4290 which was rendered before the final judgment was rendered, and the appeal which discussed the purport of the judgment is groundless. Thus, the final appeal shall be dismissed.

Justices Lee Young-chul (Presiding Judge) of the Supreme Court of Justice Lee Young-dong (Presiding Judge) and Kim Young-dong and Kim Jong-chul, Han Sung-sung Red Corpung, Man-man, Man-man, Manman