(영문) 제주지방법원 2012.11.8.선고 2012노64 판결

The part of the lower judgment against Defendant C and D is reversed. Defendant C and D shall be punished by a fine of KRW 3,00,000. In the event that Defendant C and D fail to pay the above fine, the above Defendants shall be confined in the workhouse for the period calculated by converting the amount of KRW 50,000 from one day to one day. Defendant C and D shall be ordered to pay a reasonable amount of the said fine. All appeals filed by Defendant A and B are dismissed.

Reasons

1. Summary of grounds for appeal;

A. Error of mistake

Defendant B, not with the intention of hindering the vicarious execution, merely putting the fruit trees on the roads of obstructing the vicarious execution, but with the fact that he saw the balth of H as a public official H. However, he did not go beyond it.

Defendant C was put up only a wooden sub-mark to the turdy field of the Office of Education, where he stored the objects to be collected.

피고인 D 역시 교육청 잔디밭 쪽으로 밀어놓으려고 통나무를 든 것일 뿐 대집행 방해할 의도가 없었고, 비닐천막의 외피를 발로 찼을 뿐이지 공무원에게 발길질을한 바 없다.

B. misunderstanding of facts or misapprehension of legal principles

(1) The vicarious administrative execution should be subject to a violation of "alternative duty of act". Since the Jeju Mayor did not issue a disposal order based on Article 83 of the Road Act, the vicarious administrative execution of this case was made as the object of the violation of the duty of omission, and is illegal. Thus, the defendants' act of resisting this is not deemed to constitute the crime of obstruction of performance of official duties.

(2) There was no prior collusion with the other Defendants about the act of displaying each item, which is a dangerous object by Defendant A, and Defendant A was involved in the contingent site at the time of removal counter-execution and the other Defendants could not be recognized or known, despite the fact that the other Defendants could not recognize or recognize it, the judgment of the court below which held the other Defendants liable for the crime of co-principal of the special obstruction of performance of official duties by Defendant A, is erroneous in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the requirements for the establishment of co-principal and in the misconception of facts.

C. Unreasonable sentencing

The sentence of the lower court against the Defendants (Defendant A, B: each of six months of imprisonment, one year of suspended execution, Defendant C, and D: three months of imprisonment, one year of suspended execution, and one year of suspended execution) is too unreasonable.

2. Determination

A. As to the assertion of mistake of fact

According to the evidence duly admitted and examined by the court below, the defendants can sufficiently recognize the fact that they engaged in the same conduct as stated in the judgment of the court below. Thus, all of the defendants' arguments of mistake of facts are without merit

B. As to the assertion of mistake of facts or misapprehension of legal principles

(1) Whether the instant administrative vicarious execution is legitimate

Article 38 (1) of the Road Act provides that "any person who intends to build, rebuild, alter, or remove structures, articles, or other facilities, or to occupy and use roads for other purposes in the zone of a road shall obtain permission from the road management agency. The same shall also apply to an extension or alteration of permitted matters." Article 45 of the same Act provides that "no person shall do any of the following acts with respect to roads without justifiable grounds." Article 83 of the same Act provides that "the act of piling soil and stones, bamboo, or other obstacles shall be prohibited." Article 83 of the same Act provides that "the road management agency shall revoke permission or approval granted under this Act, suspend the effect thereof, suspend works, rebuild structures, relocate things, or take other necessary measures against any person who falls under any of the following subparagraphs, such as construction, removal, removal, removal, or removal of things on the road by the road, removal of things on the road by the road, removal of things on the road by the road and removal of things on the road by the road pursuant to the provisions of Article 8 (3).

Meanwhile, according to the evidence duly adopted and examined by the court below, the Jeju Mayor voluntarily delivered the article on the road to the Jeju District Headquarters on February 28, 201, in violation of Articles 38(1) and 45 of the Road Act, and the article 18:3 of the Road Act to voluntarily remove the article on the road until March 4, 2011, and the article 38:3 of the article 13 of the article 38 of the article provides that if the article is not carried out, the article 3 of the article will be delivered by registered mail and the article 3 of the article will be delivered to March 2, 201; the Jeju Mayor delivered the article 3 of the article 3 of the article 13 of the article 13 of the article 2 of the article 31; the article 18:3 of the article 3 of the article 2 of the article 31 of the article 16 of the article 3 of the Act to the Jeju District Headquarters on March 10, 2011.

According to the above facts, it can be deemed that the issuance of each books including the fact that the object is specified and the considerable time limit is the issuance of an order under Article 83 of the Road Act, and the violation of the duty of omission has been converted into the duty of act as a substitute, upon the issuance of the above order.

Therefore, the administrative vicarious execution of this case is deemed to be subject to the duty to remove the unmanned of the alternative act, and it constitutes legitimate execution of official duties. The defendants' act of assault, etc. against the public officials in the above administrative vicarious execution constitutes the crime of obstruction of performance of official duties. Therefore, this part of the defendants' assertion

(2) Whether the crime of special obstruction of performance of official duties is established

형법 제30조의 공동정범은 공동가공의 의사와 그 공동의사에 기한 기능적 행위지배를 통한 범죄 실행이라는 주관적·객관적 요건을 충족함으로써 성립하는바, 공모 자 중 구성요건 행위 일부를 직접 분담하여 실행하지 않은 자라도 경우에 따라 이른바 공모공동정범으로서의 죄책을 질 수도 있는 것이기는 하나, 이를 위해서는 전체 범죄에 있어서 그가 차지하는 지위, 역할이나 범죄 경과에 대한 지배 내지 장악력 등을 종합해 볼 때, 단순한 공모자에 그치는 것이 아니라 범죄에 대한 본질적 기여를 통한 기능적 행위지배가 존재하는 것으로 인정되는 경우여야 한다(대법원 2006. 12. 22. 선고 2006도1623 판결, 대법원 2007. 4. 26. 선고 2007도235 판결 등 참조). 그리고 이 경우, 범죄의 수단과 태양, 가담하는 인원과 그 성향, 범행 시간과 장소의 특성, 범행 과정에서 타인과의 접촉 가능성과 예상되는 반응 등 제반 상황에 비추어, 공모자들이 그 공모한 범행을 수행하거나 목적 달성을 위해 나아가는 도중에 부수적인 다른 범죄가 파생되리라고 예상하거나 충분히 예상할 수 있는데도 그러한 가능성을 외면한 채 이를 방지하기에 족한 합리적인 조치를 취하지 아니하고 공모한 범행에 나아갔다가 결국 그와 같이 예상되던 범행들이 발생하였다면, 비록 그 파생적인 범행 하나하나에 대하여 개별적인 의사의 연락이 없었다 하더라도 당초의 공모자들 사이에 그 범행 전부에 대하여 암묵적인 공모는 물론 그에 대한 기능적 행위지배가 존재한다고 보아야 할 것이다(대법원 2010. 12. 23. 선고 2010도7412 판결).이 사건 기록에 의하면, 피고인들은 F노동조합 제주본부의 간부급 지위를 가진 사람들로서 2010. 11. 23.경부터 이 사건 현장에서 노숙투쟁을 하여왔던 점, 이 사건 현장에는 각목, 통나무, 목재깔판 등 건축폐자재 및 각종 취사도구 등이 적치되어 있었던 점, 2011. 2. 21.경 1차 행정대집행으로 이 사건 현장의 노상적치물 등을 철거하였으나 피고인들을 비롯한 F노동조합 제주본부 노조원들을 또다시 이 사건 현장에 건축폐자재 등을 적치하고 노숙투쟁을 계속하였던 점, 2011. 3. 23. 이 사건 행정대집행 당시 피고인들 주변에는 위와 같은 건축폐자재 등이 적치되어 있었고 피고인 A은 이러한 건축폐자재 중 주위에 있던 각목을 집어들고 원심 판시 기재와 같은 행동을 하였던 점, 피고인들은 서로 시간적, 장소적으로 근접하여 각기 원심 판시와 같은 행위를 하였던 점, 실제로 피고인 A을 제외한 나머지 피고인들도 통나무, 목재깔판 등을 집어 들고 행정대집행 중인 공무원들을 위협하였던 점등을 종합하여 보면, 피고인 A을 제외한 피고인들이 비록 피고인 A이 위험한 물건인 각목을 양손에 들고 휘두른 특수공무 집행방해행위에 대하여 구체적으로 모의하거나 이를 직접 분담하여 실행한 바 없었다. 하더라도 이러한 행위가 발생할 수 있다는 점에 대하여 충분히 예상할 수 있었음에도 불구하고 이를 방지하기에 족한 합리적인 조치를 전혀 취하지 아니하고 각기 원심 판시 기재와 같은 행위를 하였던 것으로 보여지는바, 피고인들에 대하여 특수공무집행방 해죄에 대하여 본질적 기여를 통한 기능적 행위지배가 있었다고 보아 피고인들을 특수공무집행방해죄의 공동정범으로 의율한 원심 판결은 정당한 것으로 판단되므로, 원심판결에 공동정범성립에 관한 사실오인이나 법리오해의 위법이 있다는 피고인들의 주장은 모두 이유 없다.

C. Regarding the assertion of unreasonable sentencing

(1) Determination as to Defendant A and B

Examining the motive, means, and consequence of the instant crime, and the overall sentencing conditions indicated in the instant pleadings, such as the circumstances after the crime, the lower court’s punishment against the Defendants is too unreasonable. Therefore, the Defendants’ assertion is without merit.

(2) Determination as to Defendant C and D

The Defendants’ act not only interferes with the legitimate performance of duties by public officials, thereby impairing the State’s function, but also harming public officials, and assaulting them, which is dangerous in the situation at the time of vicarious administrative execution, which may be somewhat excessive. However, the Defendants’ claim is reasonable, since it appears that the original deliberation sentence is somewhat inappropriate in light of the following circumstances: (a) there was an agreement on pending issues of labor-management disputes between the FF Trade Union and the Jeju Special Self-Governing Province; (b) the extent of the Defendants’ participation in the instant case was relatively minor; (c) the extent of the Defendants’ participation in the instant case is relatively minor; and (d) there is a significant restriction in the Defendants’ vocational choice if the Defendants choose imprisonment with labor; and (e) taking into account all the circumstances that are the conditions for sentencing, such as the Defendants’ age, character and conduct, motive, means and consequence of the instant crime, and the circumstances after the crime.

3. Conclusion

Thus, Defendant C and D’s appeal is reasonable, so it is in accordance with Article 364(6) of the Criminal Procedure Act.

The part of the judgment of the court below against the defendant C and D shall be reversed, and the appeal by the defendant A and B shall be dismissed in accordance with Article 364 (4) of the Criminal Procedure Act on the grounds that the appeal by the defendant A and B is without merit.

Criminal facts and summary of evidence

The summary of the facts charged and evidence against Defendant C and D recognized by this court is identical to each corresponding column of the judgment of the court below, and thus, it is cited in accordance with Article 369 of the Criminal Procedure Act.

Application of Statutes

1. Article 144 (1), Article 136 (1), and Article 30 of the Criminal Act: Articles 144 (1), 136 (1), and 30 of the same Act;

1. Commercial competition;

Defendant C and D: Articles 40 and 50 of the Criminal Code

1. Selection of punishment;

Defendant C and D: Selection of each fine

1. Detention in a workhouse;

Defendant C and D: Articles 70 and 69(2) of the Criminal Act

1. Order of provisional payment;

Defendant C and D: Article 334(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act