2013Do1267(a) The name of a crime recognized as an attempted murder: The punishment of violence, etc.

Violation of law (Bodily Injury by Group, Deadly Weapons, etc.)

(b) Violation of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act (Habitual group, deadly weapon, etc.);

Change of Injury: Punishment of Violences, etc. Act

(In the case of a group, injury by deadly Weapons, etc. of Organizations, etc.), the name of the crime partially recognized:

Violation of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act (a group, a deadly weapon, etc., injured);

Partially Recognized Crime: Punishment of Violences, etc. Act

Violations (Habitual Injury)

(c) Violation of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act (Habitual Injury);

Change: Violation of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act

(Habitual Injury by Organizations, etc.): Violence

Violation of the Punishment, etc. of Acts (Habitual Injury)

(d) Violation of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act (part of habitual assault);

Change: Violation of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act

(Habitual Violence by Organizations, etc.): The name of a crime of violence partially recognized.

Violation of the Punishment Act (Habitual Violence)

(e) Violation of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act (the composition and activities of an organization, etc.);

Some Revocation of Public Prosecution)

(f) Violation of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act (a group or group of organizations;

Defendant D, C, E, or

name of a crime recognized for F, G, or H

The name of the crime recognized against Defendant A and I:

Violation of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act (a group, a deadly weapon, etc.)

g. Magnas

(h) Violation of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act;

Defendant 1. A.B.D.E. F.D.

2.ma.f.A.

3.e.h.B

4. E. H. C

5. E.

6. E. This;

7. e. f. P

8. E. Q.

9. E.R.

10.e. S

11.e. T:

12. E. H. U.

13.e.V.

14.e.h. F

W. 15, e.h. W

16. E. X

17.e. I

18. E.g. Y

19.(e)Z;

20.e.g. G

21. E. H. H

22.e. g. A

23.e. AB

24.e. AC

Defendant D and Prosecutor (in respect of Defendants)

Attorney DN (N on the part of defendant D)

Attorney DO (Defendant A, B, U, F, W);

I, Y, G, and H Central Offices for H

Attorney DP (National Election for Defendant C)

Attorney D Q (Korean National Assembly Line for Defendant E)

Attorney DR (Defendant O, P)

Daejeon High Court Decision 2012No344 decided January 11, 2013

Daejeon High Court Decision 2012No344-1 (Separation) decided January 16, 2013

June 14, 2013

All appeals are dismissed.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. As to Defendant D’s ground of appeal

Examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the evidence duly admitted, the court below is justified in finding Defendant D guilty of the charge of carrying deadly weapons and dangerous articles on May 15, 2008 against the victim 2 among the facts charged in the instant case against Defendant D, and of habitual injury on July 20, 208, and the charge of habitual injury on July 20, 2008. In so doing, the court below did not err by exceeding the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence against logical and empirical rules.

Although the Defendant asserts to the effect that there was an error of mistake in the lower judgment regarding the remaining charges found guilty of the victim Z, according to the record, the Defendant appealed the first instance judgment against the judgment, and only asserted unreasonable sentencing as the grounds for appeal on this part, this does not constitute a legitimate ground for appeal.

In addition, under Article 383 subparagraph 4 of the Criminal Procedure Act, only in cases where death penalty, life imprisonment, or imprisonment or imprisonment without prison labor for not less than ten years has been imposed, an appeal on the grounds of unfair sentencing is allowed. Thus, in this case where a more minor sentence has been imposed on the defendant, the argument that the amount of punishment is unreasonable

2. As to the Prosecutor’s ground of appeal

(5) If the Defendants were to form a new E-mail organization with no fixed number of members of the 2nd group of crime or to form a new E-mail organization with no fixed number of members of the 2nd group of crimes, then the Defendants cannot be viewed as constituting a separate organization with different criminal intent because they were separated from the existing organizations and were integrated with other organizations (see Supreme Court Decision 200Do1274 delivered on June 11, 209, etc.). Further, if the Defendants were to form a new E-mail organization with no fixed number of members of the 2nd group of crimes or to form a new E-mail organization with no fixed number of members of the 0th group of crimes, then the Defendants cannot be viewed as constituting a new E-mail organization with no fixed number of members of the 4th group of members of the 2nd group of crimes under the joint purpose of this Act (see Supreme Court Decision 9Do1274 delivered on June 1, 200).

(3) Examining the above legal principles and records, the above determination by the court below is just and acceptable. In so doing, the court below did not err by exceeding the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence against logical and empirical rules, or by misapprehending the legal principles as to criminal organizations under Article 4 of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act or by failing to exhaust all necessary reasons.

B. As to the grounds of appeal on conflict

Examining the reasoning of the judgment of the court below in light of the records, it is justified that the court below maintained the judgment of the court of the first instance which acquitted each of the Defendants on the grounds that there is no evidence of each of the charges in violation of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act (Habitual disturbance by organizations, etc.) and the conflict, and there is no error exceeding the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence in violation of logical and empirical rules.

C. As to the grounds of appeal on Defendant D’s attempted murder does not necessarily require the intention of murdering or planned murdering, it is sufficient to recognize or anticipate the possibility or risk of causing death of another person due to his own act, and its recognition or prediction is not only conclusive but also conclusive. In a case where the Defendant merely contests that there was no criminal intent of murder or assault at the time of committing the crime, the issue of whether the Defendant was guilty of murder shall be determined by taking into account the objective circumstances before and after committing the crime, such as the background leading up to the crime, motive, type of a deadly weapon prepared at the time of committing the crime, the nature and repetition of the crime, and the likelihood of causing death (see Supreme Court Decision 2010Do9869, Nov. 11, 2010, etc.).

The lower court maintained the judgment of innocence of the first instance court on the ground that it is impossible to recognize the intention of murder in full view of the circumstances in the holding, including: (a) Defendant D was in a situation where it could sufficiently bucks down the bucks; and (b) immediately after that, the victim AV was transferred to a hospital, the lower court maintained the judgment of innocence of the first instance.

In light of the above legal principles and records, the above determination by the court below is just and acceptable, and there were no errors by exceeding the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence in violation of logical and empirical rules, or by misapprehending the legal principles on the intention of murder.

D. As to the grounds of appeal on the habitual nature of Defendant C, habitual crime refers to any brush and the tendency of a crime, which do not constitute the essence of the act, and refers to the character that constitutes the character of the offender. As such, whether habituality as prescribed by Article 2(1) of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act refers to the Defendant’s age, character, occupation, environment, criminal record, motive, means, method and place of the crime, interval with the previous crime, and similarity with the contents of the crime (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2004Do6176, May 11, 2006).

The court below affirmed the judgment of the first instance that held it difficult to view Defendant C as having a habit of committing an act of violence in light of the fact that Defendant C was sentenced to a fine of KRW 3 million for a violation of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act on April 9, 2002, and that it did not commit a crime of the same kind for a considerable period after committing the crime around 207.

In light of the above legal principles and records, the above determination by the court below is just and acceptable, and there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles as to habituality.

E. As to the grounds of appeal on Defendant A’s act of violence on February 2010

Examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the records, it is just that the court below affirmed the judgment of the court of first instance that acquitted Defendant A of the facts charged in violation of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act (a group, deadly weapons, etc. and injury by deadly weapons, etc.) around February 2010 among the facts charged in this case against Defendant A on the grounds that there is no evidence of the crime, and there is no error in violation of the principle of free evaluation of evidence in violation of logical and empirical rules.

F. As to the grounds of appeal regarding Defendant P’s act of violence on August 201

Examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the records, it is just that the court below affirmed the judgment of the court of first instance that acquitted Defendant P of the facts charged as to the violation of the Punishment of Violences, etc. Act (a group, deadly weapon, etc. and injury by an organization, etc.) around August 201, among the facts charged in this case against Defendant P, on the grounds that there is no evidence of the crime, and there is no error in violation of the principle of free evaluation of evidence against logical and empirical rules.

3. Conclusion

Therefore, all appeals are dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Park Poe-young

Justices Min Il-young

Justices Lee In-bok

Justices Kim Shin -