A. If it is evident that the right to claim the cancellation registration of ownership transfer on the real estate, which is the right to be preserved for the injunction against disposal, does not take place even at the time of the above provisional disposition order, the above provisional disposition order does not have the effect of preventing the act of disposal as the exercise of security right on the real estate. Therefore, the plaintiff cannot oppose the legitimate subsequent purchaser of the real estate as the registration of the provisional disposition prohibition against disposal, which exists in form, and the subsequent purchaser may oppose the

(b) A juristic act is not merely a content contrary to good morals and other social order, but merely a form of connection, motive, or means of legal act cannot be deemed null and void.

C. Article 216 of the Civil Procedure Act does not stipulate that an inheritor may not take over the proceedings where the proceedings are not interrupted.

A. Articles 216 and 211(1) of the Civil Procedure Act may not be returned to the effect that even if the parties die, an inheritor may not take over the proceedings, if there is an attorney and the proceedings are not interrupted.

(b) A juristic act is not merely a content contrary to good morals and other social order, but merely a form of connection, motive, or means of legal act cannot be deemed null and void.

C. If it is evident that the right to claim the cancellation registration of ownership transfer on the real estate, which is the right to be preserved for the injunction against disposal, does not take place even at the time of the above provisional disposition order, the above provisional disposition order does not have the effect of preventing the act of disposal as the exercise of security right on the real estate. Therefore, the recommendation is a registration of the provisional disposition prohibition against disposal, which exists in form, and it cannot be set up against the legitimate subsequent purchaser of the real estate, and

Article 719 of the Civil Procedure Act; Article 103 of the Civil Act; Article 216 of the Civil Procedure Act; Article 211(1) of the Civil Procedure Act

Park Jong-il

Defendant 1

Defendant 2, the deceased Nonparty 1’s taking-over of lawsuit

Seoul High Court Decision 69Na1115, 1116 delivered on June 9, 1972, Seoul High Court Decision 69Na115, 1116 delivered on July 9, 1972

The appeal shall be dismissed.

The costs of appeal shall be borne by the plaintiff.

The ground of appeal No. 1 by the plaintiff Park Jong-Gyeong, Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant is examined.

The judgment of the court below is erroneous in finding facts in violation of the rules of evidence or rules of experience or logic, even though the court below erred in finding facts against the rules of evidence, since the non-party 1 to the plaintiff's wife, was exempted from the forfeiture of the real estate due to the plaintiff's non-party 1's non-party 1's movement in the name of the real estate, and allowed the plaintiff to continue to hold the ownership of the real estate from the country since the plaintiff's non-party 1 to the non-party 2,70,000 won of loan to the above 1,270,000 won of loan to the defendant 1,000 won of loan to the above 1,270,000 won of loan to the defendant 1,000 won of loan to the above 1,000 won of loan to the above 1,000 won of loan to the defendant 1, and the facts that the defendant 1's non-party 1 had lawfully purchased the real estate since the defendant 2's non-party 1's transfer.

The second ground of appeal is examined.

However, as seen earlier, the judgment of the court below held that the plaintiff's transfer registration on the real estate in the name of the non-party 1 was to secure the loan credit (the plaintiff's loan credit against the non-party 2 with the plaintiff's consent) against the non-party 1, and there is no evidence to acknowledge that the plaintiff paid the above debt to the non-party 1 at the time of the decision of the provisional disposition prohibiting the disposal of the lawsuit against the non-party 1. Thus, it is clear that the right to claim the cancellation registration of the ownership transfer registration on the real estate in this case, which is the right to be preserved for the above provisional disposition, did not take place until March 10, 1965 at the time of the above provisional disposition. Thus, the above provisional disposition does not have the effect of preventing the act of disposal as the exercise of the security right on the real estate in this case. Thus, it cannot be asserted against the defendant 1 who lawfully purchased the real estate in the form of the plaintiff's registration of prohibition of disposal, and it cannot be asserted against the plaintiff's transfer registration of the title.

The first ground for appeal by the plaintiff Kim Yong-jin is examined.

As seen earlier by the original judgment, the court below acknowledged the fact that the non-party 1, 270,000 won of the real estate was transferred to the moving Chuncheon for the purpose of securing the claim of 1,270,000 won of the loan lent to the non-party 1,270,000 won of the loan to the non-party 1,20,000 won of the loan to the non-party 1,30,000 won of the loan to the non-party 1,30,000 won of the loan to the non-party 1,30,000 won of the loan, and the ownership transfer registration on the real estate in the name of the non-party 1,300,000 won was made. Thus, the court below acknowledged the facts that the plaintiff 1,30,000,000 won of the loan to the non-party 1,50,000 won of the loan to the non-party 1,000,0000 won of the loan.

The grounds of appeal Nos. 2, 3, and 4 are examined.

A comprehensive review of the records by comparing various evidences adopted by the original judgment, the plaintiff's wife was exempted from the forfeiture of real estate since the plaintiff was deprived of the plaintiff's act with the consent of the plaintiff, and caused the plaintiff to continue to hold the ownership of the real estate. On the other hand, as seen above, it is acceptable to find the original fact at the time of the transfer between the movement and the transfer for the purpose of securing the loan claim against the plaintiff in the Korea-Japan as above. Thus, there is no illegality in finding the facts without any ground, and there is no error in violation of the rules of logic and experience in the cooking of evidence and the fact-finding, and in violation of the rules of free discretion in the deliberation of evidence and the fact-finding, there is no error in the misapprehension of the above fact-finding, and on the premise that the original judgment and the evidence were inconsistent with the value judgment of the evidence, and thus, it is improper to criticize the judgment of the court below and the right to a full hearing of fact-finding, and there is no allegation in the grounds of appeal as to the defendants' allegation that there is no grounds for appeal.

The grounds of appeal No. 5 are examined.

The judgment of the court below, as seen above, completed the registration of transfer of ownership on the real estate in the name of the non-party 1, constitutes part of the cause for the transfer of the above registration. However, this recommendation merely constitutes a matter contrary to the public order or good customs and contrary to the so-called public order or good customs, and thus cannot be null and void, and therefore, the above registration cannot be null and void. Therefore, the judgment of the court below that the above registration is null and void can be reviewed in comparison with the evidence and records, and it is just in light of the purport of the court below that the registration was passed through the non-party 1's name on the basis of the fact that it was inconsistent with the legal principles and the legal regulations on the original judgment, and there is no reason to argue that the judgment of the court below, as pointed out, violated the legal principles and the legal regulations on the original judgment, and there is no illegality in the misapprehension of the logical and empirical rules or the legal reasoning in the judgment on the evidence preparation as pointed out.

The grounds of appeal No. 6 are examined.

Examining the original judgment in light of the records, the court below is just in holding that the act of transferring the name of the Plaintiff’s real estate in this case to the creditor to the mobile Chuncheon in order to secure the repayment of the obligation as seen above does not constitute an unfair act that significantly undermines the interest in transaction by a juristic act, and there is no other evidence to acknowledge that the act was an unfair act. There is no illegality in violation of the law of argument and experience in the determination of evidence and the fact-finding. The argument is without merit because the plaintiff or the wife asserted against the opposing fact that there is no obligation to borrow the loan in relation to the movement of the land in this case, and without any ground, there is no reason to believe that there is an unlawful act

The grounds of appeal Nos. 7 and 8 are examined.

However, according to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below determined that the theory evidence consistent with the plaintiff's argument that the sale and purchase of the real estate in this case between the moving Chuncheon and the defendant Song-jin was the most trade act or the legal act against social order is not believed, and it cannot be found in the record that there is illegality in violation of logical and empirical rules in the determination of the evidence cooking and fact finding, and then, it cannot be found that 3.4.5 billion won of monetary claims against the moving Chuncheon held in the purchase of the real estate in this case because the defendant Song-jin was the opportunity to recover the claim from the moving Chuncheon and the defendant Song-jin was the most opportunity to recover the claim, and that the contents of the sale contract and the execution of the contract and the date of registration of transfer of ownership are the most exceptional fact, the defendant Song-jin has not yet repaid the principal and interest of the bank obligation secured by the real estate in this case. According to the facts of the agreement between the owners of the real estate in this case and the owners of the real estate in this case, it should not be justified in the court below's decision.

The grounds of appeal No. 9 are examined.

As to the plaintiff's act of infringing upon the plaintiff's assertion, the court below's decision did not believe the evidence attached to the plaintiff's act of infringing upon the plaintiff's movement and did not exist any other supporting material, and thus rejected the claim, and it is not a simple title trustee from the plaintiff to the plaintiff. The court below's decision that the movement did not perform the duty of due care as a good manager and that the plaintiff acquired the right to cancel the act of infringing upon the plaintiff's claim for damages acquired by the claim for damages acquired by the plaintiff's act of infringing upon the plaintiff's own property, is without merit, and it is not justified in the decision of the court below, on the ground that the plaintiff did not assert new facts.

The grounds of appeal No. 10 are examined.

In this regard, in the judgment on the second ground of appeal by the plaintiff Park Jong-Gyeong, the judgment of the original court is reasonable, and there is no illegality in violation of the legal principles on the validity of the registration of provisional disposition prohibiting disposition.

The grounds of appeal No. 11 are examined.

However, it cannot be said that the original judgment erred by misapprehending the facts in the judgment that cited the counterclaim claim by Defendant Song-jin.

The plaintiff did not have a claim against the above movement, and the plaintiff's wife, with the consent of the plaintiff, completed the registration of transfer of ownership to the real estate in this case as a security for the obligation to borrow the loan against the movement, and the cause for the registration of transfer of ownership in the name of the defendant Song-jin cannot be recognized as false indication, anti-social order or fraudulent act in collusion, as mentioned above. Therefore, it is unreasonable to criticize the original judgment on the premise of the opposing opinion.

The grounds of appeal No. 12 are examined.

Article 211 (1) of the Civil Procedure Act provides that the provisions of Article 216 (1) of the same Act shall not apply to the case where there is an attorney, even if the party died, the power of attorney shall not be extinguished even if the party died, so the lawsuit proceedings shall continue as they are, so it does not require the inheritor to take over the litigation proceedings. If the litigation proceedings are not interrupted as mentioned above, the inheritor shall not take over the litigation proceedings. In this regard, the judgment of the court below shall not be deemed to be a defendant 2 who is the deceased non-party 1's taking over the litigation proceedings, and it shall not be deemed that the judgment of the court below is a defendant 2, who is the deceased non-party 1's taking over the litigation proceedings, and it shall not be deemed that there is an error in the misapprehension of the legal principle of Mson.

The grounds of appeal No. 13 are examined.

In this paper, the evidence which can be seen to the effect that the original judgment was rejected as not trustable or that it was indirectly rejected on the ground that it did not prove the fact-finding at the time of original decision and that it was unlawful in the failure to examine the evidence, and there was no error in violation of logical and empirical rules in the protocol that rejected the evidence of lawsuit by the court below.

Therefore, the appeal is dismissed. The costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating judges.

Justices of the Supreme Court (Presiding Judge) Kim Young-chul (Presiding Judge)