Dacro Co., Ltd. (Law Firm Lowsty, Attorneys Yellow-ho et al., Counsel for defendant-appellant)

Head of Yusung

September 11, 2013

1. On December 24, 2012, the Defendant’s disposition rejecting an application for rectification filed against the Plaintiff is revoked.

2. The costs of the lawsuit are assessed against the defendant.

The same shall apply to the order.

1. Details of the disposition;

A. The Plaintiff was designated as a high-tech company by the Minister of Knowledge Economy on October 22, 2010 pursuant to Article 9(1) of the Special Act on the Promotion of the Taeduk Special Research and Development Zone, etc. (amended by Act No. 11232, Jan. 6, 2012; hereinafter “Special Act”) located in the Taeduk-gu Special Research and Development Zone, etc. (hereinafter “instant Special Zone”), which is located in the Taeduk-gu Special Research and Development Zone, as stipulated in Articles 2 and 4 of the former Special Act (amended by Act No. 11232, Jan. 6, 2012);

B. On July 27, 2012, the Plaintiff acquired 951 square meters prior to the Daejeon Seo-gu ( Address 1 omitted) located in the instant special zone and 2,631 square meters prior to ( Address 2 omitted) (hereinafter “instant land”) and newly constructed a multi-household house to be used as a lodging house for employees on that ground (hereinafter “instant accommodation”).

C. On September 14, 2012, the Plaintiff reported acquisition tax, etc. on the instant land. On September 25, 2012, the Plaintiff paid KRW 62,832,790 as acquisition tax, and KRW 3,141,630 as special rural development tax, and KRW 6,283,270 as education tax.

D. On November 13, 2012, the Plaintiff filed a claim for correction against acquisition tax, etc. on the ground that the acquisition of the instant land constitutes “real estate acquired by a high-tech company to use directly for its unique duties” under Article 5(2) of the Daejeon Metropolitan City Ordinance on the Reduction and Exemption of Market Price (hereinafter “instant Ordinance”). However, on December 24, 2012, the Defendant rendered a disposition to refuse the said claim for correction on the ground that the Plaintiff’s acquisition of the instant land does not constitute “acquisition for the purpose of using directly for the fore duty” (hereinafter “instant disposition”).

[Ground of recognition] Facts without dispute, Gap evidence 1 to 4, Eul evidence 1 to 3 (including branch numbers, hereinafter the same shall apply) and the purport of the whole pleadings

2. Whether the instant disposition is lawful

A. The plaintiff's assertion

The instant land constitutes “real estate acquired by a high-tech company to use directly for its unique duties” subject to exemption from acquisition tax under Article 5(2) of the instant Ordinance as real estate acquired by the Plaintiff to use as a site for a lodging place of its employees, and thus, the instant disposition should be revoked on a different premise.

B. Relevant statutes

The entries in the attached Table-related statutes are as follows.

C. Determination

1) Article 5(2) of the instant Ordinance provides that “The real estate acquired by high-tech enterprises, research companies, foreign-capital invested companies, and foreign research institutes under Article 2 of the Special Act to use directly for their unique duties shall be exempted from acquisition tax.”

2) First, with respect to the meaning of “real estate acquired to be used directly for the high-tech business” under the above provision, Article 5(2) of the Ordinance of this case only provides that the purpose of acquiring the real estate is “to use directly for the high-tech business” as a requirement for exemption from acquisition tax, and does not limit the purpose of the real estate to the office, place of business, research institute, factory, or its site. Thus, to the extent that the use of the real estate is limited to “business or business real estate for facilities necessary for the production and sale of products related to high-tech technology”, it is not permissible in light of the principle of strict interpretation of tax law.

3) Next, as to whether the land acquired as a site of an employee's accommodation was real estate acquired for his own business under Article 5 (2) of the Ordinance of this case, the following facts acknowledged by adding the whole purport of arguments to the items stated in evidence Nos. 8, 9, 13 through 16, namely, ① the Plaintiff is a company that conducts research, design, and manufactures and sells inspection equipment, such as semiconductors and semiconductors, medical diagnosis equipment, etc.; the Plaintiff's business accounts for a significant portion of production technology, product development, and marketing; the employees of each department are in need of continuous and stable employment. In fact, most employees of the above departments are the persons belonging to each of the above departments, and ② the Plaintiff is not obliged to use the accommodation for the purpose of constructing a new accommodation or constructing a new accommodation for the purpose of using it for profit-making business under the Building Act (see Supreme Court Decision 200Da10600, Jan. 2, 2006).

4) Therefore, the instant disposition taken on the premise that the Plaintiff’s land in this case is not a real estate that was acquired for the purpose of using it directly for the duties of milk, cannot be relieved of its revocation due to its illegality.

3. Conclusion

Therefore, the plaintiff's claim of this case is justified and it is so decided as per Disposition.

[Attachment Form 5]

Judges Kim Yong-ri (Presiding Judge) Lee Dong-young

Note 1) Article 36(1) of the Special Act, Article 30 subparag. 7 of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act, and Article 7 subparag. 1 of the attached Table 7