Main Issues
The timing of the violation of the Framework Act on the Construction Industry that requires the supply of or the execution of construction works by lending the name of a construction business to another person;
Summary of Judgment
Article 96 Subparag. 4 and Article 21 of the Framework Act on the Construction Industry provides that “The act of a constructor allowing another person to receive or perform a construction work by using his name or trade name” is completed when the constructor causes another person to receive or demand a construction work by using his/her name or trade name, or causes another person to commence the construction work, and the construction work remains only until the completion of the construction work.
[Reference Provisions]
Articles 21 and 96 subparag. 4 of the Framework Act on the Construction Industry, Article 326 subparag. 3 of the Criminal Procedure Act
Reference Cases
[Plaintiff-Appellant] Plaintiff 1 and 1 other (Law Firm Doz., Attorneys Park Jong-soo et al., Counsel for plaintiff-appellant)
Escopics
Defendant
upper and high-ranking persons
Prosecutor
Defense Counsel
Attorney Lee Jae-chul
Judgment of the lower court
Seoul Central District Court Decision 2006No1060 Decided January 17, 2007
Text
The appeal is dismissed.
Reasons
The grounds of appeal are examined.
Article 96 Subparag. 4 and Article 21 of the Framework Act on the Construction Industry provides that “The act that a constructor lets another person receive or execute construction works using his name or trade name by allowing another person to do so shall be completed at the time of receiving a contract for construction works or having another person commence construction works by using his name or trade name, and shall be completed at the time of the completion of the construction works, and shall remain in the state of infringement of the rights until the completion of the construction works (see Supreme Court Decision 89Do2173, Apr. 10, 199).
In the above purport, the court below is just in maintaining the judgment of the court of first instance that acquitted the defendant on the ground that the three-year statute of limitations has expired, counting from the commencement of construction works, and there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the statute of limitations as alleged in the grounds of appeal.
Therefore, the appeal is dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.
Justices Kim Young-ran (Presiding Justice)