1. The plaintiff's appeal is dismissed.

2. The costs of appeal shall be borne by the Plaintiff.

The purport of the claim and appeal is the purport of the appeal.

1. The reasoning of the court's explanation of this case is the same as that of the judgment of the court of first instance, except for the case mentioned in paragraph (2). Thus, it is acceptable to accept this as it is in accordance with the main sentence of Article 420 of the Civil Procedure Act.

2. Parts to be dried;

A. On the 2nd page of the first instance judgment, “the same Gun” in the first instance judgment is regarded as “the same GunY”.

B. On January 19, 199, the second part of the judgment of the court of first instance, "No. 19 of Jan. 19, 199" in the second part of the judgment of the court of first instance, shall be deemed "No. 9 of Jan

C. From Nos. 4 to 6, 15 of the judgment of the court of first instance shall be followed as follows.

B. (1) According to the evidence as seen earlier, it is recognized that at the time of the purchase of the part of the land B before the instant partition and 200 of the land E before the instant partition, the victim purchased the land by the Defendant pursuant to the former Farmland Reform Act and the victim was the first passenger of the Plaintiff at the time of the purchase of the said part, and at the time of the enforcement of the former Farmland Reform Act, the land listed in the size 529 of the land B before the instant partition and Paragraph (1) of the annexed Table No. 1 of the Real Estate List No. 529 of the land before the instant partition constituted the land B before the instant partition, which is a single parcel, without dividing the land described in the size 200 of the land before the instant partition and paragraphs (2) and (3) of the annexed list of Real Estate

(2) However, comprehensively taking account of the evidence as seen earlier and the following circumstances acknowledged in Gap evidence Nos. 8-1, 2, 11-1, 2, and 12-2, as well as in the relevant legal principles, even if I was the owner of at least 529 of the land B before the instant subdivision and 200 of the land E before the instant subdivision at the time of the enforcement of the former Farmland Reform Act, only such circumstance alone was that I owned all the land B before the instant subdivision and the land E before the instant subdivision.

It is insufficient to recognize that the portion corresponding to each of the instant lands was owned, and there is no other evidence to prove this. Therefore, the Plaintiff’s assertion is without merit.

(1)