[1] In a case where the insurer paid liability insurance when entering into an automobile insurance contract with a substitute driver, even though the terms and conditions which only compensate the excess amount are stipulated under the Guarantee of Automobile Accident Compensation Act, the case holding that the payment of liability insurance amount constitutes a business management because it is sufficiently recognized that the insurer had an intent to handle the business for the insurer at the time of paying the liability insurance amount, and it is obvious that it is against the insurer’s intent to pay the liability insurance amount, and it is difficult to

[2] Whether it can be deemed that there was a designation as a repayment of another person's obligation where the creditor knew that the third party would repay the other person's obligation while receiving the repayment (affirmative)

[1] In a case where the insurer paid liability insurance in spite of the terms and conditions which only compensates the excess amount where a substitute driver is subject to liability insurance (personal liability insurance) under the Guarantee of Automobile Accident Compensation Act when concluding an automobile insurance contract with a substitute driver, the case holding that the payment of liability insurance is a business management because it is not clear that the insurer had an intent to handle the affairs for the insurer at the time of paying liability insurance, and it is against the insurer's intent to do so.

[2] In accordance with Article 469 of the Civil Code, the repayment of a debt can be made by a third party. Thus, in order for the third party to repay the debt of the other party and extinguish the debt, the third party shall have the intention to repay the debt of the other party, and such intent shall be expressed through the designation of repayment indicating the repayment of the other party. However, if the creditor knows that the third party is the repayment of the debt of the other party, it can be deemed that the third party was designated as the repayment of the debt of the other party.

[1] Article 734 of the Civil Code / [2] Article 469 of the Civil Code

ELa District Damage Insurance Co., Ltd. (Law Firm Sejongyang, Attorneys Kim Mine-hun et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Samsung Fire Marine Co., Ltd. (Law Firm Vindication, Attorneys Jeon Jae-in et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Seoul Central District Court Decision 2009Na16017 Decided August 18, 2009

The judgment below is reversed, and the case is remanded to Seoul Central District Court Panel Division.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. Whether the management of affairs is established;

In order to establish office management, first of all, it is not clear that the office work is another person's business and there is an intention to vest in another person the de facto benefit of management, i.e., the intention to vest in another person's business, and furthermore, the process of such office work is disadvantageous to the principal or against the principal's will (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 94Da41072, 41089, Dec. 22, 1994; 97Da26326, Oct. 10, 197). Here, a manager's intention to handle office work for another person can be in conflict with the will for his own benefit, and there is no need to externally indicate it, and there is no need to determine at the time of managing office

According to the reasoning of the lower judgment, the lower court determined that it was difficult to view that the Plaintiff intended to handle the affairs on behalf of the Defendant in paying the instant liability insurance to the Plaintiff, on the ground that the Plaintiff did not express the intent to pay the instant liability insurance on behalf of the Defendant, who is a legal obligor, or did not waive the victim’s right to claim insurance against the Defendant.

However, according to the records, when concluding an automobile insurance contract with a substitute driver, the plaintiff has a provision that only compensates for excess amount if the substitute driver is subject to liability insurance (personal liability insurance) under the Guarantee of Automobile Accident Compensation Act. The plaintiff knows that the plaintiff did not have any obligation to compensate for the insurance proceeds of this case, such as requesting the owner of the accident after the occurrence of the accident in this case by proxy driver to contact the owner of the accident in this case, and demanding the report on the occurrence of the accident in this case. The plaintiff paid it to the victim, while paying the insurance proceeds to the victim, and received a written waiver of right in relation to all claims against the victim as well as the injured party and the joint tortfeasor. In light of the legal principles as seen earlier, even if the plaintiff did not externally express his intent to pay the liability insurance proceeds of this case on behalf of the defendant

In addition, the lower court determined that it is evident that the Plaintiff’s payment of the instant liability insurance to the victim is against the Defendant’s will, i.e., the Plaintiff’s payment of the instant liability insurance to the victim, in light of the following: (a) the Plaintiff’s refusal to accept and process the instant accident; and (b) the Plaintiff paid on behalf of the victim pursuant to Article 3 of the Enforcement Decree

However, according to the records, the fact that the Defendant did not deal with the insurance accident regarding the amount equivalent to the instant liability insurance amount is merely because the owner of the insured vehicle merely neglected to accept the report on the insurance accident. However, there is insufficient evidence to deem that the Plaintiff paid the instant liability insurance amount even though the Defendant did not have any obligation to pay the liability insurance amount or was clearly aware that the Plaintiff did not have any intent to pay the liability insurance amount and was contrary to the intent of the Defendant, it is difficult to view that the Plaintiff’s payment of the instant liability insurance amount goes against the intent of the Defendant

Nevertheless, the court below erred by misapprehending the legal principles as to the requirements for the establishment of office management, which held that the plaintiff's payment of liability insurance money of this case does not constitute office management, and the ground of appeal pointing this out has merit.

2. Whether the obligation to reimburse office management expenses or obligation to return unjust enrichment arises;

In accordance with Article 469 of the Civil Code, a third party may perform the obligation, and the third party shall have the intent to perform the obligation of the other party and extinguish the obligation of the other party, and such intent shall be expressed through the designation of repayment indicating that it is the repayment of obligation of the other party. However, if the creditor knows that the third party has performed the obligation of the other party while receiving the repayment, it can be deemed that the third party has been designated as the repayment of obligation of the other party.

According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below rejected the plaintiff's claim for reimbursement of office expenses equivalent to the above liability insurance amount or the claim for restitution of unjust enrichment on the premise that the defendant's liability insurance amount was extinguished, on the ground that there is no evidence to support that the plaintiff had expressed his intent to repay the defendant's liability insurance amount to the victim, and thus, the payment of the liability insurance amount to the victim does not have effect as repayment by a third party. Therefore, the defendant still bears the liability insurance amount to the victim.

However, according to the facts and records acknowledged by the court below, the victim received the agreement amount related to the accident of this case including the liability insurance of this case from the plaintiff and submitted to the plaintiff a letter of waiver of right that "the victim would waive all the claims against the parties involved in the accident of this case and the joint tortfeasor" at the plaintiff's request. In the process of preparing and submitting the letter of waiver of right as above while receiving the above agreement amount, the victim fully recognized the fact that the plaintiff's obligation as well as his/her own obligation and the obligations of "the parties involved in the accident of this case and the joint tortfeasors" are jointly repaid, and the victim's claim against the other parties concerned and the joint tortfeasor is extinguished by receiving the above agreement amount

Examining these circumstances in light of the legal principles as seen earlier, even if the victim did not specifically have been designated as the Defendant’s obligation from the Plaintiff at the time of receiving the reimbursement, it is sufficient to deem that the victim was the Plaintiff to have known that the Plaintiff would also jointly repay the obligation of the party involved in the accident and the joint tortfeasor. Therefore, it can be deemed that the Plaintiff had designated that it would have repaid the Plaintiff’s obligation while paying the instant liability insurance to the victim. Accordingly, the Plaintiff’s payment of the instant liability insurance became effective as the third party’s repayment, and thus, the Defendant’s obligation to pay the Defendant

Nevertheless, the court below erred in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the requirements for third party's repayment, which held that the payment of the liability insurance in this case to the victim is not effective as a third party's repayment, which affected the conclusion of the judgment. The ground of appeal pointing this out has merit

3. Conclusion

Therefore, the judgment of the court below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the court below for a new trial and determination. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Min Il-young (Presiding Justice)