(a) Criteria for determining whether the time of establishing a public official relationship and the grounds for disqualification for appointment

(b) Validity of an act of appointing disqualified public officials by national negligence;

C. Legal nature of revocation of appointment act for disqualified public officials, application of the good faith principle, and whether the right to cancel is extinguished by prescription

(d) Whether or not a person who is disqualified for appointment may request retirement under the Public Officials Pension Act or the Labor Standards Act where he/she actually serves as a public official;

A. The grounds for disqualification for public officials as stipulated in the State Public Officials Act are absolute passive requirements to be appointed as public officials, and public officials relations is not registered in the list of candidates for appointment as stipulated in Article 38 of the State Public Officials Act and Article 11 of the Decree on the Appointment of Public Officials, but established at the time of national appointment. Thus, whether a reason for disqualification for public officials exists should be determined on the basis of the law enforced at the time of appointment, which is not registered in the

B. If there was a ground for disqualification for appointment as a public official at the time of appointment, even if it was not revealed that it was disqualified due to national negligence, such appointment should be deemed as void as a matter of course.

C. In this sense, the principle of good faith and the principle of trust cannot be applied in cancelling the initial appointment disposition, and the right to cancel such a meaning is not extinguished by prescription, since the State is appointed as a public official without knowing the grounds for disqualification, but finds that the person who is ex post disqualification is ex post facto disqualified, and the revocation of the appointment of public official is merely an act of notifying and confirming that the person was immediately null and void from the beginning.

D. The retirement allowance under the Public Officials Pension Act or the Labor Standards Act is paid when a person retires while serving as a lawful public official due to the acquisition of his status or the establishment of an employment relationship, and as a result, an act of appointing a disqualified person whose appointment is null and void cannot obtain his status as a public official or establish an employment relationship, and even if a disqualified person is actually serving as a public official, such disqualified person may not request the retirement allowance under the above Act.

A. Articles 38 and 39(b) of the State Public Officials Act. Article 33(1)4(d) of the former State Public Officials Act (Amended by Act No. 2460, Feb. 5, 1973); Article 46 of the Public Officials Pension Act; Article 28(1) of the Labor Standards Act

Plaintiff

Head of the Clean Correctional Institution;

Daegu High Court Decision 85Gu339 delivered on April 4, 1986

The appeal is dismissed.

The costs of appeal are assessed against the plaintiff.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

The grounds for disqualifications for public officials prescribed in the State Public Officials Act are absolute passive requirements to be appointed as public officials, not when they are registered in the list of candidates for appointment under Article 38 of the State Public Officials Act and Article 11 of the Decree on the Appointment of Public Officials, but when they are appointed by the State. Thus, whether there is grounds for disqualifications or not shall be determined on the basis of the law enforced at the time of appointment, not at the time when they are registered in the list of candidates for appointment. If there are grounds for disqualifications at the time of appointment, even though the State's negligence did not reveal that they are disqualifieds, the act of appointment shall be deemed null and void as a matter of course. Even if the State did not know that there is grounds for disqualifications for appointment of public officials, and if the State finds that the person was disqualified after being appointed as public officials without knowledge that he was disqualifieds, it shall be deemed that the original act of appointment was null and void as a public official, and thus, the original principle of good faith or trust cannot be applied in cancelling appointments.

According to the reasoning of the judgment of the court below, the court below found that the plaintiff passed an open recruitment examination for Grade 9 public officials in the Southern Gwangju District of 1972 and registered the appointment of public officials in August 17 of the same year, and was promoted to teachers in the Jeonnam Prison of August 16, 1984, and held office as a public official in Cheongsong prison security and public officials. The plaintiff's disposition of cancellation of appointment was just in violation of the above principle of cancellation of appointment since he was sentenced to 2 years of suspension of execution and 1 year of suspension of qualification for 8 months in violation of public law from the Appellate District Court of Gwangju of March 5, 1970 and 1 year of suspension of qualification for 1970.3.13 years in effect at the time of the above appointment, and the judgment of the court below was just in violation of the above principle of cancellation of appointment as a public official in violation of Article 33 (1) 4 of the former State Public Officials Act (Act No. 2460 of Feb. 5, 19719).8.

In addition, as the plaintiff was appointed as a public official and cancelled, the plaintiff's right to survival and social life of the plaintiff and his family were caused by a complete consequence of the administrative agency's failure to thoroughly investigate the plaintiff's identity, and thus, the defendant's argument that the defendant is liable to compensate for damages therefrom is a new argument that was not inside the court below, and thus, it cannot be a legitimate ground for appeal. All arguments are without merit.

Therefore, the appeal is dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Yellow-ray (Presiding Justice)