A. The meaning of "a post-person who commits an offense" under Article 211 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Act, which prescribes the current criminal.

B. The case reversing the judgment of the court below which concluded that the arrest of a flagrant offender was erroneous in the incomplete hearing or in the misapprehension of legal principles, where a police officer, who was dispatched after about forty minutes, arrested the police officer, refusing to accompany the police officer in the office of general affairs, after threatening the principal in the school room.

(c) Whether it constitutes the crime of obstruction of performance of official duties by means of assault, etc., against a person who fails to meet the requirements as a flagrant offender.

A. Article 211(a) of the Criminal Procedure Act provides that "a person who is latter to commit a crime" refers to cases where it is evident from the standpoint of a person who arrests him/her that he/she is an offender immediately after the commission of the crime. "after the commission of the crime," is interpreted as "after the commission of the crime," and "after the commission of the crime," and "after the commission of the crime, it is interpreted as "after the commission of the crime," and therefore, it can be viewed as a flagrant offender only in cases where it is clearly recognized that the person who is arrested in view of time and place is the offender who has committed the crime.

B. The case reversing the judgment of the court below which concluded that a teacher was a flagrant offender, on the ground that there was an error in the misapprehension of legal principles as to a flagrant offender, on the ground that, in case where the police officers called out to the school room and refused to accompany a police officer by demanding the presentation of a warrant of detention, the above teacher who was seated in the general affairs room at the time of arrest could not be readily concluded that the crime was clearly recognizable to the police officer, even though the above teacher cannot be said to have been clearly perceived by the police officer.

C. In a situation where it is not recognized that a police officer satisfied the requirements as a flagrant offender, if the police officer arrested or attempted to force a person refusing to accompany, this cannot be deemed a lawful performance of official duties, and thus obstructing the performance of official duties by means of assault, etc. against a person refusing to force force and a police officer, the crime of obstructing performance of official duties is not committed.

(b)Article 211(c) of the Criminal Procedure Act; Article 136 of the Criminal Code; Article 3(2) of the Act on the Performance of Duties by Police Officers;

C. Supreme Court Decision 72Do2005 decided Oct. 31, 1972 (Gong2037), 75Do3779 decided Mar. 9, 1976 (Gong1976, 9067) (Gong1991, 1678)

Defendant

Defendant

Busan District Court Decision 90No1410 delivered on May 3, 1991

The judgment of the court below is reversed.

The case shall be remanded to Busan District Court Panel Division.

The defendant's grounds of appeal are examined.

1. Article 211(a) of the Criminal Procedure Act provides that "after the commission of a crime (i.e., the latter)" refers to cases where it is evident from the standpoint of the person who arrests an offender immediately after the commission of the crime. As such, Article 211(1) provides that "after the commission of the crime (i.e., the latter)" with respect to a flagrant offender who is in the original meaning of Article 211(1) provides that "after the commission of the crime shall be deemed to be a flagrant offender as in the same manner as "the person who is in the process of the commission of the crime", and Article 211(2) provides that "after the commission of the crime is completed" shall be deemed to refer to the last and last stage of the commission of the crime or the time connected thereto, so it can be deemed to be a flagrant offender only if it is clearly recognized that the person who is arrested in consideration of time and place is a flagrant offender with respect to the fact that the crime was committed.

2. The court below found the defendant guilty of obstruction of performance of official duties of the police officer in the instant case where he interfered with the police officer's arrest of the above police officer on the ground that, at the time of the defendant's work as the first female middle school teacher, Non-Indicted 1, who was a volunteer teacher, was in the school principal room of the school, was sent to the school principal room after being reported that he saw him to threaten the principal by putting him, and was in order to force Non-Indicted 1, the investigation by the Kimhae Police Station and the police officer under his jurisdiction, and continued to put the body of the police officer under his command in order to stop Non-Indicted 1 from driving a vehicle with Non-Indicted 1 on the playground, and thus, the court below found him guilty of obstruction of performance of official duties of Non-Indicted 1 on the ground that it is an act of committing the crime, namely, an act of committing the crime.

3. However, examining the relevant evidence in comparison with the records, it was difficult for Nonindicted 1 to have avoided any disturbance, such as entering the school room for about five minutes, knife the knife, threatening the school floor, and threatening the school floor. The police officers, upon receiving a report, attempted to arrest Nonindicted 1, who attempted to arrest Nonindicted 1, is only 40 minutes after the completion of the above act of commission of the crime. Furthermore, the police officers’ general affairs, which are not the school room where the crime was committed, are not the school principal and the general affairs of the police officers arrested Nonindicted 1, but the police officers’ refusal to accompany Nonindicted 1, who were in attendance at the school office, upon request of the warrant of detention. Accordingly, if the facts are the same, it is difficult to readily conclude that the police officers’ general affairs as at the time of arresting Nonindicted 1, who had taken place in the school room, meet the requirements of Article 12(1)1 of the Criminal Procedure Act, as well as those of Article 21(2)1 of the Criminal Procedure Act.

Nevertheless, the court below did not consider whether the police officers arrest Nonindicted 1 in a situation where the specific situation at the time of the commission of Nonindicted 1’s crime and the arrest is deemed to exist, and it concluded that Nonindicted 1 was a flagrant offender as a person after the commission of the crime, without examining whether or not the police officers arrest Nonindicted 1. Thus, the court below did not properly conduct the deliberation or erred by misapprehending the legal principles on the flagrant offender.

In addition, if Nonindicted 1’s police officers were to arrest or force Nonindicted 1’s refusal to accompany in a situation where it is not recognized that Nonindicted 1 met the requirements as a flagrant offender, this cannot be deemed a legitimate performance of official duties, and therefore, even if the Defendant obstructed Nonindicted 1’s performance of official duties by means of assault, etc. against Nonindicted 1 and police officers, it should not be deemed that the crime of obstruction of performance of official duties is not established. Thus, it is obvious that the foregoing illegality committed by the lower court was affected by the judgment.

There is a reason to point this out.

4. Therefore, without examining the grounds of appeal, we reverse the judgment of the court below and remand the case to the court below for a new trial and determination. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating judges.

Justices Yoon Jae-ho (Presiding Justice)