A. The meaning of "self-confisction" under Article 286-2 of the Criminal Procedure Act

(b) The method of indicating the facts of the crime of an aiding and abetting;

A. Article 286-2 (Determination of Summary Trial Procedure) of the Criminal Procedure Act is sufficient to recognize the facts stated in the indictment and further, to not state facts that constitute grounds for excluding illegality or responsibility, and it does not refer to the statement of the person who is guilty clearly.

(b) In the statement of the facts of an aiding and abetting offender, all facts constituting the elements of the principal offender’s crime, which are the elements of the premise thereof, must be indicated, and it cannot be said that the statement of the facts of an aiding and abetting offender without such indication is the statement of facts constituting the crime.

A. Article 286-2 of the Criminal Procedure Act; Article 323 of the Criminal Procedure Act; Articles 31 and 32 of the Criminal Act

Defendant

Attorney Kang Jin-hee

Jeju District Court Decision 81No100 delivered on July 24, 1981

The judgment below is reversed and the case is remanded to Jeju District Court Panel Division.

We examine the defendant's defense counsel's grounds of appeal.

1. We examine the first ground for appeal.

Article 286-2 of the Criminal Procedure Act refers to the so-called simple trial procedure as provided in Article 286-2 of the Criminal Procedure Act is a trial procedure in a case other than the case to be tried by the collegiate panel of the district court and its branch court in the first instance, in which the defendant confessions the facts charged in the court, and its contents include a special exception to admissibility of evidence (Article 318-3 of the Criminal Procedure Act), the simplification of the procedure of examination of evidence (Article 297-2 of the Criminal Procedure Act). Thus, the confession of the facts charged is sufficient to recognize the facts stated in the indictment and to make a statement to the person guilty clearly.

However, according to the protocol of the first trial of this case, the defendant of this case stated in the prosecutor's statement that "It is necessary for the defendant to take the initiative from the co-defendant of the court of first instance to Busan and assist the defendant in the defendant's secret with the knowledge of the defendant's secret," "It is obvious that the co-defendant of the court of first instance takes the defendant's 1 and delivered the defendant to the non-indicted 2 and does not have any statement to deny the crime." The defendant's answer is merely a whole of the defendant's statement in the court of first instance, and it is not clear that the defendant's statement to see that the defendant's statement to see the defendant's court of second instance should not be denied the defendant's motive to commit the crime. Thus, since the defendant's statement to see that the defendant's defendant's defendant's defendant's defendant's secret statement to sees that the defendant's defendant's secret statement to her mother is an unlawful statement, the decision of the court of second instance cannot be accepted by the above legal principles as to deny the defendant's opinion.

2. We examine the second ground for appeal.

The establishment of a principal offender constitutes part of the elements of an aiding and abetting offense, and the establishment of an aiding and abetting offense first becomes a prerequisite to acknowledge the principal offender’s criminal act. Therefore, in the statement of facts of an aiding and abetting offender, all the facts constituting the principal offender’s crime must be stated in the statement of facts that do not include such facts, and the statement of facts of an aiding and abetting offender cannot be deemed a statement of facts that constitute a crime. The judgment of the court of first instance maintained by the court below, around 15:00 on December 21, 1978, "the defendant is not only the first instance court’s co-defendant at the Jeju Airport Complex Office located in Jeju, but also the first instance court’s judgment that did not clearly state the reasons that it would have been unlawful since he was asked by Nonindicted Party 1 to take the initiative of the principal offender from Busan and that he would not have any error in the law of aiding and abetting him as stated in the first instance court’s judgment in the first instance court’s statement of reasons that he would not have any error in the first instance judgment."

3. Therefore, the judgment of the court below shall be reversed and the case shall be remanded to the Jeju District Court Panel Panel Division. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating judges.

Justices Lee Il-young (Presiding Justice)