2016Da27506 Other (money)

Man-rognbC Co., Ltd.

A

Seoul Central District Court Decision 2016Na10949 Decided November 24, 2016

April 13, 2017

The judgment of the court below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Seoul Central District Court Panel Division.

1. Where there is no precedent of the Supreme Court with regard to the interpretation of statutes applicable to a small case in a specific case, there is a case where a number of small claims, the issue of which is the interpretation of the same statutes, are pending in the lower court, and there is a case where the Supreme Court terminates the case without making a decision as to the interpretation of the statutes on the grounds that it is a small amount case, it would be likely that the legal safety of people's lives would be harmed if the case is terminated without making a decision as to the interpretation of the statutes. In such special circumstances, even if the Supreme Court did not meet the requirement of "when it makes a decision contrary to the precedents of the Supreme Court" which may be the ground for appeal in regard to the small amount case, it shall be deemed that the determination of errors in the interpretation and application of the substantive law can be made at the level of performing the fundamental function of the Supreme Court, such as the unification of statutory interpretation (see, e.g

In this case, there is no precedent of the Supreme Court on the issue of whether the starting point of the extinctive prescription under Article 166 of the Civil Code, which is at issue, can be changed by implied agreement in any case, and since there is a situation in which the lower court's judgment is different, the court below's interpretation of the above provision of this case and the propriety of its application shall

2. Article 166 of the Civil Code provides that "the extinctive prescription shall run from the time when a right can be exercised." Thus, the extinctive prescription of a claim with a time limit shall run from the time when the time when the time limit comes due, but where the obligee and the obligor have agreed to defer the time limit after such time limit comes due, the extinctive prescription shall resume from the time when the changed time limit

The agreement of deferment of time is explicitly and implicitly possible, and it is necessary to comprehensively consider all circumstances such as the process and contents of the contract, progress of performance, and existence of an implied agreement of deferment of time in any case in the contractual credit relationship.

3. According to the reasoning of the lower judgment and the evidence duly admitted by the lower court, Article 2 of the sales contract of this case sets the remainder due date of the sales contract of this case as of October 25, 2009 (paragraph (2)). On the other hand, where there is an increase or a decrease in the size of the store after the drawing of a shop, the sales contract of this case requires the purchaser to make a final settlement (Paragraph (1) and notify the purchaser in writing in the event of a change in the date of the intermediate payment and the balance payment (Paragraph (6). Article 3 provides that the purchaser shall pay 19% late payment in a year, and the Defendant did not pay the remainder as of October 25, 2009 after the lapse of the first payment period. The Plaintiff allocated the store to the buyer through a drawing, and the Plaintiff did not pay the remainder as of March 19, 2010 after receiving a written notice to the Defendant of the reduction in the final amount due to the whole area and the common area of the store allocated to the buyer.

4. In light of the aforementioned facts and the following circumstances revealed through this, it is reasonable to view that the instant contract for the sale in lots was explicitly modified on April 30, 2010, when examining the following: (a) the period of extinctive prescription of the instant contract for the sale in lots was scheduled to settle the sales price after drawing the store from the time of its establishment; (b) was premised on the fact that the due date for the remainder payment can be changed; and (c) the Plaintiff’s notice of deferment of payment was given to the Defendant who did not pay all the remainder after the due date specified in Article 3 of the instant contract for the sale in lots was delayed for at least six months; and (d) the Defendant’s interest and the date of performance of the outstanding claim under the instant contract for sale in lots was not likely to be contrary to the presumed intention. Therefore, it is clear that the extinctive prescription of the instant claim will run again from May 1, 2010 on January 27, 2015, which is the date of application for the instant payment in lots.

5. Nevertheless, the lower court determined that the extinctive prescription of the claim for the remainder of the sale price in this case was completed solely based on its stated reasoning. In so doing, it erred by misapprehending the legal doctrine on the starting point of the extinctive prescription period, thereby affecting the conclusion of the judgment

6. Therefore, without further proceeding to decide on the remaining grounds of appeal, the lower judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded to the lower court for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Cho Jong-hee

Justices Kim Chang-tae, Counsel for the defendant

Justices Park Sang-ok