[1] In a case where an informant knew of false facts to a person who is not directly related to coverage and preparation of an article, but such facts were reported in a newspaper, whether the informant may be held liable for the crime of defamation by publication (negative with qualification)

[2] The case holding that since a doctor merely informed the National Assembly member of false facts to resolve a political dispute with a medical device company, if such facts were published in daily newspapers, defamation by publications does not constitute a crime of defamation

[3] The meaning of "the purpose of slandering a person" under Article 309 (1) and (2) of the Criminal Code and the method of determining such "the purpose"

[4] The case holding that there was a false perception about the above information by a physician who informed the specific medical device company that the power cost, preferential finance, and performance of medical devices are not good

[1] Since the crime of defamation by publication may be committed by indirect crime, it may also be established even in cases where false materials are provided to a reporter who is unaware of the fact, and if the informant knows false facts to a person who is not directly related to news gathering and preparation of the article, the informant may not be held liable for the crime of defamation by publication, unless there are special circumstances such as where the informant specifically asked the reporter to disclose the facts to the reporter or where the reporter is highly anticipated that he/she should be inserted into the press, and even if he/she is published in the newspaper and distributed to the public, he/she shall not be held liable for the crime of defamation by publication.

[2] The case holding that since a doctor merely informed the National Assembly member of false facts in order to resolve a political dispute with a medical device company, if such facts were published in daily newspapers, defamation by publications does not become established

[3] "Purpose of slandering a person" under Article 309 (1) and (2) of the Criminal Code shall be determined in consideration of the contents and nature of the relevant statement, the scope of the other party to whom the publication of the relevant fact was made, the method of expression, etc., as well as the degree of infringement of reputation that may be damaged or damaged by the expression.

[4] The case holding that there was a false perception about the above information by a physician who informed the specific medical device company that the power cost, preferential finance, and performance of medical devices are not good

[1] Articles 307(2) and 309(2) of the Criminal Act / [2] Articles 307(2) and 309(1) and (2) of the Criminal Act / [3] Articles 309(1) and (2) of the Criminal Act / [4] Articles 307(2) and 309(2) of the Criminal Act

[3] Supreme Court Decision 2001Do2372 Delivered on September 14, 2001

Defendant

Defendant

Law Firm Barun Law Office, Attorney Jeong Ho-ho

Seoul District Court Decision 2000No999 delivered on June 27, 2000

The judgment of the court below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Seoul District Court Panel Division.

1. Regarding ground of appeal No. 1

A. Since the crime of defamation by publication may be committed by indirect crime, it may also be established even in cases where false materials are provided to a reporter who is unaware of such fact for the purpose of slandering another person, and such false materials are provided to a newspaper, etc. However, in cases where the informant knows false facts to a person who is not directly related to the news coverage and preparation of the article, barring special circumstances such as where the informant specifically asked the reporter to disclose such facts to the reporter or where the reporter is highly anticipated that he/she should publish such facts, and even if published in the newspaper and distributed to the general public, he/she cannot be held liable for the crime of defamation by publication.

B. Of the facts charged in this case, the court below found the defendant guilty by pointing out false facts by publishing the above information to the public prosecutor in charge of the President's high-level creative order of the president, on October 22, 1996, through Kim Jong-hee, which had been the Seoul Government Government Affairs City, which had been the Seoul Government Government Council of the Republic of Korea, on October 22, 1996, "Meson had been rapidly cultivated by companies or government's protection policies and authorities' safeguard measures that fall short of technical capabilities compared to foreign countries. There was a preferential financial support for the rapid growth of Meson. There was a preferential financial support for 1 billion won on the government's high-ranking level, but the defendant filed a complaint against Meson's Meson's fraud, but caused Meson to disclose the above information to the National Assembly on October 23, 1996.

C. However, according to the facts acknowledged by the court below, the defendant filed a complaint against Emerson's representative director on or around March 1996 to resolve the dispute between the defendant and Medson's company. However, on or around July 30, 1996, the defendant did not have suspicion by the prosecutor's office, but again, as a member of the new political council at the time of September 1996 to resolve this problem through the Emerson's speech, it was difficult to recognize that the defendant, as a member of the new political council at the time of 1996, had presented relevant data to explain the details of the dispute and the process of the prosecution's case at the National Assembly level, and asked the members to investigate Medson's corruption at the National Assembly level, and it was difficult to find that the defendant's Madson transferred the above materials to the above members of Emerson's political materials to open to the public through the newspaper's news campaign speech at the National Assembly.

D. Nevertheless, the court below found the defendant guilty of this part of the facts charged as above has erred by misapprehending the legal principles of defamation by publication or by misunderstanding facts against the rules of evidence, and it is clear that such illegality affected the conclusion of the judgment. Thus, the ground of appeal pointing this out has merit.

2. Regarding ground of appeal No. 2

"Purpose of slandering a person" under Article 309 (1) and (2) of the Criminal Code shall be determined by comparing and considering the contents and nature of the relevant statement, the scope of the other party to whom the relevant fact was published, and the degree of infringement of reputation that may be damaged or damaged by the expression, etc. (see Supreme Court Decision 2001Do2372, Sept. 14, 2001, etc.).

In light of the above legal principles and records, it is just that the court below recognized that there was a purpose to defame the defendant with regard to the facts constituting the crimes of paragraphs (2) through (4) of this case, and there is no error of law by misunderstanding the legal principles as to the purpose of defamation by publication, or by misunderstanding facts against the rules of evidence, as otherwise alleged in the

3. As to the grounds of appeal Nos. 3 through 4

According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below determined that the defendant could not be aware of the above information on the ground that the defendant's information of this case was false, considering the following facts: (a) the defendant, as shown in the judgment of the court below, was growing rapidly through government protection policies and preferential financing of 10 billion won for a person with authority; (b) the high order of the President's initiative as a rear force of Medson, by inserting pressure to the public prosecutor in charge; (c) the defendant also demanded that the edson's edson's edson's edson's edson's edson's edson's edson's edson's edson's edson's edson's edson's edson's edson's edson's edson's edson's edson's edson's edson's e e.

In light of the records, the above fact-finding and judgment of the court below are acceptable, and there are no errors in the misapprehension of legal principles as to false facts in the crime of defamation by publication, or in the misconception of facts as to the mistake of facts or false recognition of facts by violating the rules of evidence, as otherwise alleged in the grounds of appeal.

4. Conclusion

Therefore, the part of the judgment of the court below that reported to the Lee Jae-in under Paragraph (1) of the crime of this case and made defamation through publications cannot be maintained any more illegally. Since the court below rendered a single sentence on the ground that the remaining guilty part of this case and the crime of concurrent crimes under the former part of Article 37 of the Criminal Act are concurrent crimes with the remaining guilty part of this case, the judgment of the court below is reversed in its entirety, and the case is remanded to the court below for a new

Justices Son Ji-yol (Presiding Justice)