In a case where the “Committee on the Settlement of History for Truth and Reconciliation” established a truth-finding that confirms or presumes a person subject to an application for ascertaining the truth as a victim, and the victim, etc. exercised his/her right within a reasonable period based on such determination, whether the State is allowed to assert the completion of extinctive prescription (negative) and the scope of “reasonable period” in this case (negative)

Articles 2, 750, 766(1) of the Civil Act, Article 2(1), 8 of the State Compensation Act, Article 32 of the former Accounting Act (repealed by Act No. 217 of September 24, 1951) (see current Article 96 of the National Finance Act), Articles 19(1), 22(1), and 26 of the Framework Act on the Settlement of History for Truth and Reconciliation

Supreme Court en banc Decision 2012Da202819 Decided May 16, 2013 (Gong2013Ha, 1077), Supreme Court Decision 2013Da203529 Decided July 25, 2013, Supreme Court Decision 2013Da207323 Decided October 17, 2013

Plaintiff 1 and four others (Law Firm Subdivision, Attorneys Park Gi-soo et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Korea

Seoul High Court Decision 2012Na100205 decided July 11, 2013

The judgment below is reversed and the case is remanded to Seoul High Court.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. Judgment on the misapprehension of legal principles as to extinctive prescription

A. In a case where the State received an application to establish the truth against a victim subject to the application of the Framework Act on the Settlement of History for Truth and Reconciliation and conducted a truth-finding decision by the Defendant’s “Regulatory Commission for Truth and Reconciliation” (hereinafter “Settlement Commission”), it is reasonable to deem that there exist special circumstances to have a trust in the Defendant’s exercise of rights within a reasonable period of time when the victim or his/her bereaved family members exercise their rights within the reasonable period of time. Nevertheless, the State’s assertion of the completion of extinctive prescription against the victim constitutes an abuse of rights against the principle of good faith and not permissible (see, e.g., Supreme Court en banc Decision 2012Da202819, May 16, 2013). However, denying the effectiveness of extinctive prescription based on the principle of trust and good faith should be limited to 20 years prior to and after the pronouncement of legal stability, remedy for difficulty in proof, and sanctions against negligence in exercising rights, and thus, it should be limited to the period of extinctive prescription period of time exceeding 16 years in exceptional cases where an obligee’s exercise of rights.

B. According to the reasoning of the lower judgment, on January 5, 2009, the Court rendered a truth-finding decision with respect to the deceased on January 5, 2009, and the Plaintiffs’ exercise their rights by filing the instant lawsuit against the Defendant on January 16, 2012. As such, it is apparent that the Plaintiffs’ instant lawsuit was filed beyond three years from the date of the truth-finding decision.

Examining these facts in light of the legal principles as seen earlier, it cannot be deemed that the Defendant’s defense for the completion of extinctive prescription constitutes an abuse of rights against the principle of trust and good faith, and the fact-finding decision as above does not change on the ground that it was notified on January 21, 2009 to Plaintiff 1, the applicant for the investigation of truth.

C. Nevertheless, the lower court rejected the Defendant’s defense of extinctive prescription on the ground that it is reasonable to view that the Plaintiffs exercised their rights within a considerable period of time that could exclude the Defendant’s defense of extinctive prescription. In so doing, the lower court erred by misapprehending the legal doctrine on the abuse of rights in the defense of extinctive prescription

2. Conclusion

Therefore, without further proceeding to decide on the remaining grounds of appeal, the lower judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded to the lower court for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Min Il-young (Presiding Justice)