Where there is a restriction on building permission under Article 12 of the Building Act, the period excluded from idle land.

In determining whether a parcel of land constitutes a piece of land not deemed a idle land pursuant to Article 8(3) of the Land Excess Profit Tax Act and Article 23 of the former Enforcement Decree of the Land Excess Profit Tax Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 14470 of Dec. 31, 1994), if there is a restriction on construction permission pursuant to Article 12 of the Building Act, it is reasonable to determine the reason and period not deemed a idle land pursuant to Article 23(1) of the former Enforcement Decree of the Land Excess Profit Tax Act, not the provision of Article 23(1) of the same Enforcement Decree, but the provision of Article 23(3) proviso of the same Enforcement Decree of the same Act. However, if an application for construction permission was filed prior to the lapse of one-year grace period (excluding the period of restriction on construction pursuant to Article 12 of the Building Act) from the date the land is deemed to have been acquired, it shall be deemed that the period calculated by adding

Article 12 of the Building Act, Article 8(3) of the Land Excess Profit Tax Act, Article 23 subparag. 1 of the former Enforcement Decree of the Land Excess Profit Tax Act (amended by the Presidential Decree No. 14470 of Dec. 31, 1994), Article 23 subparag. 3 of the former Enforcement Decree of the Land Excess Profit Tax Act (amended by the Presidential Decree No. 14470 of Dec. 31, 1994)

[Plaintiff-Appellant-Appellee] Plaintiff 1 and 1 other (Law Firm Han, Attorneys Lee Dong-young and 1 other, Counsel for plaintiff-appellant-appellee-appellant-appellee-appellant-appellant-Appellee-Appellee-Appellant-Appellee-Appellant-Appellee-Appellee-Appellant-Appellee-Appellant-Appellee-Appellant-Appellee-Appellant-Appellee-Appellee-Appellant-Appellee-Appellant-Appellee-Appellant-Appellee-Appellant-Appellee-Appellee

[Defendant-Appellee] Plaintiff 1 et al.

Head of the tax office

Seoul High Court Decision 93Gu27552 delivered on June 2, 1994

The appeal is dismissed.

The costs of appeal are assessed against the defendant.

The grounds of appeal by the defendant litigant are examined.

According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the head of Gangnam-gu Office, based on macroficial evidence, has restricted the construction permission of neighborhood living facilities and business facilities from June 5, 1990 to December 31, 192 with respect to the land of Gangnam-gu, including the land of this case, in accordance with the construction restriction measures of the Minister of Construction and Transportation for the prevention of excessive heat in the construction competition, and the plaintiff also applied for construction permission to the Gangnam-gu Office to construct neighborhood living facilities and business facilities in this case with co-owners of this case and owners of neighboring land, but the head of Gangnam-gu Office cannot construct the land on the same day on the ground that it is subject to the restriction on construction permission under Article 12 (1) of the Building Act, and even if the use of the land is not directly prohibited or restricted by the provision of the law itself, the court below determined that the use of the land of this case is not prohibited or restricted by Article 8 (3) of the Income Tax Act, Article 23 (1) 9 of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act or the same Act.

As pointed out, in determining whether a parcel of land constitutes a piece of land under Article 8 (3) of the Land Excess Profit Tax Act and Article 23 of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act, as in this case, if there is a restriction on construction permission under Article 12 of the Building Act, it shall not be deemed to be the provision of subparagraph 1 of Article 23 of the Enforcement Decree of the Land Excess Profit Tax Act, but it is reasonable to determine the reason and period not regarded as a idle land under the provision of subparagraph 3 of Article 23 of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act, even though it is reasonable to determine the reason and period not regarded as a idle land, the court below's decision does not clearly affect the land of this case from December 31, 1989 to 1 year grace period (excluding the period from June 5, 1990 to December 31, 192, 192, which is the period of restriction on construction under Article 12 of the same Act). Thus, if the plaintiff applied for construction permission on June 17, 1992).

Therefore, the appeal is dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Cho Chang-tae (Presiding Justice)