A. Probative value of the suspect interrogation protocol prepared by the prosecutor

B. Whether Article 11 of the Constitution is violated in cases where the books seized in violation of the former Anti-Public Law and the National Security Act were adopted as evidence of guilt

C. The meaning of "person who has engaged in the leading duty" under the National Security Act;

D. Whether a person may be punished for committing a violation of the Decree during the enforcement of martial law after the lifting of martial law (affirmative)

A. The protocol of interrogation prepared by the prosecutor is admissible unless there is any reason to suspect that the statement in the prosecutor's office was made under unrecognizable circumstances because the statement in the prosecutor's office was not made voluntarily and it was not made under reliable circumstances.

B. The freedom of study under the Constitution can also be limited to the extent that it does not infringe on its essential substance by Article 35 of the Constitution. Therefore, the restriction under the former Anti-Public Law or the National Security Act would have dealt with the constitutional limit of the freedom of study under the Constitution. Therefore, the adoption of the books seized due to the violation of the same Act as evidence of conviction cannot be said to be a disposition contrary to Article 11(2) and (6) of the Constitution.

(c) The term "person who has been engaged in a leading duty" as referred to in the National Security Act refers to a person who has engaged in an important role or guidance activity for the purpose of a conclusion or group in question, regardless of the status in question or group;

D. Even if emergency martial law was rescinded, the punishment for a violation of martial law during the enforcement of said martial law is not extinguished, and thus, the punishment for such violation may be punished in accordance with the penal law at the time of the act unless there are special measures following the lifting of martial law.

A. Article 312(b) of the Criminal Procedure Act: Articles 11, 21, and 35 of the Constitution of the Republic of Korea; Article 4 of the former Anti-Public Law (Abolition); Article 7(c) of the National Security Act; Article 3(d) of the Martial Law Act

A. Supreme Court Decision 80Do2570 delivered on December 23, 1980, 82Do754 delivered on June 8, 1982, D. 4283Do115 delivered on April 10, 1951, 81Do304 delivered on March 24, 1981

Defendant 1 and three others

All of the defendants

Attorney Park So-young, Lee In-bok, Lee In-bok

Seoul High Court Decision 82No2725 delivered on February 16, 1983

All appeals are dismissed.

From among the days of detention pending trial after the appeal, 1, 2, and 3 shall be counted as 60 days, and 10 days for Defendant 4 shall be counted as 10 days, respectively.

Each ground of appeal is examined.

1. As to the grounds of appeal by Defendant 1, private defense counsel, and public defense counsel:

(1) The protocol of interrogation prepared by the prosecutor is admissible unless there is any reason to suspect that the defendant who was the suspect affixed his signature and seal in the court and recognized the authenticity of the protocol of interrogation prepared by the prosecutor in the court, unless it is found that the statement made by the prosecutor is made under unrecognizable circumstances because it is not arbitrarily done (see Supreme Court Decision 1980Do232, Dec. 23, 1980; 80Do2570, Jun. 8, 1982; 82Do754, etc.), and even after reviewing the record, the defendant acknowledged the authenticity of the protocol of interrogation prepared by the prosecutor against the defendant in the court, and there is no evidence to suspect that the content of the protocol of interrogation prepared by the prosecutor is not reliable as it is a non-regnizable statement and it cannot be found that there is any error of law by the court below contrary to the rules of evidence after remanding the protocol of interrogation

(2) A written statement prepared by a person other than the defendant or a prosecutor or senior judicial police officer may be admitted as evidence only when the authenticity of its formation is recognized by the statement of the person who prepared the statement or the person who made the statement, unless the defendant or his defense counsel consents to it as evidence. However, in comparison with the record and examination of the written statement prepared by the person other than the defendant or the prosecutor or senior judicial police officer from among the time evidences of the judgment of the first instance court cited by the court below after remand, it is obvious that the person who made the statement or the person who made the statement is recognized as true in the court, and therefore, it is not acceptable to criticize the original judgment on the premise that his written statement or the person who made the statement is inadmissible

(3) After remand, the court below's decision that recognized the facts of the offense against the defendant by comparing the trial evidence of the court of first instance as cited by the court below with the records is justified, and there is no error of law by misconception of facts against the rules of evidence, such as the theory of lawsuit, etc.

(4) The freedom of study under the Constitution can be limited to the case necessary for national security, maintenance of order, or public welfare pursuant to Article 35 of the Constitution unless it infringes on the essential contents. Thus, the restriction under the former Anti-Public Law or the National Security Act will address the constitutional limit of the freedom of study under the Constitution. The court below adopted the books seized by the violation of the same Act as evidence of conviction, and thus, it cannot be said that the books violated Article 11(2) and (6) of the Constitution.

(5) In light of the records, examining all the circumstances requiring the sentencing conditions, it seems that the health team, 10 years of imprisonment with prison labor sentenced to the defendant, and 10 years of suspension of qualifications are too excessive. Therefore, the arguments are groundless.

2. As to the grounds of appeal by Defendant 2 and state appointed defense counsel

(1) Since it is evident in the record that the defendant's interrogation protocol or the defendant's written statement on the defendant's suspect's written statement or written statement on the defendant's written statement in the process of handling affairs in the court of first instance that the defendant did not recognize its contents in the court of first instance, and it was not adopted as evidence of conviction after the remand of the court of first instance that the court of first instance cited by the court below, it is not reasonable to discuss the part on the defendant's written statement in the prosecutor's office and the part on the defendant's written statement, prosecutor's or judicial police officer's written statement concerning the admissibility of evidence of the written statement in which

(2) Examining the documentary evidence of the judgment of the court of first instance cited by the court below in comparison with records, we affirm the measures taken by the court below that recognized the criminal facts against the defendant, and there is no error of law such as misunderstanding of facts against the rules of evidence, misunderstanding of legal principles as to the National Security Act and anti-government organizations, or incomplete deliberation.

(3) A person who has been engaged in a leading duty under the National Security Act refers to a person who has performed an important role or leading duty for the relevant association or group (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 4283No115, Apr. 10, 1951). According to the facts established in the judgment of the first instance court cited by the court below, Defendant 1 was under Defendant 2 and 3's guidance, and he was under Defendant 1's command on May 17, 1981. 16:00 from the time when he was under the direction of the court below, he did not necessarily contribute to the establishment of the unified nation's status, which is the subject of history, according to the unification route of the North Korean pupe group, and thus, the purpose of the meeting is that the defendant has been under the direction of the defendant and the head of the U.S. and the head of the U.S., etc., to the extent that he did not have been under the direction of an anti-government organization.

Therefore, there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles or incomplete hearing on the guidance duty such as theory.

(4) Even if emergency martial law was rescinded, there is no reason to extinguish the punishment for a violation of martial law during the enforcement of the said martial law. Thus, barring any special measure following the lifting of martial law, a person may be punished for such violation under the penal law at the time of the act (see Supreme Court Decision 81Do304, Mar. 24, 1981; 81Do304, Jun. 24, 1981). Therefore, there is no argument that a violation of martial law is subject to a judgment of acquittal as in the case of the abolition of sentence due to the repeal of the law after the act.

(5) We accept Defendant 1’s grounds of appeal as it is, as it is, about the argument that adoption of the books related to the Defendant’s criminal facts as evidence of guilt infringes on the right to academic freedom under the Constitution.

(6) In this case sentenced to 7 years of imprisonment and 7 years of suspension of qualification for the defendant, the point of unfair sentencing is clear that it does not constitute a legitimate ground of appeal under the Criminal Procedure Act, and therefore, all arguments are groundless.

3. As to the grounds of appeal by Defendant 3, private defense counsel, and public defense counsel:

(1) As to the part of the Defendant’s ground of appeal disputing the decentralization of the statement at the prosecution, it is identical to that of Defendant 1’s ground of appeal.

(2) After remanding, we fully affirm the court below's measure that recognized the facts of the offense against the defendant by comparing the trial evidence of the court of first instance cited by the court below with the records, and there is no error of law such as misunderstanding of facts against the rules of evidence, incomplete deliberation, and misunderstanding of legal principles as to the composition of anti-government organization, such as theory of lawsuit.

(3) As to the argument that the adoption of the books seized due to Defendant’s criminal facts as evidence of guilt infringes on Defendant 1’s freedom of study under the Constitution, the following is cited: (4).

4. As to the grounds of appeal by Defendant 4 and state appointed defense counsel

(1) As to the part of Defendant 1’s grounds of appeal disputing the admissibility of evidence of the protocol in which the statement was made by a person other than the Defendant or by a senior judicial police officer, it is identical to that of Defendant 1.

(2) After remanding, we affirm the court below's measure that recognized the criminal facts against the defendant by comparing the trial evidence of the court of first instance as cited by the court below with records, and there is no error of law of misconception of facts and incomplete hearing due to violation of the rules of evidence, such as the theory of lawsuit, and of misunderstanding of legal principles as to the composition

(3) The adoption of the books related to the Defendant’s criminal facts as evidence of guilt is based on the same reasoning as the above determination of Defendant 1’s grounds of appeal on the grounds that it was unlawful by infringing the freedom of study guaranteed by the Constitution.

For the same reasons, each appeal by the Defendants is without merit, and all appeals are dismissed, and part of the number of days pending trial after the appeal is to be included in the principal sentence. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating judges.

Justices Kim Young-ju (Presiding Justice)