The meaning of a farmer under the Farmland Reform Act

A farmer entitled to receive a distribution of farmland under the Farmland Reform Act is not necessarily required to be an adult, and even if a minor is a minor, he/she shall be considered as a farmer so long as he/she cultivates farmland by engaging in agriculture together with his

Article 11 of the Farmland Reform Act

Supreme Court Decision 73Da931 delivered on September 25, 1973 (Daad 10534 delivered on September 25, 197, Supreme Court Decision 21No31 delivered on March 31, 200, Supreme Court Decision 80Da1082 delivered on September 9, 1980

Plaintiff

Defendant 1 and one other

Jeonju District Court of the first instance (78Gahap255)

The defendants' appeals are dismissed.

The costs of appeal shall be borne by the defendants.

Defendant 1, with respect to Jeonju-si 2, the procedure for registration of cancellation of ownership transfer registration due to inheritance on March 17, 1951, as Jeonju-si District Court No. 5781, Feb. 24, 1978, against Jeonju-si 122, and the procedure for registration of ownership transfer due to the completion of redemption on September 2, 1969, by the Defendant Republic of Korea against the Plaintiff.

Litigation costs shall be borne by the defendants.

The judgment of the first instance shall be revoked.

The plaintiff's claim is dismissed.

All the costs of lawsuit shall be borne by the plaintiff in the first and second instances.

With respect to the real estate stated in the purport of the claim (hereinafter referred to as the "real estate of this case"), the registration of transfer of ownership was received on June 10, 1937 on the register, No. 11458, and the registration of transfer of ownership was completed in the name of Nonparty 1 on April 10 of the same year due to sale and purchase on September 15, 1945 as No. 2742 of the receipt of the registration of the same court on July 7 of the same year, and the procedure for the registration of transfer of ownership was completed in the name of Nonparty 2 on the ground of sale and purchase on July 24, 1978, and thereafter, the registration of the same court was received on February 24, 1978, through inheritance on March 17, 1951 under Defendant 1's name, and there was no dispute between the plaintiff and Defendant 1, and it is recognized by the entry in the evidence No. 2 (register) of this case.

According to Gap evidence Nos. 1 (a certificate of repayment), Gap evidence Nos. 2 (a copy of the register), Gap evidence Nos. 4 (a certificate of land repayment), and Gap evidence No. 5 (a certificate of reply to fact-finding), verification of documents related to farmland distribution in the court of first instance on the testimony of the court of first instance, the non-party No. 1 was a Japanese person. The real estate of this case, which was a Japanese person's property as of August 9, 1945, is recognized as farmland reverted to the plaintiff under related Acts and subordinate statutes. The real estate of this case, which was managed by the management office, was not owned by the non-party Nos. 1, 2 (a copy of the register of land), Eul evidence No. 4 (a certificate of land repayment), and the non-party No. 5 (a certificate of land reimbursement to the court of first instance, and was not cultivated by the non-party No. 1, the non-party No. 2, who was an heir of this case. 97).

Defendant 1’s attorney recognized the real estate of this case as farmland on the premise that Japan was a Japanese person even though it was not a Japanese person, and distributed the farmland. This is null and void, and the real estate of this case was distributed as farmland although it was already created at the time of the distribution of the farmland, and thus, the above distribution disposition was null and void. Thus, it is identical to the above recognition as to the fact that the real estate of this case was farmland to which Japan was reverted, and that the present situation at the time of distribution of farmland of this case was farmland, and that the present situation was farmland at the time of distribution of farmland of this case. Thus, the argument by Defendant 1’s attorney cannot be accepted as without merit.

The defendants asserted on July 17, 1934 that the farmland distribution disposition against the non-party 4 cannot be viewed as a farmer under the Farmland Reform Act because the non-party 4 was a minor under the age of 15 at the time of enforcement of the Farmland Reform Act. Therefore, since the non-party 6 and the non-party 4 asserted that the farmland distribution disposition against the non-party 4 was invalid, the non-party 4 can not be viewed as the defendant's assertion that the farmland distribution disposition against the non-party 4 did not necessarily require that the plaintiff is an adult at the time of distribution, and even though the plaintiff is a minor, the non-party 4 should be regarded as a farmer if he had engaged in the farming and had cultivated the farmland at the time of distribution of the farmland, and the non-party 4 cannot be viewed as null and void as the non-party 4's assertion that the farmland distribution disposition against the non-party 4 had been made under the above non-party 4's name as well as the non-party 4's allegation that the above farmland distribution disposition against the non-party 4 was invalid.

The Defendants asserted that the real estate in this case was sold by Nonparty 4 to the Plaintiff prior to the completion of repayment, and that it was null and void in violation of Article 16 of the Farmland Reform Act. As such, if the person who received the farmland distributed sells it to another person before the repayment is repaid and the purchaser continuously pays the farmland with the delivery of the farmland and continues to do so, the sale should be deemed null and void. As such, the fact that the Plaintiff purchased the farmland in this case prior to the completion of the repayment from Nonparty 4 and cultivated it by delivery and possession on September 2, 1969 is identical to the above recognition, and the sale between Nonparty 4 and the Plaintiff on the real estate in this case shall be deemed null and void.

However, the non-party 4, a seller of the real estate in this case, ordered the plaintiff to complete the registration of transfer under the Act on Special Measures for the Registration of Transfer of Distribution Farmland Ownership by preparing a certificate of transfer, etc. for the land in this case after the plaintiff, a buyer, paid the above repayment fee, and delivered it to the plaintiff, and based on this recognition, it shall be deemed that the non-party 4 prepared and delivered the above recognition document with the knowledge that the above sale of the real estate in this case was null and void at the time of preparation and delivery of the above transfer certificate, etc., and therefore, it shall be deemed that the non-party 4 prepared and delivered the above recognition document with the knowledge that the above sale of the real estate in this case was null and void (see Supreme Court Decision 67Da281 delivered on April 18, 1967

The defendant Republic of Korea issued a redemption certificate to the plaintiff even if the obligation of the defendant to transfer ownership was extinguished by Article 11 of the Act on Special Measures for the Adjustment of Farmland Reform Project, and it is sufficient that the defendant's obligation to transfer ownership to the plaintiff was not fulfilled by the obligation to transfer ownership, but the obligation to transfer ownership on the ground of the completion of repayment does not fall under Article 11 of the same Act, and it is not exempt from the obligation to transfer ownership as it is because the defendant issued a redemption certificate. Therefore, each of the above arguments is groundless.

Thus, Defendant 1 has the obligation to register cancellation of the above ownership transfer registration due to the inheritance under the name of Defendant Republic of Korea, and Defendant Republic of Korea has the obligation to register transfer of ownership to the Plaintiff and perform each of the above real estate, and Defendant 1 shall accept all of the Plaintiff’s claim for objection against Defendant 1 by subrogation of the Republic of Korea.

Therefore, the judgment of the first instance court that shares the same result is just and without merit, and the appeal by the Defendants is dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the Defendants as the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition.

Judges Yoon Il-young (Presiding Judge)