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(영문) 수원지방법원 2020.06.04 2019노6095
성매매알선등행위의처벌에관한법률위반(성매매알선등)
Text

The defendant's appeal is dismissed.

Reasons

1. Summary of grounds for appeal;

A. The first instance court found the Defendant guilty of the crime in its holding on the premise that the crime of violation of Article 19(1)1 of the Act on the Punishment of Arrangement of Commercial Sex Acts, Etc., which constitutes the crime in its holding, is an abstract dangerous crime without any grounds to regard it as an abstract dangerous crime, and on the premise that the above crime falls under the abstract dangerous crime, even though D who attempted to purchase sex in connection with the crime in its holding, did not confirm his/her actual intent to purchase sex.

Therefore, the judgment of the first instance court is erroneous by mistake of facts or misapprehension of legal principles.

B. The judgment of the court of first instance on the defendant's grounds of unfair sentencing (the fine of KRW 4,00,000) is too unreasonable.

2. Determination:

A. As to the assertion of misunderstanding of facts or misapprehension of legal principles, the "act of arranging sexual traffic" under Article 19 (1) 1 of the Act on the Punishment of Acts of Arranging Sexual Traffic is to arrange or facilitate the convenience between the parties intending to engage in sexual traffic. It does not necessarily require that the parties intending to engage in sexual traffic by such mediation have to actually engage in or face with each other, but it is sufficient that the parties are only engaged in sexual traffic to the extent that the parties intending to engage in sexual traffic did not have any involvement any longer by linking the intentions of the parties intending to engage in sexual traffic, even if there

(see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2011Do14272, Dec. 22, 2011). In light of the foregoing legal doctrine, according to evidence duly adopted and examined by the court of first instance and the court of first instance, it is sufficiently recognized that the Defendant had “act of arranging sexual traffic to the extent that it can be possible to do so” as stated in the judgment.

As above, in this case, the crime of violating the Act on the Punishment of Arrangement of Commercial Sex Acts, Etc. is established against the defendant without regard to the occurrence of internal intention or actual sexual intercourse of the parties involved in sexual traffic.

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