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본 영문본은 리걸엔진의 AI 번역 엔진으로 번역되었습니다. 수정이 필요한 부분이 있는 경우 피드백 부탁드립니다.
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(영문) 서울중앙지방법원 2020.01.31 2019노2455
성매매알선등행위의처벌에관한법률위반(성매매알선등)
Text

The defendant's appeal is dismissed.

Reasons

1. Summary of grounds for appeal;

A. misunderstanding of facts and misunderstanding of legal principles1) With respect to the fact that the instant facts charged are unlawful because the recovery of sexual traffic is not specified, and thus, the act of arranging sexual traffic has been performed to a controlling police officer, it does not constitute the act of arranging sexual traffic since the police officer had no intention

B. The sentence imposed by the lower court (one year and two months of imprisonment and a fine of five million won, confiscation, and collection) is too unreasonable.

2. Judgment on misconception of facts and misapprehension of legal principles

A. As to the specification of the facts charged in the instant case, the facts charged against the Defendant constitute a crime by comprehensively covering the act of arranging the sexual traffic of the Defendant who has been pending for a certain period, and it is not clear that the facts charged were specified by specifying the whole time and period of the crime, method of the crime, accomplices related to the mediation of sexual traffic, other employees of the other party to sexual traffic, and places of sexual traffic, and the subject of the

It cannot be deemed that the defendant's exercise of right to defend was infringed.

This part of the defendant's assertion is not accepted.

B. As to the act of arranging sexual traffic to a traffic officer, the phrase "act of arranging sexual traffic" under Article 19 (2) 1 of the Act on the Punishment of Acts of Arranging Sexual Traffic means that the parties intending to engage in sexual traffic make good offices or convenience. Thus, in order to act as a broker for sexual traffic, the parties intending to engage in sexual traffic must not necessarily reach the level of actually engaging in sexual traffic, but it is sufficient that the parties intending to engage in sexual traffic by linking the intentions of the parties intending to engage in sexual traffic to the extent that it is possible for them to engage in sexual traffic even if there is no involvement of the intermediary.

(see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2011Do14272, Dec. 22, 2011). Moreover, the communication with the intent of the parties who intend to engage in sexual traffic, i.e., sexual traffic contracts.

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