[1] The purport of the exclusion clause, and the effect of the "part of the exclusion clause" in the "part of the comprehensive insurance contract for business purpose motor vehicles, which is an employee of the insured subject to liability for accident compensation under the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act", "no compensation shall be made even if any damage occurs beyond the scope of compensation under the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act" (negative)

[2] The case reversing the judgment of the court below which recognized the discharge on the ground that the "part of the terms of the comprehensive automobile insurance contract for business purpose which exceeds the scope of compensation pursuant to the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act" does not have an effect on the ground that the "part of the terms of the comprehensive automobile insurance contract for business purpose" is not effective in case where a person who entered into the comprehensive automobile insurance contract with an insurance company and operated the business with one regular full-time worker boarding and operating the worker on the side of the seat of the driver's seat for business, and all the back part of the left side of the large cargo vehicle parked on the

[1] The purpose of the provision of the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act (hereinafter referred to as the "Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act") which provides for exemption from liability for an employee who is an employee of the insured with liability for damages caused by an occupational accident in accordance with the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act (hereinafter referred to as the "Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act") is to stipulate various employer's liability for compensation in the Labor Standards Act which regulates the relationship between the employer and the employee, and to secure such liability for compensation, as the Industrial Accident Insurance Act establishes the industrial accident insurance system under the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act, it is reasonable to interpret that the employee's liability for damages caused by an occupational accident subject to the industrial accident insurance is to be excluded from liability for damages caused by the industrial accident insurance to the extent that it is possible to compensate for damages caused by a third party within the scope of liability for damages caused by the occupational accident. Thus, even if the damage caused by the occupational accident exceeds the scope of indemnity under the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act, it is against the purpose of Article 2 (1) of the Insurance Act which provides for the insurer's liability for damages to the insured as well as the insurer's liability for damages caused by an accident.

[2] The case reversing the judgment of the court below which recognized the exemption on the ground that the "part of the terms and conditions of comprehensive automobile insurance for business purpose which exceeds the scope of compensation pursuant to the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act" does not have an effect on the ground that the "part of the terms and conditions of comprehensive automobile insurance for business purpose" is not effective, where a person who entered into an insurance contract with an insurance company for comprehensive automobile for business purpose and operated a business with one regular full-time employee boarding and operating a worker on the side of the driver's seat for business, and all the rear part of the left part of the large cargo vehicle parked on the side

[1] Article 6(1) and (2)1 of the Regulation of Standardized Contracts Act, Article 7(2)2 of the Commercial Act, Article 663 of the Commercial Act, Article 5 of the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act / [2] Article 6(1) and (2)1 of the Regulation of Standardized Contracts Act, Article 663 of the Commercial Act, Article 5 of the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act

[1] Supreme Court Decision 93Da23107 delivered on November 9, 1993 (Gong1994Sang, 76), Supreme Court Decision 97Da4746 delivered on April 25, 1997 (overruled)

Plaintiff 1 and six others (Attorney Lee Jae-sik, Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Samsung Fire and Marine Insurance Co., Ltd. (Attorney Jung-hun et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Daejeon High Court Decision 2001Na8439 delivered on December 12, 2002

The judgment of the court below is reversed, and the case is remanded to Daejeon High Court.

We examine the grounds of appeal.

1. The judgment of the court below on finding facts

A. Based on the evidence of employment, the lower court: (a) concluded a comprehensive insurance contract for business-use motor vehicles with the Defendant on July 14, 200 with respect to the non-party 1 who operated the gas alarm machine installation business with the trade name of "○○ Industry" (vehicle registration number omitted); (b) on the basis of the comprehensive insurance contract for business-use motor vehicles (hereinafter "the instant motor vehicle"); (c) on the part of the general insurance contract for business-use vehicles applicable to the above insurance contract, the personal compensation II shall not be compensated for the insured worker who is entitled to the accident compensation under the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act (Article 11(2)4 of the ordinary insurance contract; hereinafter referred to as "the exemption clause of this case") and acknowledged the fact that the non-party 1 caused damages beyond the scope of compensation under the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act to the non-party 2, including the day on which the non-party 1 died on which the non-party 2 road was placed on the left-hand side of the road (hereinafter referred to as "non-party 2, on the street 1").

B. Based on these facts, the court below held that the accident of this case constitutes occupational accident since the accident of this case occurred on the roads on which Nonparty 1 2 et al. al. was on board for the execution of the construction work contracted by Nonparty 1 and was on the construction site. The business operated by Nonparty 1 is subject to the above Act pursuant to Article 5 of the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act (hereinafter referred to as the "Industrial Accident Insurance Act"), since the number of workers at ordinary times is more than one, and accordingly the insurance under the above Act is also subject to the above Act, regardless of whether Nonparty 1 actually subscribed to industrial accident insurance, the industrial accident insurance money should be paid as a matter of law regardless of whether Nonparty 1 actually subscribed to industrial accident insurance. Thus, the defendant's duty to pay insurance money pursuant to Article 2 of the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance to the plaintiffs, who are parents of Nonparty 2 et al., constitutes exemption pursuant to the above exemption provision of this case, and rejected this legal principle within the scope of Article 6 of the Commercial Act, which excludes the scope of damage compensation insurance clause of this case from the scope of damage compensation clause.

2. The judgment of this Court

A. Of the terms and conditions of comprehensive automobile insurance, the term "no compensation shall be made to a person who is an employee of the insured with liability for damages under the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act", which provides for the employer's various liability for compensation in the Labor Standards Act governing the relationship between the employer and the employee with respect to the damages caused by occupational accidents arising from the relationship between the employer and the employee. In order to secure such liability, the industrial accident insurance system is established under the Industrial Accident Insurance Act regulating the liability for compensation. Thus, it is reasonable to interpret that the accident insurance is excluded from the scope of the automobile insurance for the purpose of compensating for the damages to a third party to the extent that it is possible to compensate for the damages caused by the occupational accident, which is the subject of the industrial accident insurance, to the extent that it is possible to compensate for the damages caused by the occupational accident to the extent that it exceeds the scope of compensation under the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act. If the insurer is exempted from liability under the exemption clause of this case, it is not only against the purpose of Article 6 (1) 2 of the Automobile Insurance Act, but also against the insured's obligation to compensate for damages to the insured.

Therefore, the phrase "no compensation shall be made even in the event of damage exceeding the scope of compensation under the Industrial Accident Insurance Act" is not effective in accordance with each provision of the same Act.

Supreme Court Decisions 93Da23107 delivered on November 9, 1993 and Supreme Court Decision 97Da4746 delivered on April 25, 1997, etc. are to be amended to the extent that it conflicts with the opinion of this case.

B. Ultimately, the judgment of the court below that the "part within the overall title" of the exemption clause of this case is valid is erroneous in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the effect of the automobile comprehensive accident compensation insurance exemption clause, which affected the conclusion of the judgment. The ground of appeal pointing this out is with merit.

3. Conclusion

Therefore, without further proceeding to decide on the remaining grounds of appeal, the lower judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded to the lower court for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

The final judgment of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court (Presiding Justice) shall be delivered with the assent of all Justices who reviewed the appeal and the appeal shall be delivered with the assent of all Justices.