Defendant 1 and three others

Stickness (prosecution), flag, mobility, correction (public trial)

Law Firm (LLC) et al.

1. Defendant 1

A defendant shall be punished by imprisonment for three years.

344,647,589 won shall be additionally collected from the defendant.

To order the defendant to pay an amount equivalent to the above additional collection charge.

Of the facts charged against the Defendant, each of the facts charged against the victim Nonindicted Co. 1 and Defendant 1 (attached Form No. 645, 729, 3132, 3307, 4379, 5812, 13757, 15683, 1894, 19781), shall be acquitted.

The summary of each judgment of innocence shall be publicly notified.

2. Defendant 2

A person shall be punished by imprisonment with prison labor for six months for a crime listed in the table of crime (3)-1 in the separate sheet of crime (1), (2), (3) and (5) in the judgment of the defendant, and by imprisonment for two years for a crime listed in the separate sheet of crime (3) and attached sheet of crime (3)-2 in the judgment of the defendant.

However, the execution of the above sentence shall be suspended for two years from the date this judgment becomes final and conclusive for the crime No. 1-A, (b), (c) and (3) of the crime committed in the judgment, and the attached list No. 3-1 of the crime committed in the judgment.

Of the facts charged against the accused, the charge of occupational breach of trust, violation of the Act on the Regulation and Punishment of Criminal Proceeds Concealment, and the charge of fraud against the victim Nonindicted Co. 1 and Defendant 1 (attached Form 3), 645, 729, 3132, 3307, 4379, 5812, 13757, 15683, 1894, 19781) is not guilty.

The summary of each judgment of innocence shall be publicly notified.

3. Defendants 3 and 4

Defendants shall be punished by imprisonment for six months.

except that the execution of each of the above penalties shall be suspended for two years from the date this judgment becomes final and conclusive.

To order the Defendants to provide community service for 120 hours each time.

Of the facts charged against the Defendants, any section of the following shall be acquitted:

The summary of each judgment of innocence shall be publicly notified.

【Criminal Records】

Defendant 2 was sentenced to imprisonment with prison labor for six months at the Seoul Central District Court on January 12, 2018 due to a crime, such as violation of the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Crimes (Bodily Injury resulting from Dangerous Driving) and the judgment became final and conclusive on January 20, 2018 and is still under probation.

【Criminal Facts】

Defendant 1 and the representative director of Nonindicted Co. 1 (hereinafter “Nonindicted Co. 1”), a company operating the virtual currency exchange located in Songpa-gu Seoul ( Address omitted), were in charge of overall affairs of the company as the major shareholder and the representative director. Defendant 2 was in charge of the management of the company’s funds as the major shareholder and the inside director of Nonindicted Co. 1. Defendant 3 was in charge of the management of the company’s funds as the major shareholder and the inside director. Defendant 3 was in charge of the fund disbursement of the company as the director of the internal company and the head of the public relations team. Defendant 4 was the head of the technology development team

Defendant 1, Defendant 2, and Defendant 3 came to know each other while working as an insurance solicitor. From around 2016, they run an unauthorized private futures trading company. On July 2017, Defendant 1, Defendant 2, and Defendant 3 were willing to establish a virtual currency exchange on the ground that they were referred to as “financial experts”, as they prevail in the business and exchange of virtual currency in Korea.

1. Joint criminal conduct by Defendants 1 and 2

(a) Violation of the Commercial Act, false entry into public electronic records, and public or private electromagnetic records;

On July 2017, in establishing Nonindicted Company 1, which is a company operating the virtual currency exchange, the Defendants, despite the Defendants’ intent or ability to pay KRW 500 million of the established capital with the funds, were urged to lend the full amount of capital from the corporate bond company called “○○○” to make the best payment for the share capital as if the Defendants prepared the capital amount of KRW 500 million.

On July 19, 2017, the Defendants appointed Nonindicted 7, an employee of the above company as the representative of the promoters of Nonindicted Company 1, and allocated 1,000 shares at the same time. After obtaining a balance certificate of the Bank Account (Account No. 1 omitted, Account No. 269, and Account No. 2 omitted) in the name of Nonindicted Company 7, the Bank of Korea deposited in KRW 500,269,213, the Defendants submitted an application for registration of incorporation to a public official who is aware of the most of the payment of the shares in the Seoul Central District Court’s registry and submitted an application for registration of incorporation to the public official in charge of the said remaining certificate and made the public official enter the “amount of the capital” column of the Commercial Register of the above company, a public electronic record, into a “amount of KRW 500,00,000.” Around that time, the Defendants deposited the amount of KRW 500,500 in the account of Nonindicted Company 1’s corporate account or set the shares transferred only to the Defendants 71000 shares.

In the end, the Defendants conspired to act for the pretending payment, and made a false report to the public official to enter false facts in the commercial register, which is a public electronic record, and exercised it by having the public official keep it.

(b) Events, such as writing, electronic records, etc.; and

On January 5, 2018, the Defendants opened the Internet virtual currency trading system (hereinafter “Nonindicted Company 1’s virtual currency trading system”) with the trade name of Nonindicted Company 1 (hereinafter “Nonindicted Company 1”), and concluded that many members would make trading orders using the Nonindicted Company 1’s virtual currency trading system and actively make transactions accordingly, the Defendants made a false entry of the number of virtual currency holdings and the balance amount of won currency (KRW) as if they were holding the same in the name of Nonindicted Company 1’s virtual currency trading system, and as if they were holding the same in the name of the next name account, they made a false entry of the amount of virtual currency holdings and the balance amount of won currency holding as if they were holding the virtual currency and Korean currency currency assets that were not actually held in the name of the second name account. The Defendants made a false entry into the order for trading the so-called “processing Co. 1” (referring to the virtual currency that existed only in the actual transaction system without taking place, hereinafter the same shall apply) using the automatic order.

1) A crime committed on January 5, 2018

On January 5, 2018, immediately before the opening of the virtual currency trading system of Nonindicted Company 1, the Defendants: (a) connected to the manager page of the aforementioned trading system to create “a borrowed account” and “processed coaches and won currency (KRW)” at the office of Nonindicted Company 1, the Defendants created a borrowed-name account (ID) with the name of the member ID (member ID 1 omitted), and the name of the account name “Defendant 1”; and (b) in fact, even if the number of 1,00,000 accounts was not put into 1,00,000 in the above name of “Defendant 1” account, Defendant 1, as if the number of 1,00,000 bitcos were put into the account of Nonindicted Company 1’s 1, “the number of 00,000 bitcos and 1,000 bitcos and 1,000 bitcos and 1,000.

As a result, the Defendants conspired to forgee electronic information on virtual currency or cash balance by account, electronic records pertaining to rights, obligations, or certification of facts, and used it immediately to the system 30 times in total, as shown in the attached Table of Crimes (1), and entered 1,000,000 "BTC (BTC), 1,000,000" in each account, and 1,000,000,000 "BCH" in each 1,00,000,000" in each 30 column, such as in the attached Table of Crimes (1).

2) Crimes committed on January 19, 2018

On January 19, 2018, at the office of Nonindicted Company 1, at around 10:51, the Defendants used the name “the borrowed account” created in the virtual currency trading system of Nonindicted Company 1 and the “processed coin” entered in the trading order, and had side effects such as overworking to the system during the process of issuing trading orders, etc., the Defendants partly supplemented the “twit program” in order to alleviate these problems, and generated a lot of “processed coin account” to issue trading orders.

Accordingly, the above non-indicted 1's virtual currency trading system was connected to the manager page of the above non-indicted 1's virtual currency trading system, and the newly created member ID (member ID 2 omitted), non-indicted 2's account name "non-indicted 2's account name" was created, and the above non-indicted 2's non-indicted 2's non-indicted 1's non-indicted 2's non-indicted 1's account's non-indicted 2's non-indicted 1's non-indicted 1's non-indicted 2's non-indicted 2's non-indicted 2's "non-indicted 1,00,000's non-indicted 2's account name was falsely marked as if non-indicted 1 entered into the account.

As a result, the Defendants conspired to forgee electronic information on the quantity of virtual currency or cash balance held by each electronic records, which are electronic records on rights, obligations, or certification of facts, and used it immediately to the system, as well as enter 10 books of account newly made over 60 times in total as shown in the attached Table of Crimes (2), each of the 1,000,000 "BC" (BC), 1,000,000 non-coin (BCH), 1,00,000,000's balance, 1,000,000's balance (ETH)'s balance (point), 1,00,000,000's balance, and each of the above 100,000's balance (hereinafter referred to as 1,000's balance), as shown in the attached Table of Crimes (2).

(c) Occupational embezzlement;

1) The Defendants were in the custody of the Company’s funds on behalf of the victim Nonindicted Company 1 for business purposes;

A) Around July 28, 2017, at the office of Nonindicted Company 1, the amount of KRW 30 million in the company’s account (Account No. 3 omitted) in the name of Nonindicted Company 1’s bank account (Account No. 3 omitted) is embezzled by remitting to the bank account (Account No. 4 omitted) in the name of Nonindicted Company 8’s bank account in the name of the Defendants, such as the cost of the private futures trading company’s system

B) Around August 1, 2017, Nonindicted Company 1’s office embezzled KRW 25 million of the company’s operating expenses in the account of Nonindicted Company 1’s bank (Account No. 3 omitted) to be used for personal purposes, such as the cost of the private futures trading company’s system, and embezzled the money via Nonindicted Company 9’s account (Account No. 5 omitted) in the name of the Defendants.

Accordingly, the Defendants conspired and embezzled the sum of KRW 50 million, which was in the occupational custody for the said victims, on two occasions.

2) On February 8, 2018, the Defendants conspired to keep the funds of Nonindicted Company 1 for the business purpose at Nonindicted Company 1’s office, and embezzled KRW 60,000,000 in the company’s account (Account Number 6 omitted) in the name of Nonindicted Company 1 for the personal purpose of using the funds of Nonindicted Company 1 for the personal purpose of the Defendants, by remitting them to the Korean bank account (Account Number 6 omitted) in the name of Defendant 1 and the Korean bank account (Account Number 6 omitted) in the name of Defendant 2, respectively.

(d) Violation of the Act on the Aggravated Punishment of Specific Economic Crimes;

From January 16, 2018, the Defendants: (a) transferred KRW 1 billion from the bank account (Account Number 8 omitted) in the name of Nonindicted Company 1 to the company bank account (Account Number 8 omitted) in the name of Defendant 1 for virtual currency trading; (b) transferred KRW 1 billion from the bank account (Account Number 9 omitted) in the name of Nonindicted Company 1 to the company bank account in the name of Defendant 1; and (c) transferred KRW 1 billion from the bank account (Account Number 9 omitted) in the name of Nonindicted Company 1 to the bank account in the name of Defendant 1 for the purpose of paying to customers; and (d) transferred KRW 1 billion from the bank account (Account Number 9 omitted) in the name of Nonindicted Company 1 to the bank account in the name of Nonindicted Company 1; and (e) transferred KRW 1 billion from the above company account account number of the Defendant 1 to another company bank account in the name of Defendant 1 to the above company bank account in the name of KRW 16 billion (Account Number 1.2 billion.

Accordingly, on January 29, 2018, Defendants conspired and embezzled KRW 1.4 billion out of the company funds kept in custody for the victim non-indicted 1 in the course of business for the purpose of the victim non-indicted 1, as Defendant 1’s new stocks payment amounting to KRW 770 million, and Defendant 2’s new stocks payment amounting to KRW 630,000,000,000 for KRW 630,000,000 for personal capital, etc.

(e) Fraud;

1) Details of the public offering

The Defendants submitted trading orders to “processed Coin” without actual storage through the “ robot account” and “ robot program,” and traded between “the robot account,” thereby providing customers with a window screen, etc. marked as if the trading of virtual currency in Nonindicted Company 1 Exchange was activated, and a large quantity of purchase prices were introduced. In addition, the Defendants sold the “processed Coin” through “the robot account” to the general customers, and then requested customers to release the actual money, then then released the customer’s deposit without permission, purchased the coin at another virtual currency exchange, and then sold the coin with the coin’s purchase of the coin in another virtual currency exchange instead of being shipped out as if the ○ Co., Ltd. were listed on Nonindicted Company 1’s electronic wallets. However, the Defendants followed these circumstances, after receiving trading orders and “unspecific foreign currency” deposited to ordinary customers, and considered that trading orders and transactions were active, and continued to have entered into the market and multiple customers’ safe payment and participation in the exchange.

2) Fraudulent act

around July 2017, the Defendants: (a) established Nonindicted Company 1 to open the virtual currency exchange; (b) provided demonstration services of the virtual currency trading system (open beta services) around December 2017; (c) opened and operated Nonindicted Company 1’s “Cance Exchange Services” by providing regular transaction system around January 5, 2018; and (d) provided multiple unspecified users with various types of accounts (hereinafter “definite account”) on the virtual currency trading system, such as the crime described in the aforementioned B B B before opening the Exchange; (b) provided that Nonindicted Company 1’s virtual currency trading volume and won were not recorded in the “Account”; (c) provided that Nonindicted Company 1’s actual trading volume and won traded volume were not known as if the actual trading volume were recorded in the virtual currency and won currency exchange; and (d) provided that Nonindicted Company 1’s actual trading volume and trading volume were not entered into with the general market “disfinite trading order” or “disfinite trading order,” and (e) provided the general market “disfinform trading order” without being entered into.

However, in fact, upon Nonindicted Company 1’s virtual currency trading system, Nonindicted Company 1 submitted a large quantity of orders through the Defendants’ “ robot account” and “ robot program” through the “ robot account,” or sold “processing Coins” which were falsely entered without real storage to ordinary customers through the “ robot account,” thereby making it difficult to say that the trading order volume and the trading contract volume in the Exchange constitute a de facto depression, and that the market purchase price has been continuously introduced.

iii)the act of defraudation;

From January 5, 2018 to March 12, 2018, the Defendants conspired to deception an unspecified number of users as above, and had the users receive KRW 4,530,000 (No. 645, 729, 3132, 3307, 4379, 5812, 13757, 1894, 19781), and KRW 50,000 (No. 15683 annually), including 10 times total sum of KRW 4,580,00 (no. 15683) from January 5, 201 to March 12, 2018, to have the users transfer the money under the name of Nonindicted Company 1 with the money deposited in the name of one bank (including fees and fees) over total sum of KRW 21,784,292,307 (including fees and fees).

2. Defendant 1

A. Occupational breach of trust

On January 16, 2018, the Defendant transferred KRW 1.5 billion to the company bank account of Defendant 1 among the customer deposits of Nonindicted Company 1 at the above Nonindicted Company 1’s office to the company bank account of Nonindicted Company 6, which was linked to Defendant 1’s account. On January 16, 2018, the Defendant purchased KRW 46 of the average purchase price of KRW 1,787,000,000, total of KRW 81,312,924, which was KRW 81,312,924, since the Defendant purchased KRW 1,50,000 from the company’s company’s company’s company’s company’s company’s company’s assets to the company account of Nonindicted Company 6’s Defendant 1.

Nevertheless, at around 11:32 on January 18, 2018, the Defendant transferred approximately KRW 34,4647,589,00 from among the 46 BTC 21.5674341 market price of approximately 34,4647,589 among the 46 BTC 21.56 non-indicted 21.5674341 x 15,980,000 purchase price (i) approximately 38,543,392 won (i.e., BTC 21.5674341 x 17,871,083), instead of transferring the amount equivalent to BTC 21.574341 x 17,083 won to the electronic wall in the management of Nonindicted Party 1.

Ultimately, the Defendant violated his duties, thereby acquiring, or had a third party obtain, proprietary benefits of 21.5674341 (34,4647,589 won at the market price) which is bitcoin, thereby causing damage equivalent to the same amount as that of Nonindicted Company 1.

(b) Violation of the Act on the Regulation and Punishment of Criminal Proceeds Concealment;

On January 16, 2018, the Defendant transferred KRW 1.5 billion to the Nonghyup Bank account (Account Number 11 omitted) in Defendant 1’s virtual account at Nonindicted Company 1’s office, at Nonindicted Company 1’s office. On January 18, 2018, KRW 46,000,000 per unit through the virtual currency trading system of Nonindicted Company 6 purchased KRW 1,787,000 per unit, KRW 1,3112,924. On the same day, the Defendant purchased KRW 46,00,00 purchased KRW 81,311,00,00 in total, KRW 1,5254, which was in custody of Defendant 1’s corporate bank account. On the same day, Nonindicted Company 1 purchased KRW 46,5254,00,000 in total, KRW 1,5374,74639,649,647,7537.

Ultimately, the Defendant: (a) concealed one of the bitcos purchased from Nonindicted Company 6, a virtual currency exchange, in order to promote specific crimes by transferring part of the bitcos purchased from Nonindicted Company 6, which was the virtual currency exchange; or (b) for the purpose of pretending the proceeds of crime as legitimately acquired property, the market price of the crime, which was acquired through serious crimes, was 34,4647,589 won, which was the bitco of virtual currency equivalent to KRW 1.5674341.

3. Defendants 3 and 4

On January 2018, the Defendants received a proposal from Defendant 1 and Defendant 2 to allocate 80,000 new shares of Nonindicted Company 1 by using the funds of Nonindicted Company 1 (deposit money) and accepted it.

around January 2018, the Defendants, along with Defendant 1 and Defendant 2, transferred KRW 1 billion from the bank account (Account Number 7 omitted) of Nonindicted Company 1’s national bank used for the purpose of receiving customer deposit money to the bank account (Account Number 8 omitted) in the name of Defendant 1, and transferred KRW 1 billion from the bank account (Account Number 9 omitted) of Nonindicted Company 1’s corporate bank to the bank account (Account Number 100 million) for the purpose of taking out customer deposit money and paying it to its customers on or after January 16, 2018. On or around January 26, 2018, the Defendants transferred KRW 1 billion from the bank account (Account Number 9 omitted) of Nonindicted Company 1’s corporate bank to the above bank account of Nonindicted Company 1’s corporate bank account. On or around January 26, 2018, the Defendants transferred KRW 200,000,000 won deposited in the above bank account of Defendant 1’s corporate bank to KRW 1008,18.

Ultimately, around January 29, 2018, the Defendants: (a) deducted Defendant 1 and Defendant 2’s personal account of the Company’s funds kept in custody for the victim Nonindicted Company 1; (b) again, deposited Defendant 3’s payment of KRW 40 million for Nonindicted Company 1’s new shares; and (c) KRW 40 million for Defendant 40 million for Defendant 4’s new shares; and (b) embezzled Defendant 1 and Defendant 2 for personal increase of funds in collusion with each other.

1. Defendants’ respective legal statements

1. Each legal statement of the witness Nonindicted 4, Nonindicted 5, and Nonindicted 10

1. The witness's each legal statement in each of the defendants 1, 2, 3, and 4

1. The result of the fact-finding inquiry of Nonindicted Co. 6 of this court

1. Each prosecutor's interrogation protocol against the Defendants

1. Each prosecutor's statement against the defendant 3 and the defendant 4;

1. Details of account transactions in the name of the Defendant 1, Nonindicted Company 1’s terms and conditions of use, Nonindicted Company 1’s personal information protection policy, Nonindicted Company 1’s electronic wallet, KRW 1’s deposit and withdrawal; Nonindicted Company 1’s corporate register; Nonindicted Company 1’s corporate register; Nonindicted Company 1’s corporate register; Nonindicted Company 1’s corporate register; Defendant 1 and Defendant 2’s corporate bank; details of investment in each exchange by Defendant 1 and Defendant 2’s other exchange; details of account transactions; details of account transactions for capital increase, Defendant 2 and Defendant 1’s financial statements; details of Nonindicted Company 3’s business opening, customer inquiry; customer statement; driver’s license; statement of entry into an automobile; details of entry into an exchange; details of entry into an exchange with Nonindicted Company 1’s book; current status of entry into an exchange-related 5’s book; and details of entry into an exchange-related 1’s book; and details of entry into an exchange-related 5’s book; and details of entry.

1. Each investigation report (in addition to the terms and conditions of introduction and use of company 1, report on the certified transcript of corporate register of non-indicted 1 and report on the present status of the corporation);

1. Previous convictions in the judgment: Investigative report (Defendant 1, Defendant 2 attached to the suspect's separate decisions), criminal suspect's two court rulings (Seoul Central District Court Decision 2017Ma6357, Seoul Central District Court Decision 2017No40888);

1. Article relevant to the facts constituting an offense and the selection of punishment;

A. Defendant 1: (1) Articles 628(1) and 62(1) of the Commercial Act; (2) Article 30 of the Criminal Act; (3) Article 228(1) and 30 of the Criminal Act; (4) Articles 229, 228(1) and 30 of the Criminal Act; (3) Articles 232-2 and 30 of the Criminal Act; (4) Articles 232-2 and 30 of the Criminal Act; (3) Articles 234, 232-2 and 30 of the Criminal Act; (4) Articles 5 and 30 of the Criminal Act; (5) Articles 30 of the Criminal Act; (3) Articles 256 and 35(1) and 30 of the Criminal Act; (4) Articles 28(1) of the Criminal Act; (5) Articles 28(1) and 30(1) of the Criminal Act comprehensively select a victim’s imprisonment with labor; (5) Articles 306(17)

B. Defendant 2: Articles 628(1) and 622(1) of the Commercial Act; Article 30 of the Criminal Act; Article 228(1), Article 30 of the Criminal Act; Article 228(1), Article 30 of the Criminal Act; Articles 229, 228(1), and 30 of the Criminal Act (the use of false electronic records; the choice of imprisonment); Articles 232-2, 30 of the Criminal Act (the use of false electronic records; each choice of imprisonment), Articles 234, 232-2, and 30 of the Criminal Act; Article 30 of the Criminal Act (the use of pre-written records; each choice of imprisonment); Articles 356 and 35(1) and 30 of the Criminal Act; Article 28(1) of the Criminal Act; Article 30 of the Criminal Act; Article 25(1)6 of the Criminal Act’s comprehensive punishment; Article 30 of the Criminal Act’s Embezzlement; Article 18(35)

C. Defendant 3 and Defendant 4: Articles 356, 355(1), and 30 of the Criminal Act (the occupational embezzlement, and the Defendants do not have the identity of a custodian in the line of duty)

1. Handling concurrent crimes;

Defendant 2: The latter part of Articles 37 and 39(1) of the Criminal Act [the crime of violating the Commercial Act, the crime of false entry in public electromagnetic records, etc., the crime of uttering of false entry in public electromagnetic records, etc., each crime of false entry in private electromagnetic records, etc., each crime of uttering of private electromagnetic records, etc., each crime of occupational embezzlement as of July 28, 201, and August 1, 2017, the crime of occupational embezzlement as of August 1, 2017, the part as stated in the attached list of crimes (3)-1 (hereinafter referred to as “Defendant 2’s 1 fraud”), and the violation of

1. Aggravation for concurrent crimes;

(a) Defendant 1: the former part of Article 37, Article 38 (1) 2, and Article 50 of the Criminal Act (limited to concurrent crimes with the punishment prescribed in the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Economic Crimes (Embezzlement) with the largest penalty);

B. Defendant 2: the former part of Article 37, Article 38(1)2, and Article 50 of the Criminal Act

1) Violation of the Commercial Act, crimes of false entry into public electromagnetic records, etc., crimes of false entry into public electromagnetic records, crimes of false entry into public electromagnetic records, crimes of false entry into private electromagnetic records, crimes of uttering of each private electromagnetic records, crimes of false entry into private electromagnetic records, crimes of uttering of each private electromagnetic records, crimes of occupational embezzlement committed on July 28, 201 and August 1, 2017, crimes of occupational embezzlement committed on business embezzlement committed on August 1, 201, between

2) On February 8, 2018, the crime of occupational embezzlement, the violation of the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Economic Crimes (Embezzlement), each part of the attached Table of Crimes (3)-2 of each crime of fraud (hereinafter “Defendant 2’s 2 crime”), each of the attached Table of Crimes (hereinafter “Defendant 2’s 2 crime”), the punishment is one of the concurrent crimes with the punishment prescribed in the

1. Discretionary mitigation;

Defendant 2: Articles 53 and 55(1)3 of the Criminal Act (the occupational embezzlement of February 8, 2018), the violation of the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Economic Crimes (Embezzlement), and Defendant 2’s second fraud, taking into account the favorable circumstances among the reasons for sentencing following the relevant crime)

1. Suspension of execution;

A. Defendant 2: Article 62(1) of the Criminal Act (with respect to the crime of violation of the Commercial Act, the crime of false entry into public records, electronic records, etc., the crime of uttering of public records, etc., each of such crimes, the crime of uttering of public records, etc., each of such crimes, the crime of uttering of private electronic records, etc., the crime of occupational embezzlement on July 28, 2017, and the crime of occupational embezzlement on August 1, 2017, and Defendant 2’s crime of fraud, taking into account

B. Defendant 3 and Defendant 4: Article 62(1) of the Criminal Act (The conditions favorable to the reasons for sentencing below)

1. Social service order;

Defendant 3 and Defendant 4: Article 62-2 of the Criminal Act

1. Additional collection:

Defendant 1: Article 8(1)3 of the Regulation of Criminal Proceeds Concealment Act

1. Order of provisional payment;

Defendant 1: Article 334(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act

1. Facts of recognition;

The evidence duly adopted and examined by this Court shall be deemed based on the evidence.

A. In general, users’ use of the virtual currency trading system of Nonindicted Company 1

(i)member;

In order for users to use the virtual currency trading system of Nonindicted Company 1, they should first enter e-mail address, clinic name, name, password, double password, etc. on the website of Nonindicted Company 1 and enter them into a membership through the procedures agreed to the terms and conditions of use of Nonindicted Company 1 and personal information handling policies. If users become members, each of the relevant users’ account is created on the database of Nonindicted Company 1.

(ii) Admission and withdrawal;

A) If a user deposits virtual currency into the electronic branch of Nonindicted Company 1 or deposits won currency into the corporate account of Nonindicted Company 1, the Nonindicted Company 1’s side shall enter the virtual currency points or KRW points equivalent to the amount and amount deposited into the relevant member account into the point balance in the relevant member account.

(B) If a user requests a withdrawal from Nonindicted Company 1 within the scope of a virtual currency point or KRW point, the side of Nonindicted Company 1 shall transfer the virtual currency or won currency equivalent to the quantity and amount requested for withdrawal to the electronic wallet or bank account designated by the user in accordance with the details thereof.

3) virtual currency transactions

A) Users may trade virtual currency on the virtual currency trading system, to the extent of the balance of the virtual currency points and KRW points entered. A user who wishes to sell virtual currency, shall designate a quantity and unit price, or shall submit an order for selling virtual currency to the Nonindicted Company 1’s virtual currency trading system at the market price. On the contrary, a user who wishes to purchase virtual currency shall submit an order for purchasing virtual currency to the Nonindicted Company 1’s virtual currency trading system at designated price or market price.

B) Sales orders or purchase orders submitted by users are indicated in the home page of the virtual currency trading system of Nonindicted Company 1. The home page of the above home page shall be indicated at present, the home page and order quantity of the sales and purchase orders, high prices, low prices, transaction volume, transaction amount, etc.

C) If the sales orders submitted and the purchase orders coincide with each other, the transaction is concluded, and at the same time, the time, amount, and quantity of the transaction is indicated in the family information book. Moreover, as to the amount of transaction concluded, the virtual currency points decrease from the seller’s member account on the seller’s database in Nonindicted Company 1, and the KRW points increase, and on the contrary, the number of virtual currency points increase from the buyer’s member account and the KRW points decrease.

B. Operational behavior of Nonindicted Company 1 Exchange by Defendant 1 and Defendant 2

1) Defendant 1 and Nonindicted Party 2: 00 points (name 1 omitted on January 5, 2018) in the virtual currency trading system (name 1 omitted) (name 3 omitted on the membership : Defendant 1), (name 4 omitted on the member : Defendant 1), (name 5 omitted on the account (name 5 omitted on the member : non-indicted Party 1), and (name 6 omitted on the account) (name 1 omitted on the member : non-indicted Party 1: non-indicted Party 1’s name omitted on each of the above members’ accounts; 00 points (name 1 omitted on each of the non-indicted Party 1): 10 points (BTC), non-indicted Party 1’s name omitted on each of the non-indicted 1’s virtual currency trading accounts (name 20 billion won on each of the non-indicted Party 1’s own accounts), and 10 billion won on each of the non-indicted Party 1’s name omitted.

At the time when Defendant 1 and Defendant 2 entered the virtual currency points and the KRW points as above, they did not hold the amount of virtual currency or won equivalent to the points entered by Nonindicted Company 1, or did not have deposited the corresponding amount of virtual currency or won in Nonindicted Company 1.

2) Defendant 1 and Defendant 2: (a) purchased and created a robot program automatically submitting orders from Nonindicted Company 3; and (b) linked the above (name 1 omitted) account (name 1 omitted) (name of Defendant 1) to a robot program; and (c) linked the API (hereinafter “processing Account”); and (d) transmitted from a large virtual currency exchange, such as △△, using API (API) in a large virtual currency exchange, referring to information such as the current price, asking price, transaction volume, etc., which was transmitted by the API; and (b) submitted a purchase order and sales order to the IPI trading system automatically via the IP program.

3) As a result, in the case of classifying the total number of transactions entered into in the trading system of Nonindicted Company 1’s virtual currency, the trading ratio entered into between Defendant 1 and Defendant 2 was 5.1% or 5.1%, and, if the trading ratio entered into between the processing account and the general member account (hereinafter “general account”) reaches a maximum of 89.63%, the trading ratio entered into between the processing account and the general member account was 9.81% or less, and the trading ratio entered into between the general account was 9.81% or less. The detailed details thereof are as follows.

50,196 (34.03%) 72,630 (49.24%) 22,448 (15.22%) 147,510 Bitcoin 66,466 (34.53%) 11,778 (9.81%) 120,094 120,732 (17.27%) 98,030 (4.88%) 72,7730 (4.88%) 218,4320 (36.52%) 218,4320 (4.24.52%) 218,4320 (14.84.52%) 18,4639,2974 (36.369.47) 696)

4) In a case where a transaction between the processing account and the general account is concluded, if Nonindicted Company 1 did not actually own, and Defendant 1 and Defendant 2 did not enter into the database and sell the virtual currency only in the balance of points (so-called “processed coiner”) to the users, or if the users purchase the virtual currency from the users with Korean won points only in the balance of points, the sum of the virtual currency points and the KRW points in the database of Nonindicted Company 1 would be inconsistent with the sum of the virtual currency quantity and the Korean won currency value held by Nonindicted Company 1 in the electronic branch and bank account.

Accordingly, Defendant 3 was in charge of expenditure for the purchase of virtual currency in accordance with the orders of Defendant 1 and Defendant 2. Defendant 4 was in charge of the settlement of accounts by comparing the sum of virtual currency points and the KRW points on the point database with the sum of virtual currency quantity and the sum of Korean currency on the actual account of Nonindicted Company 1’s electronic branch points, according to the orders of Defendant 1 and Defendant 2. Defendant 4 settled accounts around a day, and Defendant 4 did not reach the aggregate of points on the point database, if the virtual currency or Korean currency amount actually possessed by Nonindicted Company 1’s electronic branch or bank account falls short of the sum of points on the point database, Defendant 3 transferred the virtual currency or Korean currency from Nonindicted Company 1’s electronic branch of the Nonindicted Company 1 and Defendant 2’s personal bank account, such as Nonindicted Company 6, and Defendant 1 and Defendant 2 purchased and sold the virtual currency from other exchange, such as Nonindicted Company 6, etc., and transferred it to Nonindicted Company 1 and the electronic branch account or bank account.

2. As to the assertion by Defendant 1 and Defendant 2

(a) Any writing, electronic records, and electromagnetic records;

1) Summary of the assertion

① Corresponding from virtual currency points or KRW points mean that there is a claim right corresponding to the pertinent point, and it does not mean that won or virtual currency corresponding to the pertinent point has been deposited in Nonindicted Company 1’s electronic wallet or account. Thus, even if the Defendants entered the point balance in the cyber currency transaction system in Nonindicted Company 1’s virtual currency transaction system, it does not constitute false electronic information. ② The “componding” in the crime of fraud, electronic data, etc. is limited only to the type of electronic records prepared or modified against the intent of the institution installer and operator, and the unffortuing does not fall under the concept of “componding.” As such, the Defendants’ entry of the Defendants into the virtual currency point and KRW points does not constitute the crime of writing, electronic document, etc., and the crime of uttering. ③ The Defendants’ entry of the virtual currency points and KRW points without the deposit of the virtual currency or won does not constitute an unlawful operation of Nonindicted Company 1, the purpose of which was to prevent speculation from using it, and thus, did not exist.

2) Whether any points information entered is false

On January 5, 2018, the Defendants created five processing accounts, such as the virtual currency trading system (name 1 omitted) (name 1 omitted) (Defendant 1). The Defendants entered virtual currency points and KRW points into the balance by each of the above accounts. On January 19, 2018, Nonindicted Company 1’s virtual currency trading system (name 2 omitted (name 2 omitted) and created ten processed accounts, such as 10 (name 2 omitted) (name 2 omitted). Likewise, as seen above, the Defendants entered the virtual currency points and KRW points into the balance by each of the above accounts. However, there is no room to view that the Defendants did not have any other right to request that the said Defendants enter the said virtual currency points into the said accounts, as if so, there is no false claim that the said Defendants did not have any right to receive the said virtual currency balance, as seen above, from each of the instant companies, and there is no reason to view that each of the said Defendants did not have any right to claim for the payment in Korean currency, as in fact.

3) Whether the case constitutes a tort

A) Relevant legal principles

Article 227-2 of the Criminal Act provides that electronic records, which are the objects of an electronic document, are not in itself a physical substance, and therefore cannot be seen or read without a separate display or output device. It does not include several people's intentions or actions in the process of creation, but there are many cases where additional input information is automatically combined with existing information by a program, and the new electronic records are created and operated. From the process of use, it does not independently use it with objective and solid meaning, but rather performs the planned proven function by using it in a system established and operated for the purpose of creating, processing, storing, and printing information by electronic means. Thus, this legal doctrine applies not only to cases where a person who is not authorized to participate in the creation of electronic records in relation with a person who installs and operates the above system prepares electronic records or input unit information necessary for the creation of electronic records within the scope of duties of each person, but also to cases where a person who has obtained authority to input information by a specific unit within the scope of duties of the person who installs and operates the system, and also to cases where it is against the intent of the person who created and operated electronic records.

① In light of the fact that: (a) data newly entered is processed with the existing data by the program and is highly likely to be linked to various information participants in the course of the formation and modification of electronic records; (b) there are characteristics different from ordinary documents in that it is actually possible to reproduce or alter such electronic records without any specific effort; and (c) there is a risk of causing damage due to the false preparation of electronic records. ② The crime of forgery or alteration of electronic records, etc. also should be regarded as “safety of credibility and transactions in the public” as well as “an act of entering false information” without any provision corresponding to the above characteristics of electronic records, and there is no possibility of damage to public credit solely on the basis of “an act of entering false information” as well as “an act of forging or altering electronic records,” which does not constitute a crime of forgery or alteration of electronic records, and there is no need to punish the act of forging or altering electronic records, which is no more than an act of forging or altering electronic records, and there is no possibility that the aforementioned provision should be applied to the act of forging or altering electronic records.”

B) Determination

In accordance with the above legal principles, even if the Defendants were to have the authority to make a comprehensive decision on the overall business affairs of Nonindicted Company 1 as the representative director or internal director in charge of finance of Nonindicted Company 1, the managing body of the Nonindicted Company 1’s virtual currency trading system is Nonindicted Company 1, separate from the Defendants, and the Defendants were to have the authority to enter or change the virtual currency point or the KRW point balance by accessing Nonindicted Company 1’s virtual currency trading system, as the executives of Nonindicted Company 1 were authorized by Nonindicted Company 1 to enter or change the said virtual currency point or the balance from the Nonindicted Company 1’s virtual currency trading system. However, it is reasonable to view that the Defendants’ act of entering the false virtual currency point and the KRW point balance on the virtual currency trading system of Nonindicted Company 1 in order to use them for trade can only be exercised within the scope permitted where it is inevitably necessary to enter or change artificial information, such as in the event the payment in the virtual currency or won currency or won, and therefore, it is reasonable to view that the Defendants’ act constitutes the aforementioned Defendants’ act of exercising their authority.

4) Whether the purpose is to mislead Nonindicted Company 1’s management of affairs

The electronic records prescribed in Article 232-2 of the Criminal Act are not used independently with objective and solid meaning, but rather used by an individual or corporation for the purpose of creating, processing, storing, and generating information by electronic means, and performing the intended function of proof. As such, the term "purpose of causing a loss to the management of affairs" means that electronic records are used by a forged or modified electronic records to mislead the management of affairs of a person who establishes and operates the said system (see Supreme Court Decision 2008Do938, Jun. 12, 2008).

Although there was no fact that the Defendants actually deposited or balance of the virtual currency or won currency corresponding to the points in which the Defendants entered, the Defendants created multiple processing accounts in the name of Defendant 1, etc., and then falsely entered the large amount of virtual currency points and the KRW point balance, and then used them in the actual transaction of the company’s virtual currency transaction system using the robot program, thereby adversely affecting the accuracy and reliability of the information, such as the title, conclusion price, order volume, trading volume, etc. of the Nonindicted Company 1’s virtual currency transaction system. Therefore, the Defendants are bound to deem that there was a purpose to make the Defendants conduct the business affairs of Nonindicted Company 1.

Meanwhile, the Defendants asserted that there was no purpose to handle the affairs of Nonindicted Company 1 for the purpose of preventing the market price manipulation by the speculative force and for the stable operation of the virtual currency trading system for Nonindicted Company 1. However, the Defendants’ act of entering the points balance of Nonindicted Company 1 in a false manner and the Defendants’ act of directly participating in the transaction as a trading partner is separate from each other. There is no inevitable relation that the Defendants’ act of entering the transaction in a false manner must be prior to the Defendants’ act of entering the transaction. The Defendants’ act of entering the transaction in order to prevent the speculative force within the balance is technically possible regardless of the legality or technically, and as long as the Defendants’ act was inevitable to adversely affect the accuracy and reliability of the electronic records managed by Nonindicted Company 1, thereby impairing the public trust and security of the transaction, the Defendants’ act of entering the transaction in a false manner did not directly relate to the Defendants’ act of entering the transaction in a false manner, as it did not have any justifiable reason to deem the Defendants’ act of entering the transaction in a false manner.

(b) Occupational embezzlement of February 8, 2018;

1) Summary of the assertion

Defendants agreed to receive benefits of KRW 10,000 per month for six months from August 2017 to January 2018, the Defendants received benefits each month for six months from August 2017 to January 2018. As such, Defendants received KRW 30,000,000 from Nonindicted Company 1 as the intent to receive unpaid benefits in the form of bonus after the fact-finding. As such, Defendants did not have any criminal intent to commit embezzlement.

2) Determination

The court duly adopted and examined the following circumstances, namely, ① the representative director of Nonindicted Company 1 and the inside director, and Article 33 of the articles of incorporation of Nonindicted Company 1 provide that “the remuneration of the executives shall be determined by the resolution of the board of directors” (as alleged in the Defendants, the board of directors of Nonindicted Company 1 adopted a resolution to determine the remuneration of the Defendants as KRW 10 million each month from August 2017 to January 2018, and there is no objective document that the Defendants received only KRW 5 million each of the above remuneration amount. However, according to the following facts, it cannot be found to be recorded in the prosecutor’s office’s statement that the Defendants did not use the funds for personal investigation by 00,000 won for each of the above 300,000 won and 100,000 won and 200,000 won and 300,000 won and 300,000 won and 300,000 won and 30,000.).

(c) Violation of the Act on the Aggravated Punishment of Specific Economic Crimes;

1) Summary of the assertion

The Defendants paid the amount of money stored in the account in the name of Nonindicted Company 1 as the capital increase, and the capital of Nonindicted Company 1 was not actually changed in the process of paying the stock price and there was no external leakage of the fund, and thus the assets themselves are identical to the company itself. Therefore, the Defendants did not have the intent of unlawful acquisition or embezzlement.

2) Determination

Even based on this part of the crime itself, if the defendants paid the capital increase in Nonindicted Company 1 is not considered to be a mere fictitious payment, and if the defendants arbitrarily delivered the funds of Nonindicted Company 1 to the defendants in order to use them as the capital increase amount they should pay, then the crime of embezzlement is already completed because it would be arbitrarily useful the funds of the company at that stage. Even if the defendants used them as the actual capital increase amount and then re-deposit them to Nonindicted Company 1, it cannot be deemed that there was no intention of illegal acquisition or embezzlement (see Supreme Court Decision 2004Do5167, Nov. 10, 2006).

The Supreme Court en banc Decision 2003Do7645 Decided June 17, 2004, which is cited by the defense counsel of the defendants, cannot be invoked as different cases from this case.

Therefore, this part of the Defendants and the defense counsel’s assertion is without merit to further examine.

(d) Each fraud;

1) Summary of the assertion

① This part of the facts charged is a comprehensive entry of an unspecified number of users as victims, and the individual deception which is the requisite for the establishment of fraud and the facts charged that are not specified by the other party, so the public prosecution procedure is null and void in violation of the provisions of the law, and thus, the judgment dismissing the prosecution shall be sentenced. ② The purpose of the user’s deposit of money into the account of Nonindicted Company 1 was to charge the KRW point and use it to trade virtual currency. The purpose of the user’s deposit was to use the KRW point, and the KRW point corresponding to the money deposited by the user was normally paid, the user was able to trade virtual currency using the KRW point, and the user was able to do the virtual currency normally in response to the user’s request for withdrawal, so the Defendants did not deceive the user, and there was no criminal intent for fraud. Moreover, the Defendants did not have any property

2) Whether the facts charged are specified

A) Relevant legal principles

The purpose of the law, which stipulates the date, time, place, and method of a crime, to specify the facts charged, is to limit the scope of the trial against the court and to facilitate the exercise of the right of defense by specifying the scope of defense against the defendant. As such, the facts charged is sufficient to include these elements in the indictment to the extent that the facts constituting the crime can be distinguished from other facts. Even if the date, place, method, etc. of the crime are not explicitly indicated in the indictment, it does not go against the purport of the law that specifies the facts charged, and if it is inevitable to indicate the general facts in light of the nature of the crime charged, the indictment cannot be deemed unlawful because the contents of the indictment are not specified (see Supreme Court en banc Decision 2002Do807, Jun. 20, 200).

B) Determination

Pursuant to the above legal doctrine, this part of the charges of fraud against the Defendants: (a) the Defendants created the processing account; (b) input false virtual currency points and KRW points; (c) automatically submit an order for purchase and sale using the robot program; and (d) continuously and repeatedly conduct the transaction between the processing account or between the processing account and the general member account for about two months; and (b) made it impossible for the Defendants to divide the actual virtual currency transaction from the actual user through the processing account; (c) under the circumstance that the actual user does not have a separate transaction by using the virtual currency transaction system of Nonindicted Party 1; (d) the market price and trading volume of the virtual currency in the process of such transaction can be seen as normally formed; and (e) the Defendants deceiving the unspecified number of users and acquired money from the users under the name of the deposit and commission; and (e) there are unavoidable circumstances that make it difficult for the Prosecutor to generally indicate the type of deception or the other party to a certain extent in light of the nature of the offense charged; and (e) the Defendants’ assertion that it does not interfere with the victim’s right to defend and defense.

3) Whether deception, deception, and fraud, and fraud are recognized

A) Relevant legal principles

(1) The deception as a requirement for fraud refers to any affirmative or passive act that widely lacks the fiduciary duty and good faith to each other in the transactional relationship. It does not necessarily require that it is related to the important part of a juristic act. It is sufficient to determine the basic facts of a judgment to allow an actor to perform the act of disposal of property that the other party wishes by omitting the other party into mistake. Whether a certain act constitutes deception that causes a mistake of another person should be determined generally and objectively by taking into account the specific circumstances at the time of the act, such as the transaction, the other party’s knowledge, experience, occupation, etc. (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 91Do2746, Mar. 10, 1992; 98Do3549, Feb. 12, 199; 2003Do7828, Apr. 9, 2004; 2005Do195, Oct. 25, 2007).

(2) Denmarkation by passive act refers to the failure of the other party to the duty of disclosure to inform the other party of a certain fact. In cases where it is evident that the other party would not have been aware of such fact in light of the empirical rule of general transactions, it is legally obligated to notify such fact in light of the good faith principle (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 9Do2884, Jan. 28, 2000; 2003Do4531, May 27, 2004). In transactions involving ordinary users through the Internet, users are bound to depend solely on the information or advertisement provided by the service provider, and thus, the trust and expectation of the information of the service provider is to be specially protected. If the defendant, as the operator of the pertinent Internet trading company, made an account under the name of the manager of the relevant Internet trading company without knowledge of such fact, and made the actual use of the Internet or intangible property that the defendant had not been aware of such fact by means of false or intangible trading, etc., 2000 square meters or other means to use the account.

(3) In the case of a crime of fraud the content of which is the taking-off of property, if there is a delivery of property by deception, it constitutes a crime of fraud on its own by infringing on the victim's property, and even if considerable consideration has been paid or there has not been any damage to the victim's property, it does not affect the establishment of the crime of fraud (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 82Do777, Jun. 22, 1982; 95Do203, Mar. 24, 1995; 99Do1040, Jul. 9, 199; 2000Do1899, Jul. 7, 200; 206Do7470, Jan. 25, 2007; 2017Do12649, Dec. 22, 2017).

B) Determination

In light of the above legal principles, the following circumstances acknowledged by the evidence duly adopted and investigated by the court are as follows: (a) the Defendants conspired to create multiple processing accounts as seen earlier in the company’s virtual currency transaction system; (b) falsely entered the said accounts into an order for purchase and sale of a large number of virtual currency points and the KRW points; and (c) thereby making the users enter into a transaction between the processing account or between the processing account and the general member account by using the robot program; (d) thereby, Nonindicted Company 1 Company 1’s virtual currency exchange was engaged in genuine virtual currency transactions by many actual users; and (e) by deceiving the users by deeming that the market price and trading volume of virtual currency are normally formed; and (e) deceiving the users without knowledge of such circumstances to transfer money under the name of deposit and commission from the users to the account in the name of Nonindicted Company 1; and (e) accordingly, the Defendants were also guilty. Therefore, all of the Defendants and the defense counsel’s assertion on this part is also acceptable.

(1) In addition to Nonindicted Company 1, various virtual currency exchanges, such as △△△, △△, and Nonindicted Company 6, exist in the city, and users who wish to trade virtual currency, among various virtual currency exchanges, are taking into account the economic factors such as accessibility to the Exchange, order transmission and processing speed, and security conditions, etc. As a matter of course, the users should take into account the technical factors such as the number of transactions, but the users should actively purchase or sell the virtual currency in the virtual currency exchange, and have an opportunity to trade at more favorable prices. Therefore, the order quantity and the trading volume submitted to the Exchange and the transaction volume to be concluded can only be considered as very important factors, namely, how much users can easily choose from the standpoint of customers who choose the virtual currency exchange. In other words, if users who want to participate in the exchange have not been able to freely withdraw from the exchange because of the lack of the order amount submitted to the Exchange, it is difficult to expect the users to freely choose to do so, even if it does not want to do so.

However, in a case where an Exchange operator, without following the above normal publicity method and without notifying the users in advance, raises users by providing information that is not true to potential customers, or impliedly or concealing the truth, and accordingly, receives virtual currency or money from users who are erroneous, under the name of deposit, regardless of whether the virtual currency or money actually received from the users has been returned, such act is made by deceiving the users, thereby constituting fraud under the Criminal Act, by deceiving the users of the virtual currency or money under the name of deposit, regardless of whether the virtual currency or money received as deposit is returned.

(2) As seen earlier, the Defendants created 15 processing accounts in total in the virtual currency trading system under the name of Defendant 1, etc., and entered them falsely on the Exchange database. After connecting the transfer account to the robot program, the Defendants continuously and repeatedly submitted a large number of orders for selling and purchasing virtual currency automatically into the Nonindicted Company 1’s virtual currency trading system with the virtual currency points and the KRW points recorded as above. The Defendants made various transaction information, such as the orders, details of conclusion, and trading volume, to be indicated in the Nonindicted Company 1’s virtual currency trading system. The users were aware that the number of users participated in the trading system in the Nonindicted Company 1’s virtual currency trading system, and the liquidity was sufficient, and thus, transferred money to Nonindicted Company 1’s account in order to trade virtual currency from Nonindicted Company 1’s virtual currency exchange, and, in fact, the Defendants transferred 9% of the total trading volume from Nonindicted Company 1’s virtual currency trading system to the Nonindicted Company 1’s trading account at least 7-50% to 30% of the general account or 98% of the 9% of the total trading amount.

In light of the above facts, the Defendants alleged that the Defendants were only for the stable operation of the virtual currency trading system, which was used by Nonindicted Party 1, by preventing the manipulation of the virtual currency market by external speculative force. However, there was no doubt as to the Defendants’ assertion as to whether there was an attempt to manipulate the market price by external speculative force or not. ② Even if there was an attempt to manipulate the market price by external speculative force, there was an excessive high-priced or low-priced transaction, or a possibility of such a danger exists in the virtual currency exchange, it is reasonable to view that the Defendants were able to use the virtual currency market at the same time as that of the instant company 4 in the manner of entering into the trading by using the virtual currency or the virtual currency exchange with the same trading volume as that of the Defendant 1, it would be reasonable to view that the Defendants were not able to use the virtual currency market at the same time as that of the instant case, and that there was no possibility for the Defendants to directly purchase the virtual currency market at the same time as that of the instant company 1 to sell or purchase the virtual currency market at a different market market price.

Therefore, the Defendants actively deceiving users by means of increasing the ordered volume, trading volume, etc. of the virtual currency exchange of Nonindicted Company 1 through the most trade, and it is recognized that the Defendants had the intent to commit fraud.

(3) Furthermore, even when the Defendants submitted orders using virtual currency points and KRW points which were falsely entered, and subsequently did not inform users of such fact in advance, it constitutes an act of deceiving users by silenting, as an operator of the Exchange and a party to the most recent transaction, the fact that the duty of disclosure under the good faith principle exists.

In other words, where the market participants entered and traded virtual currency equivalent to those actually owned and won currency assets, only among the accounts of each transaction party, and there is no change in the total balance of points or the virtual currency and won assets of Nonindicted Company 1. However, in cases where the virtual currency is sold to users using the virtual currency points recorded in the processing account, the corresponding trading quantity decreases from the processing account, and at the same time, the user’s virtual currency point balance has not been actually owned as much as the volume traded. As such, Nonindicted Company 1 did not own the same in fact, the total amount of the virtual currency points in the user’s account is less than the total amount of the trading volume of the user’s virtual currency assets is less than the total amount of the user’s virtual currency point in the Nonindicted Company 1’s virtual currency account, and in cases where the Defendants purchased the virtual currency from the user of the electronic currency in the same manner as the user’s virtual currency account or from the user’s electronic currency account, the relevant company did not have any difference in the total amount of the user’s KRW 1.

However, as seen above, the exchange entered false points into the processing account, and transfers them to the executive officers of the Exchange as much as the shortage was caused by its transactions with the users, and the methods of operating the exchange was difficult for the general users to predict them. In addition, in the whole process, the risks of insolvency that the Defendants would not return the virtual currency or money of Nonindicted Company 1 to the Nonindicted Company 1 due to nonperformance risk or lack of the Defendants’ repayment ability; various transaction risks that the Defendants could not be deemed as having failed to trade in other exchanges or to incur investment losses due to fall short of the value of virtual currency; the Defendants did not know the Defendants of the above fact that they would not have been able to recover the said virtual currency or won from other exchanges due to the Defendants’ default or bankruptcy; thus, it is evident that the Defendants were directly and indirectly exposed to the Defendants’ account in violation of the principle of trust and good faith and that some of the risks in the operation of the Exchange would have been stolen or stolen; as seen earlier, it is evident that the Defendants did not know the Defendants’ intent to use the said virtual currency or won from other trading accounts of Nonindicted Company 146.

(4) As such, insofar as the Defendants, when operating Nonindicted Company 1, deceiving users actively or passively, and let them receive money from Nonindicted Company 1, the crime of fraud is established against each of the Defendants, and even if the Defendants entered the KRW points equivalent to the amount deposited in the account of the victim’s user, and the Defendants were able to engage in virtual currency transactions with the above KRW points or made the users normally withdraw money from the user’s request for withdrawal, such circumstances may be considered as favorable sentencing factors against the Defendants, apart from the fact that there is no room to consider the Defendants as favorable sentencing factors for the Defendants.

3. As to Defendant 1’s assertion

A. Occupational breach of trust

1) Summary of the assertion

There was no fact that the defendant transferred 21.5674341 Bitcoin to a non-electronic wallet, and there was no proof that the defendant managed and controlled the above non-electronic wallet.

2) Determination

A) In light of the following circumstances, i.e., ① the Defendant’s 21.574341, non-indicted 6’s account opened under the Defendant’s name, which could have been identified by this court’s lawfully adopted and investigated evidence, (i.e., the transfer of the Defendant’s 11:32:341, Jan. 18, 2018 to Non-indicted 6’s electronic wall transfer from Non-indicted 4 to Non-indicted 6’s 1:6:31:60, Jan. 18, 2018; and (ii) the Defendant’s 2:400 transfer of the instant virtual currency from Non-indicted 6’s account to Non-indicted 4; and (iii) the transfer of the Defendant’s 6:400, Jun. 16, 201 to Non-indicted 2, 206 to Non-indicted 6 Nonindicted Co. 3; and (iv) the transfer of the Defendant’s 6:3000, non-indicted 2436:18.

B) In addition, Article 355(2) of the Criminal Act provides that “When a person who administers another’s business obtains pecuniary advantage or causes a third party to obtain such pecuniary advantage by doing an act in violation of his/her duties, thereby causing loss to the principal,” the crime of breach of trust is established if the principal causes loss to the principal by having a third party obtain pecuniary advantage even if the defendant does not obtain any direct pecuniary advantage through his/her breach of trust. Therefore, the crime of breach of trust is established if the defendant causes loss to the principal by causing the third party to obtain pecuniary advantage. Therefore, regardless of whether the defendant proves that he/she manages and controls the non-transferable electronic wall, i.e., the above non-coin transferred 21.5674341, regardless of whether the defendant has proved that he/she manages and controls the non-transferable electronic wall, so long as the defendant or the third party obtains pecuniary advantage equivalent to the amount of the non-coin and causes loss equivalent to the same amount to the non-indicted

C) Therefore, the defendant and his defense counsel's assertion cannot be accepted on the grounds that there are many grounds.

(b) Violation of the Act on the Regulation and Punishment of Criminal Proceeds Concealment;

1) Summary of the assertion

① Since there is no fact that the Defendant transferred 21.5674341, a bitcoin to an bitcoin, it cannot be recognized as “cambing act”. ② The base point of time for calculating criminal proceeds under the Regulation on Criminal Proceeds Concealment Act shall be deemed as the prior public notice of judgment. In this case, in this case, the value of bitco, 21.5674341, a bitcoin, which is the property profits acquired by the act of breach of trust, is less than KRW 94 billion as of December 5, 2018, and thus, the Defendants’ breach of trust does not constitute a serious crime under the Regulation on Criminal Proceeds Concealment Act.

2) Whether the act of concealment is recognized

As seen earlier, the Defendant transferred 21.5674341, a bitcoin, which was kept in the Defendant’s account in violation of his duties, to the e-mail. It is reasonable to view that the Defendant concealed 21.5674341, a bitco, which was caused by the criminal act of occupational breach of trust, as the e-mail. The Defendant’s assertion against this is without merit.

3) Whether the case constitutes a serious crime

The amount of profit acquired by a person who deals with another person's business through breach of trust shall be the value of the property interest acquired through the crime of breach of trust, that is, the amount of profit acquired through the crime of breach of trust, and shall be calculated on the basis of the period of the crime, and shall not be considered at the time of the occurrence of the crime, and even if the possibility of change of circumstances is possible at the time of the act of breach of trust (see Supreme Court Decision 90Do1815, Oct. 16, 1990).

Pursuant to the foregoing legal doctrine, the Defendant’s occupational breach of trust is calculated as approximately 34,647,589 won (BTC 21.5674341 x 15,980,000 won) by transferring 21.5674341 bitco, a bitco, which was kept in the Defendant’s account of Nonindicted Company 6, to the non-indicted 6. The Defendant committed occupational breach of trust by transferring 21.5674341 bit 15,980 bit 15,000 won at the time of the expiration of the period. Moreover, the Defendant and the aforementioned defense counsel’s assertion is apparent in the language and text. Therefore, the Defendant and the aforementioned defense counsel’s assertion cannot be accepted.

3. As to the assertion by Defendant 3 and Defendant 4

A. Summary of the assertion

① The Defendants did not receive any proposal to allocate new shares with the company’s funds, and did not know that the increased capital was paid as the company’s funds. Defendant 1 and Defendant 2 did not consent to the act of embezzlement, such as this part of the facts charged, and there was no intent to illegally obtain shares from the Defendants. ② The fund management of Nonindicted Company 1 was in charge of Defendant 2, and the Defendants did not have the status of keeping the company’s funds in custody.

B. Whether there was a conspiracy with Defendant 1 and Defendant 2, and whether there was an intention to obtain unlawful permission

In light of the above facts, it is difficult to reverse Defendant 1’s capital increase by Defendant 2 and Defendant 2’s previous prosecutor’s office’s statement, and it is reasonable to view that Defendants 1 and 2 were not aware of the fact that the above Defendants’ capital increase was 80,000 won or more, and that Defendant 1’s capital increase was 60,000 won more than 2 billion won in accordance with the self-regulation of the virtual currency exchange. However, it is reasonable to view that Defendants 2 and 3 were not aware of the fact that Defendant 1’s capital increase was 40,000 won or more, and that Defendant 2 were not aware of the fact that Defendant 1’s capital increase was 80,000 won or more, and that there was no other reason to view that the above Defendants were 60,000 won more than 10,000 won of new shares and 500,000 won of new shares.

(c) the existence of a custodian’s status for business;

In a case where non-occupiers embezzlement in collusion with a non-occupier, the non-occupiers also establish an accomplice relationship in accordance with the main sentence of Article 33 of the Criminal Act. However, in the case of the wife, the proviso is applied (see Supreme Court Decision 65Do493 delivered on August 24, 1965).

Even if the Defendants did not have the status as a custodian in the line of duty, as seen earlier, insofar as the Defendants conspired with Defendant 1 and Defendant 2, who is a manager in the line of duty, and committed embezzlement, the crime of occupational embezzlement is established against the Defendants in accordance with the above legal doctrine. Therefore, this part of the Defendants and the defense counsel’

1. Defendant 1

(a) Scope of punishment: Imprisonment with prison labor for not less than three years but not more than 45 years;

(b) Scope of recommendations based on the sentencing criteria;

1) Basic crime: Fraud

[Determination of Punishment] Types 5 (at least 30 billion won) of the General Fraud Group

[Special Doctrines] Reduction element: Where a person commits a deceptive act with willful negligence, or where the degree of a deceptive act is weak, and the risk of the occurrence of damage is not substantially realized, the penalty is not paid or the damage is recovered from considerable part / Where the person commits a crime repeatedly for an unspecified or large number of victims or over a considerable period of time.

[Scope of Recommendation] Special Mitigation, Imprisonment with prison labor for not less than 2 years and 6 months but not more than 9 years

2) Concurrent Crimes 1: Violation of the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Economic Crimes (Embezzlement), each occupational embezzlement, and occupational breach of trust

[Determination of Punishment] Type 3 (50 million won or less to 5 billion won) of the Embezzlement and Breach of Trust Crime Group

【Special Convicted Person】

[Scope of Recommendation] Basic Field, Imprisonment with labor for not less than two years, but not more than five years

3. Concurrent crimes: False entry into public electronic records, etc.;

[Determination of Punishment] Type 1 (Non-business, Non-Organization) of the Act on the Forgery, Alteration, etc. of Official Document Crime Group :

【Special Convicted Person】

[Scope of Recommendation] Basic Field, Imprisonment for not less than 8 months, but not more than 2 years;

4) The scope of final sentence due to the aggravation of multiple offenses: Imprisonment with prison labor for not less than two years and not less than six months but not more than 12 years and not more than two months;

5) Scope of sentence comparison with recommended sentences: Imprisonment with prison labor for not less than three years but not more than 12 years and not more than 2 months;

(c) Determination of sentence: Three years of imprisonment;

The circumstances favorable to ○: (a) there is no penalty power that exceeds the fine imposed on the Defendant; (b) the Defendant did not seem to have committed a crime with strong fraud with the intent of a strong fraud; (c) the withdrawal of money was normally made at the request of the user; (d) the risk of damage was not significantly realized; and (e) considerable damage can be deemed to have been recovered; (b) the Defendant returned a part of the damage that he embezzled and deducted from the amount of the damage that the Defendant embezzled and returned to the company and the part

○○ Unfavorable Circumstances: The Defendant did not divided his mistake, but transferred his responsibility to the financial authorities or investigation agencies, and the Defendant entered false points information of Nonindicted Company 1 in a false manner, thereby committing fraud repeatedly over a considerable period of time to unspecified multiple unspecified victims. In particular, the Defendant actively planned, implemented, and directed various crimes as representative director, and the Defendant embezzled KRW 70 million of the company’s funds for the purpose of personal use. The Defendant used it for the acquisition price of new stocks for personal use. The motive, method, and result of the crime, the customer’s trust in the Exchange was considerably damaged due to the Defendant’s crime, which affected the domestic virtual currency trading market.

2. Defendant 2

(a) The crime No. 1-A, B-1), and E, Defendant 2-1 fraud in the judgment;

1. Scope of punishment: Imprisonment with prison labor for not less than one month but not more than 15 years;

2) Since it is ex post concurrent crimes, the sentencing criteria do not apply.

(iii) Determination of sentence: Six months of imprisonment and two years of suspended sentence;

(b) Crime No. 1-C. 2), D, and E, Defendant 2’s fraud

1. Scope of punishment: Imprisonment with prison labor for not less than one year and six months but not more than two years and six months;

2) The scope of recommendations for sentencing guidelines

A) Basic crime: Fraud

[Determination of Punishment] Types 4 (at least 5 billion won, less than 30 billion won) of the General Fraud Group

* descriptive criteria: 2-stage increase in type as a result of adding up the same competition;

[Special Contributors] Reduction element: Where the risk of occurrence of damage has not been substantially realized, the court shall not grant punishment, or where damage has been recovered from a considerable part; / Where a crime has been committed repeatedly for an unspecified or large number of unspecified victims or for a considerable period of time.

[Scope of Recommendation] Reduction Area, Imprisonment with labor for not less than one year and six months but not more than six years;

(b) Concurrent Crimes 1: Violation of the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Economic Crimes (Embezzlement) and occupational embezzlement

[Determination of Punishment] Type 3 (50 million won or less to 5 billion won) of the Embezzlement and Breach of Trust Crime Group

【Special Convicted Person】

[Scope of Recommendation] Basic Field, Imprisonment with labor for not less than two years, but not more than five years

C) The scope of final sentence due to the aggravation of multiple offenses: Imprisonment with prison labor for not less than two years but not more than eight years and six months;

(iii) Determination of sentence: Two years of imprisonment;

The circumstances favorable to ○○: (a) there is no criminal power to punish the Defendant more than once suspension of execution; (b) the Defendant did not seem to have committed a crime with strong fraud with a strong intent; (c) the risk of damage was normally realized due to the withdrawal request from users; (d) considerable damage was not realized; and (e) considerable damage was recovered; (b) the Defendant returned a part of the damage that he embezzled to the company; (c) the part of the damage was partially recovered; and (d) the equity should be taken into account with the case of the Defendant simultaneously with the case of a violation of the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Crimes

The defendant's mistake is not divided, and the defendant has committed fraud repeatedly over a considerable period of time for many unspecified victims by entering false points information about non-indicted 1's company's company. In particular, the defendant, as an internal director in charge of finance, has been in charge of raising funds for various crimes, and the defendant has embezzled the funds of 60 million won of the company to use them for the personal purpose of acquisition of new stocks. There are circumstances that are not good in the motive, method, and result of the crime, the damage has not yet been recovered, the trust of the customers' exchange has been significantly damaged due to the defendant's crime, and thereby has a negative effect on the domestic virtual currency trading market, and the defendant has committed a second crime during the period of suspension of execution without being aware of the suspension of execution of imprisonment.

3. Defendant 3

(a) Scope of punishment: Imprisonment with prison labor for not less than one month but not more than five years;

(b) Scope of recommendations based on the sentencing criteria;

[Determination of Punishment] Type 1 (100 million won) for Embezzlement/Misappropriation Crime Group 1

[Special Sentencings] Reductions: If punishment is not granted or substantial damage has been recovered.

[Scope of Recommendation] Reduction Area, Imprisonment with labor for not less than one month, but not more than ten months;

(c) Determination of sentence: Six months of imprisonment and two years of suspended sentence;

○ Unfavorable circumstances: The Defendant’s mistake is not divided, and the Defendant embezzled funds of a certain company for personal use as the acquisition price of new stocks, and there is a good reason for the motive, method, and result of the crime.

The circumstances favorable to ○: The Defendant was the primary offender, and the Defendant was in charge of passive role in complying with the instructions given by Defendant 1 and Defendant 2, and the considerable part of the amount of damage incurred by the instant crime was restored.

4. Defendant 4

(a) Scope of punishment: Imprisonment with prison labor for not less than one month but not more than five years;

(b) Scope of recommendations based on the sentencing criteria;

[Determination of Punishment] Type 1 (100 million won) for Embezzlement/Misappropriation Crime Group 1

[Special Sentencings] Reductions: If punishment is not granted or substantial damage has been recovered.

[Scope of Recommendation] Reduction Area, Imprisonment with labor for not less than one month, but not more than ten months;

(c) Determination of sentence: Six months of imprisonment and two years of suspended sentence;

○ Unfavorable circumstances: The Defendant’s mistake is not divided, and the Defendant embezzled funds of a certain company for personal use as the acquisition price of new stocks, and there is a good reason for the motive, method, and result of the crime.

The circumstances favorable to ○: The Defendant was the primary offender, and the Defendant was in charge of passive role in complying with the instructions given by Defendant 1 and Defendant 2, and the considerable part of the amount of damage incurred by the instant crime was restored.

1. Each fraud against Defendant 1 and Defendant 2’s victim Nonindicted Company 1 and Defendant 1

A. Summary of the facts charged

From January 6, 2018 to March 5, 2018, the Defendants conspired to deceive unspecified number of users as stated in the crime No. 1-Ma as indicated in the judgment, and had the victim Nonindicted Company 1 transfer the total amount of KRW 4,530,00 (No. 645, 729, 3132, 3307, 4379, 5812, 13757, 1894, 19781), and KRW 50,000 from Defendant 1 to March 5, 2018 (Attached Table No. 15683) to Nonindicted Company 1’s bank account under the name of Nonindicted Company 1, a total of KRW 4,580,000 (Attached Table 3).

B. Determination

Defendant 1 is a deception who committed each fraud, such as the statement in Paragraph (e) of Article 1 of the facts constituting a crime in the judgment. Defendant 1 is a company with which Defendant 1 is a representative director. At the same time, there is no room to regard that Defendant 1 was involved in a mistake in the status of each victim, and there is no other evidence to acknowledge the guilty of this part of the facts charged in the

C. Sub-committee

Therefore, since each fraud part of the facts charged against the Defendants against the victim non-indicted 1 and Defendant 1 constitutes a case where there is no proof of criminal facts, the court acquitted the Defendants pursuant to the latter part of Article 325 of the Criminal Procedure Act and publicly announced the summary of the judgment pursuant to Article 58 (2) of the Criminal Act.

2. Defendant 2

A. Summary of the facts charged

1) Occupational breach of trust

The operator of the virtual currency exchange bears the duty of care of a good manager to execute customer deposits entrusted from the customers for the purpose of selling and buying virtual currency for the purpose of concluding transactions based on the customer’s order. In the event that the company sells virtual currency in the name of Defendant 1 and Defendant personal, it may cause risk of property loss to Nonindicted Company 1 and customers due to the price fluctuation in the virtual currency, etc., and risk of misappropriation utilization. Furthermore, in the event the Defendant voluntarily withdraws the customer deposits kept by Nonindicted Company 1 without any means of entry or control on the company’s account books and arbitrarily uses them, there is a high risk of using corporate funds and loss due to the nature of the virtual currency transaction, in which it is difficult to confirm the owner and transaction details with the Defendant. Nevertheless, Defendant 1 and the Defendant used “Bot program” and “the borrowed account” and sold “processed Corco” without holding for Nonindicted Company 1’s ordinary members, and if ordinary members request the delivery of the virtual currency, most of them could not be released from the company’s account with the Defendant 1 and the Defendant 1.

On January 16, 2018, Defendant 1 and Defendant 1 purchased KRW 1.5 billion from the above office of Nonindicted Company 1 to the virtual account (Account Number 11 omitted) connected to Defendant 1’s account from the victim Nonindicted Company 1’s customer deposit money. On January 16, 2018, the Defendant and Defendant 1 purchased KRW 81,312,924,000 per average purchase price of KRW 46 of bitco (BTC) through the virtual currency trading system of Nonindicted Company 6 around January 16, 2018. As such, Defendant and Defendant 1 purchased KRW 81,787,00,000 in total, KRW 1,3112,924 for the benefit of the company and customer. Therefore, the duty to appropriately manage the said bitco who purchased the company’s assets as customer deposit money.

Nevertheless, around 11:32 on January 18, 2018, Defendant 1 and Defendant 1 transferred approximately KRW 34,4647,589,00 (2TC 21.5674341 x 15,980,000) of approximately 38,5330,392 (BTC 21.5674341 x 17,871,0833 x 17,083) of the 46 Bitcoin, which was kept in custody as above, to the electronic wall of Nonindicted Company 1’s management, and used them voluntarily for personal trading by Defendant 1 and Defendant 1.

Ultimately, the Defendant, in collusion with Defendant 1, obtained property gains from which the market price is equivalent to KRW 34,4647,589, a bitco, the market price of which is KRW 21.5674341, a bitco, in violation of the above occupational duties, whereas the Defendant inflicted property damage equivalent to the same amount on Nonindicted Company 1.

2) Violation of the Act on the Regulation and Punishment of Criminal Proceeds Concealment

On January 2018, Defendant 1 and Defendant 1 wished to transfer and store customer deposits from members kept in the account of Nonindicted Company 1 to Defendant 1’s corporate bank account (Account Number 8 omitted) under the pretext that they would purchase virtual currency that may be released to customers from Nonindicted Company 1’s virtual currency exchange, and to transfer them to Defendant 1’s electronic bank account (Account Number 8 omitted) and, in the case of virtual currency, it is difficult to confirm the recipient’s personal information and details of specific transfer if they are transferred to the electronic wall address on the block chain, using the fact that their contents are not entirely stated in the account book, and in the case of virtual currency, it is difficult to confirm the recipient’s personal information and specific transfer details.

around January 16, 2018, Defendant 1 and Defendant 1 purchased KRW 46,524,00,000 from Nonindicted Company 1’s office to Defendant 1’s virtual account (Account Number 11 omitted). From January 18, 2018, 46,00 bitcoin through the virtual currency trading system of Nonindicted Company 6 purchased KRW 81,31,000,000,000 and KRW 81,924,000,000,000. On the same day, it is presumed that Nonindicted Company 1’s office entered Nonindicted Company 1’s electronic locks, and that it was difficult for Nonindicted Company 1 to transfer KRW 3205254,00,000 to Nonindicted Company 1’s virtual currency, and that Nonindicted Company 1’s non-indicted 6,000,0000,000 won x KRW 1,53146,7464,7546,7.3646.7.7.364

Ultimately, the Defendant, in collusion with Defendant 1, arbitrarily transferred 1.5 billion won of customer deposit money in the Nonindicted Company 1’s corporate account to Defendant 1’s personal account, purchased bitco at KRW 1.5 billion, which is the criminal proceeds from the serious crime, from Nonindicted Company 6, which is a virtual currency exchange, and concealed 21.5674341, which is a virtual currency bitco, for the purpose of promoting specific crimes or pretending to be acquired as legitimate assets, by transferring part of them to the electronic wallets.

B. Determination

A joint principal offender prescribed in Article 30 of the Criminal Act is liable for the entire crime in cases where the elements of a crime are realized through the cooperation of accomplices according to the intent to jointly commit a crime, and each of them is liable for the entire crime. In order to constitute a joint principal offender, the subjective elements are the intent to jointly process and objective requirements, and the fact that the crime is committed through functional control by the joint doctor as an objective element is necessary. In such a case, the intention to jointly process is integrated for the purpose of committing a specific crime with the intention to jointly commit a specific crime, and the intention to jointly process is to move to one another by using another’s act (see Supreme Court Decision 2013Do12592, Apr. 26, 2017).

As seen earlier, Defendant 1 stated to the effect that Defendant 1’s electronic wall transfer 21.5674341, which was in custody of Nonindicted Co. 6’s account digital wall transfer to Nonindicted Co. 6, thereby committing each crime of occupational breach of trust and violation of the Act on the Regulation and Punishment of Criminal Proceeds Concealment. As to whether Defendant 1’s intent or functional control over the act was at the time of each of the above crimes, health class, Defendant 1 and Defendant 1 asserted that the above bitco transfer was made by piracy regardless of Defendant 1’s own intention or functional control over the act, and they denied the public offering, and Defendant 1 stated to the prosecutor’s investigation that “the above bitco transfer was made by piracy, 21.574341, the above bitco,” and Defendant 1’s prosecutorial statement to the effect that “the bitco transfer was made by Defendant 1 to the above bitco,” and that Defendant 1’s respective testimony and evidence transfer to Defendant 14 and Defendant 1614 of the above crime were not changed.

C. Sub-committee

Therefore, since the facts charged in this part of the facts charged constitute a case where there is no proof of the facts charged, the judgment of innocence is rendered under the latter part of Article 325 of the Criminal Procedure Act, and the summary of the judgment is publicly announced under the main sentence of

3. Forgerys, electronic records, etc. of Defendants 3 and 4, and tides, electronic records, etc.; and

A. Summary of the facts charged

As indicated in Paragraph 1-B of the criminal facts stated in the judgment, Defendant 1, and Defendant 2: (a) fabricated information on virtual currency holdings by the account on January 5, 2018, and January 19, 2018; and (b) forged information on virtual currency holdings; and (b) displayed it on the trading system and exercised each of them, Defendant 3 and Defendant 4 assisted and assisted Defendant 4 by facilitating it in advance by means of helping purchase and management of “twit program” in advance.

B. Determination

1) Whether the facts charged are unspecified

The Defendants’ defense counsel asserts that this part of the facts charged does not specify what kind of aiding and abetting the Defendants. The Defendants’ defense counsel argues that this part of the facts charged is somewhat comprehensive, as alleged by the Defendants’ defense counsel. However, in light of the overall purport of the facts charged in the instant case, in light of the foregoing legal doctrine, the part of “Smi” in the instant facts charged is the “Smi” from the time when concluding a contract for the supply of virtual currency exchange solution with Nonindicted Co. 3 on July 27, 2017 to the time immediately before the time when the act of entering false points on the virtual currency trading system of Nonindicted Co. 1 was conducted, and the part of “the method of assisting the management of the robot program, etc.” refers to the Defendant 1, Defendant 2, and Nonindicted Co. 1, Nonindicted Co. 1, 2018, continuously submitting a series of order management and remuneration systems for the said period.

Therefore, it is difficult to view that the record of this part of the facts charged is unclear or that the prosecution procedure has become null and void due to the lack of specification of the facts charged to the extent that it hinders the Defendants from exercising their right to defense. Therefore, the above assertion by the Defendants and the defense counsel cannot

2) Whether assistance is recognized

The aiding and abetting act under the Criminal Act refers to any direct or indirect act that facilitates the implementation of a principal offender (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 95Do456, Sept. 29, 1995; 2003Do4128, Apr. 28, 2006; 2012Do13748, Mar. 12, 2015). The Defendants’ aiding and abetting the purchase and management of robot programs are merely preparing physical facilities so that Defendant 1 and Defendant 2 can submit orders for purchase and sale automatically to the company 1’s virtual currency trading system using robot programs. Even if Defendant 1 and Defendant 2 created a member account connected to the robot program and then made a false entry of points into the account, the Defendants’ aiding and abetting act cannot be deemed to constitute the aforementioned false entry into the program and use of the program itself, and thus, the Defendants’ aiding and abetting act cannot be deemed to constitute the aforementioned false entry into the program and use of the program.

C. Sub-committee

Therefore, since this part of the facts charged against the Defendants constitute a case where there is no proof of facts constituting a crime, each of the facts charged should be pronounced not guilty under the latter part of Article 325 of the Criminal Procedure Act, and the summary of this part of the judgment should be disclosed in accordance with

Judges Ahn Sung-sung (Presiding Judge)