Requirements for the employer’s lock-out to be deemed a legitimate industrial action / Where the employer’s lock-out continues to maintain the lock-out, even though it is justifiable for the employer to discontinue the industrial action and expressed his/her genuine intent to return to work, and the nature of the lock-out has been changed to aggressively out of the defensive purpose for the industrial action by workers, whether the subsequent lock-out loses legitimacy (affirmative) and whether the employer may be exempted from the duty to pay wages during that period (negative) / The degree of the employer’s expression of intent to return to work in such case

Articles 41(1) and 46 of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Association Act

Supreme Court Decision 98Da3431 Decided May 26, 200 (Gong2000Ha, 1493) Supreme Court Decision 2012Da85335 Decided May 24, 2016 (Gong2016Ha, 825) Supreme Court Decision 2013Da101425 Decided April 7, 2017 (Gong2017Sang, 940)

Attached Table 1 is as shown in the list of plaintiffs.

Attached 2 List of Plaintiffs (Attorney Kim Sang-hoon et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

UP Co., Ltd. (Law Firm Cheongam et al., Counsel for the defendant-appellant)

Daejeon High Court Decision 2012Na6378 decided April 24, 2014

All appeals are dismissed. The costs of appeal between the Plaintiffs and the Defendant are assessed against each party, and the costs of appeal between the Plaintiffs and the Defendant are assessed against each party.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. As to the ground of appeal by Plaintiffs 1 and 28

A. An employer’s lock-out under Article 46 of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act may be deemed legitimate industrial action if it is reasonable as a means to defend an industrial action by workers in light of the specific circumstances, such as the degree of bargaining and process between the employer and workers, the purpose and method of industrial action by workers, and the degree of shock that the employer receives. In such a case, the employer is exempted from the employer from the duty to pay wages to workers during the lock-out period (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 98Da3431, May 26, 2000). However, even if the commencement of a lock-out itself is justifiable in light of specific circumstances, such as the industrial action by workers, even if the workers cease industrial action after a certain point and expressed their genuine intent to return to work, if it can be deemed that the lock-out has become aggressive beyond the defensive purpose of the industrial action by workers, the subsequent lock-out becomes justifiable, and the employer cannot be exempt from the duty to pay wages during the lock-out period (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2015Da2714, May 2014.

B. On May 18, 201, the lower court, based on its stated reasoning, determined that the commencement of a lock-out is reasonable as a means of counter-defense and defense against the obstruction of the Defendant’s production activities by the Plaintiffs’ union employees during the industrial action and during the lock-out period, on the grounds that the Plaintiff’s trade union’s act of industrial action on the part of the Plaintiff, including the Plaintiff’s member companies, and the Plaintiff’s union chines association (hereinafter collectively referred to as “the Plaintiff’s union ”) constituted a strike of the Plaintiff’s member companies and the union chiness association (hereinafter referred to as “the Plaintiff’s union chines”). Furthermore, the lower court determined that it is difficult to view that it was justifiable to maintain the lock-out as it is, on June 14, 2011, on the grounds that the Plaintiff’s union member’s act of industrial action and its period, had sufficient reasons to suspect whether the intent to return to work was genuine or genuine.

C. Of the grounds of appeal, the argument that the lower court’s fact-finding, which forms the basis of the lower judgment, is nothing more than erroneous in the selection of evidence and the determination of the value of evidence belonging to the free trial of the fact-finding court. In addition, even when examining the reasoning of the lower judgment in light of the aforementioned legal doctrine and the evidence duly admitted, the lower court did not err by exceeding the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence contrary to logical and empirical rules, or

2. As to the Defendant’s ground of appeal

A. The lower court, based on its stated reasoning, determined that it is difficult to view that a lock-out for the Defendant’s Youngdong factory is reasonable as a means of defense against and defense against the Plaintiff’s industrial action in labor union. Moreover, as the circumstance of lock-out against the Defendant’s industrial action was removed when the Defendant was notified of his intention to return to work two-lanes from the Plaintiffs’ Trade union on July 12, 201, unlike the transfer, the lower court determined that maintaining a lock-out for the ASEAN factory on the ground that the Plaintiff’s hostile act and tort were continued, and that the Defendant’s genuine intent for consultation between labor and management should be confirmed, by asserting that the act in question against the Plaintiffs’ trade union’s trade union continues to exist, constitutes an aggressive lock-out for the purpose of weakeninging the Plaintiffs’ labor union’s ability, etc.

B. Of the grounds of appeal, the argument that the lower court’s fact-finding, which forms the basis of the lower judgment, is nothing more than erroneous in the selection of evidence and the determination of the value of evidence belonging to the free trial of the fact-finding court. In addition, even if examining the reasoning of the lower judgment in light of the aforementioned legal doctrine and the evidence duly admitted, the lower court did not err by exceeding the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence inconsistent with logical and empirical rules, or by misapprehending the legal doctrine on the legitimacy of commencement or maintenance of lock

3. Conclusion

Therefore, all appeals are dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against each party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

[Attachment 1] List of Plaintiffs: Omitted

[Attachment 2] List of Plaintiffs: Omitted

Justices Kim Shin (Presiding Justice)