Requirements for exclusion under Article 2 (1) 2 (c) of the River Act

Even if the land was incorporated into a river area which is an area adjacent to a river to which this Act is applied mutatis mutandis before the current River Act enters into force, it shall fall under any of the river areas referred to in the items of Article 2 (1) 2 of the current River Act in order to be a river area which is a cross-section area under the current River Act, and among them, in order to be excluded from the items of Article 2 (1) 2 of the same Act, the river management agency shall obtain the consent of the installer in order to manage it as a river appurtenances if the river management agency or the person permitted or entrusted by the river management

Article 2 (1) 2 (c) of the River Act

[Plaintiff-Appellant-Appellee] Plaintiff 1 and 1 other (Law Firm Gyeong, Attorneys Park Jong-soo et al., Counsel for plaintiff-appellant-appellant-appellee)

Plaintiff

The Central Land Expropriation Committee

Seoul High Court Decision 91Gu12365 delivered on September 18, 1992

The appeal is dismissed.

The costs of appeal are assessed against the plaintiff.

We examine the grounds of appeal.

(1) On the first ground for appeal

According to the reasoning of the judgment below, since the plaintiff's assertion was obtained on October 4, 1980, the Minister of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, which acquired ownership by the Gyeonggi-do Office for the registration of ownership transfer under the name of the plaintiff, and the land of this case (hereinafter "the land of this case") was flown only until 1978, and it was found that the construction of the river of this case was excluded by the Gyeonggi-do Office for the purpose of the construction of the 1,000-do Office for the purpose of the construction of the 2,000-do Office for the purpose of the construction of the 3,000-do Office for the purpose of the construction of the 1,000-do Office for the above river, and the construction of the 3,000-do Office for the 1,000-do Office for the purpose of the construction of the 1,000-do Office for the purpose of the construction of the 3,000-do Office for Construction of the 1,000-do Office for the 2.

The above judgment of the court below is deemed to include the purport of rejecting the plaintiff's assertion that the above bank road is established by the permission or entrustment of the Governor of the Gyeonggi-do or that the consent of the Seoul Do Maritime Land Management Office should be obtained in order to manage it as river appurtenances. Thus, there is no error of omission of judgment as pointed out in the judgment of the court below. The argument is without merit.

(2) On the second ground for appeal

Examining Gap evidence Nos. 5 (Examination), which was not rejected by the court below, there is a theory of the lawsuit pointing out that it was indicated that the difficulty rock was designated as a river to which the Gyeonggi-do Public Notice No. 3148 on Mar. 4, 1965 was applied mutatis mutandis, and there is data supporting this in the record (record 67 pages).

However, according to the records, the plaintiff alleged in the court below that the land of this case was incorporated into the river area, which is the terminal area of the difficult dump site and its name and section designated by the Gyeonggi-do Public Notice No. 345 of September 29, 1982, and that it was incorporated into the river area, which is the terminal area of the difficult dump site and publicly notified by the Gyeonggi-do public notice of March 4, 1965. Thus, it cannot be accepted since it did not claim that the above river area was incorporated into the above river area, and even if the land of this case was incorporated into the river area, which is the terminal area of the difficult dump site, the river management agency of the Gyeonggi-do public notice of March 4, 1965, it shall not be deemed to fall under any of the river areas of Article 2 (1) 2 of the River Act or the river management agency of the Gyeonggi-do public notice of March 1, 1966.

(3) Therefore, the appeal is dismissed and all costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Choi Jae-ho (Presiding Justice)