[1] Whether money, valuables, and other property benefits provided as a means of inducing, soliciting, or coercing sexual traffic while employing a leapsing person constitutes illegal consideration (affirmative), and whether economic benefits paid on the premise of sexual traffic or related to sexual traffic, other than economic benefits provided as direct consideration of sexual traffic, constitute illegal consideration (affirmative)

[2] In a case where the issue arises as to whether the prepaid payment lent by Gap employed the so-called “Tet Damb” as an employee Eul constitutes illegal consideration, the case holding that the judgment below erred by misapprehending the legal principles on the grounds that the aforementioned prepaid payment is a premise of prostitution such as Eul, or an economic profit related thereto, which constitutes a juristic act of anti-social order, although it constitutes a juristic act of anti-social order

[1] Article 10 of the Act on the Punishment of Arrangement of Commercial Sex Acts, Etc. provides that a claim against a person who has engaged in the act of arranging sexual traffic or a person who has employed a person who has engaged in the act of selling sexual traffic with respect to the act of selling sexual traffic shall be null and void regardless of the form or title of the contract. The illegal consideration as stipulated under Article 746 of the Civil Act refers to the case where the act of causing sexual traffic is contrary to good morals and other social order. Since the act of inducing and coercing sexual traffic is contrary to good morals and other social order, money, valuables, other property gains, etc. provided as a means of inducing, soliciting, coercion, coercion, etc. of sexual traffic, while employing a person who has sexual intercourse, cannot be claimed as illegal consideration, and furthermore, if economic benefits are premised on, or related to sexual traffic, as well as economic benefits provided as direct consideration for sexual traffic, it shall not be claimed as illegal consideration.

[2] In a case where the issue was whether the pre-paid payment lent by Party A, who employed Party B, etc. as an employee, constitutes illegal consideration, the case holding that the court below erred by misapprehending the legal principles in holding that the aforementioned pre-paid payment constitutes a juristic act contrary to social order as stipulated in Article 103 of the Civil Code, on the ground that, in light of all circumstances, Party B et al. could not choose a prostitution due to the reason that the pre-paid payment obligation and the employment condition at a disadvantage that imposes various economic burdens, and Party A et al was aware of it and was in a position that induces and encourages it, and that the aforementioned pre-paid payment constitutes a juristic act contrary to social order as stipulated in Article 103 of the Civil Code

[1] Article 10 of the Act on the Punishment of Acts of Arranging Sexual Traffic, Articles 103 and 746 of the Civil Act / [2] Article 10 of the Act on the Punishment of Acts of Arranging Sexual Traffic, Articles 103 and 746 of the Civil Act

[1] Supreme Court Decision 2004Da27488, 27495 decided September 3, 2004 (Gong2004Ha, 1650)

Plaintiff 1 and one other (Attorney Cho Young-chul, Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Defendant

Busan District Court Decision 2010Na2852 Decided July 14, 2011

The judgment of the court below is reversed, and the case is remanded to Busan District Court Panel Division.

We examine the grounds of appeal.

1. Article 10 of the Act on the Punishment of Arrangement of Commercial Sex Acts, Etc. provides that a claim against a person who has engaged in the act of arranging sexual traffic or a person who has employed a person who has engaged in the act of selling sex with regard to the act of arranging sexual traffic shall be null and void regardless of the form or title of the contract. The illegal consideration as stipulated under Article 746 of the Civil Act refers to the case where the act of causing sexual traffic is contrary to good morals and other social order. Since the act of inducing and coercing sexual traffic is contrary to good morals and other social order, money, valuables and other property gains, etc. provided as a means of inducing, soliciting and coercing sexual traffic in employing a person who has sexual intercourse constitutes illegal consideration and cannot be claimed for return thereof (see Supreme Court Decision 2004Da27488, 27495, Sept. 3, 2004). Furthermore, if economic benefits are paid or related to sexual traffic as well as direct consideration for sexual traffic, it shall not be deemed that they constitute illegal consideration.

2. According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below rejected the plaintiffs' assertion that each of the above lending acts is invalid in accordance with Article 103 of the Civil Act and Article 10 of the Act on the Punishment of Acts of Arranging Sexual Traffic since each of the above lending acts (hereinafter "Advance payment") constitutes illegal consideration, and the defendant cannot claim a return thereof against the plaintiffs. ① The plaintiffs and non-party 1, who are other female employees of the Multilateral of this case, worked for other Multilateral of this case and worked for the business of delivering coffee and tea to the plaintiffs, or for the defendant's work of delivering them as employees, and ② the defendant and non-party 1 did not pay the plaintiffs' money to the non-party 2 for the reason that they did not pay the plaintiffs' money to the non-party 1 and the non-party 1 did not pay the plaintiffs' money to the non-party 2 for the reason that they did not have to do so after the defendant's own order or decision to deliver it to the non-party 2.

3. However, we cannot agree with the above determination by the court below for the following reasons.

A. According to the records, in the police investigation into the case of the non-party 2's violation of the Act on the Punishment of Arrangement of Commercial Sex Acts, Etc. against the non-party 2, the plaintiff 1 stated that the non-party 3 had a leaptable opportunity from the time of the work on the other side before the day of this case. The non-party 3 stated that the other female employees of this case are also the same. ② The multi-party 3 did a leapet business for the purpose of prostitution, as well as other female employees did not pay the above leapet. ③ The plaintiffs were not only the plaintiffs, but also those who did not pay the above leapet. The plaintiffs did not know that the remaining amount of money at the time of this case's leapbling is less than 2,00 won, so it is extremely extremely difficult for the plaintiffs to receive the pre-paid 10,000 won per day to receive the pre-paid leapet's income or 250,000 won per day.

In full view of these circumstances, it is reasonable to view that the plaintiffs could not choose a prostitution due to the reason that they were against the obligation to return the prepaid payment in this case and the unfavorable employment conditions under which the economic burden is added, and that the defendant was not only aware of it, but also in the location of inducing and promoting it.

B. Therefore, in light of the legal principles as seen earlier, the Defendant’s advance payment of this case is either premised on the Plaintiff’s prostitution or is related to it, and its lending cannot be deemed to be a juristic act against social order as stipulated in Article 103 of the Civil Act. Thus, the lower court determined that the instant advance payment lending is valid on a different premise, and the lower court erred by misapprehending the legal principles as to the juristic act against social order as stipulated in Article 103 of the Civil Act, thereby making judgment. The Plaintiffs’ assertion pointing this out is with merit.

4. Therefore, the lower judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded to the lower court for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Park Poe-young (Presiding Justice)