logobeta
본 영문본은 리걸엔진의 AI 번역 엔진으로 번역되었습니다. 수정이 필요한 부분이 있는 경우 피드백 부탁드립니다.
텍스트 조절
arrow
arrow
(영문) 대법원 1989. 1. 31. 선고 87다카2561 판결
[소유권이전등기말소등기][공1989.3.15.(844),344]
Main Issues

If the transfer registration of ownership made in the name of a third party is invalidated after the acquisition by prescription is completed, whether the cancellation of the registration is demanded (affirmative)

Summary of Judgment

The third party who acquired the ownership of the real estate after completing the registration of ownership transfer prior to the completion of the acquisition by prescription may not assert the acquisition by prescription. However, this is based on the premise that the registration in the name of the third party is lawful. If the registration in the name of the third party is completed for the invalidation of the cause, the person entitled to claim the registration of ownership transfer due to the completion of the acquisition by prescription can seek the cancellation of the registration of ownership transfer with respect to the owner at the time of the completion of the acquisition by prescription by subrogation of the third party.

[Reference Provisions]

Articles 186 and 245 of the Civil Act

Reference Cases

Supreme Court Decision 85Meu2306 Decided August 19, 1986

Plaintiff-Appellee

Plaintiff 1 and 8 others, Counsel for the plaintiff-appellee-appellant

Defendant-Appellant

Defendant 1 and one other

Judgment of the lower court

Daegu District Court Decision 86Na279 delivered on August 28, 1987

Text

All appeals are dismissed.

The costs of appeal shall be assessed against the defendants.

Reasons

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. As to the grounds of appeal Nos. 1 and 2

According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below acknowledged that the deceased non-party 1 was deceased on April 10, 194, and the non-party 2 was deceased on the ground of inheritance, and that the non-party 4, the deceased non-party 1, the deceased non-party 4, the deceased non-party 6, and the deceased non-party 1, the deceased non-party 4, the deceased non-party 1, the deceased non-party 4, and the deceased non-party 4, the deceased non-party 1, the deceased non-party 4, the deceased non-party 9, and the deceased non-party 1, the deceased non-party 3, the deceased non-party 4, the deceased non-party 1, the deceased non-party 3, the deceased non-party 4, the deceased non-party 1, the deceased non-party 3, the deceased non-party 3, the deceased non-party 4, and the deceased non-party 1, the deceased non-party 4, the deceased party 9.

In light of the records, the above recognition and judgment are correct, and there is no error of law by misunderstanding the facts against the rules of evidence or misunderstanding the legal principles as to the prescriptive acquisition, and the Supreme Court precedents listed in the arguments are inappropriate, since they are those discarded or inconsistent by the Supreme Court Full Panel Decision of all the Supreme Court Decisions 82Da708, 709, 82Meu1792, 1793, July 12, 1983, and there is no reason to argue that the judgment of the court below is attacked.

2. As to the third ground for appeal:

A. The prescriptive acquisition by possession of real estate under Article 245(1) of the Civil Act is the acquisition of ownership only by registering it, and the ownership is only the right to claim the ownership transfer registration against the owner at the time of completion of the prescriptive acquisition. Thus, it cannot be asserted as to the third party who acquired the ownership of the real estate by completing the ownership transfer registration before registering the completion of the prescriptive acquisition. However, this is premised on the legitimacy of the registration in the third party’s name. If the registration of the third party’s name is invalid, the person holding the right to claim the ownership transfer registration due to the completion of the prescriptive acquisition is entitled to claim the registration of ownership transfer against the owner at the time of the completion of the prescriptive acquisition on behalf of the third party and claim the cancellation of the registration as to the above third party and claim for the ownership transfer registration due to the completion of the prescriptive acquisition on behalf of the owner at the time of the above third party. As seen above, as seen in this case, the ownership transfer registration made by Defendant 1 to Defendant 2 is null and void.

for the registration of ownership transfer due to such cause, and

B. According to the records (Evidence No. 31-2, 3) the plaintiffs raised an objection against Defendant 2 as to compulsory execution against the real estate held by Defendant 2 on the ground that the plaintiffs are the owners of the real estate in the Daegu District Court's Sung-gu Branch of 85-Ma27, a third party's objection against Defendant 2, but the judgment against the plaintiffs was rendered on the ground that the plaintiffs are not the owners of the real estate in the judgment, and the judgment became final and conclusive on the ground that the plaintiffs are not the owners of the real estate in the judgment. However, in the case of this case, the registration of ownership transfer to Defendant 1 and the registration of title transfer to Defendant 2 is not the same as the third party's lawsuit by seeking the cancellation of the registration on the ground that the registration in the name is null and void. Thus, it is not a double lawsuit or there is no interest in the lawsuit against res judicata

C. The Plaintiffs’ right to claim for the transfer registration of ownership against Defendant 1 was based on the completion of the acquisition by prescription on March 31, 1966, which was after the enforcement date of the Civil Act. Thus, the theory of lawsuit merely criticizes the lower court on the ground that the completion of the acquisition by prescription is prior to the enforcement date of the Civil Act, on the premise that it was not registered within six years from the enforcement date

All arguments are groundless.

3. As to the grounds of appeal Nos. 4 and 5

According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below held that the defendant 2 was a person who was not engaged in agriculture but enters the court near the court by possessing documents daily, and was living together with the above defendant 2's capacity to obtain a successful bid on January 29, 1985. The court below held that the defendant 2 did not transfer the above real estate to 484 (the house of Ga-dong, Kim Jong-dong, Kim Jong-dong, which was the location of the above real estate, for the purpose of the successful bid on January 29, 1985. The court below held that the defendant 2 had no capacity to obtain a successful bid on September 25 of the same year, and that the defendant's agent transferred the above real estate to 3rd-dong, Kim Jong-dong, Gyeong-dong, which was the location of the above real estate, to 484 (the house of Ga-dong, which was well known) and had no capacity to obtain a successful bid on May 9, 1986.

In preparation for the records, the above fact-finding and decision of the court below is justified and there is no error of law by misunderstanding the facts against the rules of evidence and by misunderstanding the legal principles against the Farmland Reform Act and the Resident Registration Act, and the decision of the court below is not contrary to the Supreme Court Decision 74Da1518 delivered on July 11, 197.

The issue is groundless.

Therefore, the appeal is dismissed and all costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Lee Chang-chul (Presiding Justice)

arrow
심급 사건
-대구지방법원 1987.8.28.선고 86나279
참조조문
본문참조조문