Trade Union's Political ContributionsCase

(11-2 KCCR 555, 95Hun-Ma154, November 25, 1999)

A.Background of the Case

In this case, the Court found the ban on labor unions' politicalcontributions violative of freedom of association, freedom of expres- sion, and the right to equality, and therefore unconstitutional.

The complainant labor union filed constitutional complaints against(1) the ban on all political activities of a labor union in Article 12 of the Trade Union Act; (2) the ban on labor unions' political contribu-tions in Article 12(5) of the Political Fund Act; and (3) the ban oncampaign activities of all organizations including labor unions in Ar-ticle 87 of the Act on the Election of Public Officials and the Pre-vention of Election Malpractices. In the meantime, the ban on laborunions' political activities was repealed when the old statute was re-placed by the new Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act(1996. 12. 31.), and the ban on all organizations' campaign activitieswas revised to allow campaign activities only to labor unions (1998. 4. 30.).

B.Summary of the Decision

The Court invalidated Article 12(5) of the Political Fund Actin the following unanimous decision while dismissing the complaintsagainst other statutes for the justiciable interests ceased to exist dueto the revisions:

Today, individuals can realize their political identities throughgroups that synthesize, prioritize, and reconcile their various interestsand desires. Interest groups and political parties are indispensableelements of democratic opinion-making. Social organizations are sec- ond to political parties in acting as bridges between the state and the people. The statute is based on the premise that a labor organiza-tion must perform only its regular task of 'improvement of workingconditions' through collective bargaining and agreement and cannotengage in any political activity. Such legislative intent make themeaning and substantive availability of political freedom vacuous.

The statute allows political contributions by other social organ-izations, especially management but bans political contributions bylabor unions. It is intended to restrain labor unions' influence onpolitical parties and labor unions' participation in political discourse. Such scheme can undermine the reconciliation of social interests be-

tween labor and management, and bias the political discourse againstlabor.

The legislative purposes of preventing the draining of labor unionbudgets or excessive financial burdens on union members do not jus-tify the ban, either. Weak finance of a labor union merely meansthat the 'balance of power' and the 'equality in weapons' are brokenagainst labor union while labor and management, two private organ-izations, are determining working conditions under the principle ofprivate autonomy. Therefore, the fear of weak finance cannot justi-fy the statute. The statute is further unjust because the state,through the statute, even further worsens the relative position oflabor by regulating political contributions adversely to labor.

'Independence' required of labor unions does not mean politicalneutrality, or neutrality in religion or other values. It only meansindependence of the organizationin factand independence of thedecision-making structurein law. Therefore, the workers, who arein the same social and economic positions, may find themselves acommon political objective and, through union activities, not only im-prove working conditions but also participate in the formation of the people's political judgment without compromising their independenceas long as they are acting out of their free wills and according tothe union's organizing principles.

In the end, given the meaning of political freedom guaranteedby the Constitution, 'prevention of politicization of labor union' and 'protecting labor union's finance' are not legitimate legislative pur-poses. Even if they are partially legitimate, they are not compellinginterests that may justify the ban on political contributions. The pro-vision violates the complainant's freedom of expression and associa- tion and is unconstitutional.

The provision is also violative of the principle of equality. Therole of social organizations in the people's political decision-making isequally applicable to labor unions. The statute, however, allows poli-tical contributions to interest groups such as corporations representingthe management interest or the association of management entitieswhile banning them only to labor unions. We cannot help but find- ing that the statute discriminates against labor unions in the area of political activities.