Manslaughter of a Lineal Ascendant of theOffender or His Spouse Resulting fromBodily Injury Case

(14-1 KCCR 159, 2000Hun-Ba53, March 28, 2002)

In this case, the Constitutional Court upheld the provision of the Criminal Act stipulating heavier sentence for crime causing death ofa lineal ascendant of the offender or his spouse resulting frombodilyinjury than that for crime causing death of other person resultingfrom bodily injury.

A. Background of the Case

The Criminal Act provides that a person who inflicts bodilyinjuryupon another, thereby causing his death, should be punished bylimitedimprisonment for not less than three years. The instant statutoryprovision stipulates that a person inflicting bodily injury upon "alineal ascendant of the offender or his spouse", thereby causingdeath,should be punished by imprisonment for life or not less than fiveyears. The complainant charged with the crime of causing death ofa lineal ascendant of the offender or his spouse resulting frombodilyinjury petitioned the Court to request the constitutional review oftheinstant statutory provision, but the Court did not grant the request.

The complainant then filed the instant constitutional complaint.

B. Summary of the Decision

The Constitutional Court unanimously upheld the instantstatutory provision, and ruled as follows:

(1) The principle of equality stipulated by Article 11(1) of theConstitution does not imply imposition of absolute equality withoutany differential treatment. Rather, it stipulates a relative equalityprohibiting differential treatment without reasonable basis inlegislation and enforcement of the law. Therefore, differential treatment or in-equality with reasonable basis does not violate the principle ofequality.

The instant statutory provision does not impose a heaviersentenceon crime against a lineal descendent by a lineal ascendant, butimposesa heavier sentence on a crime against "a lineal ascendant of the offender or his spouse," thereby discriminating against the linealdescendent.

Respect and love are the pillars of relationship between relativesformed by marriage or blood. A lineal ascendent rears hisdescendent to become a successful member of the society, and takes upon legaland moral responsibilities for the descendent's action. Adescendent, on the other hand, shares the responsibilities of the lineal ascendentas a family member, pays respect and strives to requite for theascendent's sacrifice. Such is the natural and overarching moralitydominant in the historically and socially confirmed familyrelationships.Such morality should be protected by the Criminal Act because itforms a basic order that maintains and develops each family and thesociety. A crime of causing death of a lineal ascendant of theoffender or his spouse resulting from bodily injury, then, is contraryto the universal social order, and morality, and there are amplereasons for more social censure of the immorality of this crime than that of a crime of causing death resulting from bodily injury of an ordinary person.

(2) While a crime of causing death resulting from bodily injury of an ordinary person is punishable by limited imprisonment for notless than three years, the crime of causing death of a linealascendantof the offender or his spouse resulting from bodily injury ispunishableby imprisonment for life or not less than five years. Consideringthe original purpose, role, or function of punishment as well as thedifference between the instant crime and a crime of causing deathresulting from bodily injury of an ordinary person, it cannot be saidthat the sentence prescribed by the Criminal Act for the instantcrime is too severe. Moreover, a single statutory mitigation or adiscretionary mitigation under extenuating circumstance wouldenablethe judge to suspend the sentence. In light of

these facts, theheavysentence for the instant crime prescribed by the Act is not tosevereas to destroy the balance of the entire scheme of criminalpunishmentsystem, and it does not deviate from the original purpose andfunction of the punishment.

(3) Some argue that the instant statutory provision forces com-pliance with a moral principle by reflecting the principle in law.While the law and morality could be distinguished, moralcomponentscould not be overlooked altogether when making assessment forcriminal liability. The instant statutory provision does not forcecompliance with a moral principle: Punishment of the instant crime is severe since the degree of criminal liability for the instant crimeis greater because of its greater immoral nature. While the lawcannot force observation of morality, it cannot be denied that theCriminal Act does play some role in maintaining social morals andgood customs. Since the fact that the victim is a lineal ascendentof the offender can be taken into consideration for specificsentencing procedures as one of the more important factors in the circumstanceof the crime, incorporation of such consideration into the statutoryprovision, thereby making it a requirement to aggravate thesentencewould not be forbidden, and it cannot be said that resultingdifferential treatment is without a reasonable basis.

(4) Considering the reasons for the aggravated sentence and theappropriateness of the degree of severity of such punishment for adescendent who committed the crime of causing death of a linealascendant of the offender or his spouse resulting from bodily injury, it can be concluded that there is a reasonable basis for differentialtreatment. Thus, the instant statutory provision does not violatethe principle of equality stipulated by Article 11(1) of the Constitution.