Request for Constitutional Review of Article 53 Section 1 of the Military Criminal Act

[19-2 KCCR 535, 2006 Hun-Ka 13, Nov. 29, 2007]

In this case, the Constitutional Court declared Article 53 Section 1 of Military Criminal Act unconstitutional, which provided for death penalty as the only statutory punishment when a subordinate killed a superior, due to the violation of the Principle of Proportionality between criminal punishment and responsibility.

Background of the Case

Article 53 Section 1 of Military Criminal Act provides, "Any one who killed a superior shall be punished with death penalty (hereinafter, "the statutory provision at issue in this case").

The petitioner was indicted for murdering a superior, was convicted to death penalty at a General Military Court of the Third Army Headquarters on November 23, 2005, got the decision of dismissal of appeal after appealing to Higher Military Court of the Ministry of National Defense on April 21, 2006. Then, during the pending second appeal to the Supreme Court, he filed a motion to request a constitutional review on the statutory provision at issue in this case. The Supreme Court accepted the motion and referred the case to the Constitutional Court on August 31, 2006.

Summary of the Opinions

The Constitutional Court declared Article 53 Paragraph 1 of the Military Criminal Act unconstitutional. The reasons are as follows.

1. Summary of the Majority Opinion

A.It is illegitimate in the criminal penalty system and remarkably out of proportion to the gravity of the offence that the statutory provision at issue in this case uniformly punish with the death penalty for the murder of a superior in the military in time of peace regardless of the motive and the mode of the act. In addition, it is not an appropriate enactment of

criminal penalty in terms not only of criminal policy but also of current legislative trend in the world.

B.The statutory provision at issue in this case is against the substantial ideas of the rule of law respecting and protecting the human worth and dignity and loses its legitimacy in the criminal penalty system because it did not observe the proportionality between the nature of the crime and the responsibility of the offender by providing for too heavy penalty when compared to the gravity of the crime.

2. Summary of the Nonconformity Opinion of Justice Cho Dae-hyen

The statutory provision at issue in this case has legitimate aim of legislation since it is to contribute to the achievement of special mission, national defense, by firmly establishing the chain of command and order. However, it does not differentiate one case when the murdered is the superior with the power of order from another case when the murdered is just the superior with no power of order to the murderer. It does not differentiate one case when the murder occurred before the enemy from the opposite case. It included all of them in "the murder of a superior" and punish them with death penalty. Therefore, it is against the Principle of Proportionality between the responsibility and penalty as well as against the Least Restrictive Means Rule because it uniformly punish them with the death penalty without differentiating the degree necessary to achieve legislative aim.

3. Summary of Dismissal Opinion of Justice Kim Jong-dae

The purport of referral by the Supreme Court is not that the murder of superior itself is unconstitutional but that providing only death penalty in the provision makes them unable to avoid the sentence of death penalty. However, if the Supreme Court judges the lower court's sentencing of death penalty to be proper, the Supreme Court would maintain the sentencing of death penalty by applying other legal provision in spite that the referred provision is decided to be unconstitutional. If the Supreme Court judges the sentencing of death penalty unreasonable, the Supreme Court could reverse the lower court's decision even without referring to the Constitutional Court and avoid sentencing the death penalty. For this

reason, the referral in this case lacks the interest of decision, is illegal and should be dismissed.

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Parties

Requesting Court

The Supreme Court

Petitioner

Kim ○ Min

Relevant Case

Supreme Court 2006 Do 2783, Murder of Superior etc.

Judgment

Article 53 Section 1 of the Military Criminal Act (enacted on January 20, 1962, Act No. 1003) is unconstitutional.

Reasoning

1. Introduction of the Case and Subject Matter of Review

A. Introduction of the Case

The Petitioner was accused of killing his superior and was sentenced to death at the General Military Court of the Third Army Headquarters on November 23, 2005 (2005 Godan 11) and filed an appeal, which was dismissed at the High Military Court of the Ministry of National Defense on April 21, 2006 (2005 No 265). He then appealed to the Supreme Court (2006 Do 2783), and while pending, filed a motion for Constitutional Review of the Article 53 Section 1 of the Military Criminal Act, the provision which regulates the crime of killing one's superior. The Supreme Court granted the motion and requested constitutional review on August 31, 2006.

B. Subject Matter of Review

The subject matter of review in this case is the constitutionality of Article 53 Section 1 of the Military Criminal Act (enacted on January 20, 1962, Act No. 1003) (hereinafter referred to as the statutory provision at issue in this case), which provides:

Military Criminal Act

Article 53 (Killing Superior, Preparations and Conspiracies) (1) A person who kills his or her superior shall be punished by death.

2. The Requesting Court's Reason for Requesting Constitutional Review and the Opinions of Related Agencies. (omitted)

3. Reasoning

A. The Decision on the Precondition of Adjudication

In order for a request of Constitutional Review of a law to be legitimate, the constitutionality of the law applied to the case pending at the requesting court shall constitute a precondition of the adjudication of that case. To establish a precondition of adjudication, first, a specific case should be pending at the court; second, the law the unconstitutionality of which is in issue should be the one that is to be applied to said pending case; and third, the adjudication of the court that tries the case will depend on the constitutionality of the law. The adjudication of a court is considered to 'depend', not only when the conclusion or judgment itself of the pending case is to be affected by the unconstitutionality of the law in issue, but also when, owing to such unconstitutionality, even though the judgment itself will stay the same, a different reasoning will be used to support that conclusion of the case, or the legal meaning of the substance or effect of the decision is expected to change considerably (5-2 KCCR 578, 587, 93 Hun-Ka 2, Dec. 23, 1993; 12-1 KCCR 848, 864, 99 Hun-Ba 66 et al., June 29, 2000).

The Minister of the Ministry of National Defense contends that, because the charge in this case is proved by the relevant evidence and

the conclusion of the case will not differ according to a sentencing condition, the statutory provision at issue in this case does not function as the precondition of adjudication. However, if the Constitutional Court accepts the request of Constitutional Review and ultimately declares unconstitutional the statutory provision at issue in this case which provides death penalty as the only statutory punishment, the statutory provision at issue in this case will thereby loose effect retroactively and no longer be applicable to all cases where the charges are based upon the statutory provision at issue in this case, and as a result, will affect the court's judgment of the pending case. Also, even when the indictment is amended whereby the provision applied to the petitioner is replaced by, for instance, that concerning ordinary murder under the Criminal Act, the reasoning of the adjudication will differ from before. Therefore, it can be stipulated that the substance of the trial will differ according to the conclusion of the Constitutional Review, and that the constitutionality of the statutory provision at issue in this case thereby constitutes a precondition of adjudication of the pending case.

B. Review on Merits

(1) The Limit on the Legislative Power in Establishing Statutory Punishment

With regard to the limit on the legislative power in establishing statutory punishment, the Constitutional Court has consistently ruled as follows: The legislator's decision on what conduct and punishment shall be defined as crime and imposed thereto is primarily an issue that is subject to the legislative policy of the government, and thereby should be concluded with overall consideration for the history and culture of the country, the values and legal sentiment of the general people as well as the current at the time of enactment, actual conditions and the nature of the crime, the legal interest that is protected by the law and the law's efficiency in preventing the crime. Therefore it is a decision that should be granted with an extensive legislative discretion, namely freedom of legislative formation. Thus, unless it can be established that the statutory punishment to a crime is too severe in light of the nature of that crime and the due liability that the offender should bear, and hence frustrates

the balance of the punishment system as a whole and thereby violates the constitutional principle of equality in respect to other crimes, or that the statutory punishment exceeds the degree that is necessary in accomplishing the function and purpose of the punishment to the crime of the sort and thereby violates the principle of proportionality or the principle against excessive restriction both of which can be derived from Article 37 Section 2 of the Constitution, or it can be established in other ways that the legislative discretion has been exercised in an arbitrary fashion without giving thought to Constitution or other constitutional principles, the severity of a statutory punishment is merely a problem that concerns the propriety of the legislative policy, and is not a subject of the review for unconstitutionality (4 KCCR 225, 229, 90 Hun-Ba 24, Apr. 28, 1992; 7-1 KCCR 478, 487, 91 Hun-Ba 11, Apr. 20, 1995; 7-2 KCCR 397, 404, 92 Hun-Ba 45, Oct. 26, 1995; 11-1 KCCR 529, 538-539, 96 Hun-Ba 16, May 27, 1999; 11-1 KCCR 622-629, 98 Hun-Ba 26, May 27, 1999 etc.).

(2) The Principle of Proportionality between Liability and Punishment

The Constitution sets forth the realizing of a law-governed country, where the people's fundamental rights are protected against abusive exercise of state power, as the founding principle. Here, the substantial concept of a law-governed country includes a doctrine that stipulates that when establishing a statutory punishment, the nature of the crime and the offender's liability thereto should abide by a reasonable relationship of proportionality (4 KCCR 225, 230, 90 Hun-Ba 24, Apr. 8, 1992).

When the legislator chooses to regulate a crime with punishment, it shall be ensured that such punishment is enacted proportionately to the degree of unlawfulness and liability. An excessive punishment, that is not in accord with both the unlawfulness which constitutes the crime and the liability of the offender, departs from the principle of proportionality and therefore cannot be tolerated by the Constitution.

It is primarily in the legislator's discretion to determine the sort and range of a punishment, and in doing so, the legislator shall; abide by Article 10 of the Constitution that provides that the State shall respect and protect human worth and dignity from the threat of punishment, leave room for the principle of individualization of punishment to be applied

when establishing the range of statutory punishment and thereby realize the substantial ideas of the rule of law, and abide by the principle of proportionality so that the punishment might accord with the nature of the crime and the offender's liability. This is the same when aggravating a punishment (4 KCCR 225, 230, 90 Hun-Ba 24, Apr. 8, 1992) - thus even when it is necessary to raise the penalty in light of the legislative purpose, if such aggravation clearly infringes the balance and the legitimacy of the punishment system when compared to other punishments in general, such legislation is deemed unjustifiable and the provision at issue becomes an unconstitutional one that violates the Constitution's fundamental principle that guarantees human worth and dignity (13-2 KCCR 570, 592, 2001 Hun-Ka 16, Nov. 29, 2001).

For above reasons, the Constitutional Court has issued a decision of unconstitutionality in the following cases: Constitutional Complaint of Article 5-3 Section 2 Paragraph 1 of the Act on the Aggravated Punishments of Specific Crimes etc. (4 KCCR 225-254, 90 Hun-Ba 24, Apr. 28, 1992), Constitutional Complaint of Article 11 Section 1 of the Act on the Aggravated Punishments of Specific Crimes etc.(15-2(B) KCCR 242-257, 2002 Hun-Ba 24, Nov. 27, 2003), Request of Constitutional Review of the part of the crime of threat in Article 3 Section 2 of the Act on Punishment of Violences, etc. (16-2(B) KCCR 446-460, 2003 Hun-Ka 12, Dec. 16, 2004), Request of Constitutional Review of Article 5 Section 4 Paragraph 1 of the Act on the Aggravated Punishments of Specific Economic Crimes etc. (18-1(A) KCCR 491-502, 2006 Hun-Ka 5, Apr. 27, 2006) etc.

(3) Whether the Principle of Proportionality has been violated

The question at issue in this case is whether the statutory provision at issue in this case is, however crucial the liability of killing one's superior may be, justifiable in providing death penalty as the only statutory punishment without inquiring into whether the crime has been committed during a time of war or not, or what the motive and the specific act of the crime were.

(A) The most important factor that should be taken into account when defining the sort and range of a punishment is the legal interest that is

protected by such punishment and the nature of the crime. Where the legal interest differs, the statutory punishment may differ accordingly, and where the nature of the crime differs, the statutory punishment again should differ accordingly even if the legal interest is the same (9-1 KCCR 290, 298-299, 95 Hun-Ba 50, Mar. 27, 1997).

The Criminal Act provides that, without distinguishing deliberate murder and manslaughter, a person who intentionally kills another shall be punished by death, or imprisonment for life or not less than five years. Such wide-ranging statutory punishment leaves room for the judge when trying an actual case to flexibly choose one of the pronounceable sentences in consideration of the specifics of the criminal act and the nature of the crime, and to pronounce suspension of execution when grounds that call for mitigation of punishment in extenuation of circumstances exist. Also, the Criminal Act provides that a person who kills one's own or one's spouse's lineal ascendant shall be punished by death, imprisonment for life or for not less seven years, and the Military Criminal Act punishes killing a sentinel by death or imprisonment for life. In comparison to above statutes, it is too heavy a punishment to regulate the crime of killing a superior during time of peace only by death, without inquiring into what the motive and the specific act of the crime were. Such excessive punishment is grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime and thus cannot be justified in light of the punishment system, and is hardly an adequate enactment of punishment in light of the criminal policy and current worldwide trend of legislation.

(B) The statutory provision at issue in this case is not in accord with the constitutional intent that assumes educational improvement and rehabilitation of the criminal as the basis of punishment - it rather is an enactment that puts undue emphasis on the punishment's function of general prevention and is under the harsh doctrine of retribution that primarily employs pre-modern, heavy penalties in regulating a crime. Also, a provision that, with the pretense of maintaining the line of command and preserving national defense, unconditionally prescribes death penalty for the crime of killing any superior without distinguishing between the time of war and peace or asking whether or not the offender was a subordinate to the victim, is hardly a regulation that is proportionate to the nature of the crime and the liability thereto. Even

though it is provided that the judge may resort to mitigation of punishment in extenuation of circumstances, if the statutory punishment itself fails to be proportionate to the nature of the crime and the liability thereto, a mere possibility of mitigation at the trial is not sufficient to make up such deficit.

(C) Considering that in other provisions of the Military Criminal Act, for instance as in the provisions that regulate assaulting or injuring the superior, the statutory punishments are separately prescribed when confronted with an enemy from that of other circumstances, it can be assumed that the legislator can also regulate the crime of killing the superior with distinction between a state of confronting an enemy and other circumstances, or between the time of war and peace. If so, it should be provided that at least when not confronting an enemy or when not in time of war, a reasonable punishment may be determined with consideration to the motive, circumstances and the method used in the crime. There is no foreign legislation that provides death penalty as the only sentence pronounceable for the crime of killing a superior, furthermore, it is difficult to spot a country that even aggravates the punishment when the victim is a superior. Even if allowing the unique state of confrontation between South and North Korea, the strength and integrity is not expected to be restored by an intimidating effect of a severe statutory punishment. Therefore, there is small practical benefit in sustaining such legislation. Moreover, even though one cannot deny the strong intimidating effect of the punishment restricted only to death penalty, it is not certain whether such restriction actually fulfills the function of general prevention, namely, whether it successfully prevents one from killing his or her superior in actual circumstances. Also, a provision that provides death penalty as the only statutory punishment regardless of the motive and the nature of the crime is hardly a regulation that is proportionate to the nature of the crime and the liability thereto, and violates the substantial ideas of the rule of law that stipulates that the punishment shall be enacted with respect to human worth and dignity and in proportion to the nature of the crime and the offender's liability.

4. Conclusion

As seen above, the statutory provision at issue in this case regulates a crime with excessive punishment that is grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime and thus violates the principle of proportionality between the nature of the crime and the offender's liability thereto. Such excessive punishment violates the substantial ideas of the rule of law that intends to respect and protect human worth and dignity, and thus cannot be justified in light of the punishment system. We thereby decide as set forth in the judgment. This decision is a unanimous one except Justice Cho Dae-hyen who wrote the opinion of nonconformity to the Constitution set forth in below 5. and Justice Kim Jong-dae who wrote the dissenting opinion set forth in below 6.

5. Opinion of Nonconformity to the Constitution by Justice Cho Dae-hyen

The statutory provision at issue in this case defines the act of a soldier killing his or her superior as an independent crime and regulates it with the sole sentence of death penalty. The military is an institution responsible of national defense, and to accomplish this mission, it has to participate in acts dangerous to life and limb of the soldiers, such as war, and thus it is crucial to maintain a strict chain of command. The legislative purpose of the statutory provision at issue in this case can be justified in that it seeks to accomplish the distinctive mission of national defense by establishing a chain of command.

It can also be said that in order to accomplish said legislative purpose, it is necessary to devise an independent crime such as the statutory provision at issue in this case. However, the extent of such need differs between in a case where the victim is a superior officer who holds the right to command and in a case where he or she is a mere senior who lacks the right to command. Still, the statutory provision at issue in this case does not distinguish between those two cases nor does it ask whether the crime is committed while confronting an enemy, and rather includes all of above into killing superior and regulates it only with death penalty. A law, that uniformly punishes a crime with maximum penalty without considering the respective extent of need in accomplishing the legislative purpose, violates the principle of proportionality between the

liability and punishment and also departs from the principle of minimum necessary restriction of fundamental rights.

However, the statutory provision at issue in this case does not violate the Constitution with respect to the cases where the offender, while confronting an enemy, kills a superior officer who holds the right to command. In conclusion, the statutory provision at issue in this case contains both constitutional and unconstitutional part, and distinguishing the two is a task of the National Assembly. Therefore the Court should issue a decision of nonconformity to the Constitution and urge to replace the law by legislation.

6. Opinion of Dismissal by Kim Jong-dae

I think the Request of Constitutional Review of the statutory provision at issue in this case presents no justiciable interest and thus is legally insufficient, thereby submit the opinion of dismissal as below.

A. Need of the Justiciable Interest

In order to try a case of general lawsuit in the court, a justiciable interest should be present. Similarly, an interest of judgment should be present in order to receive constitutional adjudication. An interest of action or judgment implies that the court can actually contribute to the solution of a dispute, and is required so as to prevent exploiting the judicial system futilely and unhelpfully.

An interest of action or judgment is required in all trials as a matter of course, and it is a requisite for a trial to be legally sufficient even when the law does not expressly state such interest as necessary, since it is a factor inherent in the essence of all trials. Therefore, a request of a trial that does not present an interest of judgment cannot be but legally insufficient.

In a case of a Request of Constitutional Review pursuant to Article 41 of the Constitutional Court Act, if the dispute in issue can be settled regardless of the decision of the Constitutional Court, it shall be deemed that there is no interest for the Constitutional Court to decide on the constitutionality of the provision at issue.

The Request of Constitutional Review in this case, as to be seen below,

does not present an interest of judgment in light of the Requesting Court's cause of the request and the relevant provisions.

B. Interest of Judgment of the Request of Constitutional Review in the Instant Case

(1) Requesting Court's Cause of the Request and Subject Matter of Review

The Requesting Court stated that the statutory provision at issue in this case extremely restricts the judge's discretion in deciding a sentence with respect to a crime of killing superior, which can be carried out in various forms of action with different level of severity, by providing death sentence as the only statutory punishment. Also, when compared to murder with the purpose of rebellion prescribed in Criminal Act and murder as an action of rebellion prescribed in Military Criminal Act, regulating a crime uniformly with death penalty, without considering various forms of action and respective sentencing conditions, infringes the balance and the legitimacy of the punishment system. This is the reason that the Requesting Court sets forth in finding Article 53 Section 1 of the Military Criminal Act which provides A person who kills his or her superior shall be punished by death. seemingly unconstitutional.

To arrange above argument of the Requesting Court, it is not insisting the unconstitutionality of Article 53 Section 1 with respect to the constituting factors of the crime (A person who kills his or her superior), namely, punishing defendant for the crime of killing superior. Rather, according to the Requesting Court, merely the part of the statutory provision at issue in this case that provides death penalty as the only possible statutory punishment is where the unconstitutionality may reside in.

If so, the subject matter of review that the Requesting Court ultimately submitted for the Court's decision is not the whole text of Article 53 Section 1 of the Military Criminal Act, but rather, the part of said provision where it provides the statutory punishment by stating shall be punished by death (hereinafter referred to as the 'Instant Statutory Punishment Provision'). And the cause of request of Constitutional Review of the Instant Statutory Punishment Provision is that it is unlawful to

provide death sentence as the only statutory punishment without considering various forms of action and respective sentencing conditions (therefore, had the statutory punishment of Provision 53 Section 1 been death or imprisonment for life, there no such request would have taken place.)

(2) Lack of Interest of Judgment

The Requesting Court requested the Constitutional Review of the Instant Statutory Punishment Provision arguing that it is unlawful to provide death sentence as the only statutory punishment without considering various forms of action and respective sentencing conditions. Accordingly, in deciding whether or not an interest of request is present, one shall distinguish between the cases where the sentence of death penalty is justifiable and cases where it is not.

(A) Cases where the Requesting Court decides the Sentence of Death Penalty by the Trial Court to be Justifiable

If the Requesting Court decides, in consideration of the charges proved by evidence and the sentencing conditions, that the sentence of death penalty by the trial court is justifiable, it follows that the Requesting Court will also dismiss the appeal and confirm the lawfulness of the sentence of death penalty. In this case, the fact that the Instant Statutory Punishment Provision provides death penalty as the only statutory punishment does not affect the court in deciding the sentence because, even if the Instant Statutory Punishment Provision provides other punishments, the court handling the instant case will sentence death penalty all the same.

Meanwhile, the Requesting Court contents that even when the sentence of death penalty by the trial court is deemed justifiable in consideration of the charges and the sentencing conditions, the precondition of adjudication can be recognized because once the Instant Statutory Punishment Provision is declared as unconstitutional, at least a different provision will be applied to the instant case.

However, such contention of the Requesting Court is fettered with too formal a logic considering the precondition of adjudication, and in the case

in issue where the defendant filed a motion for Constitutional Review, the interest for judgment cannot be found due to following reasons.

It is clear that the defendant filed a motion for Constitutional Review so as to avoid death penalty, and the Requesting Court also requested the Constitutional Review of the statutory provision at issue in this case that provides death penalty as the only statutory punishment in order to avoid sentencing a death penalty. That granted, a decision of the Constitutional Court with respect to the unconstitutionality of the statutory provision at issue in this case that provides death penalty as the only statutory punishment does not have any significance for the defendant or the court of the case in issue, because the court will all the same sentence death penalty by merely applying a different provision. It is doubtful that while at all events sentencing death penalty, merely applying a different provision will contribute to the solution of the specific case other than preserving the integrity of a theoretical formal logic. It has to be asked whether it is fine to allow a procedure of the Constitutional Court be exploited that way.

(B) Cases where the Requesting Court decides the Sentence of Death Penalty by the Trial Court to be Unjustifiable

Even if the Requesting Court decided the sentence of death penalty by the trial court to be unjustifiable and thereby requested the instant Constitutional Review in order to reverse the sentence, the interest of judgment is not to be found.

Article 383 Paragraph 4 and Article 391 of the Criminal Procedure Act provides that in a case where either punishment of death or imprisonment or imprisonment without prison labor for life or not less than ten years, a leave is granted to an appeal on the grounds of improper sentence and if such appeal is allowed, the court can reverse the original judgment.

Meanwhile, even though the Instant Statutory Punishment Provision provides death sentence as the only statutory punishment, it does not necessarily follow that death penalty is the only pronounceable sentence as the Requesting Court contents. A court can, through mitigation of punishment in extenuation of circumstances pursuant to Article 53 and 55 of the Criminal Act, freely sentence either 'imprisonment or imprisonment without prison labor for life or not less than ten years'

Therefore, even though the Instant Statutory Punishment Provision provides death sentence as the only statutory punishment, the Requesting Court may, if it decides that such sentence by the trial court is unjustifiable, reverse the original judgment and impose punishment other than death penalty pursuant to the provisions of the Criminal Act and the Criminal Procedure Act, with or without the Constitutional Court's decision on the unconstitutionality of the Instant Statutory Punishment Provision (it does not seem that the cause of request set forth by the Requesting Court includes the argument that it is unlawful in the sense that a sentence of imprisonment or imprisonment without prison labor 'less than ten years' is impossible even after mitigating the punishment in extenuation of circumstances).

Therefore, even if the Requesting Court's intention was to avoid sentencing death penalty, there is no legal interest in requesting a Constitutional Review of the Instant Statutory Punishment Provision which provides death penalty as the only statutory punishment.

(3) Sub-conclusion

As seen above, in light of the cause of request set forth by the Requesting Court, the request of the instant case fail to present an interest of judgment.

Only, if the Requesting Court requested the instant case on the grounds of the unconstitutionality of the death penalty itself, there might have been an interest of judgment because once the death penalty itself is declared as unconstitutional, the Requesting Court will have to reverse the original judgment and the defendant will no longer be sentenced to death penalty.

C. Conclusion

In the case where the Requesting Court decides the sentence of death penalty by the trial court to be justifiable, such sentence will still be maintained by simply applying a different provision even if the provision requested for review is decided unconstitutional. In the case where the sentence of death penalty is deemed unjustifiable, the Requesting Court can still reverse the original judgment and avoid such sentence even

without requesting for Constitutional Review.

Therefore, the Request of Constitutional Review of the instant case lacks an interest of judgment and thus legally insufficient, and should be dismissed.

Justices Lee Kang-kook(Presiding Justice), Lee Kong-hyun, Cho Dae-hyen, Kim Hee-ok, Kim Jong-dae, Min Hyeong-ki, Lee Dong-heub(Assigned Justice), Mok Young-joon, Song Doo-hwan