[영문판례]
Revocation of Driver Licenses for Using Cars in Commission of Crime
[17-2 KCCR 378, 2004Hun-Ga28, November 24, 2005]
In this case, the Court struck down the relevant provisions of the Road Safety Act that mandatorily revokes the driver license of a person who has committed a crime using an automobile.
Background of the Case
The relevant provisions of the Road Safety Act mandatorily revoke the driver license of a person who has committed a crime using an automobile. Petitioner had his license revoked for forcefully confining and driving another person in his car. Petitioner filed an administrative action seeking cancellation of the revocation. The presiding court referred for constitutional review the question of the constitutionality of the provisions.
Summary of the Decision
The Constitutional Court found the instant provisions unconstitutional with a decision of eight to 1 for the following reasons:
1. Majority Opinion of Eight Justices
A. Ordinarily, a 'crime' is an anti-social act infringing upon legal interests and is therefore subject to criminal punishment pursuant to criminal law. According to the instant provision, a license is revoked not only when a car is used directly as a tool of or place for a grave crime but also when the car is used in before- or after-the-fact crimes such as preparing or conspiring for or fleeing from an underlying crime, or when the car is used in a criminal negligent offense. These days, cars have established themselves as necessities in people's daily lives since cars are the popular means of transportation or the means of making a living. Traffic laws are punctuated with special provisions concerning driving an automobile. We do not believe that the scope of the crimes covered by the instant provision includes minor negligent offenses. The instant provision, however, does not take into account the gravity or intent of the crime and revokes a driver license on account of the use of an automobile in any crime. Its coverage is too broad and violates the principle of clarity.
B. The instant provision indiscriminately revokes a driver license without taking into account the extent the automobile contributed to the commission of the crime and how grave the crime was, as long as a car was used in the commission of a crime. It thereby eliminates any room to consider the individuality and uniqueness of each specific case. It requires revocation of the driver license even in cases of very low illegality and culpability, and therefore violates the principle of minimum restriction. Once a driving license is revoked, under the instant provision, the driver cannot obtain a license for two years. Such consequences constitute excessive restriction on basic rights, and violate the principle of balance among legal interests. Therefore, the instant provision violates the freedom of occupation and the general freedom of action and therefore the Constitution.
2. Dissenting Opinion of One Justice
The clause "when a crime was committed using an automobile" can be interpreted to mean when the automobile was directly used as the means of committing a crime, and therefore its meaning cannot be said to be unclear. Even if one cannot obtain a driver license for two years after his or her license is revoked, under the instant provision, it does not constitute excessive restriction on basic rights because the fact of using a car as the direct tool of committing a crime indicates a very high degree of danger and culpability: mandatory revocation of the driver's license under those circumstances is not excessive for a person who used the car as the direct means in committing the crime.
Aftermath of the Case
Before this decision was announced, the aforesaid provision was revised to require revocation only in instances of using an automobile for crime, rape, and other grave offenses. On the day of the announcement, the Supreme Court finalized a judgment in a case where the instant provision was applied, giving rise to a controversy on the effect of that Supreme Court judgment (Law Times, December 12, 2005).