2. B

3. C (D before the opening of name);

4. E.

5. F;

[Judgment of the court below]

2.H

3. I

Plaintiff Intervenor Law Firm LLC et al., Counsel for the intervenor joining the Plaintiff

Attorney Quota

Attorney Jeong-chul et al., Counsel for the plaintiff

Law Firm Macl, Attorney Park Ma-young

Attorney Cho Jin-jin, Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant

Law Firm Sil Law Firm, Counsel for defendant-appellant

[Defendant-Appellee]

Law Firm LLC, Attorney Park Jae-soo

Attorney Lee Dong-ho, Counsel for the defendant-appellant

2. Of the litigation costs, the part pertaining to the participation by the Plaintiff’s Intervenor shall be borne by the Intervenor, and the remainder shall be borne by the Plaintiffs.

A. On March 28, 2015, the J Housing Redevelopment Project Establishment Promotion Committee (hereinafter referred to as the “Promotion Committee”) held an inaugural general meeting of the partnership.

B. On April 8, 2015, the instant promotion committee filed an application for authorization to establish an association with the Defendant. On July 6, 2015, the Defendant rejected the said application on the ground that the consent ratio is below 75% (3/4) of the owners of lands, etc. as stipulated in the former Act on the Maintenance and Improvement of Urban Areas and Dwelling Conditions for Residents (amended by Act No. 13508, Sept. 1, 2015; hereinafter “Urban Improvement Act”). On August 17, 2015, the instant promotion committee obtained consent from 2,365 of the owners of lands, etc., and filed an application for authorization to establish an association with the Defendant (hereinafter “instant application”).

D. On September 18, 2015, the Defendant approved the establishment of the Intervenor joining the Defendant on the ground that 1,775 of the owners of land, etc. 2,365 agreed to establish an association and the consent ratio was 75.05% (hereinafter “instant disposition”).

[Ground of recognition] Facts without dispute, entry of Gap evidence 2 and 3 (including each number; hereinafter the same shall apply), the purport of the whole pleadings

2. The plaintiffs' assertion

The instant disposition is invalid because there is a defect that does not reach 75% of the consent ratio of the owners of land, etc. prescribed by the Urban Improvement Act, and such defect is serious and apparent.

3. Relevant statutes;

It is as shown in the attached Form.

4. Determination on the defense prior to the merits

A. Defendant’s assertion

The Plaintiffs are forced to become members of the land owners, etc. in the rearrangement zone, and even in the case of opposing the rearrangement project, they are subject to cash settlement. As such, the disadvantages suffered from the instant disposition are merely de facto, indirect, and economic disadvantages, and cannot be deemed to be disadvantages suffered from the status of a third party, who is not a member of the Intervenor joining the Defendant. Therefore, there is no legal interest to seek

B. Determination

A third party, who is not the direct counter party to an administrative disposition, is legally entitled to a decision of the propriety thereof by filing an administrative litigation seeking the cancellation or change of the disposition, and the legal interest here refers to a case where there is a direct and specific interest protected by the law based on the basis of the disposition, and it does not include cases where it is merely an indirect or factual or economic interest.

The Plaintiffs, who did not consent to the establishment of the Intervenor, suffered disadvantages to expropriate their own land by the Intervenor joining the Intervenor due to the instant disposition, and the disadvantage is direct and specific.

Therefore, the defendant joining the defendant's defense prior to the merits is without merit.

5. Judgment on the merits

A. In order for an administrative disposition to become null and void as a matter of course, the defect must be objectively obvious as serious violation of the important part of the law. In determining whether the defect is significant and obvious, the purpose, meaning, function, etc. of the law should be examined from a teleological perspective, and at the same time, reasonable consideration should be given to the specificity of the specific case. In a case where an administrative agency takes an administrative disposition by applying a provision of a law to certain legal relations or factual relations, it is clearly stated that the legal principle that the provision of the law cannot be applied to such legal relations or factual relations, and even though there is no room for dispute over the interpretation, if the administrative agency applied the above provision to the legal relations or factual relations, it shall be deemed that the defect is significant and obvious. However, if there is room for dispute over the interpretation of the law because the legal principle that the provision of the law cannot be applied to such legal relations or factual relations is not clearly revealed, it is merely erroneous about the facts of the requirements for the administrative disposition (see, e.g., Supreme Court en banc Decision 94Nu615, Jul. 111, 1995).

In a case where there is a defect that misleads the factual basis of an administrative disposition, it should be apparent that the data, based on which the factual basis is the basis of the mistake, lacks external appearance, or objectively lacks the authenticity of its establishment or content, or it is impossible to recognize the authenticity of its establishment or content. In a case where the existence or absence of the defect can be clarified only when the data on the factual basis should be accurately examined (see Supreme Court Decision 91Nu6863, Apr. 28, 1992).

In addition, in an administrative litigation that claims the invalidity of an administrative disposition as a matter of course and seeks the confirmation of invalidity thereof, the Plaintiff is liable to prove the ground for invalidity thereof (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2012Du18554, May 28, 2015).

C. Defect in calculating the number of consenters

1) The plaintiffs' assertion

In the Urban Development Act, which is in general legal status of the Act on Urban Improvement, states that the number of consenters shall be calculated respectively as one landowner. Thus, in this case where the Urban Improvement Act applies, if part of the site subject to a site subject to a site ownership of an aggregate building is included in the rearrangement zone, all sectional owners of such aggregate building shall be recognized as the owner of the land, etc. However, even though the site of the aggregate building was included in the rearrangement zone of this case, the defendant calculated the site as one owner of the land, etc., and did not calculate the number of 61 sectional owners of the KI as the owner of the land, etc., and therefore, 60 persons should be added

2) Determination

In full view of the evidence No. 4, Eul evidence No. 8, Eul evidence No. 15, Eul evidence No. 8, and Eul evidence No. 15, it can be acknowledged that there is Kmanion Port on the ground of the 4,022 square meters wide (hereinafter referred to as "Ldong"), Dong-gu, Gwangju-gu (hereinafter referred to as "Ldong"), Dong-gu"), the P consent No. 4/5 of the above aggregate building is located within the rearrangement zone in this case, Ndong and 0 were located outside the rearrangement zone, the Pdong has six sectional owners, the defendant considers the owners of land, etc. as Q one and treats that his/her consent was not submitted.

Article 2 subparagraph 9 (a) of the Urban Improvement Act defines "owner of land, etc." as "owner of land or building located in an improvement zone or a person with superficies thereof" for a redevelopment project. Since land whose site ownership has been established cannot be disposed separately from an aggregate building, a sectional owner of an aggregate building located outside an improvement zone cannot be deemed the owner of land, etc. merely because part of the site of the aggregate building is included in the improvement zone. Therefore, since the Kinan Nandong and zero Dong are located outside the improvement zone of this case, they cannot be deemed the owner of land, etc., but in the case of P consent, 4/5 of the building is located outside the improvement zone of this case, and that six sectional owners should be added to the total

In light of the purport of the prohibition of separate disposition of land, which is the object of the right to use the building and the right to use site, as to whether to recognize one owner of land, according to the sharing relation of M land, it cannot be recognized as one owner of land, etc., by recognizing the above land as co-ownership of the owner of land, in light of the purport of the prohibition of separate disposition of the building and the right to use site, as well as the purport of the entire pleadings. In addition, in full view of the written evidence Nos. 3 and 4, Q, which is recognized as the owner of the land, in the instant disposition, is the same as or similar to the ratio of the right to use site to other sectional owners under the register of the above land, and is not the owner of the land, and is not the current owner of KM as a sectional owner of the land (six owners of land, etc. - five additional owners of land, etc.

1) The plaintiffs' assertion

If one person owns a large number of land or buildings, the owner of the land, etc. shall be deemed one person, and even if one person transfers the land or building after the consent to establish the association, the new owner of the land or building shall not be included in the owner of the land, etc. Therefore, the person to whom the land or building was transferred from R, S, T, U, V,W, X, Y, Z, AAAB, AC, or AD shall not be deemed the owner of the land or building.

2) Determination

The number of owners of land, etc. for calculating the consent rate shall be calculated by the method prescribed by Article 28 of the Enforcement Decree of the Urban Improvement Act as of the time of application of this case. The number of owners of land, etc. at the time of application of this case cannot be calculated as one owner of land, etc. solely on the ground that several parcels were owned at the time of consent to the establishment of the committee of promotion of this case. Accordingly, the aforementioned assertion by the prior Plaintiffs on

(d) Defects in double calculation of the owners of land, etc.

1) The plaintiffs' assertion

If one person owns a large number of land or buildings, the owner of the land, etc. shall be deemed one person, but since AE, AF, AG, AH, AI, and AJ are calculated in duplicate number of consenters, the above six persons shall be excluded from the total number of consenters.

2) Determination

A) Relevant legal principles

According to Article 2 subparagraph 9 (a) of the Urban Improvement Act, "owner of land, etc." is the owner or superficies of the land or building located in the rearrangement zone. According to Article 17 of the same Act and Article 28 (1) 1 of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act, the consent of the owner of the land, etc. in the housing redevelopment project shall be calculated as the owner of the land, etc., if one piece of land or one building belongs to several co-ownerships, one representative of such several persons shall be calculated as the owner of the land. If superficies is established on the land, the owner of the land and one person representing persons with superficies shall be calculated as the owner of the land, etc., regardless of the number of parcels of land or buildings. In light of the contents and structure of the relevant Acts and subordinate statutes, if one person owns a lot of land or a building, one person for each piece of real estate shall be calculated as the owner of the land, etc., and if the same co-owner jointly owns the land or building in different parcels of land, regardless of the number of real estate.

B) AE, AF, AG, AH, and AJ-related

In full view of the overall purport of the arguments in the evidence Nos. 3, 68 through 71, and 73, the facts in relation to AE, AF, AG, AH, AI, and AJ can be acknowledged as follows.

A person shall be appointed.

In light of the above legal principles, it is just that the Defendant calculated the owner of a plot of land and building or the owner of land and building, co-owners, persons holding superficies, etc. as stated in the above table as the owner of a plot of land and the consent of the owner of a plot of land, etc. is reasonable, and the above assertion is without merit on different premise.

C) AI-related

According to Gap evidence No. 3, the defendant recognized two owners of land, etc. and the consenters as shown below with respect to the land BH and buildings, BI, and BJ land.

A person shall be appointed.

However, in full view of the purport of the argument in Gap evidence No. 72 and the purport of the argument as a whole, it can be acknowledged that the superficies of the BK union established with respect to the land of this case was cancelled on April 21, 2015, which was prior to the application of this case. Thus, the defendant's calculation of the owner of land and the consenting person separately from the land of BH land and building owned by the AI alone, and the land of BI is unlawful (one owner of land and one decrease of the consenting person).

E. Defect in calculating part of the State and public land;

1) The plaintiffs' assertion

With respect to State-owned or public land, six persons of the Gwangju Metropolitan City superintendent of education, Gwangju Metropolitan City, the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, the Ministry of Strategy and Finance, and the Seo-gu Incheon Metropolitan City shall not be calculated as owners of land, etc., and three thousand owners of land, etc. of Gwangju Metropolitan City

2) Determination

Even if the property management authority of State and public land becomes the Incheon Metropolitan City Office of Education, Gwangju Metropolitan City, the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, the Ministry of Strategy and Finance, the Ministry of Strategy and Finance, and the Seo-gu Gwangju Metropolitan City, the owners of land or buildings shall be deemed to be only three persons (the owners of land, etc. and three persons, and the number of consenters decreased).

(f) Where no written consent exists, or it cannot be viewed as a legitimate written consent;

1) BL-related

A) The plaintiffs asserted that since they submitted only BN's written consent among co-inheritors of BL, the owner of the land, the above written consent is null and void.

B) In full view of the evidence Nos. 74 and 74, Eul’s evidence Nos. 74, and 1, the purport of the entire pleadings is as follows: (a) the owner of a certified copy of the register of BM land was the BL1; (b) the fact that BL died on October 25, 2009; and (c) the fact that BO, BP, and Q were appointed as a representative member of BN as to the land above, the written consent on

2) BR-related

A) The Plaintiffs asserted that the above written consent is null and void without the consent of the heir BT in the written consent to the appointment of the representative partner of the co-inheritors of BR, who are the owners of the land and the building.

B) Comprehensively taking account of the overall purport of the arguments in Gap evidence Nos. 3, Eul evidence Nos. 2, 3, and Eul evidence Nos. 10 and Eul evidence Nos. 2, 3, and 10, the written consent on the land and building of BS is legitimate, since it can be acknowledged that the BR had already died on February 7, 199, which was before the death of June 1, 2009, the heir of BR had been the spouse and children of BU, BW, BX, and BX as the representative partner of BU.

(iii) BY-related

A) The Plaintiffs asserted that since only CAA consent form among co-inheritors of BY, the owners of BZ land and buildings, the above consent form is invalid.

B) In full view of the evidence Nos. 75 and 75, Eul’s evidence Nos. 75 and 3, the owner of the register of the BL land and building was BY, the fact that the BY had already died at the time of the instant application, the CA as the spouse of BY,CC, CD, and the fact that CC and CD appointed CA as the representative partner, and the consent on the above land and building was lawful.

4) CE-related

A) The Plaintiffs asserted that the consent form written by CG Co., Ltd., the owner of CF land is null and void without the consent of CG. Accordingly, the Defendant asserts that the above superficies is superficies for the purpose of collateral, and thus no separate consent is required.

B) Article 28(1)1(b) of the Enforcement Decree of the Urban Improvement Act does not provide for an exception to the appointment of a representative with superficies who is a financial institution for the purpose of securing bonds, and Article 28(1)1(b) of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act does not provide for an exception to the appointment of a representative with superficies who is a person with superficies that is a financial institution for the purpose of securing bonds, and when interpreting that the consent of the owner of land, etc. is legitimate, the consent of the person with superficies should be subject to the consent of the person with superficies in light of the following: (a) the requirements for the determination of whether the superficies is a person with superficies for the purpose of securing bonds and the interpretation

C) Comprehensively taking account of the purport of the entire arguments in Gap evidence No. 76, it can be acknowledged that the consent form of CG, the holder of superficies, is without the consent form of CG, and thus the consent form written by CE is null and void (reduction of one consent number);

5) AF-related

A) The Plaintiffs asserts that the consent form of AF’s name on the AF’s land is not only a copy of the consent form, but also the consent form of co-owners’ representative members was not submitted.

B) Comprehensively taking account of the overall purport of the pleadings in the descriptions of Gap evidence Nos. 69, 111, and Eul evidence Nos. 69 and 111, and Eul evidence Nos. 4, the original copy of the AF written consent indicating the intention of consent related to the land NO and the land AO has been submitted, and the AR, AP, a co-owner of the land AO, and Qu submitted the written consent for the appointment of representative members. As such,

6) CHrelated

A) The Plaintiffs asserts that since CI and CJ land was owned jointly by CH and CK but the consent of CK was omitted, the consent written by CH is null and void.

B) Comprehensively taking account of the overall purport of the arguments in the evidence Nos. 3 and 5, CK’s written consent as to CI, CJ’s co-owners and CL’s land, and CI’s sole owner of the building. As such, CI, CJ’s CH on land, and CK’s written consent is valid.

7) CM-related

A) The plaintiffs asserts that since the date of birth stated in the written consent of CM differs from that of the date of birth on resident registration, the above written consent is null and void as a written consent that they did not prepare

B) According to the evidence evidence Nos. 78 through 80, CM’s written consent form is CN, the date of birth on the resident registration of CM is CO, and CM’s written consent form. Thus, CM’s written consent form is valid.

(g) Submission of a copy of written consent to the establishment

1) The plaintiffs' assertion

The consent of not less than 45 persons, CP, QR, CTR, CTS, CU, CV, CV, CY, CY, DA, S, DB, DB, DD, DD, DE, DF, DG, DH, DJ, DJ, DK, DK, DL, DM, DM, DM, DN, DN, DP, DP, DF, DTR, DTS, DU, DF, DV, DV, DV, DV, DW, DW, DH, DH, DH, DB, E-U, E-U, E-U, and E-U, submitted a copy of the consent.

2) Determination

A) Relevant legal principles

The purpose of requesting the written consent of the owners of lands, etc. in the establishment of redevelopment cooperatives under the Urban Improvement Act and requiring the administrative agency to submit the written consent when applying for authorization to establish redevelopment cooperatives is to prevent the dispute between the related parties that may arise in connection with the consent by clarifying the consent of the owners of lands, etc., and further to prevent the administrative agency from taking administrative power to confirm the consent when applying for authorization to establish redevelopment cooperatives only by the written consent submitted at the time of applying for authorization to establish redevelopment cooperatives.

B) the consent of the former owner is a copy;

Since Article 28 (1) 3 of the Enforcement Decree of the Act on the Maintenance and Improvement of Urban Areas and Dwelling Conditions, a person who acquires land or a building from a person who has consented to the establishment of a promotion committee or an association shall be deemed to have been established by the promotion committee or the association, in light of the above provision and the purport of requiring the written consent of the owners of the land, etc., a written consent to determine the consent of the former owners shall be submitted only one document, and there is no need to submit a separate written consent for each transferred land or building. Accordingly,

C) In a case where the same owner owns a number of parcels of land or buildings, and part of them belongs to a number of parcels of land or buildings and are recognized as separate owners of land, in light of the purport of requiring written consent, only one copy of a written consent to verify the consent on the whole parcels of land or buildings is required, and there is no need to separately prepare and submit the original written consent for each parcel of land or building to be treated. Accordingly, this part of the Plaintiffs’ claim on a different premise is without merit.

The plaintiffs' assertion in this part is without merit, in full view of the purport of Eul's written evidence 6 and the purport of the entire argument, since Eul's written consent submitted by the EDR and the EE foundation.

H. Counterfeiting written consent to the establishment of the association

1) The plaintiffs' assertion

The EF employed by the Intervenor for the Intervenor submitted only identification cards or copies of identification cards from EG, EH, EI, EJ, EK, EK, EM, EM, EN, ES, BR, EP, Q Q, ER, ETS, EU, ES, EV, EW, or X, and signed and sealed the written consent for establishment. The above written consent is invalid.

2) Determination

It is difficult to recognize that EF prepared a written consent without obtaining consent from the owners of land, etc., or that the signature and seal stated in the written consent was substituted by EF. Even if the above written consent was forged or affixed instead, there is no evidence to support the fact that the Defendant knew or could have known it, it cannot be said that the defect is objectively evident.

(i) relation to the DY (EY);

1) The plaintiffs asserts that the consent form of the former owners of the EZ land and buildings owned by the DSS is null and void since the date of its preparation is March 29, 2003.

2) According to Gap evidence No. 112, it can be acknowledged that the date of preparing the EY’s consent form was written on March 29, 2003. However, the above consent form was written in accordance with the amended Act and subordinate statutes as of August 2, 2012, and it can be deemed that the above consent form was written after August 2, 2012. Thus, the above consent form was written after mistake in March 3, 2003 and 29, and there is no other circumstance that the above consent form was invalid.

3) The Defendant deemed EY as the owner of an independent building and calculated it as the owner of an independent land, etc. However, the FY appears to have entered the FA, which is the parcel number prior to the change of the EZ building, as the parcel number prior to the change of the EZ building, and otherwise, it cannot be recognized that the EY owned the FA building in addition to the EZ building transferred by the EY to the DS at the time of the instant application. Thus, the Defendant deemed EY as the owner of the land, etc. of the FA building is unlawful and its defect is significant and obvious (reduction by one owner of land, etc., reduction by one person, reduction by the number

(j) relating to written consent supplemented after an application is filed on April 8, 2015;

1) The defendant's assertion

After the second application was filed on April 8, 2015, the Defendant asserted to the effect that 14 persons should be added to the number of consenters, since the Defendant submitted the consent of FB, FC, FD, FE, FF, FG, FG, FI, FI, FJ, FJ, FK, FK, FL, FM, FN, and FO before the second application was filed. However, the Defendant did not reflect the said 14 persons in the number of consenters.

2) FB, FC, FD, FO-related

According to the evidence No. 12 Eul's statement, the defendant's allegation that the defendant filed the motion in this case without calculating the FB, FC, FD, and FO as the consenters's consent. In light of this, it is unclear whether the above consent was supplemented before the motion in this case, and it cannot be deemed that the defendant has an obligation to include the defendant in the number of consenters after examining whether the defendant's consent was given to the person who did not include the person who did not consent. Thus, the defendant's allegation that the above four persons are not included in the number of consenters is legitimate.

3) FE, F-related

According to Gap evidence 3, Eul evidence 12, Eul evidence 18, and Eul evidence 18, the defendant's defendant's defendant's allegation submitted a supplement of the consent of all owners with respect to FE, FP ground Q, FR owned by FF and FR after the first application of April 8, 2015, and the date of issuance of a certified copy of resident registration attached to the FS's above consent is June 21, 2013. The fact that the FS's consent was not written and the consent was not submitted at the time of the first application is insufficient to recognize that the FS's consent was written after the transfer of FS and FR, it is unlawful to exclude FE and F from the number of consenters due to the defendant's uncertainty's uncertainty and FR's uncertainty's uncertainty's uncertainty (in addition, two persons are added).

4) The quorum of consent for authorization to establish the FG, FH, FI, FJ, FK, FK, FL, FM, and FN-related association ought to be determined as at the time of the instant application (see Supreme Court Decision 2012Du21437, Apr. 24, 2014). Even if the consent was written after the date of the inaugural general meeting, the consent cannot be deemed null and void unless it was written before the instant application, which is the base point for calculating the number of consenters.

The written consent of FG, FH, FI, FJ2), FK, FK, FM, FN, and FN may be recognized as having been supplemented before the instant application and submitted to the Defendant, taking full account of the overall purport of the arguments in the evidence Nos. 12 and 18 of B, and the written consent of FG, FH, FI, FJ, and FN. As such, the Defendant cannot exclude the foregoing eight persons from the number of consenters on the ground that the time of preparation is uncertain, including that the written consent was not submitted at the time of the instant application on April 1, 2015 (in addition, the number of consenters).

On the other hand, according to Gap evidence 18-10, the document prepared by the FL is prepared.

The facts revealed as of December 22, 2015 can be acknowledged. However, in light of the following circumstances acknowledged by the Defendant’s Intervenor based on the overall purport of the arguments as seen earlier, it is reasonable to deem that the FK’s written consent was written prior to the instant application, given that the Defendant excluded FK from the consenters at the time of the first application, and included it in the consenters at the time of the instant application, and that the date of issuance of a certified copy of resident registration attached to the FK’s written consent was February 5, 2015 and the date of inspection of the certified copy of the register was June 4, 2015.

(k) Small decision;

As indicated below, the number of owners of land, etc. shall be 2,365 and the number of consenters shall be 1,779. As such, the ratio of consent shall be 75.22%, and the ratio of consent shall exceed 75% (3/4) prescribed in the Urban Improvement Act.

A person shall be appointed.

6. Conclusion

Therefore, the plaintiffs' claims are dismissed in entirety as it is without merit. It is so decided as per Disposition.

Judges Kim Gung-sung

Judges' rights and leathers

I seem to appear.

2) The original written consent of the FT, the former owner, was supplemented and submitted.

A person shall be appointed.

A person shall be appointed.

A person shall be appointed.

A person shall be appointed.

A person shall be appointed.

A person shall be appointed.