beta
(영문) 대법원 1987. 2. 10. 선고 85누42 판결

[법인세부과처분취소][공1987.4.1.(797),448]

Main Issues

A. A disposition under Article 59-2 (3) of the former Corporate Tax Act (amended by Act No. 3200, Dec. 28, 1979)

(b)the scope of the court’s ex officio in administrative litigation;

Summary of Judgment

A. The meaning of Article 59-2(3) of the former Corporate Tax Act (amended by Act No. 3200, Dec. 28, 1979) is not clear in both the transfer value and the acquisition value, as well as the case where only one of the two values is unclear, the transfer margin should be calculated on the basis of the standard market price in accordance with the above provision, and the other unclear value should be calculated on the basis of the standard market price and the other party's price should be determined on the basis of the actual transaction price.

B. The principle of ex officio detection under Article 9 of the former Administrative Litigation Act (amended by Act No. 3754 of Dec. 15, 1984) does not mean that the court may determine the fact that the party did not assert without any restriction, but if it is necessary for the public interest while maintaining the plaintiff's claims, it shall be clear that the court may ex officio investigate and determine the facts other than the claims, i.e., facts recorded in the records, within the scope of the claims, only based on them.

[Reference Provisions]

Article 59-2(3) of the former Corporate Tax Act (amended by Act No. 3200, Dec. 28, 1979); Article 9 of the former Administrative Litigation Act (amended by Act No. 3754, Dec. 15, 1984);

Reference Cases

A. Supreme Court Decision 82Nu557 delivered on April 26, 1983; 81Nu200 delivered on December 13, 1983; 85Nu321 delivered on June 24, 1986

Plaintiff-Appellant-Appellee

Attorney Ahn Jae-won, Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant of a social welfare foundation

Defendant-Appellee-Appellant

Gangwon-gu Director of the District Office

Judgment of the lower court

Seoul High Court Decision 83Gu945 delivered on December 20, 1984

Text

All appeals are dismissed.

The costs of appeal are assessed against each of the plaintiff and the defendant.

Reasons

1. The plaintiff's attorney's grounds of appeal are examined.

In light of the records, the court below's decision that the land of this case cannot be deemed as an income accruing from the transfer of land directly used by the plaintiff to social welfare facilities, which is a non-taxable social welfare foundation under Article 59-3 (1) 13 of the Corporate Tax Act, and that the decision of the court below which calculated corporate tax and defense tax against the plaintiff is just and there is no error in the rules of evidence such as the theory

2. We examine the first ground for appeal by the defendant litigation performer.

According to Article 59-2 (3) of the Corporate Tax Act (Act No. 3200, Dec. 28, 1979) which was enforced at the time of the establishment of taxation requirement of this case, the transfer margin, which is the tax base of special surtax, shall be the amount obtained by deducting the acquisition value and expenses as determined by the Presidential Decree from the transfer value, but where the transfer value and acquisition value are unclear, the transfer value and acquisition value shall be the amount based on the standard market price at the time of transfer determined by the Presidential Decree, and the amount based on the standard market price at the time of acquisition, respectively, as determined by the Presidential Decree. In addition, the above provision's acquisition value and acquisition value are unclear as well as where only one of the two values is unclear, the above two values shall be calculated based on the standard market price, and the other is calculated based on the actual transaction price and the value at the same time shall not be permitted under the principle of equity (see Supreme Court Decisions 82Nu577, Apr. 26, 1983; 200Nu1820, Dec.19, etc.

3. Next, we examine the second ground for appeal by Defendant Litigation Performers.

The gist of the above grounds of appeal is that the transfer value of the land of this case constitutes a specific area determined by the Commissioner of the National Tax Service from February 15, 1978 to June 29, 1981. Thus, since the transfer value of the land of this case should be calculated by the rate method pursuant to Article 115(1) of the Enforcement Decree of the Income Tax Act, the tax amount to be borne by the plaintiff is greater than the original disposition of the defendant. Thus, according to Article 9 of the Administrative Litigation Act (Article 1339 of May 2, 1963 and Article 26 of the current Administrative Litigation Act) of the Administrative Litigation Act (Article 9 of the Administrative Litigation Act has the same provision), "the court may, if necessary, conduct an ex officio examination of evidence and determine the facts not asserted by the parties." However, the court may determine ex officio the facts not asserted by the parties without any restriction, but if it is necessary for the public interest while maintaining the plaintiff's claims, it can be determined by the investigation ex officio, i.e., facts other facts presented records.

In light of the records of this case, the above ground of appeal is clear that the defendant is a new assertion that is not alleged by the court below, and there is no evidence to confirm that the area of this case where the land of this case is located is publicly announced as a specific area on the records, so the court below did not examine this point, and there is no error of law in the court below's decision.

4. Therefore, all appeals are dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against each losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Yellow-ray (Presiding Justice)

심급 사건
-서울고등법원 1984.12.20선고 83구945