[2] The effect of the deceased's successor to his/her body or aggregate, the method of disposal of his/her body or aggregate by his/her biological act or will, or the designation of the store place

[3] The meaning of a special circumstance in which the status of the expelled is not maintained

[Dissenting Opinion by Justice Park Si-hwan and Justice Jeon Soo-ahn] The main co-inheritors shall be determined by agreement among co-inheritors, but if agreement is not reached, it shall be reasonable to determine by majority vote.

[Dissenting Opinion by Justice Kim Young-ran and Justice Kim Ji-hyung] Article 1008-3 of the Civil Act refers to the most suitable co-inheritors who take over the property used in the process of preparation and preside over the proposal. In determining who is the most suitable for co-inheritors among co-inheritors to take over the property used in the process of preparation. In the event a dispute over the status of a person taking the proposal arises because the co-inheritors failed to reach an agreement among them, the determination of whether the assertion by the parties is appropriate should be made by examining and determining the legitimacy of the suit in individual cases, by comprehensively taking into account the literal interpretation of Article 1008-3 of the Civil Act and the legislative intent thereof, which are consistent with the dignity of personality and equality of men and women, while maintaining and improving family peace and custom of mutual aid among relatives.

[2] [Majority Opinion] (A) A person’s body or charnel is a corporeal substance that can be the subject of burial, management, removal, or cultivation, and the body or charnel of a ship installed in a grave is succeeded to the grave’s property, which is a property used for the use of the grave as stipulated in Article 1008-3 of the Civil Act, along with the grave’s property. The decedent’s body or charnel is also succeeded to the grave’s property for the use of the grave.

(B) In the event that the decedent disposes of his/her remains or remains by the act or will or designates a store place, such intention shall be respected unless it is contrary to good morals and other social order, and this is also the same as the third person. However, the obligation to respect the will of the decedent is merely an intentional matter, and it cannot be deemed that the third person bears a legal obligation to be bound by the condition.

[Dissenting Opinion by Justice Park Si-hwan and Justice Jeon Soo-ahn] We agree with the Majority Opinion that the deceased’s remains and remains together with the deceased’s grave, which is a property used to produce them, and that the deceased succeeds to it. However, the deceased’s possession of the right to manage and dispose of the deceased’s remains and remains shall not be deemed permitted to dispose of the remains and remains against the deceased’s will or to change the burial place without any justifiable reason.

[Dissenting Opinion by Justice Ahn Dai-hee and Justice Yang Chang-soo] (A) Inasmuch as the method of funeral is diversified and a funeral without any grave frequent, and there is no ground to force burial or the opening of a grave, the ownership of the remains shall be dealt with separately from the ownership of the grave.

(B) In a case where the deceased clearly expresses his/her own funeral and other remains in accordance with its inherent nature, if he/she had already expressed his/her final intention before his/her birth, it shall be legally respected and shall have a certain legal effect. Furthermore, in a case where funeral, grave opening or other remains have already been disposed of according to the deceased’s intent, barring any special circumstances, even if the deceased’s owner is the owner of the remains, he/she cannot request the deceased to transfer the remains to himself/herself based on his/her ownership.

[3] In any case, regarding the existence of a special circumstance in which it is impossible to maintain the status of the person subject to expulsion, customs shall be considered as the institution’s system is based on custom. Here, customs refers to the current custom that is newly formed and continued according to changes in society rather than past custom, and therefore, the basic ideology governing our society or the changes in social order and custom newly formed in accordance with the changes in social order shall be considered. It is reasonable to deem that the act constitutes a case where it is acknowledged that the person has no intention or ability to preside over the institution normally due to serious illness, serious waste and brue life, long-term stay in foreign country, serious economic difficulties that make it difficult to live, abuse or inflict serious insult or danger and injury on the ordinary parents, abuse of the ordinary parents, failure to protect and manage the graves of the person subject to expulsion, refusing to remove, or significantly contrary to the maintenance or decoration of his parents without reasonable grounds.

1. Regarding ground of appeal No. 1

(a) Method of determining the person who is deemed to exist;

(1) Article 1008-3 of the Civil Act provides that “The ownership of a seeded forest within the limit of one information belonging to a tomb, farmland of not more than 600 square meters and farmland of not more than 600 square meters, stoves, and stoves shall be succeeded by the person presiding over the deceased.” The former Civil Act, which was enacted by Act No. 471 on February 22, 1958, does not have a general provision regarding the inheritance, thereby leading to the inheritance to the category of morality and customs. While the ownership of a seeded forest within the limit of one information belonging to a tomb in Article 996 and farmland within a tombed area of not more than 600 square meters and farmland within a tombed area of not more than 600 square meters (hereinafter “property used for a tomb”) has to succeed to it, the former Civil Act, which was amended by Act No. 4199 on January 13, 199, adopted the succession succession system of Australia and has been amended by Act No. 101308.

(2) However, the former Civil Act, amended by Act No. 4199, Jan. 13, 1990, as well as the current Civil Act, only stipulates that a “person who presides over a company” succeeds to the property used, and does not have any provision as to whom it is or how it is determined.

As to this, the Supreme Court has previously held that, if there is a son among co-inheritors, the son shall normally be the son unless there are special circumstances that make it impossible to maintain the status of the person presiding the son (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 97Nu7820, Nov. 25, 1997; 96Nu18069, Nov. 28, 1997; 2001Da79037, Jan. 16, 2004).

In general, the term "mast hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand hand

(3) However, even though it is a custom or customary law as a social norm created by repeated practices of the society, if it is not justifiable and reasonable in violation of the overall legal order whose Constitution is the highest norm, it shall not be recognized as a legal norm (see Supreme Court en banc Decision 2001Da48781 delivered on July 24, 2003, etc.).

As seen earlier, the inheritance system based on the past legal thought, which aims at the maintenance and succession of a family centered on the early ancestor worship. It is based on the agricultural slope council, which is the principle of family system and self-sufficiency with the head of family. However, since the 1970s, our society has achieved high-level industrialization and urbanized society through rapid economic growth, and the large family system has changed into a nuclear family system, respect for each will of family within home, the discrimination between the book has disappeared, and the family has increased the rate of the family with only children as well as the decline of the 1st century. Accordingly, the amendment of the Constitution of October 27, 1980 to Article 34 (1) of the Constitution of the Republic of Korea has been made in place of a new family register in the direction of fostering the dignity and family life of an individual, and the amendment of the Civil Act has been made in place of a new family register in the direction of fostering the dignity and family life of an individual, and the amendment of the Civil Act has been made in accordance with the Constitution of the Republic of Korea.

As above, the conventional custom that the enemy shall succeed first to the institution regardless of the agreement among heirs, as the form of life of the members of our society and various laws and systems change, is to disregard the autonomous will of the heirs who are family members, and to discriminate among the books, and thus, it does not fit as a matter of principle the changed family system based on individual dignity and equality, and as such, the legal conviction of the members of our society has been weakened, it is no longer possible to maintain its validity as a custom or customary law, and the previous Supreme Court precedents based on such custom have no longer been able to maintain its validity as a case law.

(4) On the other hand, Article 1 of the Civil Act provides that civil matters shall be governed by the customary law unless otherwise provided by the law, and shall be governed by the cooking unless otherwise provided by the customary law. In the current situation where the former customary law or the precedents with respect to the third party is unable to maintain its validity, the determination method of the third party shall be determined by cooking in full view of the general principles of the Civil Act, the nature of the property to be used, the legislative purpose of Article 1008-3 of the Civil Act concerning succession to the property to be used, the historical and social significance of the third party, etc.

(A) However, our Civil Act provides the principle of private autonomy as the basic principle, and the Civil Act has been amended in the direction of pursuing equality among heirs, and in the case where there are many interested parties' opinions in a single legal relationship, it can be deemed that once a consultation is conducted by all co-inheritors, it would conform to the most reasonable reasoning. Therefore, if there are co-inheritors, it is reasonable to view that the third party should be determined by a consultation among co-inheritors.

(B) However, in a case where the co-inheritors fail to reach an agreement, barring any special circumstance, it is reasonable to deem that the south of the deceased (in a case where the south of the deceased died, the son, i.e., the son) is the son of the deceased, and in a case where there is no son among the co-inheritors, the son of the deceased becomes the son of the son.

The original purpose of Article 108-3 of the Civil Act is to preserve the tradition of ancestor worship and ancestor worship by maintaining and preserving the property for use, which has a special meaning, as it is accompanied by the traditional institution of inheritance, and it is necessary to secure the continuity of ancestor worship as well as the special property with mental and cultural value symbolicly symbolic, which is a symbol of a Tong Tong Tongdo. In addition, the purpose of Article 108-3 of the Civil Act on the succession of property for use is to preserve the tradition of ancestor worship and ancestor worship by maintaining and preserving the property for use, which has a special meaning. The succession of property for use is in essence an inheritance (see Supreme Court Decision 2005Da45452, Jul. 4, 2006). However, it is not only inconsistent with the sentiments of the members of our society, but also it is not possible to apply the special legal relationship between the heir and the co-inheritors with respect to the property for use, which is to dispose of by inheritance again, and thus, it cannot be applied to the general successor as the property for property for use.

Therefore, in order to maintain and preserve such property for use and to clarify the legal relationship as to the succession to the property for use, it is more appropriate to determine a specific one person rather than jointly determining the owner of the property for use, and it is desirable to determine the specific person as a person who can be able to be able to be able to be able to be able to be able to be able to be

However, the succession system of the deceased and the property used for the religious services is based on the family succession centered on the traditional ancestor worship in the past. Although today's history has been changed, it cannot be said that the above previous family succession has been completely exempted from the nature of the deceased. In addition, even though the present members of our society may have different views according to their individual values, and there is a difference in the degree of regional tradition or culture depending on the regional tradition or culture, it seems that the perception of the fact that the deceased and the descendants are the deceased and the deceased are the deceased and the deceased would be the deceased without their children, and it seems that the perception of the fact that the deceased and the deceased will be the deceased and the deceased will be the deceased, and it is difficult to see that the perception and tradition of the members of our society would take precedence over the deceased and the general social norms, and that the perception and tradition of the members of our society are contrary to the current legal order.

In full view of the above all circumstances, in a case where there is no agreement among the co-inheritors of the deceased, it is reasonable to view that a woman is a man of the deceased as a man of the deceased, regardless of the enemy's letter, if there is no child among the co-inheritors, rather than having another inheritor as a man of the deceased, and it is consistent with the most reasonable reasoning in light of social norms, so that predictability can be secured to a certain extent.

Meanwhile, in the event that an agreement is not reached, even if there is a result of discrimination between the heir in such status and other inheritors by preferentially succeeding the property used for the purpose of being the subject of the proposal, as seen above, the discrimination is caused by the circumstance that the co-inheritors fail to reach an agreement, and such discrimination is for the sake of clarifying the legal relationship as to the preservation of the tradition of ancestor worship and the succession to the property used for the purpose of the preservation and the succession to the property (see Constitutional Court en banc Decision 2005Hun-Ba7, Feb. 28, 2008).

(C) Ultimately, the deceased’s son should first be determined by an agreement among co-inheritors of the deceased, but if the agreement is not reached, unless there are special circumstances that make it impossible to maintain the status of the deceased’s son, the son of the deceased’s son (in case the son was already deceased, the son of the son, i.e., the son of the son), and if there is no son among co-inheritors, the son of the deceased’s son becomes the son.

However, since the declaration of a new legal doctrine by the Supreme Court on the method of determining the persons subject to the expulsion changes the foundation of customs on the system of succession to the company, the Supreme Court's declaration of a new legal doctrine in this judgment is due to the changes in the perception and overall legal order of the members of our society about the system, as seen earlier. If the new legal doctrine is applied retroactively, it would be contrary to the legal stability and the protection of trust of the parties based on the principles of trust and good faith by limiting the validity of the succession to the property that has been formed in trust in the previous Supreme Court precedents to the time when the new legal doctrine is applied retroactively. Therefore, it is reasonable to deem that the new legal doctrine is applied only where

However, since the Supreme Court’s declaration of a new legal doctrine in this case aims to take it as a norm of trial in this case, the new legal doctrine in this case should be applied retroactively (see Supreme Court en banc Decision 2002Da1178 delivered on July 21, 2005).

(5) The lower court held that, in the event of customary loss, the Plaintiff, the head of the deceased non-party, was in the position of a person presiding over the deceased as a son, on the premise that the status of the son was recognized to the son, except in special circumstances where she cannot maintain his/her status as a person presiding over the deceased.

The legal principles based on the premise of the court below are erroneous since they are different from the above legal principles on the determination method of the manufacturer of the deceased. However, according to the facts duly admitted by the court below, the plaintiff who is the head of the above deceased, as the head of the above body of co-inheritors, including the plaintiff and the defendants, did not hold a consultation on who is to be the manufacturer of the deceased. Thus, according to the above legal principles, the plaintiff who is the head of the above body of co-inheritors shall be deemed to be the manufacturer of the deceased. Therefore, the conclusion of the court below is just, and the above erroneous judgment of the court below does not affect

(b) Method of disposal of remains or aggregates or validity of designation of a store;

(1) A person’s remains or charnels are remains that can be the subject of burial, management, removal, or public cultivation, and a person’s remains or charnels of a ship installed in a grave is succeeded to the third person along with a grave, which is a property used for the use of a grave under Article 1008-3 of the Civil Act. The decedent’s remains or charnels are also succeeded to the third person according to the property used.

A false grave refers to a place where a deceased person was buried in his/her body, such as remains, remains, or remains, and where the body is not buried in his/her body, it shall not be deemed a grave (see Supreme Court Decisions 76Da1359, 1360, Oct. 26, 1976; 91Da18040, Oct. 25, 1991; 91Da18040, Oct. 25, 199). Unless the body is buried in his/her body, it shall not be legally effective grave. In addition, the Civil Act provides that a grave shall be the subject of death succession, and the right to care and management of a grave shall be interpreted as belonging to the deceased person regardless of who was installed the grave (see Supreme Court Decision 95Da5182, Sept. 5, 197; 95Da51812, Sept. 25, 199).

On the other hand, although the deceased's survival or appraisal on the method of disposal or the designation of the burial place of remains or remains must be respected, the burial, management, removal, and public cultivation of remains left from the confusion of the deceased shall be conducted by personal appraisal of the deceased, including the deceased, such as the petation and recovery, etc., and since the remains or remains of the deceased are succeeded to the deceased, it is reasonable to view that the management and disposition of remains or remains should be conducted in accordance with the deceased's will. Furthermore, the method of disposal or the designation of the burial place does not fall under the category of a will, but there is no other basis to recognize any legal binding force.

In full view of the above circumstances, in cases where an ancestor disposes of his/her body or her body or body with his/her will or designates a store place, his/her intention shall be respected unless it is contrary to good morals and other social order, and this is also the same as an agent as the agent. However, the obligation to respect the will of the inheritee is merely intended, and it cannot be deemed that the agent bears a legal obligation to be bound by the conditions.

(2) In light of the above legal principles, even if some co-inheritors buried the body of the deceased in the grave of this case according to the deceased non-party's death, the act of disposing of the body before the deceased's death is justified in holding that it is not legally binding upon the plaintiff who acquired the right to the body after the death of the deceased, and there is no error of law such as misunderstanding of legal principles as to the right of the third party's death.

2. As to the grounds of appeal Nos. 2 and 3

A. In any case, regarding the existence of a special circumstance in which it is impossible to maintain the status of the person subject to expulsion, customs shall be considered as the institution’s system is based on custom. In this context, custom refers to the current custom that is newly formed and continued according to changes in society rather than past custom, and therefore, the basic ideology governing our society or the changes in social order and custom newly formed accordingly should be considered. Therefore, it is reasonable to deem that serious diseases, severe waste and brush life, long-term stay in foreign countries, serious economic difficulties that make it difficult to live, abuse or causing serious insult or danger and injury to the ordinary parents, abuse of the ordinary parents, failure to protect and manage the graves of the company, refusal to remove the company, or significantly contrary to the maintenance or decoration of the parents without reasonable grounds.

B. In light of the above legal principles, the court below held that from around 1961, the deceased non-party was at his own will separate from the plaintiff's mother and living together with the defendant's mother, and did not visit the plaintiff or support by the plaintiff. On the other hand, the court below held that there is no special circumstance where the plaintiff cannot maintain the status of the deceased for the reason that there is no evidence to acknowledge that the plaintiff had expressed his intention to refuse to support the deceased or to refuse to follow the deceased's death during his existence. Further, the plaintiff's claim of this case cannot be viewed as "an act seriously violating the maintenance (maintenance) or decoration of the deceased without reasonable grounds" to the extent that he loses his status as the deceased's death.

Therefore, the judgment of the court below is just, and there are no errors in the misapprehension of legal principles as to special circumstances or the violation of laws and regulations as to the rules of evidence, which are not able to maintain the status of the requesting person.

3. Conclusion

Therefore, all appeals are dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices, except for the dissenting opinion by Justice Park Si-hwan, Justice Jeon Soo-ahn, Justice Ahn Dai-hee, and Justice Yang Chang-soo as to the first ground for appeal, and the dissenting opinion by Justice Kim Young-ran as to the determination method of the third party in the first ground for appeal, and there is a concurrence with the Majority by Justice Lee Hong-hoon, Justice Kim Nung-hwan, Justice Ahn Dai-hee, and Justice Yang Chang-soo as to the dissenting opinion by Justice Kim Young-ran, Justice

4. As to the first ground for appeal, the dissenting opinion by Justice Park Si-hwan and Justice Jeon Soo-ahn

A. As to the method of determining the person who is subject to the proposal

(1) We agree with the majority opinion that the heir of the body or the aggregate is the producer of the body or aggregate, and that the producer of the body or aggregate should first be determined by an agreement among co-inheritors. However, for the following reasons, we cannot agree with the majority opinion that the deceased's son or son or woman (hereinafter referred to as "mason, son or woman") shall be combined with the deceased's son or woman according to the deceased's son or son or son (hereinafter referred to as "mason, etc.") in the absence of agreement, unless there are special circumstances that make it impossible to maintain the status of the co-inheritors.

(A) The occurrence of a dispute over who is the subject of the expulsion is due to the fact that there was not reached an agreement among the large-scale co-inheritors. In this case, the fact that South Korea et al. naturally becomes the subject of the expulsion does not differ from the position of the previous Supreme Court precedents that have previously held that the subject of the expulsion is the subject of the expulsion. This is because South Korea et al., who is in the position to be the subject of the expulsion, has withdrawn the passive attitude so that they would not refuse the consultation or have not reached an agreement.

In light of the fact that the former Civil Act (amended by Act No. 4199 of Jan. 13, 1990) provides that South Korea as the head of Australia heir with the highest priority order, the majority opinion eventually amends the purport of the amended Civil Act of 1990, which made it possible to separate the property to be used from the family heir's privileges, by bringing about the same result as that of the former, only in the form of a person who has enjoying the privilege on the property to be used, from the "head of family, etc." to the "head of family, etc.". In addition, the succession of the property to be used under Article 1008-3 of the Civil Act, in essence, falls under the inheritance (see Supreme Court Decision 2005Da45452 of Jul. 4, 2006).

(B) Taking into account the legislative intent of Article 1008-3 of the Civil Act and the nature of the property for use, it is necessary to maintain and preserve the property for use and clarify the legal relationship as to the succession to the property for use, and for this purpose, it is fair to the majority opinion that it is more appropriate to make a certain person rather than jointly taking the property for use as a third party. However, it is difficult to agree with the majority opinion that the act of making the property for use as a third party is more consistent with the achievement of this objective than the act of making the other inheritor as a third party and is more consistent with the reasoning in light of social norms

The majority opinion is widely accepted for the most important reason that the recognition of the nature of the family succession centering on the blood relative system of the institution of institution of institution of institution of institution of institution of institution of institution of institution of institution of institution of institution of institution of institution of institution of institution of institution of institution of institution of institution of institution of institution of institution of institution of institution of institution of institution of institution of institution of institution of institution of institution of institution of institution of institution of institution of institution of institution of institution of institution of institution,

However, as pointed out in the majority opinion, the characteristics of the family system of the deceased and the existing custom in which the deceased whose deceased deceased deceased deceased deceased is the deceased's heir is based on the agricultural slope that is the principle of the relative family system and the self-sufficiency of the deceased, and it is not consistent with the current society where the will and value of an individual are respected and the high industrialization and urbanization of the nuclear family system and the high level of industrialization and urbanization of the deceased. In fact, today's expulsion has the strong character of the deceased rather than the family succession.

In addition, in the process of nuclearization, urbanization, and industrialization as above, our society, rather than the unilateral will, has the tendency to respect each other's dialogue and each other's family's will to be treated equally regardless of their gender or gender. The rate of childbirth has been lowered, the decline in the rate of childbirth, the decline in the concept of remaining nursing, and the generalization of recording a woman and his/her father together with his/her mother on the family register, a large number of clans giving the status of clans have emerged, and women have a lot of changes in the structure of the members of the society and the forms of consciousness and life of the members of the society, such as not considered to be a special day to stay or to attend the company.

Such changes are reflected in the Constitution and laws of the Republic of Korea, and the Constitution amended on October 27, 1980 has been enacted that “Marriage and family life shall be established and maintained on the basis of individual dignity and gender equality, and the State shall ensure that they shall be established and maintained” (Article 36(1)). By establishing a new provision, the Constitution expressed the constitutional decision that excluded from the family headal relationship and should be established and maintained as a human dignity and gender equality-based family relationship, and the Civil Act has equally divided the shares of inheritance among siblings, and there has been no discrimination between paternal relatives and maternal relatives and their wifes as to the scope of relatives, and the Civil Act has completely abolished the family system and implements the family relation relationship-centered family relationship registration system centered on nuclear families, while at the time of reporting marriage, many amendments have been made by considering the changes in the basic ideology and legal order of our society based on gender equality, and the Supreme Court en banc Decision on July 28, 201, which restricts the qualification of a clan member through the previous adjudication on July 128, 2005.

The legal conviction of the members of our society with respect to the past custom that takes priority over South Korea through the above process of change has already ceased to be considerable part, and it is doubtful whether such custom conforms to the overall legal order of our society, and this phenomenon will further deepen in the future.

On the other hand, among co-inheritors, there is no way to conclude that the property used for the manufacture is not to be sufficiently maintained and preserved solely for the reason that they are in the position of a funeral, etc., and even according to the majority opinion, insofar as it takes precedence over consultation on the status of a mother, etc., the purport of clarifying the legal relationship on the succession to the property used for the use of the manufacture has already been given up considerable parts, and thus, it has no significant meaning.

For the same reason, we cannot agree with the majority opinion that if an agreement is not reached, it is more consistent with the legislative intent of Article 1008-3 of the Civil Code and that it is the most consistent with the cooking in light of social norms because it is relatively justifiable in light of social norms.

(C) The Majority Opinion, even if, if the agreement is not reached, there is a result of discrimination between South Korea and other inheritors, by succeeding the property for the use of the property for the first time as the Jeju Jeju master, and by succeeding the property for the use of the property for the use of the property for the use of the property for the use of the property for the use of the property for the use of the property for the sake of the failure to reach an agreement among the inheritors, this is caused by the circumstance that such discrimination is for the use of non-existence of agreement among the inheritors, and there is a reasonable ground

As pointed out earlier, in cases where the Republic of Korea, etc. does not reach an agreement as a matter of course but the Republic of Korea, etc. would naturally induce the failure to reach an agreement. Accordingly, such discrimination depends on whether an agreement depends on the subjective intent of the Republic of Korea, etc. rather than on the objective circumstance of failure to reach an agreement among heirs, and thus, it cannot be deemed that there exists a reasonable reason.

In addition, the concept of “traditional” and “traditional Culture” as referred to in the preamble of the Constitution and Article 9 of the Constitution should be understood as the present era considering the value and order of the Constitution, the universal value of humanity, justice and humanitarian spirit, etc. In addition, since the traditional and traditional culture pertaining to family system at least should it not be against the “personal dignity” and “gender equality,” which are the constitutional ideology pertaining to family system, at least, it should not be against the “personal dignity” and “gender equality,” the former family system cannot assert its constitutional legitimacy on the basis of Article 9 of the Constitution if it conflicts with the dignity and gender equality of individuals demanded under Article 36(1) of the Constitution (see, e.g., Constitutional Court en banc Decision 2001Hun-Ga9, Feb. 3, 2005). From this perspective, if agreement is not reached, it is naturally impossible for South Korea to recognize that the head of the Gu, etc. becomes the Jeju National Assembly, etc. as the head of the Republic of Korea from the beginning, and thus, it is difficult to recognize the legislative purpose of Article 19(19).

Furthermore, even if such discrimination has an inevitable aspect for legislative purposes, if it would be inevitable to bring about the result of discrimination by gender and age among heirs, it would be desirable to seek a reasonable solution through a new interpretation suitable for the awareness of the changed members of our society and the overall legal order.

(2) According to the above review, if co-inheritors fail to reach an agreement, the head, South, etc. cannot be deemed the person taking the action, and if so, it is most appropriate to determine the person taking the action by a majority.

Since the issue of who is the exercise inside the house and who succeeds to the property used for the house is also an internal issue, it is also desirable to leave the issue of who will be the owner of the house to decide autonomously according to the intention of the members inside the house. It is also believed that there is a purport that only the successor to the property used for the purpose of this Article 1008-3 of the Civil Act is the "person who presides over the house" and that there is no provision about who is to be the owner of the property used for the purpose of the proposal. Among the methods of making decisions among the persons on equal positions, it is reasonable to follow the majority's will in light of the basic principles of a democratic society of a rational and democratic society, and it is the most reasonable to determine the owner of the property in accordance with the method of majority among the successors who are in the same position, whose existing custom that recognized the right of priority to the head of the house loses legitimacy.

Even though the method of majority does not directly stand completely, the risk of reaching the conclusion that the decision by majority would lose validity in a specific case is the most reasonable method in the way of decision made so far, such exceptional consequences would inevitably be reduced in that it is at least the method of decision made so far, and as to the unreasonable result caused by such a formal majority, it shall be treated as a special circumstance that does not maintain the status of the proposer, or as to the unreasonable result caused by such a formal majority, it is not sufficient to deny the status of the proposer in itself, but it is possible to properly adjust the individual unreasonable result that may arise from the exercise of all the powers given to the position of the proposer by the majority without limiting the status of the proposer in question through the application of the general provisions, such as abuse of rights or the violation of the good faith principle.

In addition, in exceptional cases where it is impossible to determine the method of majority such as the numbers of votes of approval and disapproval, it is inevitable to supplement the method determined by the court according to the reasoning by taking into account various circumstances: Provided, That if there is no agreement as presented by the dissenting opinions of Justice Kim Young-ran, and Justice Kim Ji-hyung, it is not desirable that the court immediately intervenes in the internal issues of the house that should be decided autonomously among heirs, and it is inappropriate for the court to determine the person subject to expulsion by taking into account the various circumstances at the time without setting the minimum objective and uniform standards at that time and at all times to determine the person subject to expulsion by taking into account the various circumstances.

On the other hand, the heir may also consider the way to jointly preside over a proposal, taking into account the closure group that may arise by specifying the person subject to removal as one person. However, this is not only inconsistent with the legislative intent of Article 1008-3 of the Civil Act, which stipulates that the property to be used shall be distributed among co-inheritors, such as the general inherited property, and thus, the property to be used for the use of the property for the use of the property shall not be able to continue to exist in the end. In addition, in such a case, it is also inappropriate since it would also be difficult for the heir to separately

(3) In conclusion, the third person is determined by the agreement of co-inheritors, but if the agreement is not reached, it is reasonable to determine by a majority. However, it is reasonable to view that this new legal principle applies only to the case in which the succession of the property of the third person is made after the pronouncement of this decision on the grounds of the same reasoning as the majority opinion.

Therefore, even though the plaintiff is not designated as the master of a company by a majority among the co-inheritors of the deceased non-party, the court below accepted the plaintiff's claim on the ground that the plaintiff is the master of a company as the above deceased's head of a company, thereby recognizing the status of the master of a company on the ground that he is the head of the above deceased, and thus, he has the right to the remains and remains of the deceased. In so doing, the court below erred by misapprehending the legal principles on the determination method

B. As to the method of disposal of fluids and aggregatess or the validity of designation of store sites

The majority opinion argues that in the event that an ancestor designates his/her place of disposal or burial with his/her life or will, his/her intention should be respected unless it is contrary to good morals and other social order, but the obligation to respect the will of the inheritee is intended and it cannot be deemed that the principal agent bears a legal obligation that must be bound by the conditions.

First of all, I agree with the Majority Opinion that the decedent succeeds to the grave, which is a property used by the decedent, along with the grave that is a property used to produce the decedent. However, on the ground that the decedent holds the right to manage and dispose of the remains and remains of the decedent, it cannot be deemed that the disposal of remains and remains against the will of the decedent or the alteration of the store place is permitted without any justifiable reason. Therefore, I cannot agree with the Majority Opinion in that sense.

The right to his/her body constitutes a core of personal rights, and the right to self-determination on his/her body should be respected to the maximum extent possible after the death of a person. Although the general principle of the current law is that no person may become the subject of rights and obligations even after his/her death, if he/she expressed his/her intention to dispose of his/her body or to dispose of his/her funeral method, place of burial, etc. by his/her will before the loss of his/her legal capacity, it is not necessary to maintain the validity of his/her declaration of intention after the death

In light of the purport that the deceased’s right to remains and remains belongs to the deceased, it is an inherent limitation in the rights of the deceased in respect of the property used, including fluids and charnels, in view of the fact that the purport of the deceased’s right to remains and remains belongs to the deceased, it shall be deemed that the existing custom and the current law allow the deceased to succeed to the rights of the property used by the deceased on his/her own, taking into account various aspects. However, considering the fact that there is room to regard the deceased to succeed to the status of the representative of his/her bereaved family, taking into account the fact that the deceased’s right to remains and remains is in fact attributable to the deceased, it shall be deemed that the act of disposing of remains or taking funeral in another way by disregarding the deceased’s survival intent of the deceased on his/her behalf as the deceased’s act of damaging the deceased’s awareness and conjection of the deceased’s will

In light of the Dissenting Opinion by Justice Dai-hee and Justice Yang Chang-soo, there is an argument that the general or limited personal rights should be recognized to the deceased person today, and even if individual statutes, such as the crime of defamation of the deceased person under the Criminal Act, the provision on the protection of author’s moral rights after the death of the author under the Copyright Act, the Act on Press Arbitration and Remedies for Damage Caused by Press Reports, etc. have the provisions on the protection of the deceased’s personal rights, it cannot be deemed that recognizing the legal binding force of the deceased’s expression of intent on disposal of remains contrary to the whole system of the current law, and even if the Act on Transplant such as Organ, etc. recognizes the primary binding force of the deceased’s intention, the act of the deceased person in possession of remains or remains against the deceased’s pre-living will and changing funeral method and burial place, shall be deemed not to be permitted unless there is any special reason.

In light of the above legal principles and records, the court below held that the act of the deceased's designation of his body site before the death is not legally binding on the plaintiff, who acquired the above deceased's right to the body site after the death, and thus, the above deceased's body should be delivered to the plaintiff without examining whether the above deceased actually designated the store site. The judgment below erred by misapprehending the legal principles on the rights of the deceased's body and failing to exhaust all necessary deliberations, which affected the conclusion of the judgment.

C. Conclusion

Therefore, the judgment of the court below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the court below for a new trial and determination.

5. Dissenting Opinion by Justice Ahn Dai-hee and Justice Yang Chang-soo as to the first ground for appeal

A. Under the premise that the Plaintiff is in the status of the Jeju Residents, the Plaintiff claims to deliver the instant remains buried in the instant grave on the basis of ownership of the instant remains to himself/herself. Accordingly, the Defendants consistently since the first instance trial and consistently asserted that the instant remains were buried in the instant grave in accordance with the deceased’s will, thus, the Plaintiff cannot claim the delivery of the instant remains in the status of the Jeju Residents. The first ground for appeal also argues that the deceased cannot claim the delivery of the instant remains in the status of the deceased. Accordingly, barring any other special circumstances, the Plaintiff asserts that, in a case where the deceased’s funeral takes place in the manner of his/her intent to dispose of his/her remains, such as the dead’s funeral, he/she shall be entitled to as the Jeju

In this case, it is thought that the deceased's intent on the follow-up treatment of funeral and other body (after-the-counter treatment), regardless of who is the subject of the subject of the subject of the subject of the subject of the subject of the subject of the subject of the subject of the subject of the subject-matter of the subject-matter of the subject-matter of the subject-matter of the subject-matter of the subject-matter of the subject-matter of the subject-matter of the

(1) The Majority Opinion deals with the issue of attribution of remains in accordance with Article 1008-3 of the Civil Act, and discusses who is deemed to belong to “the person who presides over a corpse” as determined by the body, and discusses who is deemed to be the subject of removal. In addition, the subject of removal as determined is entitled to request the delivery of the body even in cases where a funeral is held in accordance with the deceased’s will. In this regard, the Majority Opinion does not state the legal matters regarding the disposition of the body, and there is no other basis to recognize the legal binding force of the deceased’s intention, and therefore, the deceased’s duty to respect the deceased’s disposal of the body or designation of a store place is intentional, and the heir and other third parties, including the subject of removal, are not obliged to comply with this.

(2) First of all, it is difficult to adopt the previous precedents and the position of the majority opinion of this case that the person to whom a grave, etc. belongs should be treated as belonging to the body in accordance with Article 1008-3 of the Civil Act, which provides that the person to whom the grave, etc. belongs shall be treated as belonging to the body. [In particular, the grave of this case was established in January 2006 by taking out the right to use the grave from the Yangyang Park, a foundation foundation of the first instance, and is subject to the same Act as the "private cemetery" under Article 14 of the "Act on Funeral, etc.". Accordingly, the grave of this case is entirely irrelevant to the "gold-sea forest or the farmland which is the cemetery," as provided in Article 1008-3 of the Civil Act, and there seems to be no interest in the parties of this case with respect to the relevant memorial or memorial institution. As such, the grave of this case is in fact a distance from the grave of this case under the premise of Article 1008-3 of the Civil Act).

Furthermore, in a case where the deceased explicitly expresses his/her intention to dispose of the remains in accordance with the inherent nature, such as funeral method and place, it is reasonable to view that the deceased’s intention should be legally respected and has the corresponding legal effect. Furthermore, even though there is no particular legal effect on the deceased’s will in respect of the disposal of the remains, once a funeral or grave opening or other disposal of the remains after the deceased’s ex post facto disposal of the remains takes place, the ownership of the remains cannot be limited to the extent so that the ownership of the remains can not be claimed to return the remains to him/her, unless there are other special circumstances.

B. The previous precedents have dealt with the general reversion of remains in accordance with Article 1008-3 of the Civil Act, which provides for the succession of a grave, etc., as to the succession of a grave, etc., as well as the remains and remains buried in a grave (hereinafter referred to as “claimed body”). The Majority Opinion also assumes that the lower court is premised on this.

It is the starting point of the idea that the process of the legal problem in which the body belongs to anyone is to determine the attribution of the body. However, such an accident should be dealt with separately from the attribution of the body, inasmuch as it is reasonable in the era where the human body dies, it is inevitable to open a grave on the ground and remove the deceased, and there is no doubt as to the norm that should be enforced, and even in the era where the method of the funeral is diversified and the method of the funeral is frequent, and there is no basis to force the burial or the opening of a grave.

(1) It is no longer necessary to discuss that the opening of a grave is not the only way of “funering” as a process of treatment of remains. In today’s age, funerals other than the opening of a grave are more experienced by us. In addition, “the Act on Funeral, etc.” is defined as “retainment” where the body or remains is buried on the ground (and “retainment” as “retainment of remains, etc.) other than Article 2 subparag. 6 of the same Act. In addition, it is clearly revealed that “retainment” where a decedent performs funeral by burning the body, and “retainment” where a decedent performs funeral by burying it on the ground of the body or remains (Article 2 subparag. 2 and subparag. 3 of the same Act) is clearly revealed in the method of funeral (Article 2 subparag. 2 and subparag. 3 of the same Act).

As such, if a grave is not opened because cremation or natural burial has been shakened, it is clear that the logic that the ownership of the remains valid pursuant to Article 1008-3 of the Civil Act, which provides for the reversion of the grave is determined by the said Act. Since a person who has died inevitably and is dead remains at all times, the need to determine the ownership of the grave remains at all times together with the death, while the establishment of burial or grave is merely a method of funeral.

(2) As to the contents and history of Article 1008-3 of the Civil Act, which has attached the title "the succession of tombstones, etc.", the majority opinion states in front of the reason for the judgment. The above provision shall belong to graves and other matters enumerated therein to "the person presiding over the deceased".

However, there is no provision on how the bereaved family members become the legal stimulation of a grave, etc. In the event that the bereaved family members do not take the action, there is no need to limit the “stimulation” in the above term to the Japanese traditional ceremony, and for example, there is no reason to exclude the case where the bereaved family members gather on the fixed date only a simple memorial meeting that is held at the fixed date from the category of “stimulation” in this context. However, if the “stimulation” includes a broad meaning of the above mentioned “stimulation,” it may not be considered again to see what is the reason for the stimulation of a grave, stimulation forest, or stimulation of a grave, etc. to the person in charge of such a memorial box to the extent that it does not have any stimulation in the broad sense. In addition, there is also a case where there is no stimulation in the broad sense.

On the other hand, our law is based on the freedom of general action, and it does not recognize the freedom of religion more individually and unlike the Joseon Dynasty (Article 20 of the Constitution of the Republic of Korea). Therefore, the State may not force anyone to take the method of opening a grave by burialing the decedent’s remains, as well as to force anyone to take the method of “infecting” a grave. It should also affect the fact that the State cannot force anyone to take into account whether to leave the grave. Nevertheless, according to the previous precedents, the descendants of a person laid in a grave need to refrain from doing so in order to determine a person to whom the decedent’s remains.

In addition, even if there is no person in the deceased's house, and in particular, in order to determine the ownership of the body of parents, etc. even if the father or the mother is not buried in a grave, according to the previous precedents, "the person in charge of the deceased's house" or "the person in charge of the deceased's house" should pay "original creation" in the name of the customary law or cooking.

(3) On the other hand, even if a grave is opened due to the burial of remains, the title of the Act on Funeral Services, etc. (the former Act on Burial and Graveyard, etc.) was amended by Act No. 6158 on January 12, 200, and its title was changed. After several amendments, the former Act was revised by Act No. 8489 on May 25, 2007, but its contents were maintained without any big change). According to the above Act, burial (the establishment of a grave) is not possible unless it belongs to a public cemetery as provided in Article 13 of the same Act, a private cemetery as provided in Article 14 of the same Act, and a private cemetery as provided in the above provision (Article 7(1)). In principle, the period of installation of a grave is likely to be extended, but it is possible for the person who installed the grave to install the grave (Article 19(1) and 19(2) of the same Act, or the person who installed the grave to install the grave (Article 2).

As such, under the current law, a grave may be maintained only within a limited period of time, such as 15 years, even if it was once installed. However, as long as the right to be buried in a grave remains as its remains, etc., the ownership of the grave should be determined. Therefore, there is no reason to combine the issue with the ownership of the grave, which can be maintained only for a limited period of time.

(4) The majority opinion states that the deceased's burial, management, removal, and sallic support for the remaining remains due to a personal appraisal of the deceased, including the deceased's person who died before his/her death, and since the body of the deceased's body is succeeded to by the manufacturer, it is reasonable to view that the management and disposition of the deceased must be made in accordance with the deceased's will. However, as seen earlier, it is impossible to agree on the premise that the body of the deceased's body should be succeeded to the deceased's body. Moreover, as well as how the deceased's body is left to his/her personal appraisal, it is not possible to determine how the body of the deceased's body remaining after his/her death before his/her death cannot be determined. Generally, since the deceased's body is succeeded to the manufacturer's body, it is doubtful whether the body of the deceased's body of the deceased's body can be managed and disposed as the deceased's will, it should be justified in particular as follows.

In addition, the majority opinion refers to a place where the deceased’s remains and other body were buried inside the grave, and it is not a grave unless the body is buried inside the grave, but the body is the body of the grave due to the death of the body. Therefore, it is impossible to install a legally effective grave without this, and the right to manage and dispose of the grave shall be deemed to be a dead person regardless of who was installed the grave.

However, the core issue in this case is that the body is a fluid and not a grave. From this perspective, the logic that the body ought to be the body of a grave to coincide with the ownership of a grave has changed. This is because it may not be known about the body of a grave buried in a grave, but it is obvious that the body of a decedent is not related to a grave, and that it cannot be discussed about the body of a grave with respect to that body.

(5) We would like to raise an objection from a methodology perspective to the Majority Opinion’s position that it is necessary to determine who is the subject of the proposal.

(A) For that reason, the Majority Opinion states that ① “No provision exists in any law as to whether a person is the Jeju Jeju master,” and ② “the present situation in which the past custom or judicial precedents with respect to the Jeju Jeju master are unable to maintain its validity.” However, ② is a logic to justify legal discovery based on cooking in accordance with Article 1 of the Civil Act on the premise that ① is a logic to justify legal discovery based on cooking in accordance with Article 1 of the Civil Act, and ultimately, the core is ①.

(1) As to ① In a case where the succession of a grave, etc. is at issue, the court should interpret the meaning of “indemnite” under Article 1008-3 of the Civil Act, what is the “indemnite,” and what is the “indemnite” or “indemnite,” and make it clear that the meaning of the “indemnite,” can be applied to a specific case. Therefore, it would be an indefinite logic as to who is the subject of expulsion under Article 1008-2(1) of the Civil Act as to who is the “person who has contributed to the maintenance or increase of an ancestor’s property” under Article 108-2(1) of the same Act, and as to who is the subject of removal, there is no provision on the law.

(B) The majority opinion, based on the reasoning of legal judgment, judged that the head, South, etc. becomes a "person presiding over a company" as provided in Article 1008-3 of the Civil Act, has the following functions. In other words, it is intended to make the grave and the person to whom the body is reverted, even if it is not actually carried out, regardless of the narrow meaning or narrow meaning. It can be justified only in cases where the above legal text is interpreted as "a person presiding over a company" or "a person presiding over a company" unlike the ordinary meaning.

If so, there is a lot of problems. It is because it would be an indirect suggesting that the captain should preside over the captain to the south, etc., and furthermore, the captain should put the captain to the captain, etc. in general.

(6) As seen above, Article 1008-3 of the Civil Act cannot be a general standard for determining the person to whom the material belongs due to its partial structure (it is not necessary to discuss specifically the requirements for the application of the provision, what is its legal effect, and what the application affects the attribution of the material). Therefore, we need to seek a general legal theory on the treatment and reversion of the material outside the judgment framework under Article 1008-3 of the Civil Act.

C. A large number of cases in foreign countries regarding the follow-up treatment of funerals and other remains, without any exception, the deceased’s ultimate doctor becomes the primary standard (to the extent that the inheritors are in a position equivalent to the deceased’s executor).

(1) The body of a person is its essential nature. The body of a person is the most obvious “in-house”, and is also controlled by the will of a person, more remarkably than any article owned by the inside, and also by the will of a person. However, the “person,” who was living together with his/her body, due to the death of a person, is dead, and the disposal of the body is the work of a person living together. Even if the body becomes a “goods” and ownership is established in relation thereto, it is not only the capacity of ex post facto treatment such as funeral, but also the special object resulting from such obligation.

(2) The right of a person to his/her body is of the nature of personality rights, and thus, regardless of whether it is a statutory will, the right to his/her body is legally effective as a content of the so-called “ex post facto personality protection”, regardless of whether it is a matter of trust or not.

This is a separate issue as to whether personal rights should be generally recognized as the same person living in a private person (private person) or as the content and scope corresponding thereto. Here, I point out that the legal concept of personal rights itself gives legal protection to individual interests of personality in individual countries by accumulating legal protection in individual countries.

(A) Human dignity is not a complete return due to his/her death, and the need for the protection of personality for a living person does not completely extinguish due to his/her death. Our law also stipulates that Article 308 of the Criminal Act protecting the reputation of the deceased person; Article 14(2) of the Copyright Act on the Protection of Authors’ Moral Rights after Death; and Article 5(3) through (5) of the Act on Press Arbitration and Remedies, etc. for Damage Caused by Press Reports (hereinafter “Act on Press Arbitration and Damage Caused by Press Reports”) should be clearly stated in detail as to “where the deceased person’s personality right is infringed or is likely to be infringed.”

(B) It is natural to express an interest in the disposal of funeral services and other remains after the death of a person and to have his/her own will decided and implemented as it is. Our law takes legal effect in the name of will or donation in the name of a private person (private person) committed by the deceased with respect to the property that he/she had born. If so, the body of a person who considerably belongs to and was controlled by his/her will is more considerably than any property owned by the deceased and is controlled by his/her will, its nature should be added. However, although his/her final intention is not in compliance with the method such as will, it should be clearly expressed (see Article 11(1)1 of the Organ, etc. Transplant Act).

(C) Also, there is a question as to whether taking the deceased’s primary basis on the deceased’s primary basis does not result in a conflict with the bereaved family’s moral interests, such as the trend and salivation, against the deceased. However, it can be sufficiently determined and processed by appropriately setting the content and limitation of the deceased’s legal protection, and thus, the primary standard is not denied on the basis of that point.

(3) In addition, to respect the deceased’s will in terms of physical treatment, the body of the deceased’s bereaved family members after the death of the deceased, and the dispute resolution is not desirable, but may be a single method to prevent the deceased’s will in advance.

On the other hand, we are aware of the concept of “the awareness of the deceased.” No one can know the world after his death. However, the fact that the bereaved family members love with one another after his death satising one another with the body is satisfying it only. For the purpose of avoiding such a situation, there is a need to take legal effect in making decisions on how to dispose of the body remaining after his death, and there is no adequate way to prevent such a situation that is attributable to the morality of his will from being realized. To this end, it is necessary to ensure that he dies to the extent and then becomes aware of the fact.

(4) Our positive law is also on the basis of the basic recognition of the deceased’s control over the deceased’s will over the remains. Above all, the Act on Transplant of Organs, Etc. is the same.

Article 18(3) of the same Act stipulating the basic requirements for the recovery of organs from the body of a deceased person provides that where the deceased person expressed his/her final intention in connection with the recovery of organs, the deceased person’s primary standard for the recovery of organs and the bereaved family’s will is limited to secondary consideration. In other words, where the deceased objects to the recovery of organs before the death, in any case, the deceased’s affirmative consent to the recovery of organs can not be recovered from the body. On the other hand, where the deceased consented to the recovery of organs, in principle, the deceased person’s explicit refusal of the recovery of organs may not be recovered: Provided, That the deceased’s explicit refusal of the recovery of organs may be understood as being prepared in consideration of the property interest of the bereaved family in his/her will regarding property. In particular, since the recovery of organs is damaged without exception, the deceased’s express refusal of the bereaved family’s explicit refusal of the deceased person’s recovery of organs should be understood as being based on the boundary or other personal interests of the bereaved family’s surviving or other legal limits.

As such, it is supported by Article 2 of the same Act that the principal’s intent with respect to the recovery of a organ must be respected first by determining “the basic ideology of the law” and Article 2 of the same Act that the person who wishes to donate a organ under Article 2(2) provides that the voluntary expression of his/her intent with respect to the donation of the organ should be respected.

D. Furthermore, even if the legal effect of the deceased’s final intention as to the treatment of remains cannot be acknowledged, if the follow-up treatment, such as funeral or opening of grave, was made in accordance with the deceased’s will (the majority of the heirs in the absence of such legal effect as seen above), barring any special circumstance, the bereaved family’s ownership to the relevant remains shall be limited in accordance with the nature of whom the bereaved family is, and thus, it cannot be claimed that the deceased should transfer the remains to himself/herself.

(1) As seen earlier, the ownership of remains is in accordance with the unique nature of the body, such as funeral, ancestral work, and worship, in accordance with the special nature of the body. However, given that funerals already discussed in this context have already been conducted in legal issues, there is no room for problems. Otherwise, the content of memorials, public morals, and other rights are only the act of expressing the deceased’s memorials, pets, and respect.

However, in accordance with the deceased’s will, the funeral was held and the grave was established to deliver the body to himself/herself. The claim for the delivery of the body is contrary to the deceased’s will on the follow-up treatment of the body that he/she ultimately manifested, and does not comply with the original intent of the deceased, such as the drilling against the deceased, the expression of pet and respect, etc. In addition, the removal of the body or respect, etc. may be carried out even if a grave is not delivered by breaking up the grave. If the bereaved family is obstructed by worshiping the grave for death, etc., it would be sufficient to seek legal remedies, such as the prohibition. Legal disputes surrounding the remains should not be a means to resolve the fighting of “construcy” between the bereaved family members as in the instant case or to resolve their respective original demands.

(2) The Majority Opinion states that the bereaved family is in accordance with the deceased’s will on funeral and other follow-up treatment of remains, but there is no legal obligation. If so, accepting a claim for the delivery of remains by hedging a grave opened according to the deceased’s intent, which the Plaintiff had the duty to respect in this case, would be the outcome of the law that has already been realized in accordance with the moral duty. However, it is ultimately infforcing the morality, and thus, the law should not assist in such a claim.

Our law also has such an attitude. Above all, Article 744 of the Civil Code provides that even if the performance has been made without any obligation, if the performance conforms to the concept of "do", it cannot be demanded to return the performance. This provision provides that the law shall not participate in such a way as to impair the people's ethical consciousness, and that if the state has already been formed in a situation that meets the morality, it is not allowed to take the state into the original condition by using a legal means.

(3) If we agree with the majority opinion that the deceased's legal effect cannot be given to the deceased's will with respect to the follow-up treatment of remains, it shall not be permitted to treat the remains legally differently in the case where the follow-up treatment of remains, such as funeral, is not yet carried out, and where the remains are treated legally.

However, even if the same legal requirement is considered, it is not rare to distinguish between the cases related to the legal effect newly formed in a future and the cases related to the legal effect of correcting the already formed state. Except for the cases under Article 744 of the Civil Act as seen earlier, in the case of an invalid contract contrary to good morals and other social order, for instance, the performance cannot be demanded based on it, and once performed based on it, the recipient cannot demand the return of the performance as illegal consideration (Article 746 of the Civil Act). Furthermore, in the case of illegal consideration, the recipient of the payment who received the performance as illegal cause acquires the ownership and the ownership of the provider becomes invalid (see Supreme Court en banc Decision 79Da483, Nov. 13, 1979).

E. As seen above, in a case where the deceased clearly expresses his/her own funeral and other remains in accordance with their inherent nature, if he/she had already expressed his/her ultimate intention before the death, his/her intention shall be legally respected, and it is reasonable to deem that he/she has a certain legal effect. In particular, in a case where the funeral or grave opening or other remains have already been processed according to the deceased’s intent as claimed in this case, even if the owner of the remains is the owner of the remains, barring any special circumstances, he/she may not demand the transfer of the remains to himself/herself based on his/her ownership.

Nevertheless, the court of original judgment rejected the Defendant’s assertion, i.e., that if the deceased selected his cemetery before his birth and buried there there without permission, it would not be any significant circumstance that the present phenomenon would not be changed as a matter of course on the ground that the Plaintiff, the head of the deceased, as the head of the deceased, acquired the ownership of the present body as the head of the deceased, as the head of the deceased, and the deceased’s death will not affect the legal treatment of the present body based on his ownership.

Therefore, the judgment of the court below shall be reversed and the case shall be remanded to the court below in order to further examine whether the funeral and graves of this case are held and installed in accordance with the deceased’s will.

6. Dissenting Opinion by Justice Kim Young-ran and Justice Kim Ji-hyung, as to the determination method of the Jeju re-appellant in the first ground of appeal

A. The majority opinion argues that the traditional religious system aims to maintain and inherit a paternal family centered on a paternal family through the ancestor worship based on the ancestor worship. The succession of "use property" as stipulated in Article 1008-3 of the Civil Act is accompanied by such traditional institution of inheritance, and it is accompanied by such traditional institution of inheritance, and it aims at securing the continuity of religious services and maintaining the tradition of ancestor worship and religious services through the maintenance and preservation of the property used for religious services and the preservation of the tradition of religious services through the maintenance and preservation of the property used for religious services, which has a special meaning as mediating a clan resolution, and further, the traditional institution of religious services does not have any provision regarding the determination of the deceased's heir who is a successor to the property used for religious services as stipulated in this Article of Article 108-3 of the Civil Act, and it is based on the legislative purpose of the existing institution and the general principles of the Civil Act, the historical and social meaning of the deceased's deceased's deceased's property, and it is concluded that the deceased's heir's status should not be justified in the case of the deceased deceased's heir.

However, the logic and conclusion developed by the majority opinion is not different from the declaration that the first priority principle is still maintained as a guiding principle based on the traditional idea of religious law and the concept of the family centered on paternal blood relatives, in addition to eliminating the distinction between the book and the book in the decision of the third party who is the successor to the property used in accordance with Article 1008-3 of the Civil Code and recognizing the priority status of the mother as his/her children only in the family with his/her children.

However, the Dissenting Opinion by Justice Park Si-hwan and Justice Jeon Soo-ahn (hereinafter, the Dissenting Opinion by Justice Park Si-hwan) properly pointed out, not only is it contrary to the purport of the amended Civil Act on January 13, 1990, but also the Civil Act has amended not only to equal the inheritance among siblings over several occasions, but also to equal the inheritance among siblings. The succession of the property for use pursuant to Article 1008-3 of the Civil Act has the nature of inheritance in its essence. It is difficult to view that it conforms to the current custom and social legitimacy, because it has gradually been interpreted in light of the changes in legal order and perception related to the inheritance of relatives of a consistent society, such as the degree of legal conviction of the members of the community on the custom of the deceased, the enhancement of gender equality, and the abolition of the Australia system, rather than the family succession.

Furthermore, even in the context of the simplification of legal relations concerning the succession of property used for the purpose of use, the majority opinion takes precedence over the consultation among co-inheritors who are not publicly announced externally instead of consistent principles with the principle of priority, and even in the absence of consultation, the majority opinion recognizes the exception that a person cannot be deemed a person subject to expulsion if there are special circumstances that make it impossible to maintain his/her status as a person subject to expulsion in the case of a person subject to expulsion, so long as the majority opinion acknowledges the exception that a person subject to expulsion cannot be deemed a person subject to expulsion in the case of most disputes over which the co-inheritors are not recognized as a person subject to expulsion, the complexity and uncertainty of legal relations surrounding the dispute are excessive, and thus,

In this regard, while the critical mind raised by the dissenting opinion by Justice Park Si-hwan is entirely unconstitutional, it is difficult to agree with the theory of interpretation that the above dissenting opinion adopts the principle of majority as an alternative to this point as the standard for the judgment of the person who proposed a proposal under Article 1008-3 of the Civil Code.

This is because it is difficult to achieve a harmonious realization between various ideas, values and reality that may conflict with each other in a variety of cases where the decision of the re-re-re-re-re-re-re-re-re-re-re-re-re-re-re-re-re-re-re-re-re-re-re-re-re-re-re-re-re-re-re-re-re-re-re-re-re-re-re-re-re-re-re-re-re-re-re-re-re-re-re-re-re-re-re-re-re-re-re-re-re-

Therefore, among the majority opinions, the premise of the interpretation that the person who can recognize the legitimacy of the third person as the third person shall take precedence over the co-inheritors as the basic principles that judged the third person as the third person based on the cooking and the primary determination measures accordingly, shall be followed. However, if the above consultation is not held, the supplementary determination measures should be based on the order of the "mainam, etc." which reflects the intention and interest of the third person based on the religious law ideology, or as presented by the opposing opinions such as Justice Si-hwan et al., the "the principle of majority" should not be considered as the de facto absolute, preferential, and single interpretation that sets the third person as the basic principles that determine the third person as the third person as the third person, but a reasonable standard for determination that meets the cooking should be presented through a new interpretation that is faithful to the legislative purpose of Article 1008-3 of the Civil Act and the text of the above provision.

B. The new establishment of Article 1008-3 of the Civil Act reflects the legislative intent of the legislator who intends to separate the succession to the property in use from the Australian system, and in the same purport, it is deemed as follows: (a) the subject of succession was the value neutrality, instead of the former heir to the head of family; and (b) the open interpretation of the Civil Act was replaced by an indefinite concept that enables open interpretation.

This is fundamentally belonging to the category of morality and customs, so long as the Australian system which has become the previous standard loses its value as a guiding principle, it shall be deemed to reflect the reality that it is inevitable to find a concrete and reasonable solution by examining the contents and changes of dominant norms, customs, perceptions, etc. in general society in relation thereto.

Therefore, when there is no agreement among co-inheritors on who is to be a third person, or it is impossible to reach an agreement on who is to be a third person, the objective elements such as the life style of co-inheritors, place of residence, inherited property, and property to be used by the co-inheritors, the economic value of the property to be used in succession to the contents of the division, and the objective elements such as the life style of the inheritee or the maintenance of the inheritee, the spouse’s will or the intention of co-inheritors, and the determination of the third person by taking into account the subjective elements such as the existence of more than one person among co-inheritors or the like presented by the Majority Opinion or by Justice Park Si-hwan, etc., including such circumstances, rather than solely based on the facts presented by the Majority Opinion or by Justice Park Si-hwan, etc.

In this sense, “a person who presides over a third party” under Article 1008-3 of the Civil Act, newly established on January 13, 1990, is not different from “a person who succeeds to the property manufactured by co-inheritors and is most suitable for presiding over the third party”, and it can be said that it would be the best way to determine who is a co-inheritors by comprehensively taking into account the aforementioned various factors, and ultimately, it would be consistent with our society’s reasoning.

C. The majority opinion, which provides that the reasoning is the basic principle of the judgment on the third person as stipulated in Article 1008-3 of the Civil Code, and the co-inheritors's consultation, the south, etc., and the existence of the reason for the third person's failure to maintain his status as the third person is a specific decision method through the value judgment of whether there are special circumstances that make it impossible for the third person to maintain his status as the third person. However, if the majority is unreasonable by majority, there are special circumstances that make it impossible for the third person to maintain his status as the third person, or if it is impossible for the majority to follow the majority such as the number of votes and the number of votes of the third person, the majority opinion by Justice Si-hwan et al., which states that when interpreting the above provision, there is no room for the court to make a normative judgment from the viewpoint of guardianship, all of the above provisions are different from the legal principles of the interpretation theory set forth in the above Paragraph.

However, as seen earlier, Article 1008-3 of the Civil Act provides that "A person who succeeds to the property used in the title of the co-inheritors (if the co-inheritors fail to reach an agreement or are unable to reach an agreement), among co-inheritors, who succeeds to the title of the property used in the title of the title of the title of the title of the title of the title of the title of the title of the title of the title of the title of the title of the title of the title of the title of the title of the title of the title of the title of the title of the title of the title of the title of the title of the title of the title of the title of the title of the title of the title of the title of the title of the title of the title of the title of the title of the title of the title of the title of the title of the title of the title of the title of the title of the title of the title of the title of the title of the title of the title of the title of the title of the title of the title of the title of the title of the title of the title of the title of the title."

Furthermore, Article 2(1) of the Family Litigation Act lists family cases falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of a family court in Article 2(1), and Article 2(2) of the same Act provides that “The family court shall deliberate and judge on matters falling under the jurisdiction of a family court in other laws or Supreme Court Regulations.” Thus, by clarifying the interpretation theory as stipulated in Article 2(1) of the Rules of Family Litigation, which is the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court Regulations can be seen as having tried to resolve the simple and reasonable dispute through the procedure of litigation, such as family non-transmission.

D. In conclusion, when determining who is the most suitable co-inheritors to take over the property used in the process of preparation and preside over the company's proposal, the third person's third person's third person's third person's third person's third person's third person's third person's third person's third person's third person's third person's third person's third person's third person's third person's third person's third person's third person's third person's third person's third person's third person's third person's third person's third person's third person's third person's third person's third person's third person's third person's third person's third person's third person's third person's third person's third person's third person's third person's third person's third person's third person's third person's third person's third person's third person's third person's third person's third person's third person's opinion should be reviewed

For other purposes, the Supreme Court precedents that held that a forced family inheritance system was abolished by the amendment of the Civil Act in 1990 and that a deceased person still becomes a deceased person under Article 1008-3 of the Civil Act even after the deceased person’s heir was changed from Australia’s heir to the deceased person, should be modified within the scope of this opinion, if the deceased person’s son recognized as the deceased person is not a person suitable for presence of the deceased person compared to other co-inheritors, but rather the meaning of recognizing him as a deceased person solely on the ground of his status as a deceased person, regardless of specific circumstances, regardless of the fact.

E. Examining the instant case in accordance with the aforementioned interpretation theory, it is reasonable to conclude that the circumstances that should be taken into account, as in the Majority Opinion, in the case of the case where the dispute occurred due to the failure of agreement between the co-inheritors as in the instant case, barring any special circumstances that make it impossible to maintain the status of the deceased, such as the deceased’s life intent or maintenance, the biological relationship between the deceased and co-inheritors, support relationship between the deceased, and the deceased and the defendant, and the co-inheritors such as the deceased and the defendant, should be considered, and the circumstances that the deceased did not reach an agreement among the co-inheritors should be considered. It is not reasonable to conclude that the deceased becomes the deceased for the mere reason that the deceased is in South Korea. As in the reasoning of the judgment of the court below, the defendants, who were the head of South and North Korea for about 44 years, were in homes and live in the family, and the defendants, who were the deceased in the extension line, were inside and managing the cemetery, should be considered as justifiable to the extent that the plaintiff had the status of the deceased’s voluntarily collected and remains in the deceased.

Nevertheless, in this case where co-inheritors, including the plaintiff and the defendant, did not reach an agreement with respect to the determination of the third person in respect of the third person as stipulated in Article 1008-3 of the Civil Act, the court below accepted the plaintiff's claim by recognizing the status of the third person in possession of remains and remains, without examining and examining various circumstances necessary to determine who is the largest person of the deceased as the materials in possession of the deceased, and thereby recognizing the status of the third person in possession of remains and remains. In such a case, the court below erred by misapprehending the legal principles on the determination method of the third person in possession of the materials in possession and failing to exhaust all necessary deliberations, which affected

F. Therefore, the lower judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded to the lower court for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

7. Concurrence with the Majority by Justice Lee Hong-hoon and Justice Kim Nung-hwan

A. As to the method of determining the person who is subject to the proposal

(1) As indicated in the Majority Opinion, Article 96 of the former Civil Act prior to the amendment by Act No. 4199 of Jan. 13, 1990 provides that the family heir succeeds to the property used for the production, and Article 98 of the same Act provides that anyone who is to succeed to the property used for the production of the production, and Article 98 of the same Act provides for detailed specifications as to who is to succeed to the property used for the production of the production. The former Civil Act amended by Act No. 4199 of Jan. 13, 1990 changed the successor to the property used for the production of the production from the “resident of the production,” to the “resident of the production,” and did not provide for any provision as to who is to be the “the person who presides over the production of the production,” and thus, it is necessary to determine who is the person, and it cannot solve the problem by simply interpreting the meaning of the “the person who presides over the preparation.”

Therefore, the absence of determining who is the “person presiding over the company” in the Civil Act constitutes a defect in the law, and thus, it should be determined by the customary law pursuant to Article 1 of the Civil Act. As stated in the Majority Opinion, as long as the validity of the conventional custom or customary law and the Supreme Court precedents with respect to this matter can no longer be maintained, it shall be determined by the cooking. Therefore, the opinion expressed in the Dissenting Opinion by Justice Dai-hee and Justice Yang Chang-soo (hereinafter “Dissenting Opinion by Justice Ahn Dai-hee, etc.”) to the effect that it would be sufficient to resolve the issue of determining the person taking charge of the company taking charge of the company’s accusation by the interpretation of Article 108

In addition, deeming that the Majority Opinion should determine the method of determining the third person in accordance with the reasoning is that, regardless of the agreement among heirs, it is not reasonable to deem that the conventional custom that the third person is the materials to be first removed is inconsistent with the changed family system based on individual dignity and equality as a matter of principle, thereby making it impossible to maintain the validity as a custom or customary law no longer possible, or that the custom or customary law has been changed to a different content. Nevertheless, the view expressed in the concurring opinion by Justice Dai Dai-hee, etc. with the purport that the content of new custom regarding the third person in the Jeju War should be deliberated and determined as a norm of trial, and that it should be applied as a norm of trial, is not a rejection of the trial.

(2) The Dissenting Opinion by Justice Kim Young-ran and Justice Kim Ji-hyung (hereinafter “Dissenting Opinion by Justice Kim Young-ran”) states that, in the event that co-inheritors fail to reach an agreement, the court shall deliberate and determine the legitimacy of the parties’ arguments in individual cases and determine the person who proposed the proposal. However, it is difficult to adopt the interpretation theory of the current Civil Act even if it is separate from the legislative theory.

Article 108-3 of the Civil Act on the Succession to Property Used for Use changed the compulsory family inheritance system from the former Civil Act amended in 1990 (amended by Act No. 4199, Jan. 13, 1990) to the voluntary family succession system, and changed the person entitled to succeed to the property used for use from the "resident of Hoju" to the "resident of Hoju." At the time of the above amendment, the legislators did not adopt a system that allows the court to decide on the person subject to expulsion.

In addition, the decision of the third party in a family case by the court shall be deemed to fall under the case of family litigation or family expenses, and Article 2(1) of the Family Litigation Act provides that the family litigation or family expenses case belonging to the jurisdiction of the family court shall be restricted, and Article 2(2) of the Family Litigation Act provides that the matters falling under the jurisdiction of the family court may be deliberated and judged by other laws or Supreme Court Regulations. However, since the decision to determine the third party in a case falls under any of the above, it is impossible for the family court to deliberate and judge it, and therefore, the decision of the third party in an individual case shall be deemed to be possible after the revision of Article 2(1) of the Family Litigation Act, other Acts, or regulations on family litigation.

Ultimately, the dissenting opinion of Justice Kim Young-ran et al. does not agree not only with the answer to the issue of determining the person who is subject to the expulsion but also with the other issue.

(3) The Dissenting Opinion by Justice Park Si-hwan and Justice Jeon Soo-ahn (hereinafter “Dissenting Opinion by Justice Park Si-hwan”) is the most appropriate to determine the person who proposed the proposal by a majority in cases where the co-inheritors fail to reach an agreement.

However, as pointed out in the Dissenting Opinion by Justice Kim Young-ran, it is not appropriate to decide not only on a simple property relationship but also on a matter involving the area of family relationship and status by means of a majority, but also on a matter that is not consistent with the universal appraisal by the members of our society. In addition, this is likely to undermine the stability of family relations by inducing unnecessary disputes among co-inheritors regarding the property used by the co-inheritors, thereby impairing the stability of family relations and impairing the friendship among family members.

In addition, the dissenting opinion of Justices Park Si-hwan et al. is that in cases where it is impossible to determine the person subject to expulsion by majority vote, such as the numbers of votes of approval and disapproval, the court shall make a decision by taking into account all the circumstances. To such extent, the above problems about the dissenting opinion

Therefore, we cannot agree with the dissenting opinion by Justice Park Si-hwan.

B. As to the method of disposal of fluids and aggregatess or the validity of designation of store sites

(1) As to the succession of fluids and aggregates

In light of the Dissenting Opinion by Justice Ahn Dai-hee, etc., since the method of expulsion and funeral are diversified, and there are many cases in which a grave is not removed or a grave is not installed, the ownership of the right to a grave and the ownership of the right to remains remains and remains, should be separately determined. However, the Majority Opinion’s view that the ownership of remains and remains is not appropriate to regard the ownership of a grave as the ownership of a grave and the ownership of the right to remains and remains, as it is related to the ownership of a grave, etc.

However, as seen in the Majority Opinion, it cannot be deemed that there exists any grave without a body or charnel, and thus, on the premise that a grave subject to succession under Article 1008-3 of the Civil Act is buried with a body or charnel. Therefore, if a grave is installed after burying a body or charnel, the ownership of the right to the body or charnel and the ownership of the right to the care and management of the grave may not be separated. Furthermore, in this case, since the body of the deceased was already buried in the grave and it is subject to a removal by the bereaved family members, the Majority Opinion developed the legal principles on the inheritance of the property or the right to the management of the body or charnel on the premise thereof, and it is inappropriate to discuss such facts on the premise.

(2) As to the personal rights of the deceased and the validity of the deceased’s expression of intent based thereon

(A) The Dissenting Opinion by Justice Park Si-hwan, Justice Jeon Soo-ahn, Justice Ahn Dai-hee, and Justice Yang Chang-soo, based on the deceased’s personality right, expresses his/her intent to dispose of his/her remains or aggregate before the deceased’s birth or to designate a store (hereinafter “the method of disposal of remains or aggregate”) is legally binding on the deceased.

(B) Today, according to the development of science and technology and the development of various types of media, and the character and conduct of the Internet, the risk of infringement on the personality value of a person has increased, and accordingly, the need to protect personal rights has increased. The Copyright Act, the Press Arbitration Act, and the Act on Press Arbitration and Remedies for Damage Caused by Press Reports have a protective provision in preparation for infringement on the deceased’s moral rights due to the press report. However, even if there is no protective provision on the deceased’s moral rights under the positive law, a careful approach is needed to determine whether the deceased’s personal rights can be generally recognized.

Since a person becomes the subject of rights and duties during his/her lifetime (Article 3 of the Civil Code), he/she cannot be the subject of his/her rights and duties after his/her death. In addition, since his/her personality right is an exclusive right and cannot be separated from the subject of his/her own personality, unlike property right, he/she cannot be subject to transfer or inheritance, and therefore, the subject of his/her ownership shall be extinguished as the subject of his/her death, except as otherwise provided for in law.

There is no doubt that the Korean Civil Code recognizes the limited legal capacity of a fetus that has not yet been born (Articles 762, 100(3), and 1064). However, in the case of a fetus, it is expected that the deceased can be recognized as a natural person, and thus, it is expected that the fetus will be a natural person. On the other hand, in the case of the deceased, there is no appropriate comparative assessment because the capacity of the deceased becomes final and conclusive by death.

If the personal rights of the deceased are generally recognized without the provision of the positive law, who is the subject to whom the deceased’s personal rights belong (i.e., whether the deceased’s personal rights can be attributed to the deceased’s death), who is to exercise them (i.e., whether the deceased’s personal rights can be exercised), and if it is deemed that the deceased’s personal rights can be exercised on behalf of the deceased, what is the legal basis thereof, and how the deceased’s personal rights can be exercised on behalf of the deceased. In addition, it is difficult to generally recognize the deceased’

Therefore, as long as the Act does not provide for the method of exercising the deceased’s personal rights, it should be ensured to recognize the deceased’s personal rights, and rather, it would be possible to solve the above problems by indirectly protecting the deceased’s personal rights through the protection of the deceased’s own personal rights.

(C) On the other hand, it is another problem whether the principal agent is legally bound by the deceased’s expression of intent that recognized the deceased’s personality right and the deceased’s expression of intent on the method of disposal of his body and her body body frame before the death is another issue. This is because, even if the deceased’s personality right is recognized, it is obvious that the bereaved family’s unique personality rights, such as the deceased’s assessment of a pet and her mother’

In this context, we need to pay attention to the fact that the resolution of personal rights by recognizing the personality rights of a person who has already died and has already ceased to be in the moral domain may result in infringement on the personality rights of the bereaved family members, such as the de facto donor, who is the subject of living rights. Article 2(2) of the Organs, etc. Transplant Act provides that voluntary expression on the organ donation by the person who intends to donate the organ should be respected. However, Article 18(3)1 of the same Act provides that where the person consented to the recovery of the organ, etc. before the death, if the person’s family or bereaved family expressly refuses the recovery of the organ, it shall not be recovered, thereby recognizing the legal binding force of the bereaved family against the deceased’s will against the deceased’s will and making it known to the meaning of Article 2(2) of the same Act, the purport of which is to protect the inherent personality rights of the bereaved family members, such as the emotional and abstract sentiment of the deceased.

In addition, Article 1008-3 of the Civil Act is a mandatory provision established for the purpose of preserving the tradition of ancestor worship and ancestor worship, preventing the distribution and acid of the property in use, and clarifying the legal relationship as to the succession to the property in use, by allowing the deceased to succeed to the property in use. If the deceased's expression of his/her intention on the disposal method of remains and be legally bound, it may bring about a result contrary to the legislative intent above.

Furthermore, in a case where the deceased’s disposal of remains and charnels or burials, etc. are carried out at a specific place according to the deceased’s will, there may be cases where the victims, etc. cannot seek delivery of the remains and charnels without permission, but it shall be limited to cases where there are special circumstances, such as the legitimate successor, i.e., prior consent of the victims or ex post facto consent regarding the disposal of remains and charnels, etc., but it shall not be interpreted even in a case where the disposal of remains and charnels or burials were carried out unlawfully against the deceased’s will or without exclusion of the victims from the deceased’s death. If such interpretation is not made, it would be likely that a person who appears to have caused the disposal or burial of remains and charnels even by using any method on the deceased’s ground of the deceased’s will will lose food behavior, and this would be likely to cause another dispute and illegality among the bereaved family members.

(D) In conclusion, it should be respected that the deceased’s expression of intent on the method of disposal of his/her remains and body body before his/her birth is respected, but this cannot be viewed as an intentional duty nor as a legal duty, and as long as the disposal of remains and body or the selection of a store place, etc. is not contrary to good morals and other social order, it is reasonable that the deceased’s expression of intent is made in accordance with the deceased’s will, the person to whom the remains and body body belongs, as long as it does not violate good morals and other social order

8. Opinion concurring with the Dissenting Opinion by Justice Ahn Dai-hee and Justice Yang Chang-soo

A. As to the decision of the master pursuant to the cooking

(1) First, in the instant case, as pointed out in the Dissenting Opinion by Justice Ahn Dai-hee and Justice Yang Chang-soo, the following views are presented as follows: (a) no further need to discuss who is the subject of the proposal exists; and (b) subsequently, the following opinions are presented.

(2) In the current situation where the conventional custom or judicial precedents with respect to the third-party subject to the third-party subject to the third-party subject to the third-party subject to the third-party subject to the third-party subject to the presumption that the third-party subject to the third-party subject to the third-party subject to the third-party subject to the third-party subject to the third-party subject to the third-party subject to the third-party subject to the third-party subject to the third-party subject to the third-party subject to the third-party subject to the third-party subject to the third-party subject to the third-party subject to the third-party subject to the third-party subject to the third-party subject to the third-party consent

Today, we agree with the majority opinion that the interpretation of the person who proposed the proposal cannot be maintained because our people's perception and social customs about the proposal are changing. However, it is reasonable to interpret the person who proposed the proposal by cooking, and further, it is not reasonable to question whether the reasoning stated by the majority opinion is appropriate.

(3) First of all, as a traditional custom for the confluence of the spirit of the nation of the Republic of Korea, it is based on the school building. As to who is the presiding official of such a specifications, it is not necessary to determine whether it should be determined by the custom or customary law created by repeated practices of the society, or not. In the past, the Supreme Court has recognized the custom of the specifications of the specifications. If such custom is not consistent with the constitutional ideology or if it is changed according to the changes of the society, it should find out a new “refluent practices of the society” and interpret it accordingly.

In other words, it is common to determine the decision of the master in accordance with traditional habit, so it is not necessary to determine the master in accordance with custom with social reasonableness. If it is reasonable for the master in South and North Korea to become the master in a religious faith, what is the incidental behavior of the society in which the master in the religious faith is actually followed. If the South and North Korea refuses to present the master in a religious faith and the South and North Korea waits for it by traditional methods, it is not easy to explain whether the master in the religious faith is the master in the religious faith, and whether it can be the master in the religious faith.

Pursuant to the reasoning of the Majority Opinion, the Majority Opinion appears to mean a customary in substance, as it means the nature of an original object or the general principle of law approved in society. It is unreasonable as the principle of determining the presiding official of the company, which is based on traditional custom, as in this case. The content stated as the ground for cooking is that “The perception that the head of ... South or North Korea is the person who was the person who was in charge of the company as the third party, and his or her father is the person in charge of the company as the third party without being aware of the fact that his or her father is the person in charge of the company as the third party, and taking precedence over the third party is our traditional public morals, general social norms, and social norms.” Therefore, it is not questionable whether it is the ground for recognizing the fact that it is the general principle of law approved in society or that it is consistent with the justice. In other words, the Majority Opinion’s explanation of the matters that may still remain as a part of custom without considering the concept of the members of our society as to the history of the company, and it cannot be determined by the changing custom (i.).

(4) Next, the majority opinion does not agree with the content of the third party proposal based on the cooking stated in the majority opinion. The majority opinion attempts to interpret the third party proposal beyond the scope of the resolution of this case, which is a dispute between South and North Korea. It does not point out the theoretical contradiction and danger.

In the current legal system in which the succession system of succession has been abolished, the primary view that reflecting the will of the inheritee is reasonable is also expressed with respect to the decision of the person who was the subject of the succession. Therefore, in the reasoning stated by the majority opinion, it is questionable whether it is the general principle of law or not.

In addition, the majority opinion argues that the previous precedents cannot be maintained in light of Article 36 (1) of the Constitution that provides for gender equality, and eventually, there is a distinction between men and women in terms of the content. In particular, according to the majority opinion, if a woman's father and her aged children are admitted as a sibling, it would be dangerous to say that it is a cooking of the general principles of law. This would be in violation of the principle of gender equality prescribed in the Constitution as a modified application of the previous precedents, and if such principle is especially prepared, it would be faced with criticism that the Supreme Court is making a judgment based on the idea of male priority.

In addition, the majority opinion does not have a clear explanation as to who is the de facto de facto de facto de facto de facto de facto de facto de facto de facto de facto de facto de facto de facto de facto de facto de facto de facto de facto de facto de facto de facto de facto de facto de facto de facto de facto de facto de facto de facto de facto de facto de facto de facto de facto de facto de facto de facto de facto de facto de facto de facto de facto de facto de facto de facto de facto de facto de facto de facto de facto de facto de facto de facto de facto de facto de facto de facto de facto de facto de facto de facto de facto de facto de facto de facto de facto de facto de facto de facto de facto de facto de facto de facto. In light of the majority opinion, there is no question as to whether it

(5) While cooking is a supplementary court (court) and there is no law or customary law, only if there is a change in the custom or customary law, and in the present situation where it cannot be said that there is no custom or customary law as it continues to exist among the members of the society, it seems that the preparation of the issue of determination of the expulsionist is erroneous to accomplish the problem of recognition of the practical existence as a theoretical justification. Furthermore, as a general principle of the law, cooking is recognized as a general principle of the law, but it is based on the recognition of society based on the reasonable value, and it is a premise that the judge should not recognize it as his own reasonable idea (which is likely to be criticized only by the judge). In particular, if many Justices expressed their dissenting opinions as in this case, it is difficult to say that such opinion can not be said that there is social approval, and therefore it is insufficient to prepare it as it is difficult to say that there is a social recognition.

Therefore, in this case, if it is necessary to discuss who is the subject of the proposal, it should be determined after clearly recognizing what the continuation to determine who is the subject of the proposal, which has accepted the habits and social changes of today through a broad investigation and hearing.

B. As to the constitutional rights of a deceased person

(1) Our legal system maintains a uniform legal order by setting up the highest norm, which is the highest norm. Since all legal norms of social communities realize the value and content of the Constitution, certain systematic uniformity should be maintained within the framework of the Constitution. For this reason, the Constitution is at the same time its basis for the interpretation and application of all legal norms, including public and private laws, and the principle to supplement them if there is a defect in the law.

Article 10 of the Constitution provides that "All citizens shall be dignity and value as human beings and have the right to pursue happiness. The State shall have the duty to confirm and guarantee the fundamental human rights of an individual." This human dignity provision shall also be the primary norm, which provides the criteria for the purpose and value judgment of all state action as a fundamental norm, and shall be the basis for interpreting the validity and contents of all legal norms, and the primary principle to supplement the defects of laws.

Article 10 of the Constitution of the Republic of Korea guarantees an individual’s personality right and the right to pursue happiness, which is not a mere declaration provision, but a human nature and a unique value. Such individual’s personality right and the right to pursue happiness are premised on an individual’s right to self-determination (the Constitutional Court Order 89Hun-Ma82 delivered on September 10, 190) (the Constitutional Court Order 89Hun-Ma82 delivered on September 10, 190). This right to self-determination guarantees all autonomous decisions made by human beings. This includes, inter alia, the right to self-determination on human body, the right to donate or dispose of remains or remains after the death and the right to determine the store

(2) In that the subject of legal rights and duties is limited to a living person, and this is also the same as the subject of fundamental rights under the Constitution, it may be doubtful whether a deceased person can be the subject of personal rights. However, the State’s duty to protect human dignity exists ex post facto. If a person’s personality is found later, the human dignity and value may not be damaged and the human dignity shall not be maintained during the living period. This cannot be accepted as contrary to the basic spirit of the Constitution based on human dignity and the ideology of guaranteeing personal rights based on Article 10 of the Constitution.

However, a person’s general moral right, such as a person’s reputation, regardless of whether there is any explicit provision in the positive law, shall be guaranteed ex post facto, and to such extent that person’s personal right also becomes the subject of personal right. In other words, even if it is difficult to recognize the subject of identity as a simple body after death, a person’s personal right is naturally guaranteed by the Constitution as to honor, character, expression of intent, etc., which is achieved at the time of his/her survival. Provided, That the personal right of a person who is a deceased person is not a zero guarantee, but a person’s personal right is rarely guaranteed, and the need for protection is dead depending on the flow of time.

(3) The ex post facto determination of either the disposal of his/her remains or charnels, or the store method or store place is based on the right to self-determination on the body derived from the personal rights of an individual under Article 10 of the Constitution. Therefore, it should be ensured that the personal rights of the deceased are not infringed in interpreting and applying the Civil Act or supplementing the deficiencies thereof.

Although the Korean Civil Code does not stipulate specific contents or limits on the rights of the victims of death, and does not stipulate the disposal of his/her remains or the decision on the burial site as a matter of legal will, if the deceased determined the disposal of his/her remains or the burial method or burial site before his/her death, it shall have a legal effect to the extent that the personality rights of the deceased affect.

The concurring opinion with the Majority by Justice Lee Hong-hoon and Justice Kim Nung-hwan states that the personal rights of a private person cannot be recognized without any legal basis. This opinion is open and comprehensive, but the fundamental rights provisions of the Constitution are open and comprehensive, but the judicial branch embodys the contents of rights through its interpretation, and this is a duty to be granted by the Constitution to the Supreme Court. In particular, when the rights of the Constitution are infringed, the interpretation to relieve it or prevent infringement of rights should be more active, and the matters concerning fundamental rights of the Constitution should not be denied because there are no provisions in individual laws.

This interpretation is to maintain the uniform legal order in our legal system that sets up the highest standard of law, and it is to be the basis for the interpretation of all legal norms including the judiciary, and at the same time because the Constitution is to supplement the defects of the law.

As the majority opinion, interpreting that the deceased’s right to dispose of his body against his will or to transfer a grave is included in the rights of the deceased as referred to in Article 1008-3 of the Civil Act, is against Article 10 of the Constitution, since it disregards the decision that the deceased made as a human body before his death and damages the dignity as a human being, it also violates Article 10 of the Constitution. In addition, it is inconsistent with the nature of the deceased’s body and the legislative intent of the system for the succession of the deceased’s body, and it is also inconsistent with our traditional thinking.

As above, I express my concurrence with the Dissenting Opinion by Justice Ahn Dai-hee and Justice Yang Chang-soo.

9. Concurrence with the Dissenting Opinion by Justice Kim Young-ran and Justice Kim Ji-hyung

A. The Majority Opinion argues that regardless of the agreement among co-inheritors, the traditional custom that the deceased person should first succeed to the deceased's religious system is to disregard the autonomous will of co-inheritors who are members of a family, and to discriminate among the books. Thus, it is no longer consistent with the changed family system based on an individual's dignity and equality in principle, and thus it is no longer possible to maintain its validity as a custom or customary law. However, the succession system of the deceased person and the property used for religious services is based on the past family succession centering on the traditional ancestor worship and today's history, and it is still changing in today's history. However, if the agreement is not reached, it is still out of the nature of the family succession. The recognition that the deceased person becomes the deceased person and his/her father is widely acceptable without his/her children, and if the deceased person is in a position equal to those of the deceased person, it is difficult to view that the deceased person's deceased person has had priority over the deceased person's general public morals and customs, and it is difficult to view that the deceased person's deceased person has already been in Korea's legal order and order.

B. As pointed out in the Dissenting Opinion, the Majority Opinion does not differ from the declaration that, in the decision of the third party as the successor to the property used for the use of title under Article 1008-3 of the Civil Act, the distinction between the books and the books is removed, and that, in addition to recognizing the priority status of the children at the home where only their children are children, the principle of the priority of the deceased based on the traditional ideology of law and the concept of the family centering on paternal relatives is still maintained as the guiding principle.

As pointed out in the majority opinion, our society has achieved a high-level industrialization and urbanization through rapid economic growth since the 1970s, the large family system has been changed to a nuclear family system, respect for each of the families within home, the discrimination between the book and wife has disappeared, the decline in the idea of remaining nursing and the increase in the rate of families with only children as their children, and accordingly, Article 34(1) of the Constitution amended by the first sentence of Article 9 of the Constitution of October 27, 1980 provides that "Marriage and family life shall be established and maintained on the basis of dignity and gender equality of individuals, and this is maintained in the direction of realizing the equality of family members in all areas of society, and the new concept of inheritance of family relations has been improved in the direction of realizing the new concept of family relations and the new concept of inheritance of the head of family and the new concept of inheritance of the head of family shall be abolished within the 10th family register based on the traditional concept of inheritance and the new concept of inheritance of the head of family (the first new concept of family).

The majority opinion states that since the existing custom or precedent law with respect to the third party victims cannot maintain its validity, it is necessary to determine the method of determination by cooking. Furthermore, in a case where the agreement among co-inheritors is not reached, barring any special circumstance, the head of the deceased and the head of the deceased without her children will be the third party. The majority opinion excludes all the validity of the previous custom or customary law for the reason that there is discrimination between the co-inheritors by disregarding the result of the agreement made by autonomous will of the co-inheritors. However, in light of the majority opinion, it is obvious that other sons or sons who are not the head of the deceased and son of the deceased can become the third party in the past custom, etc., even though it is premised on the fact that they can become the third party in the past custom, etc., but if the agreement is not reached, it is not necessary for the third party or son and sons who are not the head of the deceased to go back to the past custom and precedent law on the ground that they are free.

C. The Supreme Court en banc Decision 2002Da1178 Decided July 21, 2005. As the Supreme Court en banc Decision 2002Da1178 Decided July 21, 2005, the legal conviction of the members of our society with respect to the past custom that limits the membership of a clan to adult male only and does not grant the membership of a clan is considerably shaken or weak, and above all, our entire legal order which has the highest norm on the Constitution guarantees the family life based on individual dignity and gender equality, and has changed in the direction of eliminating discrimination against women in all areas, such as politics, economy, society, society, and culture, and to realize gender equality, such principle of gender equality is further strengthened. Since a clan is a family organization formed for the purpose of protecting the graves of a common ancestor and promoting friendship between its members, it is naturally established at the same time with the death of a common ancestor, but only the adult male member of a common ancestor and its members cannot be deprived of the opportunity to participate in the activities of a clan with the changed legal order of the entire clan and its members.

However, the Majority Opinion, solely on the grounds of the ambiguous or inappropriate reasons such as “a relatively justifiable in light of social norms,” and “a failure to reach an agreement among co-inheritors,” etc., where co-inheritors fail to reach an agreement, de facto deprivation of the opportunity for the deceased to become the de facto victim of the death by having the deceased make a uniform decision by gender arising from the birth of the deceased. In such a case, it is apparent that this would be against our overall legal order that not only guarantees a family life based on an individual’s dignity and gender equality but also does not discriminate on the substantive rights and duties within the family.

D. Even if the nature of the third-party disciplinary action is bound to be determined as a specific one among heirs, and the inevitably causes discrimination among heirs, considering a reasonable difference is not in violation of the principle of equality under the Constitution. Therefore, the court can ensure the legitimacy of the discrimination by taking into account all the circumstances presented by the opposing opinion by intervening in the decision-making of the third party and taking into account all the circumstances presented by the opposing opinion. In addition, in the rapidly changing modern society, the dissenting opinion by Justice Kim Young-ran and Justice Kim Ji-hyung is reasonable in that it can properly reflect changes in perception about the third party in the perception of the members of our society in relation to the third party.

Chief Justice Kim Young-chul (Presiding Justice)